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1. DEVELOPMENT AID TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
The private sector in developing countries has come to the forefront of the devel-
opment agenda. Recent developments within developing countries and political 
transformations in developed countries have once again given the private sector a 
central role in development. The latter is now perceived as having a complementary 
role to the state vis-à-vis the overall aim of stimulating economic growth and alle-
viating widespread poverty: while the state must still provide the overall structures, 
the private sector will generate economic growth.  
The private sector is therefore now perceived to be a main player in all areas of 
development. It is regarded as important in reaching the UN’s millennium devel-
opment goals (MDGs) to, among other things, halve poverty by 2015 (UNIDO, 
2004); it is viewed as a panacea for development problems by donors, inter-
governmental organisations and many developing country governments (Jeppesen, 
2005); it plays a central role in more than half of the approved Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Papers (PRSP) (Fox, 2004); and it is seen as playing a contributory role in 
rebuilding post-conflict societies (Kusago, 2005). 
The private sector’s role in development was established in March 2002, when 
governments worldwide adopted the Monterey consensus,1 which is intended to 
strengthen the global partnership to achieve the MDGs by making aid one of the 
bases of poverty reduction. This partnership essentially recognises the need for fi-
nance for infrastructure and human capital to attract private investments to generate 
the necessary economic growth to achieve the MDGs. The private sector is given a 
prominent role in this consensus as regards both the financing of development and 
as a guaranteed means of achieving economic growth.  
Discussion over whether or not the private sector should be replaced by some 
other production and distribution system, which previously emerged on occasion, 
has thus now ceased. Instead, it is generally accepted that the private sector is play-
ing an increasingly important role in the world economy (Sayer, 2005). Discussions 
at the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) even signal that the private sec-
tor will have a more prominent role in development aid in the future. The DAC has 
                                                 
1 The Consensus was one of the outcomes of the International Conference on Financing for De-
velopment held in Monterey, Mexico, in March 2002. The text of the Consensus is available at 
http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/0302finalMonterreyConsensus.pdf. 
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 recently suggested that, ‘Instead of regarding private sector development as one of 
a number of tools for supporting partner governments, accelerating pro-poor 
growth through support for private sector development should be regarded as a ma-
jor, if not central part of the country assistance they [the donors] provide’ (DAC, 
2004: 7). 
This study focuses on the private sector in developing countries and asks how 
development agencies are seeking to reach their goals of poverty reduction and in-
creased welfare through support to the local private sector. More precisely, it deals 
with Danida’s2 development intervention3 in the area of private-sector develop-
ment. 
Lately, the field of private-sector development aid has received more interest 
from academic circles. Several papers have dealt with the overall design and coher-
ence of donors’ private-sector development interventions vis-à-vis their main ob-
jectives (Gibbon and Schulpen, 2004; Pietilä, 2000; Schulpen, 2000), though none 
of them have scrutinised the impacts of any of these programmes. The overall aim 
of this study is to shed light on these impacts. In order to do this, the study has been 
limited to the impacts of Danida’s Private Sector Development Programme in 
Ghana. 
1.1 Development aid to the private sector 
The foreign financing of the private sector in developing countries has increased 
tremendously over the past decade. Almost all donors, bilateral and multilateral 
alike, have private-sector development programmes, whose aim is to spearhead 
economic development intended to reduce poverty. However, the links between 
private-sector development, economic growth, and poverty reduction are seldom 
specified.  
Schaumburg-Müller (2005) identifies the following steps in mainstream eco-
nomic arguments for private-sector development leading to poverty reduction. 
First, the private sector is perceived as being more efficient than the state in gener-
ating economic growth. Secondly, cross-national econometric studies provide no 
proof that economic growth will increase inequality, though economists are fully 
                                                 
2 Danida is the acronym of an organisation called ‘Danish Development Co-operation Assis-
tance’, which was established in 1991, when institutional responsibility for aid in Denmark was 
transferred to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
3 The term ‘intervention’ is often avoided in the current development discourse. Instead terms 
like partnership and co-operation are preferred. ‘Intervention’ is chosen here because the underlying 
premise of most development remains the same, namely ‘the basic idea that a well-meaning and ra-
tional planned intervention will lead to a process which will lead to desirable state of development 
in less-developed parts of the world’ (Koponen, 2004: 11). Intervention covers development pro-
jects, programmes and policies. 
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 aware that if such growth is concentrated in urban areas, it may have this impact. 
Finally, legal, regulatory and judicial systems can develop the pro-poor effects of 
private-sector development further. However, as Fox notes (2004: 7) each of these 
steps is contested, and he continues: ‘humility is in order in identification of the 
proper role of the private sector in poverty reduction. In the current state of knowl-
edge, there can be no claim of certainty’. 
The donor community’s focus on private sector-led growth is nothing new. Pri-
vate-sector involvement in development aid dates back to the late 1950s.4 What is 
new is the apparent consensus among donors that ‘the private sector ensures eco-
nomic growth while the state provides the background conditions for this to occur’ 
(Schulpen and Gibbon, 2002: 2). This conventional wisdom among donors even 
claims that that private sector-led growth leads to a more equitable distribution of 
the benefits of growth (DAC, 1994: 3). This section first looks at the recent trends 
in resource flows to the private sector in developing countries and then scrutinises 
the role of the private sector vis-à-vis the state in development thinking the past 
fifty years. 
1.1.1 Financing development: the role of the private sector 
The renewed focus on the private sector in development aid and the general con-
sensus that this is the best hope for ending poverty (Jimoh, 2004) becomes apparent 
if one examines trends in resource flows to the private sector in developing coun-
tries. Bearing in mind the various types of resource transfers, the different defini-
tions of the private sector adopted in the statistics and the geographical coverage 
involved, a clear trend emerges: while the resource flows for the private sector were 
generally low in the 1970s, they rose at the beginning of the 1980s and stabilised 
during the mid-1980s. From approximately 1993 onwards, resource flows to the 
private sector rose sharply (Odedokun, 2004).  
Two issues, however, are of importance in this respect. First, figures for re-
source flows to the private sector generally include both private and official trans-
fers, as well as direct support to the private sector and indirect support to govern-
ment agencies. Secondly, the trends mentioned above are not confined to Sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA) but include all developing countries. Resource flows to the 
private sector are markedly higher in Asia and Latin America than in Africa. In 
SSA, for instance, only South Africa plus a few resource-rich countries benefit 
from Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).  
                                                 
4 The private sector is here broadly conceived as the ‘basic organising principle for economic ac-
tivity where private ownership is an important factor, where markets and competition drive produc-
tion and where private initiative and risk-taking set activities in motion’ (DAC, 1994). 
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 Bearing these qualifications in mind, private capital flows to the Least Devel-
oped Countries (LDC) are indeed increasing. Even if the four largest LDC-
recipients of private capital flows,5 which received eighty percent of annual private 
capital flows to LDCs in 1990-1994, are excluded, annual private capital flows to 
LDCs increased almost three times from 1990-1994 to 1995-1998. However, this 
does not mean that the remaining twenty percent is evenly distributed among all 
LDCs. Rather, a couple of LDCs receive more than half of the remaining inflow of 
private capital: in other LDCs inflows of private capital are negligible (UNCTAD, 
2000: 67). 
One would then expect Official Development Assistance (ODA)6 to be able to 
compensate for the imbalances of private resource flows to developing countries. 
Looking only at the last couple of years, ODA has indeed increased year by year in 
real terms, especially following the Monterey declaration, but also recent interna-
tional human tragedies, such as the Indian Ocean tsunami and the Iraq war, have 
meant that ODA is also expected to rise in the fiscal year 2005-2006. However, this 
trend is only recent: in the first half of the 1990s, ODA actually fell in real terms 
every year. Moreover, donors’ GNI has increased steadily and thus, in reality, 
ODA’s share of donors’ BNI has decreased gradually since the 1960s (OECD, 
2005; UNDP, 2005: Figure 3.1). Likewise, ODA’s share of total capital transfers 
declined in the 1990s. Now private capital transfers are the dominant source of 
capital transfers to developing countries, and FDI is now over five times greater 
than ODA. Furthermore, to a large degree ODA still seems to be channelled to 
countries not classified as LDCs too. According to Sobhan (2002: 539), in 1999: 
‘ODA to middle income DCs [developing countries] plus India and China ac-
counted for US$ 25.4 billion compared to US$ 10.6 billion going to the Least De-
veloped Countries’.  
These general trends in ODA conceal several variations, such as the increase in 
ODA to Africa in the 1970s and 1980s, while ODA to Asia and Latin America was 
falling. Since then, ODA to SSA has fallen steadily: in the six years following the 
fall of the Berlin Wall, ODA to SSA fell in real terms by one-fifth. This fall has 
continued partly because the 1997 economic crisis in Asia caused disbursements to 
Asia to rise, and partly because of the increasing difficulty of delivering aid to con-
flict-torn countries in SSA (OECD, 2004; Riddell, 1999; Sobhan, 2002). This is 
further supported by United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) calcula-
                                                 
5 Yemen, Myanmar, Angola and Equatorial Guinea (the latter two were interesting only due to 
large finds of oil and gas) (UNCTAD, 2000: 67). 
6 ODA is defined by DAC as grants or loans to developing countries made by the official sector; 
with the promotion of economic development and welfare as the main objective, and on conces-
sional terms (in the case of a loan, having a grant element of at least 25 percent). 
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 tion that: ‘For Sub-Saharan Africa per capita aid fell from $24 in 1990 to $12 in 
1999’ (UNDP, 2005: 84). Lately, however, there has been a growing interest in 
enlarging the amount of resources going to SSA, spurred especially by the Com-
mission for Africa, which acknowledges the multifaceted challenges that Africa 
currently is facing while at the same time urging the developed world to increase its 
ODA to Africa (Commission for Africa, 2005).  
To sum up, although resource flows to the private sector are generally increas-
ing, they are not benefitting the private sector in the great majority of poor coun-
tries. These countries are simply being excluded from these booming investments. 
Unfortunately, this trend has not been cancelled out by increases in ODA. How-
ever, aggregate trends are hiding qualitative changes in ODA. One of these changes 
is the different roles of the state and the private sector in development. 
1.1.2 The changing role of the private sector in development aid 
The private sector has been involved in development aid for the past fifty years, but 
its role vis-à-vis the state has not been constant. Rather, the relationship between 
the state and the private sector has oscillated back and forth. From the late 1950s to 
the 1960s to the 1970s, the state was perceived as the prime mover of development. 
Leading development economists of the time saw economic development as a 
process of reallocating resources from the agricultural to the industrial sector. To 
this end, the state was important, its responsibility being to coordinate economic 
growth and thus take a leading role in the development process. Entrepreneurial ac-
tivity in general was seen as insufficient. Thus, the state had to perform the entre-
preneurial task through the establishment of state-owned enterprises (SOE) and 
parastatals.7 However, from the mid-1970s onwards, development thinkers began 
to question these state-led development plans. Sufficient employment could not be 
generated to absorb growing urban populations: production processes were too 
capital-intensive, and agricultural terms of trade deteriorated. Consequently, debt 
rates and internal imbalances rose in many developing countries.  
Due to the magnitude of these problems, the focus changed at the beginning of 
the 1980s. In line with ideological changes in the Western world, the private sector 
came to be seen as more efficient and more conducive to economic development 
than the state. Hence, the private sector was placed at the forefront of the develop-
ment agenda. The structural adjustment programmes of the 1980s were designed to 
create an enabling environment for the private sector to grow by structurally chang-
ing the economy. Among the key policy instruments used by the International 
                                                 
7 See section 7.2.1 for an account of the role of SOEs in Ghana. A definition of an SOE is pro-
vided in footnote 216 on page 174. 
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 Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank were devaluations, price liberalisations, 
the rationalisation and privatisation of SOEs, and the de-subsidisation of food and 
social services. Nevertheless, after a decade of macroeconomic stability pro-
grammes and neo-liberal structural adjustment programmes in SSA, a further 
change occurred at the beginning of the 1990s. It became evident that the ‘rolling 
back of the state’ had failed to bring about structural change in the economy or to 
create a dynamic private sector. Thus, donors were seeking new ways to transform 
the economy in developing countries. Following the 1993 World Bank report, The 
East Asian Miracle, which acknowledged the active involvement of the state in the 
East Asian ‘miracle’, especially as regards industrial policies and investment in 
human capital, other donors also began to reconsider the role of the state in devel-
opment. A synthesis of public and private initiatives thus came to be recognised as 
the way forward (Adelman, 2000; Harrigan and Younger, 2000; Thorbecke, 2000).  
According to this synthesis, which has been dubbed the new ‘consensus’, the 
state and the private sector have complementary roles: the private sector is sup-
posed to generate economic growth, while the state has to ensure first, that the pri-
vate sector is able to fulfil its role, and secondly, that the benefits of growth are dis-
tributed among the population (Gibbon and Schulpen, 2004).  
 
Bilateral donors could not ignore this private economic development 
model, which, amongst other things, promised to mitigate a growing 
sense of aid fatigue. An increasing number of donors, therefore, either 
adopted new PSD [private sector development] programmes, reworked 
existing ones with PSD dimensions, or re-designated activities previ-
ously classified under other headings as PSD. (Danida, 2004a: 13) 
 
Private sector development (PSD) policies cover a wide spectrum of activities in 
almost all developing and transition economies. Recently, these policies have been 
scrutinised in several publications (Pietilä, 2000; Schulpen, 2000; Schulpen and 
Gibbon, 2002; Gibbon and Schulpen, 2004). According to these publications, PSD 
policies can be classified according to their main target, that is, the international 
level or the national level. At the international level, such policies focus on issues 
such as effective participation in international trade and debt relief for developing 
countries, while the policies at the national level may be grouped according to lev-
els of support (macro-level, meso-level or micro-level).8 At the macro-level, atten-
tion is paid to the role of the state in, for example, improving macroeconomic poli-
                                                 
8 This classification is commonly used to distinguish PSD interventions (Danida, 2004a). 
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 cies and physical infrastructure. At the meso-level, assistance to business organisa-
tions and training institutions constitute the greatest part of the support. Here these 
programmes therefore pay attention to the branch level. At micro-level, support is 
provided to local companies and comprises, for instance, access to credit for devel-
oping country businesses and the promotion of business-to-business collaborations. 
Not all donors are present in all countries, and not all types of interventions are 
applied everywhere, although many interventions are not contextualised to any ma-
jor degree. Gibbon and Schulpen (2002) provide a comprehensive list of PSD in-
terventions in operation at the turn of the new millennium. Inspired by this list, Ta-
ble 1.1 presents an outline of current PSD components and corresponding donors in 
Ghana.9  
Several conclusions may be drawn from Table 1.1. The first is that PSD inter-
ventions in Ghana tend to concentrate on the national level. Only three bilateral and 
two multilateral donors have specific interventions targeting the international level. 
In addition, several bilateral donors negotiate debt-reduction agreements with de-
veloping country governments. More specifically, the highest concentration of bi-
lateral PSD interventions is found at the micro-level, where all bilateral donors ex-
cept USIAD are represented. This is not the case for Ghana alone. According to 
Schulpen and Gibbon (2001: 61) this is a general trend, as there is an ‘extremely 
strong focus in bilateral donor programmes on the micro level toward transfers of 
technology and expertise between enterprises which are “paired” by donors them-
selves’. All the major bilateral donors represented in Ghana apart from USAID 
have PSD interventions specifically targeting the micro-level. These micro-level in-
terventions typically consist of joint ventures, technical assistance, technology 
transfer and exports between companies based in the donor country and recipient 
country respectively.  
Secondly, the table indicates a general lack of donor specialisation. On the one 
hand, most donors are implementing several programmes at different levels simul-
taneously, many of which seem to overlap. For instance, the World Bank and 
Danida are both targeting the macro-level by promoting legislative reforms, that is, 
by revising the Ghana business code and enhancing local court procedures. In a 
similar vein, the Dutch Development Agency, Dfid, GTZ and USAID are all seek-
ing to promote non-traditional exports through bilateral programmes. Co-ordination 
of activities, especially at the micro-level, is almost absent. On the other hand, 
some donors like Danida and CIDA have several programmes operating simultane-
ously.  
                                                 
9 A full list of current PSD programmes in Ghana is supplied in Appendix D. 
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 Table 1.1. Private Sector Development components in Ghana 
Level Components PSD in Ghana: illustrations 
Participation in international 
trade 
Increase private investments 
US Agency for International Devel-
opment (USAID), Deutsche Gesell-
schaft für Technische Zusammenar-
beit (GTZ), Danida 
Debt reduction 
Free international trade 
IMF, World Bank and bilateral do-
nors’ Highly Indebted Poor Coun-
tries Initiative (HIPC) I
nt
er
na
tio
na
l 
 
Donor coordination NA 
Macro economic policy 
change World Bank, USAID 
Institution-building UNDP, United Nations Capital De-velopment Fund (UNCDF), Danida 
Legislative reforms World Bank, Danida 
Infrastructural improvement European Investment Bank (EIB), GTZ 
M
ac
ro
 
St
at
e 
Public-sector reform World Bank 
Micro finance institutions Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), UNCDF 
Improved training institu-
tions UNDP M
es
o 
B
ra
nc
h 
Improve private-sector advo-
cacy 
African Project Development Facil-
ity (APDF), GTZ, Danida, USAID 
Financial support at com-
pany level 
Danida, Dutch development agency 
(Dda), Department for International 
Development (Dfid), International 
Finance Corporation (IFC), EIB 
Technology transfer Danida, GTZ, Dda 
Technical assistance Danida, CIDA, Dda, APDF 
Vocational training GTZ 
N
at
io
na
l 
M
ic
ro
 
C
om
pa
ny
 
Market access and informa-
tion APDF 
Source: Gibbon and Schulpen (2004). 
 
Thirdly, the focus on the role of the state is also noticeable. A glance at the in-
ternational level and the macro part of the national level makes it obvious that do-
nors are concentrating their efforts on changing the role of the state in order to pro-
duce an enabling environment instead of addressing the needs of the private sector. 
At the macro level, for instance, all the donors in Ghana are targeting the role of the 
state through assistance in changing legislation, improving physical infrastructure 
and stabilising the economy. At the meso-level, however, attention is concentrated 
rather on supporting institutions that promote small- and medium-scale enterprises. 
However, only a few donors are focusing on this level. 
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 In brief, therefore, the private sector in Ghana (as elsewhere in SSA) is mainly 
being targeted through a company-to-company approach. The majority of funds for 
the macro- and international levels target the state, not the private sector. At the mi-
cro-level, programmes are uncoordinated and funds often tied to collaboration with 
donor country companies, such as micro-level PSD interventions from Danida, 
CIDA, GTZ, the Dutch Development Agency and Dfid.  
1.1.3 Danish development aid to the private sector 
The growing interest in PSD support to developing countries over the past decade 
can easily be seen in Danida’s portfolio of interventions, which targets the private 
sector, sometimes bilaterally, in other cases multilaterally. Likewise some interven-
tions are directly aimed at the private sector, while others influence it more indi-
rectly.  
Danish direct bilateral PSD support currently comprises the Investment Fund for 
Developing Countries (IFU), the Danish Import Promotion Office (DIPO), the 
Mixed Credit Programme (MCP), the Private Sector Development Programme 
(PSDP), the Business-to-Business Programme in South Africa (B-t-B), the Busi-
ness Sector Support Programme in Tanzania (BSSP), the Business Sector Pro-
gramme Support in Ghana and Vietnam (BSPS),10 the Partnership Facility Program 
in Thailand and Malaysia (PFP), and the Public Private Partnerships (PPP). An 
overview of the aim and main beneficiaries of these instruments is provided in 
Table 1.2 below.  
At the multilateral level, the interventions include, among others, the IFC, which 
promotes private investment in developing countries directly and through various 
facilities, for instance, APDF; the African Development Bank; the Nordic Devel-
opment Fund; and the NORSAD Fund, which promotes cooperation between com-
panies in the Nordic countries and companies in southern Africa. Logically speak-
ing, Danida may influence these interventions only indirectly. 
Lastly, several donor interventions affect the private sector in developing coun-
tries, even though they are not aimed at it directly. Most prominently, Danida’s sec-
tor programmes, covering among other things agriculture, health, energy, the envi-
ronment, infrastructure and education, all include the local private sector to a 
greater or lesser degree. Recently, these sector programmes explicitly lay out their 
relationship to the overall consensus by including components that influence the lo-
cal private sector directly, such as financial services and input supply to small-
holders in agricultural-sector programme-support schemes.  
                                                 
10 A second phase of the Tanzania Business Sector Programme has recently been introduced. 
Like the other business sector programmes, this has now been dubbed BSPS.  
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 Table 1.2. Classification of Danish direct bilateral PSD instruments by type 
Direct support to 
Danish firms 
Institutional sup-
port to recipient 
country 
Programme 
and year of in-
troduction 
Invest-
ment 
subsidy 
Export 
subsidy
Indirect 
support to 
Danish 
firms  
Direct support 
to Business-to-
Business part-
nerships 
Indirect 
support to 
recipient 
country 
firm 
Public Private 
IFU (1967) X   X    
DIPO (1977)   X  X   
KfU11 (1991-
1997)  X X     
MCP (1993)  X12    X13 X 
PSDP (1993) X X  X   X14
B-t-B (1995) X X  X   X 
BSSP/BSPS 
(1998)      X X 
PFP (2004) X X  X    
PPP (2004) X     X X 
After Danida (2004a: table 4.4). 
 
Table 1.2 illustrates the growing importance of PSD policies for Danida: while only 
one programme has been closed down during the past forty years and a few others 
have experienced downward adjustments in funding, several new interventions 
have been added to the portfolio of PSD support. According to the recent meta-
evaluation of Danida’s PSD interventions, Danish PSD policies by and large reflect 
available knowledge regarding PSD development interventions at the time of their 
design and implementation. Moreover, Danida has had some success in adjusting 
its PSD interventions portfolio to the change in situation (Danida, 2004a). How-
ever, the PSDP is still the flagship of Danish PSD support, as is apparent from 
Danida’s recent mission statement: ‘the Government will strengthen the special 
Private Sector Programme (the PS Programme), which facilitates commercial co-
operation between Danish and local businesses’ (Danida, 2003b: 12). 
By preserving most of the past programmes instead of gradually phasing them 
out as new interventions emerge into the light of the day, Danida has maintained a 
central focus on the micro-level. Politically attention is now being concentrated on 
the relatively new BSPS, which has a more holistic approach to private-sector de-
                                                 
11 Danish Centre for Technology Transfer (KfU). 
12 The export subsidy has been partially untied since 2002. 
13 In SSA the MCP is closely connected to the sector programmes and the environmental pro-
grammes. It is also stipulated that mixed credits to the public sector in HIPC countries should only 
become available once the country has reached the HIPC completion point (see also note 215 on 
page 172).  
14 Meso-level support such as support to credit institutions and business associations, which for-
merly could be part of the PSDP in Ghana, is now catered for in the BSSP/BSPS wherever these 
have been implemented. 
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 velopment than other PSD programmes: instead of merely focusing on business-to-
business support, this programme pays attention to the underlying mechanisms for 
the private sector to act. The PSDP, however, is still perceived as a cornerstone of 
PSD intervention, which should be further strengthened in Danish PSD support, 
even though the exact design of the programme is now open to new developments. 
Thus, funds allocated to the PSDP will increase from the current 150 million DKK 
a year (2005) to 160 million DKK a year in 2006 and maintain that level until 2009. 
Roughly the same amount has been allocated to the BSPSs (Danida, 2003b: 12; 
Danida, 2004b: appendix 3; Danida, 2005a: 13ff). 
Table 1.2 also demonstrates that more than half (five out of eight running pro-
grammes) of Danida’s PSD interventions are aimed directly at developing country 
companies, that is, at the micro-level. This provides further support for the argu-
ment made above that Danida maintains a focus on the micro-level. Moreover, it 
reveals the connectedness of these interventions to the Danish private sector. The 
lion’s share of PSD interventions support Danish firms either directly or indirectly. 
This may by the main rationale for maintaining the business-to-business approach 
in Danish PSD support and maintaining the position that the business-to-business 
approach is an important instrument in its strategy of making the private sector the 
engine of growth, even though an increasing number of researchers are questioning 
the effectiveness of this type of intervention vis-à-vis the overall purpose of devel-
opment aid (Batra and Mahmood, 2003; Gibbon and Schulpen, 2004; Hodge, 2002; 
Schulpen and Gibbon, 2002). The PSDP, like the B-t-B, PFP and PPP, are thus also 
important in terms of drawing the Danish business community into development 
assistance. 
As already noted, Denmark’s focus on business-to-business assistance is in no 
way exceptional: several bilateral donors, including Belgium, Finland, Germany, 
Italy, Japan, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland, include business-to-business assis-
tance as part of their private-sector development assistance. What makes Danida’s 
PSDP of interest, however, is that it is one of the most comprehensive programmes 
of all micro-level interventions (Kragh, Mortensen et al., 2000).15
Danida’s portfolio of aid interventions includes several development pro-
grammes that are aimed at the private sector. However, it was not until 1999 that 
Danida’s reasons for this full range of PSD interventions were substantiated. Prior 
to the publication of Danida’s Partnership 2000 Strategy, several working papers 
                                                 
15 Based on the number of Danish bilateral PSD interventions and Danida’s involvement in other 
pluri- and multilateral PSD interventions, the recently published meta-evaluation of PSD interven-
tions also concludes that Denmark is ‘one of the most active bilateral donors in the sphere of PSD’ 
(Danida, 2004a: 19). 
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 were prepared that aimed to enhance Denmark’s development strategy. Among 
these was a working paper that sought to examine all the existing private-sector de-
velopment interventions that were being administered out of Danida’s develop-
ment-aid budget and to propose ways to improve them (Danida, 2000c), and an-
other that aimed to include the view of stakeholders in the programme countries 
(Danida, 2000a). The active involvement of the business sector in Danida’s Part-
nership 2000 Strategy was then operationalised in a leaflet that presented Danida’s 
‘programme of action for Denmark’s support to business development in the devel-
oping countries’. Here, it is stipulated that, even though the private sector already 
has acquired a significant position in Danida’s development interventions, an even 
stronger priority should be given to involving the private sector in the planning as 
well as implementation of development activities. Thus, Danida’s aim is to promote 
poverty-oriented economic growth through the establishment of a favourable busi-
ness sector, the involvement of the private sector in Danida’s sector programmes, a 
range of specific market instruments such as the PSDP, B-t-B, MCP and IFU, and 
by convincing international aid organisations that the private sector should have a 
prominent role in development.  
Thus, a more explicit role was now envisaged for the private sector in the devel-
opment process. In accordance with trends among other major donors, Danida saw 
the private sector as having a double role: on the one hand, to create the crucial 
economic development in the partner countries, and on the other hand to play an 
important role in the preparation and implementation of the interventions. How-
ever, nowhere in the documents is it stipulated which private sector (the Danish or 
the partner country’s private sector) has which role, or indeed whether Danida even 
distinguishes between them at all.  
Nonetheless the private sector’s role in development is now an integrated part of 
Denmark’s development strategy, as stipulated in the government’s vision for new 
priorities in the country’s development assistance (A World of Difference), in the 
new priorities for Danish cooperation with Africa (Africa: Development and Secu-
rity) and in the most recent plan for developmental priorities (Globalisation: Joint 
Progress) (Danida, 2003b; Danida, 2005a: 13ff; Danida, 2005c). 
To sum up, by and large Danida’s PSDP has remained unchanged since its inau-
guration in 1993. Its aim is to form long-term business links between Danish com-
panies and those in developing countries in order to facilitate a transfer of techno-
logical and managerial skills from the former to the latter. Since its beginnings up 
until 2005, almost a hundred PSDP collaborations have been funded. The big ques-
tion is, what has been the impact of this intervention? 
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 1.2 Available information regarding the PSDP in Ghana 
‘Denmark must make a difference with its development assistance’ 
(Danida, 2003b: 5).  
 
How is Denmark, that is, Danida, ensuring that it is indeed making a difference 
with its development aid? Assessments of the effects and impacts of its various pro-
jects and programmes in developing countries comprise essential elements of this, 
since they provide the background for future improvements in donor interventions. 
However, this is not the only reason why Danish development aid is evaluated. An-
other, just as important reason is the need to inform Danish taxpayers how and on 
what their money is being spent, given that official Danish development assistance 
is financed through compulsory taxation from citizens who may or may not agree 
with the overall purpose of Danish development aid. 
This section deals first with the knowledge regarding Danida’s PSDP in Ghana 
that may be extracted from this type of source, consisting of two internal reviews, 
one audited report and two external evaluations. It begins with a critical examina-
tion of their contents. Basically, it argues that only a little impact-related informa-
tion can be drawn from these studies: while the first review was constrained by the 
limited data available (the programme had only been running for a year and a half), 
knowledge drawn from the other review and the audited report is limited by the 
very few cases examined. The audited report only visited a very few companies, 
but it found that compulsory written material about the programme was faulty. The 
external evaluations comprise one regular evaluation and one so-called meta-
evaluation. The former provides an overall idea of how the programme has fared 
vis-à-vis Danida’s overall objectives but it does not provide in-depth knowledge 
about the business collaborations, nor does it try to explain why the programme has 
had particular impacts in particular contexts. The remaining evaluation does not 
produce any new data on the PSDP, as it is based on previous evaluations. More-
over, the main purpose of these reports is not to deepen our knowledge of the im-
pacts of the programme, but rather to judge the programme’s merits vis-à-vis its use 
of taxpayers’ money. 
However, this is not the only information available regarding the Ghanaian 
PSDP: several academic papers have used Danida’s PSDP in Ghana, or parts of it, 
as the empirical basis from which they construct their arguments. However, these 
papers have not been written in order to shed more light on the impact of the PSDP 
in Ghana, but have instead centred attention on issues related to the development of 
strategic alliances between developed and developing country businesses. The sec-
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 ond part of this section deals with the type of knowledge that can be extracted from 
these sources. 
1.2.1 ‘Reasonably successful…but showing limited concern for broader 
development aspects’: evaluation-based knowledge regarding the PSDP 
Only one formal evaluation of the Danish PSDP has been conducted, namely the 
2001 Evaluation: Private Sector Development Programme (Danida, 2001a). This 
was the first time an external evaluation team had assessed the effects of the then 
eight-year-old programme. It was carried out by a Copenhagen-based consultancy 
company and covered the operation of the PSDP in Ghana, Vietnam and Egypt. 
The evaluation had been concluded several months prior to its final release at the 
end of 2001. The delay was caused by internal disputes in Danida regarding its 
generally negative conclusions. The evaluation concluded that the results of the 
programme were rather limited in comparison to the amount of money that had 
been spent on it. This conclusion was qualified by a number of sub-conclusions, for 
example, that the technology transfer related to the PSDP in general had been posi-
tive, but ‘the improved technologies transferred to the local companies do not in 
general appear to have resulted in visible increases in profitability’ (Danida, 2001a: 
33).  
Evaluation of the PSDP in Ghana was based on visits to seventeen Ghanaian en-
terprises in the spring of 2001. The evaluation team looked at the impacts of the 
programme in relation to the following six criteria: employment generation, foreign 
exchange earnings, technology relevance, environmental improvements, sustain-
ability and additionality. The team constructed impact indicators, ranging from low, 
through medium to high, in respect of these six criteria and grouped the projects 
accordingly. In brief, although the evaluation presents us with an idea of the effec-
tiveness of Danida’s PSDP, it does not offer us an insight into why the programme 
succeeded or failed.  
In a similar vein, Danida’s internal reviews of the programme in connection with 
its extensions in 1995 and 1999 do not offer us any new understandings of how the 
PSDP has impacted on the main beneficiaries or why. The 1995 review team was in 
Ghana for ten days and visited a large number of relevant private-sector institu-
tions, but the number of PSDP companies it visited was limited to seven (Danida, 
1995: annex 2).16 It should be noted, though, that these companies were chosen in 
consultation with the staff at the embassy and at the PS secretariat in the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs. Most importantly, however, the study took place only a year and 
                                                 
16 In total, the team visited 33 companies in the three countries (Ghana, India and Zimbabwe). 
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 a half after its initiation, and therefore none of the projects had reached the comple-
tion stage. Hence, the review team had difficulties in determining the effects of the 
programme, though it concluded that the PSDP had a central role to play in provid-
ing both stimulus and direct support to establish business-to-business co-operations. 
However, the team also argues that the PSDP should limit itself to already estab-
lished businesses with proven techniques and refrain from supporting green-field 
projects, that is, projects with new or unproven products or techniques, or involving 
inexperienced partners (Danida, 1995: 41).  
The 1999 review team had a larger portfolio of enterprises to study in Ghana, 
but it chose to limit itself to a three-day visit to the country in the spring of 1999. 
During these three days, interviews were conducted with five private Ghanaian 
PSDP partners, two non-PSDP companies and the Ministry of Finance. Of the five 
Ghanaian PSDP enterprises, one had been completed in 1996, another had been 
running for a couple of years, two had just started and the fifth had not yet taken off 
(Danida, 1999b).17 Based on this data, the review team concluded that ‘training, 
technical assistance and technology transfer carried out under the programme have 
been so successful that all partners and other parties involved have proposed that 
both aims and budget should be expanded’ (Danida, 1999b: 67).18
Approximately six months before Danida undertook this second review of the 
programme, a Ghanaian consultancy company, Technical Systems Ltd., presented 
its review of the programme in Ghana (Technical Systems Ltd., 1999). This review 
should to be seen as a background paper to the official 1999 review presented 
above. At the turn of the year 1998-1999, four Ghanaian consultants interviewed 
eight different Ghanaian PSDP companies. Unfortunately, data from these inter-
views seems to be included in neither the main report nor the annexes to the 1999 
review. The main report and the annexes list all the collaborations being funded up 
to late 1998 and set out the aims of the programme, the number of employees, the 
investment and the funding, that is, they list what can be taken from the application 
forms. 
Taken together, these three reviews offer little but an overview of the amount of 
money spent and a recommendation that the programme be continued. The 1995 
review did not have enough cases to assess the merits of the programme and instead 
                                                 
17 In addition, the review team visited a Ghanaian bank that had received support from the PSDP 
but had no Danish partner, and a pig farm whose application for support was cancelled due to envi-
ronmental concerns. 
18 This quotation is almost identical to the conclusion in the background paper, even though the 
empirical data was different. In their report, Technical Solutions Ltd. (1999: 59) conclude: ‘training, 
technical assistance and transfer of technology carried out under the programme have been so suc-
cessful that all stakeholders and partners have called for its expansion in scope and budget.’  
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 concentrated on discussing the reasons for providing support for business-to-
business collaborations. The 1999 review, on the other hand, potentially had several 
cases in Ghana but chose to base its conclusions and recommendations on very few 
of them, of which only one had been completed and another had been running for 
some time. The remaining report, that conducted by the Ghanaian consultancy 
company, actually points to some of the inherent problems of the programme, such 
as the lack of loan recovery, serious management problems and difficulties in keep-
ing track of development. It recommends ‘a significant increase in the budget allo-
cation’ and an effort ‘to expand the programme significantly [to other sectors]’ 
(Technical Systems Ltd., 1999: 59, 63). 
In the autumn of 2002, the Danish Audit Department examined sixteen collabo-
rations between Ghanaian and Danish enterprises as part of a study aimed at esti-
mating the effects of the PSDP (and the Business-to-Business programme in South 
Africa). However, it only visited five partnerships and two start-up facilities in 
Ghana.19 It found that in almost half of the collaborations it visited, the stated ob-
jectives were not fulfilled. Moreover, it found that the compulsory progress reports 
were often faulty and did not reveal problems of a managerial and co-operative 
character. It thus indirectly points to the need for more knowledge about the PSDP 
in Ghana (Rigsrevisionen, 2003).  
The most recent evaluation of Danish private-sector development assistance, the 
so-called meta-evaluation entitled ‘Private and Business Sector Development Inter-
ventions’, does not offer much fresh insight into the impact of PSDP, as it is based 
solely on the available evaluations of Danish aid to the private sector in developing 
countries. Its main achievement with regard to the PSDP is its illumination of the 
relationship between this aid instrument and other Danish aid instruments that tar-
get the private sector in developing countries. However, it also comments on the 
methods adopted by the evaluation team for the 2001 private-sector development 
programme. The meta-evaluation repeatedly expresses criticism of the ‘sometimes 
subjective and qualitative’ indicators used to evaluate Danish PSD support. More-
over, it also criticises the absence of any clear indication of how these indicators 
are operationalised and supplied. Instead, the evaluation team proposes that indica-
tors should ‘be quantitative without being highly technical’. More precisely, it sug-
gests that evaluations should adopt indicators such as changes in turnover, in value 
added, and in market developments (Danida, 2004a: 8f, 53, 63f).20 This criticism 
                                                 
19 During the company visits, staff from the Audit Department were accompanied by the PS co-
ordinators from the embassy. 
20 Among the most criticised evaluations are those of the Private Sector Development pro-
gramme, which is said to be based on qualitative indicators alone, with no clear indication of how 
 23
 will form the point of departure for the discussion of the impacts on target groups 
in Chapter 8 (below).  
1.2.2 PSDP collaborations as an example of strategic alliances: academic 
papers based on Danida’s PSDP 
John Kuada and Olav Jull Sørensen have also shed light on the Ghanaian PSDP. 
Their focus has not been on the programme’s impacts. Rather, they have used the 
programme as a case study in examining partner perceptions, the effect of alliance-
promoting institutions on strategic alliances, the range of motives for participating 
in the programme, and the impact of different national business systems on inter-
firm relations (Kuada, 2000, 2002; Kuada and Sørensen, 1999, 2005; Sørensen and 
Kuada, 2000). Based on three successive periods of fieldwork in 1997, 1998 and 
1999 and interviews with sixteen PSDP collaborations, these articles illuminate the 
processes at work when two enterprises collaborate. Among the most interesting 
findings are examinations of why Danish partners decide to enter into collaboration 
with a Ghanaian partner, how well the partners are matched, the initial interaction 
between them, the different perceptions of the standards of second-hand equipment 
(Kuada, 2002), and the main reasons why the Ghanaian entrepreneurs enter the 
programme (Kuada and Sørensen, 1999). Here, Kuada and Sørensen suggest that 
the main reason is resource leveraging due to the increasing pressure on local firms 
to improve the quality of their products as a result of the liberalisation of the Gha-
naian economy, a general awareness among Ghanaian firms that their low-level 
technologies are placing them at a competitive disadvantage, and the fact that the 
high costs of local capital forces owner-managers to seek foreign funding. Con-
versely, the motive for the Danish companies should be sought in the opportunity to 
enter the Ghanaian market with limited risk.  
In a similar vein, the Ghanaian PhD researcher Bedman Narteh uses Ghanaian 
PSDP collaborations to shed light on learning potentials in international strategic 
alliances between companies in developed and developing countries respectively. 
Based on interviews with five Ghanaian partners and managing directors, Narteh 
shed lights on their motives in entering alliances (access to finance, technology, 
managerial capacity), their selection of partners (personal chemistry, resource posi-
tion, firm size), and the cultural gap between the partners (lack of prior knowledge, 
mutual suspicion).21 He also measures alliance outcomes in terms of the Ghanaian 
partner’s perceptions of profitability, product quality and learning. Narteh finds that 
                                                                                                                                        
they are operationalised; and of the Mixed Credit programme, which is also said to be based on 
qualitative indicators alone. 
21 The cases were chosen by the PSD office at the embassy in Accra. 
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 only one of the five alliances is making a profit and is pleased with the perform-
ance. Three, by contrast, are making consistent losses, and one is seeking redress in 
court in order to take full control of the alliance. Two out of the five have experi-
enced improved quality for their products and thus been able to demonstrate that 
they have acquired new skills. These results seem rather meagre, but surprisingly 
they are not accounted for in the conclusion that ‘the PSD programme offers hope 
to the Ghanaian economy as it continues to attract more partners into the manufac-
turing areas’ (Narteh, 2005: 211), and it continues: ‘The PSD programme is a boost 
in the cup of the recipient countries to develop their private sectors’ (Narteh, 
2005:212).  
1.3 Objective and research questions 
Aid is not like rain that falls on whoever happens to be present in a 
given time and place. Instead it is more like a set of weights placed on 
the scales of power at the local, regional, and national levels. Whether 
by design or by default, aid tilts power balances, strengthening some in-
dividuals, groups, and classes relative to others. (Boyce, 2002: 240) 
 
For the past forty years, aid interventions have been studied regularly to demon-
strate their effects to tax-payers with respect to the stated objectives. The studies 
have centred on assessing the outcomes of the usually technical intervention itself 
on the target beneficiaries and have only rarely taken other developments (internal 
or external) into account. Development interventions were perceived in linear fash-
ion, beginning with the planning, continuing with implementation, and ending in 
outcomes. Development was therefore seen as something that was implemented 
from the outside and that could be predicted. Consequently, studies of aid interven-
tions, mostly in the form of evaluations, also followed this linear thinking and as-
sessed the technical intervention in isolation from the surrounding society. 
However, a relatively small group of mainly anthropological researchers have 
conducted in-depth studies of development interventions in order to obtain a more 
comprehensive understanding of the processes that they initiate. These studies con-
tested this linear view of predictable development and instead suggested that inter-
ventions should be seen as processes of constant negotiation and renegotiation be-
tween actors of different worlds (the developers and the developees) who poten-
tially have conflicting interests. In order to study these interventions, questions 
therefore had to be raised regarding the very nature of the intervention, the interests 
of the various actors involved and the strategies and practices used.  
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 Even though these studies covered several interventions, they were by and large 
limited to development interventions in rural areas, they concentrated on traditional 
project aid, and they had only a very limited geographical coverage. Although the 
cases consisted of different projects in different locations, all the studies came to 
the conclusion that by definition development interventions have unintended con-
sequences (Bierschenk, 1988; Crehan and von Oppen, 1994; Elwert and Bier-
schenk, 1988; Gould, 1994; Long and van der Ploeg, 1989; Olivier de Sardan, 
1988). 
Recently, interest has revived in the countless unintended consequences of de-
velopment interventions. This time the initiative derives mainly from the NGO sec-
tor itself, which is seeking new innovative ways to improve its development assis-
tance. Among the best known and most important contributions in this field is Chris 
Roche’s book on impact assessment for development agencies (Roche, 1999), but 
impact studies of Danish NGO assistance have also been conducted (Kaare and 
Nielsen, 1999; Sultana and Folke, 1999).22 This work formed the basis for the ‘Aid 
Impact: Development Interventions and Societal Processes (AID)’ research group 
at Danish Institute for International Studies (formerly the Centre for Development 
Research), some important contributions to which have been published in Folke 
and Nielsen (2006a). 
Both the anthropological studies and recent studies of the impact of aid have 
been a main source of inspiration for this thesis. However, they have also pointed to 
the limitations in our understanding of other types of aid interventions and the ne-
cessity for contextualised theoretical as well as empirical frameworks.  
This thesis therefore sets out to investigate Danida’s PSDP in Ghana in order to 
further our understanding of the impact of development aid and why and how it 
impacts the way it does. Based on this overall aim, the theoretical objective of this 
study is to construct a framework to determine the impacts of a development inter-
vention within the sphere of private-sector development. In order to do this, the 
theoretical framework will single out causal mechanisms in the upgrading process 
of small African enterprises in the context of technology transfer, this being the 
main objective and the main source of input in Danida’s PSDP. To obtain a better 
understanding of the specific context in which Danida’s PSDP is being imple-
mented, a further aim is to establish a framework to understand how Ghanaian 
firms act and interact. 
The following sets of research questions guide the theoretical analysis: 
1. What is impact, and how is it measured?  
                                                 
22 See Madsen (1999) for an overview of these studies.  
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 2. How do small firms in sub-Saharan Africa develop technological capa-
bilities, and how may technology transfer facilitate this process? 
3. What determines the way small firms act and interact?  
These enquiries throw into question issues of how development interventions are 
studied and why, which mechanisms determine processes of technological capabil-
ity building and how changes in technological capabilities are measured, and how 
key institutions in society tend to influence firms’ behaviour. 
In general, development interventions are studied either to learn more about a 
particular intervention or to be accountable to tax-payers in the donor country. This 
study takes its point of departure in the first of these two aims, namely to learn. It 
thus seeks to further our understanding of how development interventions impact 
not only on target beneficiaries, but also on other groups in other places. Central to 
this line of thinking is an acknowledgement of the importance of time and space. In 
this regard, an intervention is perceived as just one of several simultaneous proc-
esses taking place in a specific context; its impacts begin in the planning phase of 
the intervention and extend well beyond its formal completion; and the impact of 
an intervention is not limited to a group of intended beneficiaries, but may affect 
power relations and economic structures for others (cf. Chapter 3). This line of 
thinking therefore places the emphasis on the complexity of development aid and 
on the unintended impacts of development interventions. The first theoretical ques-
tion aims to explore this complexity and suggest ways of investigating impacts. 
Danida’s PSDP basically seeks to create social and economic development by 
enhancing developing country companies’ commercial capacities and performance 
by facilitating a transfer of technological and managerial skills from Danish to de-
veloping country enterprises. The concept of technological capabilities, which de-
notes information and skills that allow productive enterprises to utilise equipment 
and technology efficiently, is applied here to further understanding of the central 
aspect of the PSDP (cf. section 4.5). The literature on technological capabilities is 
vast and encompasses different aims and different scales of analysis. The focus in 
this thesis is the technological capabilities of small enterprises in sub-Saharan Af-
rica and how these capabilities may be enhanced through private-sector develop-
ment interventions – in particular, how transfers of skills and technology can lead 
to the building of technological capabilities. The second theoretical question thus 
seeks to uncover the mechanisms and structures that promote or inhibit the building 
of technological capabilities in small enterprises in SSA, especially in relation to 
business-to-business assistance. 
The idea behind the PSDP is essentially to let private companies handle the de-
velopment intervention for the development agency – Danida only facilitates the 
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 process of transferring skills between the two private partners. The immediate tar-
get beneficiaries are small enterprises in Ghana, but the PSDP, like all Danida’s 
development interventions, aims to alleviate poverty more broadly in the partner 
country. The Ghanaian companies are thus interesting in a double sense: as target 
beneficiaries, and as a means to fulfil the overall aim of Danida’s development aid. 
Therefore, the behaviour of firms, and more specifically how firms integrate verti-
cally and horizontally, the direct involvement of their owners in management, and 
the relationship between employers and employees become significant ways of ex-
tending our knowledge of how Ghanaian companies interact with foreign partners 
and relate to other private entities in Ghana. This thesis departs from an understand-
ing that a variety of capitalisms exist and thus that the ways in which firms behave 
differ in different contexts. These ways, however, are not accidental: they differ in 
systematic ways that derive from differences in institutional features. Institutional 
features are here broadly conceived as comprising both the general patterns of trust 
and authority relations in society, and the aspects that directly affect business or-
ganisation, such as the role of the state, the financial system and the educational 
system (cf. section 5.2.1). The third theoretical question seeks to further our under-
standing of how institutional features influence firms’ behaviour. 
Following this theoretical analysis, the empirical aim is to provide a deeper un-
derstanding of the changes that are associated with Danida’s PSDP in Ghana, that 
is, whether they are short term or long term, positive or negative, planned or un-
planned, anticipated or unanticipated, direct or derived, and in the area of interven-
tion or not. 
The following research questions will guide the empirical analysis: 
1. What is the impact of Danida’s PSDP in Ghana? In particular, what is 
the immediate impact of the programme on the participating Ghanaian 
enterprises, and how does it impact on these beneficiaries in the longer 
term? What is the impact on other Ghanaian enterprises? And what is the 
impact of the intervention on Ghanaian society at large? 
2. How are the observed impacts of the PSDP accounted for? How does the 
design of the programme and the specific Ghanaian business context in-
fluence the impacts? 
The target beneficiaries of the PSDP are Ghanaian enterprises collaborating di-
rectly with Danish enterprises funded by Danida. However, since the programme 
forms part of Danida’s development portfolio, it is imperative to try to understand 
how the PSDP relates to the overall aim of reducing poverty in Ghana. This thesis 
builds on the assumption that the complexity of the intervention means that the re-
lationship between a single aid intervention and such an overall aim cannot be in-
 28
 vestigated directly. Indirectly, however, the link may be probed by analytically dis-
tinguishing between different levels of impact. This thesis differentiates between 
the target beneficiaries, the local private sector that constitutes the main entry point 
for this type of intervention, and the wider society. Methodological as well as theo-
retical emphasis is placed on the first level. Of importance here is the question of 
how the PSDP affects the building of technological capabilities. Moreover, it chal-
lenges the discrepancy between the impacts officially intended by Danida and the 
unintended impacts. Probing the impact at the private-sector level calls into ques-
tion the way technological capabilities are disseminated from the target beneficiar-
ies to other Ghanaian private companies. Lastly, the study of impacts of the pro-
gramme on society at large calls for a study of who the target beneficiaries are, how 
the gains and losses of the programme are distributed among management and em-
ployees, and how employment structure changes in connection with the programme 
(cf. section 3.4). 
A mere listing of impacts at different levels, however, does not provide us with 
greater knowledge from which to understand the changes associated with the 
PSDP. Inquiries into why the programme has impacted in certain ways are required 
to increase this understanding. These inquiries relate to the programme itself, as 
well as to the political, cultural and economic contexts in which interaction be-
tween the actors in the programme take place. They also relate to how the pro-
gramme has been appropriated by the different actors as a strategy to fulfil their 
own aims and to leverage resources. The second empirical question seeks to guide 
these inquiries. 
1.4 Organisation of the thesis 
This thesis is organised into ten chapters. The present chapter forms the first one, 
while the second presents the main components of Danida’s PSDP. The following 
three chapters contain theoretical discussions and are thus directly related to the 
theoretical aim of the study. Then follows a methodological chapter setting the 
scene for the empirical analysis. Chapter 7 provides an account of economic and 
political aspects of Ghanaian history of importance for the development of the pri-
vate sector, and is followed by two chapters dealing with the impact of the PSDP in 
Ghana. The last chapter concludes the study. 
Chapter 2 explains Danida’s Private Sector Development Programme to the 
reader through an overview of its historical roots, an account of the main compo-
nents of the programme, and a discussion of significant changes in its design. The 
chapter starts by describing the aspiration to promote Danish exports that originally 
led to Denmark’s participation in development aid and then pinpoints significant 
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 moments for the Danish private sector in Danish development aid, before providing 
an assessment of the PSDP in terms of what it supports, and who does what and 
why. The main argument in the chapter is that the Danish private sector has always 
played a dominant role in Danish development aid, even though this role is now 
diminishing. As the basic structures for Danish bilateral aid changed in the late 
1980s, a group of private-sector stakeholders was formed that came up with the de-
sign of the PSDP. This design has remained more or less unchanged, and the cur-
rent PSDP, therefore, takes due account of the needs of the Danish private sector. 
This is also apparent in the different roles assigned to the various stakeholders in 
the programme. Hence, the two largest Danish private-sector organisations play a 
determining role in who and what is supported. 
Chapter 3 sets off the theoretical discussion. The main aim of the chapter is to 
construct the overall framework for the study of the impact of the PSDP in Ghana. 
After defining the key concepts used in the study and briefly discussing the central 
consequences of these definitions, the chapter draws attention to four main types of 
study of aid intervention. It is argued that intervention studies can be categorised 
according to their main aim and their main focus. The various types of intervention 
study are then scrutinised in order to find the strengths and weaknesses vis-à-vis the 
overall aim of the thesis. To some degree all these studies have formed the recent 
focus on impact among development agencies. The third section of this chapter 
then reviews a dozen recent contributions to the aid impact literature, which it cate-
gorises according to the type of impact definition they propose, that is, linear versus 
complex definitions. The last section sums up the main conclusions of these inter-
vention studies and, based on them, it proposes an overall framework for studying 
the impact of Danida’s PSDP in Ghana. This framework calls for an in-depth 
knowledge of capability-building in small African enterprises (Chapter 4) and for a 
deeper understanding of how Ghanaian institutions influence the way Ghanaian 
companies act and, therefore, how they engage in the PSDP (Chapter 5). 
Chapter 4 constitutes the second part of the theoretical discussion, taking as its 
point of departure the changing conditions for small enterprises in developing 
countries. Small enterprises still represent the majority of enterprises in developing 
countries, but they are faced with competition from new areas. Meanwhile, most 
donors see the small enterprise sector as a potential source of economic growth. 
They therefore facilitate their growth through either direct support to the enterprises 
themselves or support to institutions that help small enterprises. Most programmes 
that support enterprises directly share a focus on the improvement of technological 
capabilities, which is the focus of discussion in this chapter. The chapter starts by 
scrutinising what is meant by small enterprises and how they are influenced by re-
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 cent changes in the global economy. It argues that the design of donor interventions 
may benefit from a categorisation of small enterprises into ‘survivalist’ enterprises 
and ‘growing’ enterprises, as their needs differ entirely. In so far as donors already 
distinguish interventions, support to ‘growing’ enterprises includes some type of 
technology transfer for the enterprises to overcome what are perceived as the main 
obstacles for growth, namely access to tools and equipment. The second section 
discusses the content and different modes of technology transfer. It argues that 
technology transfer may be necessary but not sufficient for such companies to re-
spond to changing needs. This perception of the role of technology transfer derives 
from heterodox approaches to technology change, which are briefly outlined in sec-
tion three. It follows from this that, in order for technology transfer to contribute to 
technological capability building, technological efforts are indispensable. What 
precisely technological efforts consist of and the implications of this are examined 
in section four. Then follows a discussion of the concept of upgrading, which con-
cludes that upgrading (whatever it means) depends on factors that are both internal 
and external to the firm. Firm-internal factors are dealt with in the subsequent sec-
tion, on technological capabilities. This section seeks to define the concept in ac-
cordance with the needs of this study and also seeks to operationalise it in order to 
facilitate the creation of a framework to measure changes in technological capabili-
ties. Improvements in technological capabilities are here perceived as a proxy for 
long-term impacts on the intended beneficiaries. Firm-external aspects of upgrading 
are dealt with in Chapter 5. 
Chapter 5 seeks to establish a framework to examine the factors that are shaping 
the development of the Ghanaian private sector. It points to institutions of special 
importance in the building and shaping of private enterprises and seeks to explain 
how certain institutional features tend to produce certain characteristics. The 
framework builds mainly on Richard Whitley’s Business System Approach, as well 
as on the varieties of capitalism literature (Whitley, 1999b). It basically argues that 
different ways exist to organise firms and that these ways are to a large degree 
shaped by historical developments in key institutions in society. However, before 
proceeding to the theoretical framework and the necessary modifications that are 
required to make it suit an African context, the chapter briefly discusses the term 
embeddedness and what it denotes for private companies.  
Chapter 6 offers methodological considerations. The complex phenomenon of 
the impact of aid interventions under scrutiny in this study calls for the integration 
of knowledge from various scientific disciplines. In other words, it requires an in-
terdisciplinary approach to research. First, this entails research that focuses on a 
complex problem in which different disciplines are involved in efforts to explain 
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 the phenomenon. Secondly, interdisciplinary research calls for analysis at different 
levels and with different methods. In order to overcome the problems that may be 
encountered with interdisciplinary approaches, in particular ontological problems 
such as the collision of different perspectives of reality, this chapter discusses the 
methodological considerations. Following Huberman and Miles (1994: 429), I have 
chosen to make the preferences of the study clear to others, so that they know how I 
construe the shape of the social world and how I intend to provide a credible ac-
count of this. This is done in the first section through an outline of the main ingre-
dients of critical realism, its idea of a stratified reality, and the creation of connec-
tions between the various layers of this reality. Lastly, this section seeks to frame 
this study in a critical realist manner. The second section offers insights into the 
chosen fieldwork methods: it explains how and why the cases were selected, how 
interview guides were constructed and how data have been validated. The last sec-
tion builds directly on the discussion of validity, presenting reflections regarding 
interviews with foreign business owners and managers, as well as the issue of posi-
tionality vis-à-vis the interviewee and the interviewer’s relationship with the donor 
organisation. 
Chapter 7 tells the story of local businessmen who have been crowded out of the 
private sector ever since the British colonial administration. It argues that when 
Ghana gained independence in 1957, Ghanaian businessmen were excluded from 
any profitable businesses. This situation did not change in the first two decades of 
independence: except occasionally, private local entrepreneurs were crowded out 
by parastatal enterprises on the one hand and foreign businesses on the other. Fur-
thermore, the Ghanaian economy was rapidly declining in these years. Thus, by the 
beginning of the 1980s and the start of the first Economic Recovery Programme 
sponsored by the IMF, the World Bank and others, the Ghanaian private sector was 
virtually non-existent as a productive enterprise. The argument here is that the re-
covery programmes did not manage to establish a framework for a dynamic private 
sector. Instead, people were forced into various forms of self-employment. Only the 
last few years have seen a change in the room for manoeuvre enjoyed by the Gha-
naian private sector. The subsequent sections in this chapter are based upon the 
theoretical framework presented in Chapter 5 and tell the story of how institutional 
features impact upon how Ghanaians act and interact. It thus forms the background 
for understanding how to account for the observed impacts (Chapters 8, 9). These 
sections show how the particular relationship between the state and business in 
Ghana has marginalised the Ghanaian small-enterprise sector and impeded the 
growth of strong links between the state and private businessmen. In fact, wide-
spread mistrust has developed instead. Moreover, the Ghanaian capital market in-
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 fluences the way Ghanaian companies act, including their motives for entering the 
PSDP. These sections also argue that the Ghanaian educational system hinders in-
ter-firm collaboration due to the fragmentation of skills, thus also influencing the 
impact of the programme at the private sector level. More important, however is the 
role that the family, trust and authority in shaping the Ghanaian businessman. 
Chapter 8 scrutinises the impact of Danida’s PSDP in Ghana at the level of the 
target group, that is, the enterprises that have taken part in the programme. The 
chapter begins with an analysis of technological capability building in the Ghanaian 
enterprises and seeks to explain how the PSDP has influenced this process. Techno-
logical capability building is at the heart of the PSDP. This chapter therefore analy-
ses the factors that facilitate and hinder this process at some length. Henceforth, it 
argues that traditional quantitative indicators, such as changes in employment or in 
productivity, may not be as useful in determining impact as they first seem. Instead 
cases are used to illustrate the richness of impact. Four quantifiable indicators, in-
spired by Danida’s own portfolio of aims, have been chosen to provide an overview 
of the effects of the programme, but more importantly to demonstrate the complex-
ity of impacts. The analysis of impacts based on these indicators reveals the diffi-
culties involve in using quantitative proxies to measure impact. The chapter then 
specifically analyses the unintended impacts on the target group. It examines posi-
tive and negative, direct and derived impacts and concludes that impacts are not 
predetermined but reflect a combination of policy-design, business culture, political 
will, economic resources, historical legacy and the different motives of the princi-
pal actors. 
Chapter 9 examines impacts at the levels of the private sector and of Ghanaian 
society as such. It argues that the particular characteristics of the Ghanaian business 
system described in Chapter 7, combined with the design of the programme set out 
in Chapter 2, is to a large extent impeding the spread of impacts from the level of 
the enterprise to the private sector and further. There is only sporadic evidence for 
any impacts at these levels. However, before this conclusion is reached, the chapter 
describes four instrumental cases to facilitate an understanding of how the PSDP is 
spreading into the private sector and into society at large, and – just as important – 
why impacts seldom diffuse elsewhere. Based on this conclusion, the chapter seeks 
to determine who actually benefits from the programme. 
Chapter 10 concludes the study.  
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 2. DANIDA’S PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT PRO-
GRAMME IN GHANA 
This chapter presents the history of Danida’s Private Sector Development Pro-
gramme and provides an overview of central aspects of the programme in Ghana in 
order to establish a background for the discussion in subsequent chapters, espe-
cially as regards the design of the theoretical framework in Chapters 3, 4 and 5, and 
the empirical analysis in Chapters 8 and 9. 
The chapter tells the story of the involvement of the Danish private sector in de-
velopment aid since its early beginnings in the 1950s and of its role in formulating 
what is today the PSDP. Since its inauguration the programme has not changed 
much, still being based upon the draft written by the Confederation of Danish In-
dustries (DI). Therefore, it is still driven by the available knowledge in Danish 
firms and does not take into account the different realities of the private sector in 
countries covered by Danida programmes. In the second section the chapter scruti-
nises the PSDP, briefly describing the various possibilities for support, and examin-
ing the most important ambiguities surrounding the programme. It argues that the 
many uncertainties related to, for instance, type of collaboration, training and pro-
gramme aims complicate the assessment process, providing unequal opportunities 
for Ghanaian companies seeking to benefit from the programme.  
Even though the programme is essentially the same now as it was more than a 
decade ago, minor changes have been implemented, the most important of which 
are described in section 2.2.3. Lastly, this chapter takes a careful look at the main 
actors in the PSDP, examining the different tasks they perform and illustrating their 
motives. 
2.1 The role of the Danish private sector in development aid 
Originally the motive for Denmark’s participation in providing development aid to 
developing countries (especially through the UN’s Enlarged Programme for Tech-
nical Assistance) was the possibilities it provided for the promotion of Danish ex-
ports. It was argued that although technical assistance through the UN’s programme 
could not provide immediate economic advantages for Danish exporters, such as-
sistance would create contacts that would subsequently produce commercial bene-
fits for the Danish private sector. Other arguments, however, soon took over, and 
instead of providing a direct breeding ground for Danish exports, Denmark chose to 
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 focus on providing education through scholarships to key personnel in developing 
countries. These courses focused especially on themes that were directly related to 
the comparative advantages of the Danish private sector at the time, namely co-
operative movements, technological development and agriculture. Moreover, Den-
mark made several ‘experts’ available to developing countries through the UN pro-
gramme.  
In the late 1950s and especially at the beginning of the 1960s, two interwoven 
changes took place: first, the grant allocated to development assistance was raised 
markedly, and secondly, development assistance was no longer confined to multi-
lateral channels but was increasingly granted bilaterally (as formalised in a law of 
1962 that centralised development aid in the foreign ministry and introduced the 
distinction between multilateral and bilateral assistance). These changes led to a re-
newed discussion of the role of the Danish private sector in development. Devel-
opment aid was again perceived by some as a way of opening up new markets and 
increasing exports (Pedersen, Unpublished manuscript-a, Unpublished manuscript-
b). The role of the private sector in development was supported by government 
loans to developing countries, which were largely used to make purchases in Den-
mark itself. 
Even though government loans made access to developing-country markets eas-
ier, developing countries did not become a major export market for the Danish pri-
vate sector in the 1960s. Denmark traded mostly with other industrialised countries, 
but the oil crises in the 1970s altered the geographical focus of the Danish private 
sector, and the share of Danish exports to developing countries relative to all ex-
ports increased rapidly from the beginning of the 1970s. Set against this back-
ground, in 1977 representatives of the Danish private sector produced a leaflet pro-
posing several changes in Danish development policy, which would take the role of 
the private sector into consideration. The aim was to organise development assis-
tance in such a way that it benefited both the Danish private sector and the recipient 
countries. Most crucially, it was suggested that the grants made available through 
government loans should be increased and that they should be spend on purchases 
in Denmark.  
Following discussions initiated by the leaflet, it was argued that Danish devel-
opment assistance should be concentrated in the poorest developing countries. 
Concurrently, however, guarantees were given that the relative share of Danish de-
velopment assistance to be provided as government loans should reach at least 25 
percent. Moreover, it was argued that, in the light of the current economic situation 
in Denmark, government loans should continue to be tied to Danish purchases 
(Danida, 1977: 22ff). 
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 Based on these changes, the Danish private sector now came to play a more sig-
nificant role in Danish development assistance. The scheme involving government 
loans provided excellent possibilities for the Danish private sector to benefit, since 
government loans were tied to purchases of Danish inputs and raw materials for 
production processes mostly in parastatal enterprises.23 The government loans 
therefore represented an indirect state subsidy to Danish suppliers. In theory, the 
loans were also profitable for the developing country’s own enterprises. Danish in-
puts to these enterprises were frequently more expensive than the international 
market price, but they were regarded as being fairly cheap due to the frequent over-
valuing of local currencies. In reality, however, these government loans seldom 
benefited either the local enterprises or the recipient countries in the long run, for a 
number of reasons. First, many plants were too large, the technology chosen was 
inappropriate and often too capital-intensive. Secondly, the recipients seldom had 
the capacity to utilise the inputs, and no training, technical, either organisational or 
managerial, was linked to the loans. Thirdly, no incentives were provided for the 
local enterprises to utilise the inputs efficiently. Finally, these loans often gave rise 
widespread corruption and fraud (Danida, 1997; Udenrigsministeriet, 1989). 
Several evaluations pointed out the problems related to these loans, and they 
were therefore officially ended in 1989. The end of this type of loan, however, 
should probably be seen in a broader perspective: the debt crisis in the developing 
world in the 1980s was perceived by many to be closely linked to the government 
loans that were widespread among all donors at the time.  
2.1.1 The making of the PSDP, 1988-1993 
From the end of the 1980s to the beginning of the 1990s, Denmark gradually 
changed its aid system. First, the 1988 action plan altered and reduced the number 
of recipient countries. Secondly, the system of tied aid was gradually changed, 
from formally tying individual projects to Danish purchases to an informal system 
that was committed to spending half of bilateral donor support on purchases of 
Danish capital goods, inputs, and services.24 Moreover, the following two simulta-
                                                 
23 From the beginning of the 1970s to 1987, government loans made up approximately half of 
Denmark’s total bilateral development funding, the rest being provided as bilateral project aid. In 
theory, the recipient countries made contracts directly with Danish enterprises, whereupon these 
capital goods, inputs and raw materials were transferred directly to the parastatal sector. 
24 The 1988 action programme officially reduced the number of recipient countries from 66 to 
approximately twenty (starting with twelve) in order to improve the quality of aid. Concurrently, 
however, the action programme broadened the number of core recipient countries from four (Bang-
ladesh, India, Tanzania and Kenya) to twelve. In effect, the action programme negatively influenced 
the role of the Danish private sector in development aid. First, the criteria used in selecting Danida’s 
programme countries only included the possibilities of the Danish private sector to participate in the 
development process to a minor extent. Thus, only if other criteria, such as the need for assistance, 
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 neous events gave rise to a rethinking of the role of the Danish private sector in de-
velopment aid: the situation in many of the countries in which Danida had been 
working was gradually changing. Market-reform processes were on their way: 
parastatal enterprises were being privatised, trade being liberalised, over-valued ex-
change rates devalued etc. Similarly, the involvement of the Danish private sector 
in development aid was declining, especially since the revision of the action pro-
gramme in 1988 and the subsequent termination of the government loan scheme in 
1989. Based upon these events, a Contact Committee on Industrial Development in 
Developing Countries25 was set up in 1989 to discuss the role of the private sector 
in development aid with the minister.26  
This led initially to a conference on the private sector and development assis-
tance held in November 1989 that sought to give voice to the new situation for the 
private sector. The then foreign minister, Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, claimed that the 
new action plan would provide huge opportunities for the Danish private sector to 
participate in development assistance and that consideration had been given to Dan-
ish employment. The Danish private sector, on the other hand, felt that the new ac-
tion plan constituted an obvious deterioration of its opportunities vis-à-vis devel-
opment aid (Udenrigsministeriet, 1989).  
Secondly, the setting up of the Contact Committee led to DI27 and Danida un-
dertaking investigations of the possibilities of supporting food-processing industries 
in India.28 Based on these investigations, in 1992 the Contact Committee presented 
a ‘proposal for support to the development of the private sector in developing coun-
tries’ to the Danish Parliament, which approved it on 20 February 1992. This pro-
posal is now perceived to reflect the viewpoints of both the Foreign Ministry and 
the Danish private sector (Danida, 1995: 7), and arts of the proposal were later 
                                                                                                                                        
respect for human rights, gender etc. were fulfilled were the Danish private sector’s needs and 
wishes taken into consideration. Secondly, the new programme countries did not create the same 
purchasing possibilities in Denmark and for subsequent export as some of the earlier recipients of 
government loans (Christensen, 1988; Danida, 1993; Udenrigsministeriet, 1989). 
25 Kontaktudvalget om Industriudvikling i Udviklingslandene (henceforth: Contact Committee). 
26 Just after its establishment, the Contact Committee launched two reports that directly dealt 
with the role of the Danish private sector role in development aid. One focused on the role of 
smaller Danish firms vis-à-vis development aid. The report suggested a two-phase model for private 
sector development, phase one to be based on development aid, while phase two was to be more 
commercially oriented (Kontaktudvalget, 1989a: bilag 2). The other report suggested ways of en-
hancing the number of joint ventures between Nordic companies and ones based in southern Africa 
(Kontaktudvalget, 1989b). 
27 The Confederation of Danish Industries was established in 1992, through the merger of Indus-
trirådet and Industriens Arbejdsgivere. Industrirådet, in collaboration with Danida, led the investiga-
tions. Hereafter, DI, as well as its predecessors, will be denoted ‘DI’.  
28 Based on the conclusions of DI’s investigations in India, the Contact Committee on its meet-
ing May 3rd 1991, decided to initiate a study of how Danida could support the ‘productive’ sector in 
developing countries. Demands for market economy and support to the private sector in developing 
countries were put forth as the main arguments in the debate. 
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 modified to become the PSDP. The original document maintained that it was essen-
tial to support both the individual enterprises and an enabling environment for the 
private sector; that is, it was essential to support a package solution for the devel-
opment of the private sector in developing countries. However, it was also argued 
that the most important area of intervention for the Danish private sector, and hence 
for the programme, was the individual enterprises: areas such as establishing an 
enabling environment and privatisation of parastatal enterprises were of minor im-
portance. It was thus suggested that a programme of cooperation between compa-
nies in Denmark and the particular developing country ought to be established and 
supported by Danida (Industrirådet, 1992).  
Anchored in the proposal put forward by DI, in June 1992 the Danida board was 
inclined to encourage ‘the plan to support the private sector in developing countries 
through a business-to-business approach’. Three country reports (Ghana, India and 
Zimbabwe) were produced by DI and a private consultancy company, which even-
tually developed into the strategies for the first phase of the PSDP. To a large ex-
tent these reports built on the original DI proposal: the strategy was retained, as 
were the interests of the Danish private sector. Only minor adaptations were made 
in relation to the three countries. 
The PSDP did not come alone: in the summer of 1993, the then minister of de-
velopment cooperation, Helle Degn, appointed a committee to draw up ‘a strategy 
for the involvement of the Danish private sector in bilateral development aid’. The 
committee identified various private-sector instruments that might enhance the role 
of the Danish private sector in development, and its plan was subsequently ap-
proved by the Danish Parliament in October 1993. This overall plan, as well as the 
work of DI and the Contact Committee, formed the basis of the launch of the PSDP 
in Ghana, India and Zimbabwe, and of the MCP in 1993 (Danida, 1993, 1997, 
2000c).  
The PSDP differs in many respects from earlier forms of support to the produc-
tive sector. Most importantly, for the Danish private sector this programme is de-
signed to take the needs of a larger part of that sector into consideration. Thus, 
whereas the government loans of the 1970s and 1980s largely addressed the needs 
of large-scale enterprises, the PSDP also addresses the needs of Danish small- and 
medium-size enterprises.29 Moreover, this programme directly focuses on private 
entities in developing countries. Thus, while previous support was channelled 
through government bodies in developing countries, this type of aid is channelled 
directly from one private entity to another. 
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 2.2 The PSDP in Ghana, 1993-2001: a new beginning for Danish aid to 
the private sector 
Compared to the intervening years since the launch of the 1988 action plan, the 
launch of the PSDP may be perceived as ‘a new beginning’ for the Danish private 
sector in development aid. The PSDP basically provides consultancy and economic 
support for inter-firm co-operation between Danish companies and companies in 
Danida’s programme countries. The stated rationale behind the programme is that 
inter-firm co-operation can contribute to economic as well as social development in 
the recipient countries. However, as was shown in section 2.1 above, in many ways 
the programme’s actual design resembles the needs of the Danish private sector. It 
is therefore questionable to what degree the PSDP has incorporated the needs of the 
private sector in developing countries. In order to obtain a first impression regard-
ing this issue, the roles of the different stakeholders in the programme will be scru-
tinized. However, before proceeding with this task, the next section will briefly out-
line the main components of the programme and point out the most important 
changes it has undergone since its introduction in 1993.30  
2.2.1 Brief characteristic of the PSDP 
The overall purpose of the PSDP, that is, to contribute to economic and social de-
velopment in the partner countries, is met through a transfer of competences, from 
Danish businesses to the partner businesses in the developing country. In the PSDP, 
this is done through the establishment of long-term binding agreements between 
companies in Denmark and the partner country. In this programme, development 
aid is thus essentially taken care of by two business partners. The Danish embassy 
acts solely as a facilitator and does not implement the programme itself. 
In the PSDP, two forms of business-to-business cooperation can be distin-
guished, namely the Start-up Facility and the Business Partnership, as depicted in 
Table 2.1 below.  
While the Start-up Facility, limited to a maximum of one year, is designed either 
to test the possibilities of co-operation or to deal with specific tasks, the Business 
Partnership generally lasts a minimum of three years and has a more binding char-
acter. The Start-up Facility may also form the basis of a Business Partnership, in 
which case the amount spent on the Start-up Facility is deducted from the budget of 
                                                                                                                                        
29 See also the discussion of the constraints on the Danish small enterprise sector in participating 
in development aid in the Contact Committee’s report of 1989 (Kontaktudvalget, 1989a). 
30 The PSPD is basically designed on a McDonalds concept: one programme fulfils the same 
needs everywhere. Only minor deviations from this design are observable. Hence, this outline of the 
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 the Business Partnership. The Business Partnership is divided into two phases: the 
preparatory phase (partners meet and discuss future plans, and preliminary investi-
gations can be carried out); and the project phase (setting up co-operation, training 
and technical assistance of local staff, execution of plans, evaluation). The Business 
Partnership must be commercially based, and the partners bear the commercial 
risks. Table 2.1 summarises the current possibilities for support in the PSDP. 
Table 2.1. possibilities of support in the PSDP (August 2003) 
Type Phase Description Subsidies up to 
(DKK) 
Partner identification 15,000Preparatory 
phase Study visits31 25,000
Start-up  
Facility 
Project 
phase 
Technical assistance, training and produc-
tion equipment (max 100,000) 
500,000
Partner identification 15,000
Study visits 25,000
Business 
Partnership 
Preparatory 
phase32
Preliminary investigations33 90% (250,000)
 Project 
phase 
Technical assistance, training and envi-
ronmental issues  
90% 
(5 million)34
  including export promotion activities, ad-
aptation of technology, cultural seminars, 
combating HIV/AIDS, human rights and 
measures for equal rights35
100,000 each
 Loan Investment in plant and production equip-
ment36
2.5 million
Source: Danida (2003a: 5) 
 
                                                                                                                                        
PSDP relates to the PSDP as such. Whenever the programme in Ghana differs from the overall pic-
ture, this is mentioned. 
31 Grants for study visits are only approved if the Danish company has a formal invitation from a 
local partner or vice versa. Most often, however, the visits are not limited to this one enterprise, but 
include other potential partners in the same line of business.  
32 Support for the preparatory phase is only provided once. Thus, if a Start-up Facility continues 
into a full Business Partnership, the partners obviously cannot receive additional grants for partner 
identification and study visits, though support for a feasibility study may be granted even if the part-
ners have already collaborated.  
33 The preliminary investigation may be limited to certain aspects of the collaboration, such as 
the availability of raw materials and the preparation of the training activities, or it may include all 
aspects of relevance to the collaboration.  
34 Grant and subsidies of up to DKK 5 million are approved by the embassy, subsidies, grants 
and loans of between DKK 5 and 10 million by the chairman of the board of Danida, and subsidies, 
grants and loans over DKK 10 million by the board of Danida.  
35 As a minimum the PSDP collaborations have to comply with certain standard laws and regula-
tions: as regards the environment and work environment, for instance, the collaboration has to com-
ply with national laws and regulations in the recipient country, as well as ILO conventions regarding 
labour rights. 
36 Formally, the loan agreement is made with the joint venture as the borrower. However, in 
many cases the collaboration does not take the form of a joint venture. In these cases the local com-
pany is the borrower.  
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2.2.2 Ambiguities in the PSDP 
Presented in this form, the PSDP appears simple and straightforward, but to under-
stand some of the difficulties related to the programme and some of the uncertain-
ties related to the merits of it, it is crucial to point to the ambiguities in it.  
Danida does not stipulate what is meant by long-term binding agreements be-
tween two business partners, nor is the specific form of collaboration between the 
two companies important, and it may change over time. It seems that the agreement 
is only binding on Danida if the two other parties to the agreement – that is, the 
Danish and the developing country partners – fulfil their obligations. Danida also 
has to carry out the collaboration, whether or not the premises on which it is based 
change. In contrast, the private partners can cancel the agreement at any time.  
The collaboration may take the form of a licence agreement, a sole agency 
agreement, a franchise agreement or a more binding joint venture. It may also be 
limited to staff development or the development of key personnel. What is impor-
tant is that the agreement between the two partners includes more than simply 
trade: resources, in the form of either capabilities or a business concept, must be 
transferred from the Danish to the developing country partner. 
The most important part of the PSDP is technical assistance and training.37 The 
PSDP does not provide instructions regarding how, whom or where training should 
be conducted. Training may comprise all operations in the company, that is, pro-
duction, marketing, purchases, administration, accounting etc. Also it may be ar-
ranged as either short-term or long-term training, in Denmark or in the host coun-
try, inside the company or elsewhere.  
Like the type of collaboration and the specific form of training, the aims of the 
collaborations are to a large degree left unspecified, being by the partners them-
selves and approved by the embassy staff (see Table 2.2 on pp. 44-5). The embassy 
places most emphasis on whether competence is being transferred from the Danish 
partner to the developing country partner. Secondly, it is important that the PSDP 
collaboration contributes to economic and social development in the host country. 
However, Danida does not provide a list of criteria to be taken into account when 
the application for funds is assessed. Instead, Danida provides a number of ques-
                                                 
37 In PSDP terms, technical assistance was at first perceived very narrowly, to include only ‘sup-
port to upgrading of the management team’ (Danida, 1995: 82), but is now more broadly interpreted 
as ‘primarily active participation and consultancy in implementing the co-operation’. It is therefore 
often provided in the form of Danish employees being posted to the local partner company. Train-
ing, on the other hand, means a ‘planned and structured educational process’ (Danida, 2003a: 19). In 
 41
 tions that are normally included in the assessment. These questions relate to the 
creation or preservation of jobs; expansion of production; improvement of foreign 
currency reserves; creation of export experience; access to new markets; accumula-
tion of local competence; improvement of the environment, working environment, 
women’s living conditions and employees’ rights; and combating HIV/AIDS. 
Moreover, derived positive effects and potential negative effects are both taken into 
consideration in the assessment (Danida, 2003a: 6f).38  
These questions all relate to Danida’s overall development objectives, and as 
such they indicate that the PSDP should be perceived as an integrated component 
of Danida’s development assistance. However, by merely providing a list of ‘cross-
cutting issues’, Danida is failing to inform partners how the different issues are in-
terrelated and at what level they are aimed: some parameters clearly refer to the 
company level, while others refer to the national level, and yet others target both 
the company and national levels. Moreover, the fact that the PSDP unit, along with 
the BSPS unit, is located in a separate building at the Danish embassy in Accra re-
duces the possibilities of integration with the other development activities coordi-
nated by the embassy. In other words, the physical arrangement of the Danish em-
bassy in Accra tends to reflect the role of the PSDP vis-à-vis other bilateral devel-
opment instruments.  
To sum up, the PSDP is officially open for all lines of business of all sizes in 
both Denmark and Danida’s partner countries. Danida only requires that the col-
laboration has some positive developmental impacts, for example, in job creation, 
job preservation, production increases, export experience, etc. This should ideally 
give all enterprises of all sizes an equal opportunity to participate, but this is only 
partly true in reality, as the promotion of the programme gives priority to some en-
terprises over others (cf. sections 2.2.4, 9.2). Moreover, the PSDP is limited by the 
availability of Danish enterprises that are willing to enter into collaboration with a 
company based in a developing country, as the aid is tied to Danish enterprises.39 
                                                                                                                                        
reality, however, technical assistance and training is often mixed and performed by the same per-
son(s). 
38 These questions do not correspond entirely to the ten development goals listed in the Danish 
Audit Department’s report on private-sector development programmes in developing countries, 
which omit employees’ rights and combating HIV/AIDS. According to this report, PSDP collabora-
tions will typically comply with two to seven of these ten goals. Of the 27 collaborations examined 
in Egypt, Ghana, South Africa and Uganda, all stated their aim to be to accumulate local compe-
tence: hardly any stated that they aspire to improve foreign currency reserves through the collabora-
tion (Rigsrevisionen, 2003: paragraph 34f, figure 1). 
39 Despite Denmark’s active promotion of the untying of aid in the DAC of the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development, its official application of the European Union’s directive 
for tenders (January 1st 2004) – which stipulates that all purchases of goods, services etc. for devel-
opment cooperation have to go through a tender process – and its most recent announcement that all 
Danish development aid but food aid is now untied, some components of Danish ODA are still re-
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 Therefore, certain companies and sectors may in reality be excluded from the pro-
gramme. 
2.2.3 Changes in the PSDP over time 
The current design of the programme in many ways resemble DI’s proposal dating 
from 1992. According to this proposal, the programme should be based on the de-
mands of the private sector, it should be long-term, Danida should finance a pro-
portion of the expenses, it should start in only a few countries and thereafter expand 
to all programme countries, and it should be attached to a specific unit in the For-
eign Ministry, to the local embassies in Denmark and the programme countries re-
spectively. These aspects were all included in the original design of the PSDP dat-
ing from 1993. However, the PSDP did not include all the suggestions of DI, such 
as ‘a considerable contribution of resources by the partners’, ‘adaptation of the pro-
gramme to the specific context in which it is located’, and the ‘focus on certain sec-
tors within each programme country’ (Industrirådet, 1992). Moreover, the experi-
ences of the Danish Federation of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (HVR) pi-
lot project in Zimbabwe were included in the first phase of the PSDP. Thus, in ad-
dition to the Business Partnerships proposed by DI, the PSDP came to include a 
Start-up Facility, which was meant to help smaller enterprises that were not yet 
fully ready to arrange commercially based international co-operation.  
Even though the country reports prepared by DI and a consultancy company had 
identified some potential business partners, lots of resources and efforts were spend 
in the first years of the programme to promote it and to find suitable partners. This 
was especially the case in Ghana, which was substituted for Egypt late in the proc-
ess. Actually the purpose of the first phase of the PSDP in Ghana was to obtain a 
general idea of the structure of the private sector and then find suitable partners for 
Start-Up Facilities and Business Partnerships. 
Compared to the current opportunities for PSDP support sketched out in Table 
2.1 on page 40, the first support schemes were financially smaller, but so were the 
economic risks for the partners in the initial stage of the collaboration. Of impor-
tance here is the fact that Danida distinguished between technical assistance and 
training, the former being funded fully for the first twelve months and at only fifty 
percent for the next twelve months, while the latter was funded entirely throughout 
the period.40 Later, in the second phase of the programme, further adjustments were 
                                                                                                                                        
served for Danish industry and society, among them the PSDP (DAC, 2003; Danida, 2005b: 20; 
Danida, 2005c). 
40 The original design of the programme included a so-called ‘swap facility’, which was intended 
as a facility to manage shortages of foreign exchange due to local restrictions. However, since the 
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 made: support for project execution (technical assistance, training etc.) was limited 
to 90 percent of DKK 3 million, and support for environmental issues 90 percent of 
DKK 2 million. These two forms of support have now been merged. Likewise, 
what were formerly known as special studies (90 percent of DKK 150,000) and 
feasibility studies (90 percent of DKK 250,000) have also been merged and re-
named ‘preliminary investigations’.  
The current PSDP differs in other areas as well. In the pilot phase of the pro-
gramme, support was limited to productive sectors. However, the 1995 review team 
recommended that the PSDP be broadened to cover all sectors (Danida, 1995: 39). 
Likewise, during the first phase (1993-1996), the PSDP included a special facility 
to support projects aimed at improving the business environment in the recipient 
countries. In Ghana, the Management Development and Productivity Institute, the 
Ghana Association of Consultants, the Private Enterprise Foundation, the National 
Fisheries Association and the Prudential Bank all benefited from this facility. In the 
second phase, it was decided to apply this facility only in special cases, in Ghana, 
the Association of Ghana Industries. Support for improving the business environ-
ment now comes from the Business Sector Programme Support (Danida, 2000c: 
17f). 
Besides these changes at the level of programme design, the mere fact that the 
programme has now existed in more than a decade in Ghana has had an impact on 
the way it is administered. In the first years of its existence, staff at the embassy 
spent a lot of time and resources on promoting the programme. Alliances were 
made with major business associations in order to find suitable partners, and adver-
tisements were placed in the media so as to reach entrepreneurs who that were not 
members of these associations. The current promotion of the PSDP is more spo-
radic: it may consist of embassy staff participating in business meetings, workshops 
and economic forums, but most of the current promotion is actually conducted by 
the Association of Ghana Industries (AGI) and Empretec.41 The latter even offers a 
course to prepare Ghanaian entrepreneurs for the PSDP.  
The programme has also spread tremendously: whereas it was limited to Ghana, 
India and Zimbabwe in the first three years, after the positive 1995 review Danida 
decided to expand it in the second phase42 to cover also Egypt, Uganda and Viet-
nam. In April 1999, Bangladesh was also included, basically taking India’s place, 
                                                                                                                                        
financial markets were liberalised in the three countries before the programme really took off, the 
‘swap facility’ was never used. 
41 See note 283 on page 244 for details regarding Empretec. 
42 The decision to continue into a second phase was taken by the Board of Danida in March 
1996.  
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 as new development assistance with India was suspended after its tests of atomic 
weapons in the spring of 1998.  
As is apparent from the discussion of the changes in the programme since its ini-
tiation in 1993, the most important change in design is the de facto termination of 
the special facility to support the Ghanaian business environment in 1996. Since 
then the programme has been a pure business-to-business programme. Otherwise, 
only minor adjustments have been made, such as the limit on support for technical 
assistance and training in the project phase of the Business Partnerships. As shown 
in Table 2.1 on page 40, the limit is now DKK 5 million, but this includes support 
for environmental measures that were formerly treated separately. This thesis fo-
cuses only on the ‘real’ business-to-business collaborations (cf. Chapter 6) and will 
no longer deal with the changes but treat the PSDP from 1993 to 2001 as one and 
the same thing. 
2.2.4 Who is who in the PSDP? 
All policy decisions regarding the PSDP are made in Danida, using consultants 
from Denmark and the partner countries to gather background material and make 
drafts. Moreover, relevant stakeholders are invited to comment on ideas and drafts 
at workshops. As described in section 2.1 above, this has been the case throughout 
the initial design period of the programme as well as its later amendments.43 Like-
wise, experience of the daily administration of the PSDP at the embassies is dis-
cussed at yearly seminars in Denmark, though as noted above, this has not led to 
any significant changes to the programmes’ design. However, it has been extended 
to include all programme countries, and a loan facility, previously restricted to 
Ghana, has now been made available to all countries. Recently, as already noted, 
feasibility studies and special studies were merged, and the funds made available to 
the programme increased. However, the design is basically the same: two partners 
are offered the possibility of collaborating virtually without economic risk. Most of 
the funds are allocated for technical assistance, training and environmental issues, 
only a small proportion being allocated to production equipment and inputs (see 
Table 2.1 above). Instead, the partners (in reality the local partner) can obtain a 
low-interest-rate loan for plant and production equipment.  
 
                                                 
43 Recently, the Minister for Development Cooperation decided to develop the PSDP further. To 
this aim, a reference group was established that comprises members of the Danish private sector and 
Danish academia. The preliminary results of this process will be shared with stakeholders in Den-
mark and in two Danida Programme countries. 
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 Table 2.2. Actors and tasks in the PSDP in Ghana 
Actors Tasks Motivating factors  
Danida’s PS secre-
tariat44
Policy development; financial sup-
port; co-ordination; promotion; 
events arrangement; approval of 
grants 
Poverty alleviation; PSD promotion; re-
sponse to private sector demands 
Danish embassy in 
Ghana (especially 
the PS coordinator) 
Promotion; partner identification45; 
preparation of visits; matchmaking; 
approval of partners and grants46; 
networking; supervision; follow-up 
Poverty alleviation; PSD promotion; re-
sponse to private sector demands 
Danish partners Provide technical, managerial and or-
ganisational know-how; supply tech-
nology; provide relevant training; 
provide knowledge regarding interna-
tional markets; offer advisory ser-
vices 
New markets - limited risk; cope with 
changing demands; access to raw mate-
rial; promote machines and know-how; 
publicity; ideology 
Ghanaian partners Provide knowledge of Ghanaian mar-
ket; provide a (manufacturing) site; 
cheap labour 
Increase product quality; acquire tech-
nologically advanced machines; acquire 
access to capital 
Ghanaian business 
organisations 
Matchmaking and preparation for fu-
ture collaboration 
Access to PSDP funds 
DI and HVR47 PSDP promotion in Denmark; find 
suitable Danish partners; matchmak-
ing; feasibility studies; training 
schemes  
Internationalisation of Danish indus-
tries; income-generation 
IFU Low interest loans to PSDP partners; 
loans and guarantees to Danish enter-
prises 
Promote FDI; economic and social pro-
gress in developing countries; return on 
investments 
Other Danish actors Matchmaking and feasibility studies Access to PSDP funds 
 
Table 2.2 provides a brief presentation of the most important actors in the PSDP 
in Ghana, their tasks and their motivations in entering into the programme. The ta-
ble also points out two central principles often seen in development aid. One is ‘the 
                                                 
44 Until the beginning of 1999, the administration of the PSDP was shared between the PS secre-
tariat, the country offices in Danida and the relevant embassies. In April 1999, however, it was de-
cided to anchor the administration of the programme in the PS secretariat, while implementation of 
the programme is managed by the special PS office in the embassies. It should be mentioned, 
though, that not all embassies in Danida’s programme countries have employed a Danish PS coordi-
nator, and some PS coordinators have other responsibilities than the PSDP.  
45 Even though since 1994 DI and HVR have formally been charged with the task of finding 
suitable Danish partners, the PS coordinator in the Danish Embassy in Accra has come up with sug-
gestions in many cases. From his background in the Danish banking system, the former Danish PS 
coordinator has a wide network of contacts and extensive knowledge about the Danish private sec-
tor, which he has drawn on to suggest and select Danish partners (Carlsen, 2002). 
46 See note 34 on page 40. 
47 DI and HVR are the two most important stakeholders in this category. In the time-span being 
covered in this thesis, HVR collaborated with Århus Technical School and the consultancy company 
Kampsax International, while DI collaborated with consultancy company Carl Bro. DI/HVR re-
ceived approx DKK 3 million annually in order to promote the programme and guide the partners in 
important matters relating to the collaboration, such as writing applications. Feasibility studies and 
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 principle of selection’, which denotes that neither the target group of an interven-
tion nor other stakeholders adopt the intervention in its entirety, but instead select 
the elements that suit them best and discard or counteract others. The second is ‘the 
principle of sidetracking’, which refers to the result of diverging motivations 
among different stakeholders to adopt (parts of) an intervention – actors simply ex-
ploit the opportunities at their disposal in accordance with their own aims, thus 
sidetracking the intervention (Olivier de Sardan, 2005). This section will elaborate 
further on these different roles and motives Chapters 8 and 9 provide examples of 
both selection and sidetracking in the PSDP in Ghana). 
The Danish embassy in Accra is responsible for promoting the programme in the 
recipient country. In Ghana, the means of promotion has changed with the in-
creased general awareness of the programme. While advertisements were previ-
ously placed in the paper and on the radio to advertise the possibilities of support, 
the programme now relies almost entirely on its collaboration with key business or-
ganisations and key individuals in the country for promotional purposes. Through 
this cooperation, the Embassy identifies potential PSDP companies, perhaps at 
trade fairs arranged by Danida or other stakeholders, or else through courses or 
seminars arranged by business organisations. In either case, the Ghanaian entrepre-
neur is first interviewed by the embassy staff, whereupon he or she is requested to 
fill out a questionnaire on basic company data, the proposed project idea, and more 
general aspects relating to the organisation and management of the company. On 
the basis of this data, the embassy constructs a project profile.48
According to a programme officer at the Danish embassy in Ghana, the follow-
ing characteristics (in that order) determine whether or not a Ghanaian company 
will be eligible for Danida support (Kokroh, 2002):  
 
1. The ability to find a Danish partner.  
2. The extent to which the Ghanaian company fulfils the formal require-
ments, that is, audited accounts for the past three years, profits in at least 
two of these three years, etc. 
                                                                                                                                        
other preliminary investigations came on top of this. Since 2005, HVR have won the exclusive right 
to promote the programme in Denmark. 
48 The quality of the work done by the PS coordinator and other stakeholders depends to a large 
degree on the information provided by the partners. As depicted in Chapter 7, no reliable informa-
tion exists about Ghanaian private enterprises. Moreover, staff at the embassy do not have the re-
sources to conduct in-depth assessments of the statements provided by their partners – they merely 
rely on an auditor accounts. 
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 3. An assessment of the potential gain in relation to Ghana’s development 
objectives, especially as regards employment generation, foreign ex-
change earnings and import substitution impacts.  
4. An estimate of the proposed collaboration’s demonstration effects vis-à-
vis other parts of the Ghanaian private sector.  
5. A consideration of possible linkages to suppliers, retailers and buyers.  
6. A judgement of the Ghanaian entrepreneur’s own understanding of the 
idea, as well as a critical examination of his or her former experience 
with foreign partners.  
7. An assessment of the Ghanaian entrepreneur’s managerial capacities, 
which is perceived to be necessary for the survival of the collaboration.  
 
The project profile constitutes the most important document in the matchmaking 
process. Matchmaking simply denotes the process of finding a Danish and a devel-
oping country partner who consent to collaborate on a formal basis within the 
framework of the PSDP. Matchmaking may take several forms, depending on who 
had the first contact and how this contact was brought about. Accordingly, different 
actors may take the lead role in the matchmaking process. As shown in Table 2.2 
above, actors as diverse as the Danish embassy, DI and HVR, Ghanaian business 
organisations and other Danish actors, especially private consultants, are involved 
in the matchmaking process. If, for instance, a Ghanaian entrepreneur contacts the 
Danish embassy for further information regarding the PSDP, the embassy generates 
a project file upon which DI or HVR are requested to find one or preferably more 
suitable Danish partners for the cooperation. Meanwhile, Ghanaian business or-
ganisations are contacted to find similar Ghanaian businesses. In theory, both part-
ners are invited to visit the future partner’s company, but due to the relative diffi-
culty of finding interested Danish partners, visits are most often limited to Ghana – 
that is, the potential Danish partner is invited to Ghana to meet the Ghanaian entre-
preneur in Ghana and a few other companies in the same line of business.  
Partner identification and matchmaking may also be undertaken from Denmark. 
Since 1994, DI and HVR have been assigned the task of promoting the PSDP in 
Denmark, arranging seminars, actively attending trade fairs, and disseminating in-
formation to their members about the possibilities of financial support in a process 
of internationalisation. Moreover, in collaboration with the Danish Trade Council, 
Eksportkreditfonden and IFU, Danida informs potential Danish enterprises about 
the possibilities of assistance in relation to exports, subcontractors, investments etc. 
in developing countries through a website. Therefore, an ever-expanding share of 
the Danish private sector is now aware of the PSDP and its main contents. This 
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 awareness induces representatives of Danish enterprises to make contact with either 
DI or HVR for assistance to find a developing-country partner within the PSDP 
framework. DI/HVR has a list of interested developing-country companies that 
might match Danish companies, but most often DI/HVR approaches the embassy to 
find a suitable partner. As in the case cited above, the Danish company is invited to 
meet other Ghanaian companies before a final decision regarding an application for 
PSDP funds is made. 
A third possibility concerns Ghanaian companies that are invited to trade fairs in 
Denmark to meet possible future partners.49 Company profiles are distributed in 
advance and posted on the Ministry of Foreign Affair’s website. On mutual agree-
ment Danish companies may subsequently be invited to the recipient country to 
meet other companies before a final decision to proceed is taken.  
As is apparent from above, matchmaking procedures are skewed: on the whole 
they favour Danish enterprises, as these are offered the opportunity to choose from 
various Ghanaian enterprises much more than the other way around. Only at the 
trade fairs does the recipient country company, in theory, have the opportunity to 
choose from different Danish companies. In practice, however, many developing 
country companies are confined to choosing from a very few companies, as it is 
difficult to find interested Danish partners, especially for companies from sub-
Saharan Africa. 
The Danish embassy is responsible for the dissemination of information regard-
ing the PSDP in the programme countries. Information is spread directly as well as 
indirectly. Directly use is made of leaflets and brochures, advertisements in the me-
dia, workshops and seminars, and direct interaction with Ghanaian entrepreneurs 
who approach the embassy to apply for support. Indirectly, the embassy uses its 
links with Ghanaian business organisations, most notably the Association of Ghana 
Industries and Empretec, to promote and disseminate information about the pro-
gramme. In Denmark, spreading information about the PSDP is shared by the PS 
secretariat and DI/HVR. The former is in charge of the overall strategies; it pro-
duces information for a website aimed at Danish companies that want to pursue in-
ternational business opportunities, publishes booklets and instruction manuals (see, 
for example, Danida (2001b)), and entertains direct requests from Danish compa-
                                                 
49 These trade fairs are in most cases identical with the TechChange arrangements set up to fa-
cilitate commercial cooperation between Danish and developing country companies. They are per-
ceived as a way to link Danida’s different private-sector development interventions. TechChange ar-
rangements are now held in several fairs, ranging from the Herning Industrial Trade Fair, the 
Agromek and the FoodTech, to the Copenhagen International Fashion Fair. Companies from devel-
oping companies are screened by PS coordinators and, in collaboration with DI/HVR companies, 
are selected for the fairs. So-called Reverse TechChange arrangements, where Danish companies are 
invited to fairs in developing countries, have also been held. 
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 nies. Since 1994, DI/HVR has also been assigned the task of promoting the pro-
gramme in Denmark. Based on company profiles, it seeks to find suitable interested 
partners from its members. It also produces information material regarding the in-
ternationalisation of Danish companies. Some of this relates to the opportunities for 
risk minimisation and financing, both the PSDP and other Danida private-sector in-
terventions being of importance here (see, for instance, Håndværksrådet (1998)). 
Following the initial location and screening of potential Danish partners, the role 
of DI/HVR changes: from capturing potential PSDP partners, they now become the 
counterparts of these same Danish PSDP enterprises.50 Thus, they first have to at-
tract potential customers, and then inform them about potential pitfalls. As part of 
the preparatory phase of a Business Partnership, up to DKK 250,000 may be spent 
on preliminary investigations that aim to establish such diverse matters as the avail-
ability of raw materials, market prospects, the capability of the Ghanaian work-
force, the capacity of the capital equipment, environmental concerns etc. – anything 
that is deemed relevant for the collaboration may be included in these investiga-
tions (cf. Table 2.1). In the project phase, DI/HVR acts as the Danish partner’s 
counterpart. Whenever problems arise, the Danish partner can approach either the 
embassy or DI/HVR for assistance. This is not the case for the Ghanaian PSDP 
partners, who in practice can only approach the Danish embassy for support. Thus 
an information gap is produced, where the information and guidance available to 
the Danish partner is far greater than that available to the local partner.51
The Danish embassy, together with the PS secretariat, is also responsible for the 
approval of PSDP support for the partners. As explained in section 2.2.2 above, 
there is a certain lack of clarity surrounding the criteria involved in selecting suit-
able collaborations, which must anticipate some positive impacts, though the kind 
and degree of these are unclear. This haziness is often transferred to the application 
forms and further, to the project documents, which seldom provide specific details 
about the aims of the collaboration. This is not only a problem in assessing the in-
tervention, it may also become a problem for the partners, in so far as the purpose 
of the collaboration becomes blurred, and it may become difficult to discern 
whether the collaboration is on the right track or not. This means that the process of 
                                                 
50 The PSDP does not stipulate that only DI/HVR may produce feasibility studies or environ-
mental studies: other actors, that is, private consultants, business schools and the like, are in princi-
ple entitled to do this too. However, in more than ninety percent of the cases in Ghana, the feasibil-
ity studies have been written by either DI or HVR. Moreover, only a couple of employees at these 
two institutions have been responsible for all these studies. According to a former resident manager 
for a Danish PSDP company in Ghana, this concentration results in a lack of innovative solutions 
and slow improvements (personal communication, 23 May 2002, Accra). 
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 challenging how the collaboration is progressing becomes complicated, potentially 
giving rise eventually to collaborations that continue, even though the prospects of 
success in development terms are meagre. 
In the PSDP, the Danish embassy only acts as a facilitator for the intervention, 
the true implementers being the Danish companies, who transfer the technology, 
and provide the technical, managerial and organisational training related to the col-
laboration and guidance regarding new products, processes and markets. Naturally 
they rely on the services of the PS secretariat, the embassy and DI/HVR, but as 
soon as an application is approved, responsibility for the development interventions 
devolves on to the Danish partners. Some Danish partners decide to conduct all 
training, technical assistance and supervision for their Ghanaian partners, while 
others choose to hand over some of the responsibilities to technical schools or pri-
vate consultants. 
The Ghanaian partners, for their part, are expected to provide essential informa-
tion to make the business plan feasible. In other words, they have to make knowl-
edge of the Ghanaian market available, provide access to economic or political 
networks of importance to the collaboration and supply the (production) site. 
Moreover, they are expected to provide cheap labour in order to compensate for in-
ferior equipment, raw material and technological capabilities. 
As shown in Table 2.2, the motives for participating in the PSDP are diverse. 
The donor, that is, the PS secretariat and the embassy, has as its overarching goal 
the alleviation of poverty. In line with the new consensus, the private sector is per-
ceived as a central actor in fulfilling this aim (cf. section 1.1.2), and as shown in 
section 2.1.1, the PSDP is largely a response to the demands of the Danish private 
sector.  
In their study of internationalisation processes and partner perceptions in Ghana, 
Kuada and Sørensen (1999; 2005) explored both the Danish and the Ghanaian part-
ners’ motives in entering the programme. Asked directly about their motives for en-
tering into a PSDP collaboration with a Ghanaian company, the Danish partners 
identified these as being mainly ideological and idiosyncratic in character. Whether 
as individuals or as companies, they wanted to contribute to development activities, 
and simultaneously they were excited about the adventure associated with the 
PSDP. However, some were motivated by the prospect of finding a use for other-
wise redundant equipment, while others were encouraged by potential access to raw 
materials or to a market. Research conducted for this thesis basically supports these 
                                                                                                                                        
51 It should be noted, however, that the Danish partners agree with the Ghanaian ones in com-
plaining of a deficiency of information both as regards the purpose and limits of the programme, and 
as regards the partner. 
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 findings, but in addition the possibility of exploring new markets with limited eco-
nomic risks was presented by some Danish PSDP partners as a motivating factor: 
Danida was perceived as guaranteeing the recovery of costs. Likewise, especially 
for smaller Danish enterprises, it appeared that the possibility of coping with 
changing demands by engaging in PSDP activities also influenced their decision to 
apply for PSDP funding. Moreover, in line with the ideological reasoning men-
tioned above, some Danish partners also saw the PSDP as a way of obtaining pub-
licity and promoting their specific abilities and products. 
In their study, Kuada and Sørensen also explored the motives of the Ghanaian 
partners for entering the programme. They found these to centre around resource 
leveraging. First, the high costs of local capital force Ghanaian entrepreneurs to 
seek finance abroad. Secondly, the liberalisation of the Ghanaian economy has in-
creased the pressure on local firms to improve product quality and skills, which has 
led to Ghanaian entrepreneurs seeking ways to enhance both capabilities (Kuada, 
2002; Kuada and Sørensen, 1999, 2005). 
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 3. OPENING THE BLACK BOX OF AID: A FRAMEWORK FOR 
STUDYING AID INTERVENTIONS 
The purpose of this chapter is to construct an analytical framework for the study of 
aid to the private sector in Ghana. The study seeks to understand the impacts of the 
PSDP at three different levels in Ghana, namely the enterprise level, the private-
sector level and the level of society as whole.  
The chapter begins with a definition of impact and a description of the conse-
quences of this definition with respect to studying aid interventions. Before pro-
ceeding with the discussion of impact indicators, section 3.2 examines four differ-
ent types of intervention study. It is argued that intervention studies may be distin-
guished according to their main aim, that is, accountability or learning, and their 
main focus, that is, the donor’s intentions, or communities that have been subjected 
to interventions. It is argued that the specific history of aid evaluations and its close 
relationship to aid-management tools have produced reports that only deal with 
whether or not politically articulated plans have been implemented or not. Only 
rarely is the aim of these enquiries learning rather than accountability, the focus 
communities exposed to interventions rather than donors’ intentions. In order to ex-
tend one’s knowledge about an intervention and how beneficiaries as well as other 
relevant actors are responding to it, one has to turn to a different body of literature, 
that on the ‘anthropology of development’. This was especially vibrant in the late 
1980s and scrutinised the interaction, or ‘interface’ as it is called in this literature, 
between the intervention and the intervened.  
The point of departure for section 3.3 is the intense interest that has arisen in the 
impact of aid in the last decade. Everybody seems to want to know more about im-
pact, but nobody can agree on its definition. This section examines a dozen recent 
contributions to the aid impact literature. It argues that many such studies do not 
differ fundamentally from the traditional evaluations: at most they are incremental 
extensions of them. However, some studies incorporate insights from the ‘anthro-
pology of development’ literature in order to produce a more comprehensive defini-
tion of impact. These broad definitions have informed the present study.  
Two central conclusions come from these studies. The first is that ‘a develop-
ment intervention necessarily operates at different levels and scales, and is part of a 
more general political setting’ (Folke and Nielsen, 2006b: 17). The second is that 
no common recipe for impact studies exists. Therefore, each and every study has to 
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 be contextualised in order to take the local circumstances into account. This is done 
in section 3.4.  
3.1 Defining the key concepts 
The interest in how development aid functions and the ultimate effects of develop-
ment interventions can be dated back to the first evaluations of development pro-
jects in the 1950s and 1960s in the UN system. Attempts to systematise evaluation 
approaches by means of an evaluation field manual were already being made by 
UNESCO in 1959 (Stokke, 1991).52 Since then, both evaluation and monitoring 
and appraisal have become integrated parts of development aid, and all major donor 
agencies have produced guidelines for how to conduct evaluations. However, these 
evaluations seldom enhance our knowledge regarding the ‘hows’ and ‘whys’ of de-
velopment interventions, paying attention instead to their relative success or failure. 
Recently, the term ‘impact’ has diffused into all areas of the development busi-
ness: major bilateral and multilateral donors demand assessments of the impacts of 
their programmes, NGOs are requested to demonstrate that their projects are having 
an impact on the intended beneficiaries, and researchers are interested in the im-
pacts of development interventions. This intense focus on impacts may indicate a 
growing interest in understanding the underlying processes of development inter-
ventions, but this is only seldom the case in practice: as already noted, most often 
assessments of impact do not differ substantially from traditional evaluations; in 
other words, by and large assessments of impacts are preoccupied with the relative 
success or failure of a programme with respect to its stated objectives. However, it 
should be noted that no agreement has been reached regarding the definition of im-
pact, and authors seem to apply the concept in the way that suits them best.53
This thesis seeks to enhance our understanding of how the PSDP in Ghana im-
pacts upon both the target beneficiaries and non-target groups. Moreover, it seeks 
to understand how social developments influence the relationship between the tar-
get group and the intervention (as well as between the target group and non-target 
groups). In order to grasp these relationships, the following comprehensive defini-
tion of impact is proposed. Inspired by Chris Roche (1999),54 impact is perceived 
as changes that are associated with aid interventions, whether short-term or long-
term, positive or negative, planned or unplanned, anticipated or unanticipated, di-
                                                 
52 Concurrently with the first attempts to systematise evaluations, a search for appropriate indica-
tors to measure change in development was initiated, led by the UN (especially UNDP’s Human 
Development Report) and the World Bank (World Development Report). 
53 The meanings given to most other terms related to evaluations of development aid are also 
blurred. Wherever necessary, basic definitions of these terms will be provided.  
54 Chris Roche’s original definition is provided in section 3.3. 
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 rect or derived, and in the project area or not. Following on from this, an impact 
study is defined as a systematic and thorough analysis of impact. 
This definition draws partly on the ‘anthropology of development’ literature, 
which, as already mentioned, was especially vibrant in the late 1980s,55 and partly 
on the recent contributions of interdisciplinary approaches to the study of the im-
pacts of aid.56 Building on these two lines of thought, the definition has several im-
plications for my study of the impacts of the Private Sector Development Program 
in Ghana. Among the most important are:  
1. This study is not about whether a development programme succeeds or not, or 
to what extent it succeeds: it is about how impacts are produced in a specific 
development programme in Ghana. 
2. Terms such as ‘success’ and ‘failure’ are basically policy judgements; as ana-
lytical terms they are ambiguous.  
a. The ‘failure’ or ‘success’ of a programme relates to its stated objec-
tives. However, these objectives are often too vague to provide the ba-
sis for such judgements.  
b. Development interventions are seldom recognised as either successes or 
failures by all actors: while donors and technical experts may perceive a 
programme as a success, professionals with a different background may 
find that the solution does not take gender aspects, for example, into 
consideration (Crewe and Harrison, 1998). Usually the outcome of a 
programme is ambiguous, thus increasing the uncertainty.  
c. A so-called ‘success’ for the intended beneficiaries may produce nega-
tive effects for others. Likewise, ‘failures’ may have some positive ef-
fects on the target group or elsewhere. Most development interventions 
have succeeded and failed in different ways from different perspectives. 
Consequently, ‘success’ and ‘failure’ only make sense in a very limited 
context. 
                                                 
55 The ‘anthropology of development’ in reality encompasses various approaches as described by 
Olivier de Sardan (2005). One of these is the ‘entangled social logics approach’, which was pre-
sented to a wider audience in a special issue of Sociologia Ruralis (Bierschenk, 1988; Crehan and 
von Oppen, 1988; Elwert and Bierschenk, 1988; Olivier de Sardan, 1988). Essentially, this approach 
claims that actors (individuals or groups) continuously interact and construct each other via devel-
opment. The interaction is then the focus of attention of this line of thinking. This approach contin-
ues to inspire researchers, and the idea of ‘development projects as arenas of negotiations’ is central 
in numerous studies (see e.g. Henn (1991) Nielsen (2000a)). 
56 See especially work conducted in relation to the research programme ‘Aid Impact: Develop-
ment Interventions and Societal Processes’ (2001-2004) conducted at the Danish Institute of Interna-
tional Studies (formerly Centre for Development Research) (Adam and Nielsen, 2002; Folke, 2001; 
Folke and Nielsen, 2006a; Wilson, 2004). 
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 d. Changes continue, whether or not the expected results are achieved. 
Thus, intended effects that have been achieved may erode over time 
(Earl, Carden et al., 2001).  
3. Development interventions do not happen in a vacuum. Instead, the conse-
quences of these interventions should been perceived as resulting from an inter-
play between the programme, the actors that directly or indirectly participate in 
it, and the political and economic developments framing it. 
4. Impact is here perceived as something beyond the expected effects of the inter-
vention. It therefore allows for an analysis of intended as well as unintended ef-
fects, and of positive as well as negative consequences. Moreover, it accepts 
that a particular intervention may cause particular effects that in turn produce 
other effects; that is, an intervention may have derived effects (Sultana and 
Folke, 1999: 7).  
5. This approach demands the incorporation of many different factors in the 
analysis. Thus, not only aid flows and directly targeted entities are studied, but 
also the surrounding society. In this way, the lack of clear boundaries (spatial, 
social and economical) of the intervention is taken into consideration. 
6. The approach does not propose a single method to assess impact. Rather, the 
particular field of interest guides the selection of methodologies: that is, the 
theoretical framework(s) relating to the particular field should direct the choice 
of method(s) through a selection of cases of special interest for the particular in-
tervention. 
Of course, these implications have consequences for the design of the impact 
study of the Private Sector Development Programme in Ghana. Like the definition 
of impact, the design of the study has its roots in other approaches to the study of 
aid interventions. Thus, before proceeding to the design itself, these approaches 
will be examined. 
3.2 Studying aid interventions: investigating donors’ intentions or the 
communities involved? 
As two extremes, aid interventions may be studied from the points of view of the 
donors’ intentions or of the communities being subjected to interventions. Simi-
larly, the purpose of the study may vary from pure accountability – that is, justify-
ing the expenditure of tax-payers’ money outside the national borders, at one end of 
the spectrum – to sheer learning at the other end. Presented this way, four ideal 
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 types of aid intervention studies emerge, as depicted in Figure 3.1.57 Type I is char-
acterised by its focus on the intentions of the interventionists, as well as its aim of 
demonstrating effects in order to be accountable to external stakeholders. This type 
is numerically the largest group, as it encompasses the majority of aid evaluations 
conducted during the past forty years. Type II, similarly, is characterised by its fo-
cus on the intentions of the donors, but unlike Type I, the main purpose is not ac-
countability but instead to learn more about how aid interventions work in a par-
ticular context. The border line between Types I and II is not watertight: some aid 
intervention studies may contain both accountability and learning aspects. Types III 
and IV have their main focus on communities that are exposed to aid interventions 
rather than donors’ intentions. The former aims to demonstrate effects, while the 
latter seeks to understand the processes at play when intervention meets communi-
ties.  
Figure 3.1. Four types of aid intervention studies 
 
In the following, only Types I and IV will be dealt with at any length, as they are 
contrasted on both parameters: aim and focus. Moreover, Type I comprises by far 
the largest volume of information regarding aid interventions, while Type IV con-
tains most in-depth knowledge about the interplay between interventions and local 
communities. In contrast, hardly any pure Type II studies have been conducted, 
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57 It should be noted that this simple classification misses out numerous studies of aid, for in-
stance, studies of organisational cultures in development aid, aid politics, and aid procedures. The 
intention here, however, is only to classify the studies of aid interventions.  
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 while Type III studies are by and large linked to certain sorts of aid intervention, 
namely those that are implemented using participatory methods. In addition, the 
borders between accountability and learning, as well as between the focus on do-
nors’ intentions and on communities subjected to interventions, are contested.  
The majority of knowledge we possess about aid interventions in general comes 
from evaluations of various kinds.58 Evaluations of development interventions es-
sentially serve two purposes, namely to improve future aid interventions through 
feedback of lessons learned, and to provide a basis for accountability, including the 
provision of information to the public (DAC, 1992: 132). Since these two aims are 
seldom fulfilled in one evaluation, an evaluation is often referred to as either forma-
tive, that is, it is conducted for the benefit of those managing the programme and 
therefore seeks to deepen understanding of what has happened in order to enhance 
future performance; or as summative, that is, it is conducted for the benefit of ex-
ternal stakeholders (for instance politicians, tax-payers etc.) in order to record 
achievements (Europe Commission, 2001; Kruse, Kyllönen et al., 1997).  
3.2.1 Goal-bound summative evaluations (Type I) 
This section deals with the summative evaluation that is by far the most widespread 
of the two evaluation types. It analyses why this particular type of evaluation has 
become the dominant kind and what sort of information we can draw from it. The 
reason for its dominance should be sought partly in the history of evaluation devel-
opment, with it roots in the United States, combined with specific events in Den-
mark, and partly in the close link between aid evaluations and aid management 
tools. These reasons lead to evaluation being by and large goal-bound, that is, 
evaluations assess whether or not politically articulated aims have been imple-
mented or not, as well as estimating the end effect of an intervention. Moreover, 
quantitative data dominates, as economists were in the forefront in developing 
methods of evaluation. 
Evaluation as we know it today – its methodology, its theory and its profession-
alism – has its roots in the 1960s’ expansion of the welfare state in the United 
States, which created a void of knowledge between grant-awarding authorities and 
policy-formulating authorities. In order to fill this gap, evaluations were called for. 
                                                 
58 No consensus exists as regards the precise definition of an evaluation. However, the concept is 
used to test the coherence and applicability of a programme, that is, an ex ante evaluation; to assess 
the immediate results of an implementation, that is, an ex nunc evaluation; and to examine the final 
results of a programme, that is, an ex post evaluation (Virtanen and Uusikylä, 2004). In the field of 
development aid, DAC defines an evaluation as ‘an examination as systematic and objective as pos-
sible of an ongoing or completed project or programme, its design, implementation and results, with 
the aim of determining its efficiency, effectiveness, impact, sustainability and the relevance of the 
objectives’ (quoted from (Berlage and Stokke, 1992: 5). 
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 To the fore in this development were institutions requiring information that could 
readily be applied by policy-makers. Thus, quantitative data that could easily be 
transformed into tables and figures, with information on outputs, outcomes and 
cost-effectiveness, was preferred to qualitative data that could only with difficulty 
be used for these purposes. Simultaneously, the political authorities approached 
American social scientists, especially economists, in order to obtain guidance in de-
signing evaluations of social programmes. American social science in the 1960s 
was dominated by the positivistic paradigm: evaluation research consequently also 
became dominated by this line of inference, that is, universally valid conclusions 
about a whole phenomenon were drawn from a number of observations. In line 
with this, conclusions regarding programme success or failure were transferred 
from one context to another (Albæk, 2001; Krogstrup, 2001; Virtanen and Uusi-
kylä, 2004). 
Evaluation of Danish development aid began in the 1960s. The first comprehen-
sive evaluation of a Danish development project is claimed to have influenced the 
design of aid evaluations in Denmark ever since. In the late 1950s, an agricultural 
training school project in southern India was started with the aim of making the 
beneficiaries adopt improved agricultural methods. Almost a decade after its 
launch, it was decided to evaluate the merits of the programme.59 The evaluation 
team concluded that there was no significant difference as regards the adoption of 
agricultural methods between the students who had attended the training school and 
those who had either attended the school before the project was initiated or at-
tended other schools. The evaluation created a heated debate regarding the role of 
development aid because the project was among the first Danish development pro-
jects. The project’s lack of success led to a suspension of research-based evalua-
tions of Danish development aid (Folke, 1998: 78f),60 which were replaced by a 
more standardised approach to evaluation, mostly conducted by short-term consult-
ants. 
The institutionalisation of aid evaluations in Europe began in the early 1980s, 
but most bilateral donors still did not systematise evaluations, and only a minority 
of aid projects and programmes were evaluated. However, this soon changed: for-
                                                 
59 Folke, S. et al. (1969): An Evaluation of the Danish Mysore Project. Copenhagen: Mellem-
folkeligt Samvirke. 
60 In the words of one of the researchers, ‘as a result of our evaluation…[Danida] more than 
doubts the advisability of conducting extensive investigations of development projects; investiga-
tions that seek to penetrate deeply through the application of social science methods’ (Jørgensen, 
1972: 79 (own translation)). Twenty years later, Schaumburg-Müller (1991: 103) elaborated on the 
role of this particular evaluation: ‘It was felt that this type of evaluation had given a bad reputation 
to sincere development work…. For some time, there was an aversion on the policy level not only to 
ex post evaluations, but also to some degree to social science development research in general’.
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 eign aid became increasingly exposed to criticism, and aid agencies, both bilateral 
and multilateral, responded with an added emphasis on evaluations.61  
Throughout this period, the quantity of evaluations increased dramatically. Con-
cepts, methods and approaches in aid evaluation were consolidated especially 
through the work done in DAC’s Expert Group in Aid Evaluation.62 Furthermore, 
greater attention was paid to the longer-term effects of aid interventions.63 Conse-
quently, an increasing proportion of evaluations were ex post, and in accordance 
with this trend, in 1986 the Chairman of the Board of Danida recommended that 
Danida evaluations should preferably investigate the long-term effects of aid 
(Schaumburg-Müller, 1991: 107f). Meanwhile, new forms of aid were emerging 
and slowly replacing old ones: for instance, project aid was replaced with non-
project aid, including programme aid. These new challenges were to a large extent 
met by aid evaluations: whereas no thematic or cross-cutting evaluations had been 
made prior to 1985, four were conducted in the following two years (Schaumburg-
Müller, 1991: table 1). Recently, new forms of evaluation have emerged that aim to 
increase the learning dimension as well as pay more attention to the communities 
that are the subject of the interventions. However, the core objective of the great 
majority of evaluations is maintained, namely to answer the question of whether a 
project or programme for which a donor has provided funds has achieved its stated 
objectives or not.64  
A number of other reasons have been suggested for the dominance of the sum-
mative evaluation, among them the role of the tax-payers and lack of time. Ireland, 
McGregor et al. (2003: 420) actually suggest that development staff seldom have 
the ‘time to consider whether they are “doing the right thing” as they are too busy 
demonstrating they are “doing things right”’. More likely, however, the dominance 
of the summative evaluation is related to the close link between the aid manage-
ment tool, the logical framework approach (LFA) and aid evaluations.65
                                                 
61 See Ridell (1987) for an impressive account of the various critiques of aid. 
62 In 1997, this group changed its name to the Working Party on Aid Evaluation. 
63 The increased focus on longer-term effects took off after the publication of Does Aid Work?, 
which summarised and analysed a large number of evaluations (Cassen, 1986). 
64 Evaluations often serve as justifications for continuations of interventions. Both so-called suc-
cesses and failures may serve as basis for continuation, either with minor modifications or with ma-
jor reformulations. However, evaluations seldom assess the very idea of planned interventions. 
Therefore, they seldom recommend discontinuity of the intervention or the intervener (Long, 2001). 
65 Disagreements persist as to whether or not LFA is still exerting a major influence on the way 
we perceive evaluations. Europe Commission (2001) and Gasper (1997; 2000), for instance, see a 
clear link between the two, whereas Cracknell (2000: 47ff) argues that although LFA did indeed in-
fluence aid evaluation thinking until the late 1980s, since then participatory methods have gained 
ground and thus pushed LFA aside. Disregarding these controversies, the Terms of Reference of ex-
ternal evaluations most often specifically demand LFA-like approaches, suggesting that LFA influ-
ences the way evaluations are perceived. The following quote is a typical example of advocating a 
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 From the very beginning, development interventions became tied up with plan-
ning and management tools. The project cycle is the best known illustration of this 
in the aid business. The project cycle was first introduced by the World Bank in or-
der to make sure that a high quality was maintained in the diverse projects the Bank 
was involved in. Since then, the project cycle has been developed and refined sev-
eral times. However, the central idea of a project/programme/policy that runs 
through several pre-defined progressive phases, no matter its content, is main-
tained.66
In order to streamline the work in the various phases, a number of supplemen-
tary planning and management tools were developed. The most famous of these 
tools is the LFA, which was developed for USAID in the late 1960s on the basis of 
standard American management tools to manage the project cycle. A series of pro-
ject evaluations had concluded that USAID’s projects only had limited success due 
to a lack of clear objectives and of standardised project formats. Precisely these fac-
tors were dealt with in the LFA. It therefore soon became an integral part of 
USAID’s work, and by the mid-1980s almost all major donors had adopted LFA or 
a similar planning and management tool. Today, all these donors have produced 
LFA guidelines,67 and the approach now directs all phases in development aid, 
from the initial planning phases to the ex post evaluation.  
In many ways the LFA reflected the view of the time: that is, it was assumed 
that a single organisation could implement a (controllable) change via a project. Es-
sentially, the LFA perceives the development process as a causal chain of events 
described in the logical framework or ‘logframe’. The logframe is a table that 
summarises and connects the main elements of the planned intervention.68 In es-
                                                                                                                                        
close link between LFA and evaluations: ‘The overall objective is to evaluate the programme’s 
long-term impact…. Based on the ToR, the team is required to evaluate the B-t-B Programme in 
terms of the achievements of its objectives’ (Danida, 2000b: 4).  
66 This idea of stages was first described by Baum (1970), who identified four different phases 
that all World Bank projects go through, namely: identification, preparation, appraisal and supervi-
sion. The idea of different stages was soon taken up by other donors, who developed the cycle ac-
cording to their needs. Hence, the exact number of phases, as well as the names given to them, var-
ies (Baum, 1978). 
67 The Nordic countries adopted the German version of the LFA, ZOPP. Danida has applied the 
LFA since 1989 (Danida, 1996). Even though other planning and management tools have been in-
troduced from time to time into the aid business, LFA comes closest to being an ‘industry standard’ 
(Crawford and Bryce, 2003). 
68 The ‘planned intervention’ is based on an idea of rationality. It implies that development can 
be predicted and controlled (the idea of ‘social engineering’), that it is possible to break with the 
past (the idea of ‘discontinuity’), that development may only be set in motion by outside interven-
tions (the ‘cargo image’ of intervention), and that recipient communities are homogeneous entities. 
However, these four pillars of ‘planned intervention’ have been heavily criticised, especially in the 
African context: development interventions are not inserted in a vacuum, history is not eradicated, 
development takes place continuously from the inside, and target groups are distinctively heteroge-
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 sence the matrix consists of two ‘logics’, vertical and horizontal. The former refers 
to the main intention of the project/programme. It then seeks to clarify the cause-
and-effect logic between the assumptions and the objectives. The latter refers to the 
means by which the objectives are met, that is, the measurement of resources and 
the results of the project/programme. In sum, the logframe matrix provides an 
overview of the project’s objectives, that is, its goal, outputs and activities, measur-
able indicators, possible data sources, and major assumptions and risks related to 
the project. In this way, inputs are directly related to activities that are linked to re-
sults. These results are then connected to the project/programme goals, which are 
further related to the overall development objectives. Moreover, the matrix pro-
vides the development agency with indicators to measure the extent to which each 
level is reached and assumptions of the related risks (Coleman, 1987; Crawford and 
Bryce, 2003; Gasper, 2000; Hersoug, 1996; McCaul, 2000). 
This planning and management tool has spread so widely so quickly because of 
its clear advantages for development agencies. The logframe ensures that planners 
make explicit the relationship between the proposed project/programme and the 
overall development objectives of the organisation. In this way, the development 
organisation makes certain that the project/programme falls within the boundaries 
of the mandate of the organisation. Moreover, the logframe provides a clear focus 
on indicators and possible pitfalls in the planning process.  
Des Gasper acknowledges the need for planning in development aid, but he re-
minds us that logframes are simplifications of reality and should be seen as such. 
He also reminds us of some of the major pitfalls related to the use of LFA, namely 
the ex-post application of the logframe to please external funders; the risk of filing 
to much information in the matrix; the risk of omitting important aspects of the pro-
ject just because they do not fit into the matrix; and the risk of seeing the logframe 
as an unchanging framework. Moreover, he is highly sceptical about the growing 
misuse of the LFA. Although LFA is increasingly used as a framework for evalua-
tion,69 in his view, logframes ‘give a predetermined focus which neglects major un-
intended processes and effects. Use of LFA in ex post evaluation is a form of goal-
based evaluation [that] looks mostly at desired intended effects. Further…it consid-
ers the achievement of intended effects in intended ways’ (Gasper, 2000: 23, em-
phasis in original). 
                                                                                                                                        
neous. For critiques of the planned intervention approach, see e.g. (Marcussen, 1999; Marcussen and 
Bergendorff, 2003; Mosse, 1998: 5f). 
69 The European Commission specifically stipulates the use of LFA in evaluation (Europe Com-
mission, 2001: 9). Likewise, DfID’s new ‘output-to-purpose reviews’ directly stem from the LFA 
(Coles, Evans et al., 1998). 
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 Moreover, the use of ‘objectively verifiable indicators’ as proxies for the per-
formance tends to produce quantitative indicators at the expense of the richness of 
qualitative data (Green, 2003). Similarly, the mere form of the logframe excludes 
the analysis of politics, as all problems (including political tensions) must be de-
fined as technical in order to be dealt with successfully (Bierschenk, 1988: 153). 
The logframe therefore limits the possibility of learning and obtaining a richer un-
derstanding of how aid works.70
Thus even though in theory evaluations may be both formative and summative, 
in practice this is seldom the case, as the search for learning conflicts with the plan-
ning and management and with the requests of the external stakeholders. LFA in-
hibits learning, as it points to certain anticipated (and therefore known) effects of an 
intervention. Moreover, external stakeholders demand accountability and ‘...it [the 
learning perspective in evaluation] will often limit the chances that the overall as-
sessment of the project is favourable’ (Danida, 1999a: 22). Therefore, as will be-
come apparent in the next section, the learning perspective is often left out of 
evaluations.  
3.2.2 Goal-free formative evaluations (Type II) 
Type II, also known as goal-free or formative evaluation, is conducted for the bene-
fit of those managing an aid programme and therefore seeks to deepen understand-
ing of what has happened in order to enhance future performance. It has only been 
adopted to a very modest degree. Even though attempts have been made now and 
again to develop evaluations that do not take external stakeholders’ interests into 
account but instead focus solely on the effects of an intervention in order to under-
stand better how it has worked, the main idea of an evaluation, which stems from 
the LFA, remains: it is possible to map the interrelationships between objectives, 
inputs, outputs and outcomes. Thus, formative evaluations have never had much 
impact upon mainstream evaluations (Albæk, 2001; Krogstrup, 2001). 
However, several initiatives have been made to develop methods that meet the 
reporting needs of the external stakeholders while simultaneously improving the 
performance of the development agency. One of these is the Canadian International 
                                                 
70 Not everybody is convinced that the LFA is advantageous to development work. Crawford and 
Bryce (2003), for instance, point out the static nature of the LFA, Aune (2000) its exclusionary con-
cepts (which are also seen as a strength of the LFA, in so far as it makes everybody speak the same 
language). Hersoug (1996) criticises its inability to deal with uncertainty. In a similar vein, Green 
(2003) argues that the use of LFA tends to produce simplistic strategies to address complex realities 
because the logframe matrix demands simplistic causal hierarchies. Others do not see the LFA itself 
as a problem but rather the people using it, who simply do not do their work properly (Hubbard, 
2001), and expect too much from a simple planning tool (McCaul, 2000), or do not exploit the 
LFA’s full potential (Sawadogo and Dunlop, 1997). 
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 Development Research Centre, which has developed the so-called ‘Outcome Map-
ping’ method to assess the contributions of development interventions to the 
achievement of outcomes, that is, behavioural change of intended beneficiaries. 
The main aim of the method is not to measure impact, which is actually perceived 
as indeterminate, but to improve the design and implementation of development 
programmes (Earl, Carden et al., 2001). The inventors of the method claim that it 
includes the community perspective, but it would be more accurate to state that 
they adopt participatory methods in the outcome mapping process. 
David Mosse’s process-monitoring approach is hard to categorise according to 
the typology proposed in Figure 3.1. Although it bears hardly any similarities to the 
outcome mapping approach described above, it certainly aims to understand the 
underlying processes of aid, that is, it seeks to learn more about development inter-
ventions. It focuses specifically neither on the intentions of the donors nor on the 
communities subjected to interventions, but rather takes both into account. The 
process-monitoring approach is guided by recent changes in development aid, that 
is, from projects to sectors and cross-sectoral issues, and from externally planned 
approaches towards more flexible, participatory and learning-oriented approaches. 
According to Mosse (1998), these changes entail attention being directed from the 
intervention to the processes underlying it. Thus, attention must be paid to the vari-
ous stakeholders involved in the intervention (on both sides of the devel-
oper/developee relationship) as well as their different perceptions of the relation-
ship; to potential conflicts between stakeholders as well as likely collaborations; 
and to events and relationships both inside and outside the formal boundaries of the 
intervention. Moreover, the approach places emphasis on the feedback of inputs 
from the monitoring process to the development system whereby the basis for a 
learning approach is provided. 
3.2.3 Participatory evaluations (Type III) 
The dividing line between the focus on donors’ intentions and the focus on com-
munities subject to these interventions is not clear cut. Various participatory ap-
proaches to evaluations have been developed, their main purpose being to take the 
community perspective into account when testing the effects of an intervention. 
However, disagreement persists as to whether participatory approaches really take 
the community perspectives into account or rather concentrate on the intervention 
itself (Folke, 2000). Likewise, it has been questioned whether or not participatory 
methods are the most appropriate way of uncovering information about communi-
ties subject to interventions: while participatory methods may be an efficient way to 
reveal technical information, ‘it has not in practice provided particularly good in-
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 struments for the kind of analysis of social relationships which projects require’ 
(Mosse, 1998: 15). Actually, participatory methods are ‘often more likely to ob-
scure than reveal the local social relations which shape them’ (Mosse, 1998: 16).  
Participation, like partnership and impact, is a catchphrase of current develop-
ment discourse. Therefore, assessments of various kinds and origins now include 
participatory methods. ‘But it is well known that in this area there is a huge gap be-
tween rhetoric and reality. Specifically, the number of truly participatory impact as-
sessments that have been carried out is limited’ (Folke and Nielsen, 2006b: 13). 
3.2.4 The anthropology of development (Type IV) 
Unlike the three previous categories, this category of intervention studies is not 
characterised by donor evaluations and donor assessments. Instead, the point of de-
parture is the dynamics of development, in relation to either a specific intervention 
or the development policies framing it. Intervention studies in reality cover a wide 
spectrum of studies, as indicated in footnote 55 on page 55. One distinguishing fea-
ture, however, is that they focus on the interplay between the intervention and the 
intervened, unlike the previous three types, which focus on the effects (or impacts) 
of an intervention. In other words, while Types I to III see the intervention as a one-
way process, studies within this category perceive it as an interaction, that is, a two-
way process. Furthermore, in general Type IV studies are grounded in rich data, 
based either on traditional ethnographic methods, such as interviews and participant 
observation, or on investigations of meanings and logics in texts using discursive 
methods.  
Ethnographic studies of aid interventions already have a long history. They 
originate in major developments in the field of both the sociology and the anthro-
pology of development in the 1980s, when the case for an actor-oriented approach 
to the analysis of development interventions was put forward.71 The actor-oriented 
approach paid attention to the interplay between development-internal and devel-
opment-external factors. In other words, the new approach essentially argued that a 
sole focus on structures was unsatisfactory in as much as development interven-
tions enter into the life-worlds of the groups affected by the intervention. These ac-
tors try to make the best of the intervention and, in doing so, they modify it. The 
precise result of these modifications was seen as a result of interactions, negotia-
                                                 
71 Actor-oriented approaches had already been suggested in other areas of social science in the 
1960s and 1970s. However, according to Long (2001: 14) these studies were too much focused on 
individual responses and therefore did not grasp the complexity of the social processes involved. 
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 tions and social struggles between various groups of actors (Long, 2001; Long and 
van der Ploeg, 1989).72  
Studies based this approach also criticised the mechanical conceptualisation of 
development interventions, that is, the separation between policy, implementation 
and outcomes, which was seen as a gross oversimplification, as no direct causal 
link exists between these ‘phases’. Instead, interventions should been perceived as 
processes that involve recurrent reinterpretations and transformations. As such 
‘“outcomes” often result from factors which cannot be directly linked to the im-
plementation of a particular development programme’ (Long, 2001: 25). Similarly, 
the very idea of development interventions as discrete projects in time and space 
was forcefully criticised: the ‘outcomes’ of an intervention are not confined to the 
target group, but most often spread to other parts of the population. In a similar 
vein, since development interventions are continuously initiated, actors in the de-
velopment arena73 may have their own experiences, which form their response to 
the intervention. Therefore, interventions should be seen as part of a chain or a flow 
of events located in a broader framework of activities (Long, 2001: 32). 
Systematic ethnographic studies were therefore called for in order to understand 
the interplay between intervention and actors. The most famous such studies appear 
in the collection of articles dealing with the aid interface in Sociologia Ruralis 
18(2/3), but the interplay has been dealt with extensively since (see, e.g., Bulletin 
de l’APAD; (Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan, 1997; Crehan and von Oppen, 
1994; Nielsen, 2000a; Olivier de Sardan, 2005)).74 These studies interpret devel-
                                                 
72 Alongside these studies of the interface of aid, several post-structuralist analyses of the devel-
opment discourse were undertaken. The two most influential studies are James Ferguson’s study of 
a Canadian (World Bank-supported) development project in rural Lesotho (Ferguson, 1990) and 
Arturo Escobar’s deconstruction of the concept of development (Escobar, 1995). In his study, Fer-
guson demonstrates how development organisations depoliticise development by concealing politi-
cal issues as development matters while simultaneously establishing development as a discourse that 
everybody supports. Likewise, he demonstrates how development interventions based on a depoliti-
cised discourse have an effect even when they fail on their own terms. Escobar takes a more radical 
stance in his study. He sees development as a rationalising technical discourse that conceals goals of 
dominance. These and other post-structuralist analyses of development have made us aware of the 
wide gap between policies and practice in development, but critics argue that they risk over-
generalising the motives of donor organisations and development professionals (Olivier de Sardan, 
2005). 
73 The ‘arena’ ‘is a place of concrete confrontation between social actors interacting on common 
issues’ (Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan, 1997: 240). In the anthropology of development litera-
ture, the arena is taken to encompass development interventions. In this type of arena, the social ac-
tors may not be endowed with the same level of influence or the same level of power, but they all 
are driven by interest in the intervention, and they all select and interpret the intervention in ways 
that are best suited for their purposes. Therefore, in practice (as opposed to the theoretical line up of 
a planned intervention) the development intervention becomes an unpredictable phenomenon 
(Olivier de Sardan, 2005). 
74 Most research within this line of thinking stems from the Association euro-africaine pour 
l’anthropologie du changement sociale et du développement, a Franco-African research network that 
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 opment projects as political arenas with conflicting interests. They ask questions 
such as who are the recipients, how are the resources allocated, and what is the ob-
jective of the development project? Moreover, they approach the various logics that 
determine how the different actors act.  
Inspired especially by the post-structuralist writings of authors like Ferguson 
and Escobar, Sharma (2006) has conducted a study of the impact of Finnish bilat-
eral aid to the Nepalese water sector. He argues that the achievements presented in 
official project documents differ substantially from the impact of the intervention. 
The impact is by no means limited to the outcomes of the project, but relates to the 
way the intervention is brought into play by the various actors. Moreover, the im-
pact is different in the different areas of intervention, depending largely on geo-
graphical characteristics, ethnic groups and choice of technology. Impact is there-
fore not restricted to the technical achievements of an intervention, but also covers 
all the (unintended) political consequences that are by-products of the interface be-
tween the intervention and the socio-economic reality in the area of intervention, 
and beyond. Among the most important impacts of the Finnish water project in Ne-
pal are the following. First, there is the legitimation of one historical narrative over 
another, and thus the justification of one ethnic group’s access to resources over 
another group’s access, owing partly to the way the project document narrates local 
history, and partly to the short historical time-frame of the intervention. Secondly, 
there is the creation of new leadership roles in the intervention areas through the 
project’s emphasis on local NGOs as implementers of the intervention and thus an 
alteration of local power relations: in order to become a leader, one needs prior ex-
perience with NGOs and donors, needs to be able to speak the language of the do-
nors, and have the extra time to do the work. Finally there has been widespread cor-
ruption due to the decentralisation of the procurement process. 
Above all, these ethnographic studies of the aid interface inform us that the ‘out-
comes’ of a development project or programme seldom result from factors that can 
be directly linked to the implementation of an intervention. The societies in which 
interventions are implemented are characterised by complex political, economical 
and cultural processes. Likewise, development, and development interventions, are 
social phenomena that involve several actors with dissimilar interests and motives 
both among the developers and the developed. Hence, ‘outcomes’ are the product 
                                                                                                                                        
focuses especially on the aid interface in rural areas in Francophone Africa. Researchers within this 
tradition accept that development exists in Africa and that it is not likely to disappear. Their aim is 
therefore to explain the potential conflicts related to development, such as the continuous reconfigu-
ration of power development involves (Batterbury, 2002). Numerous studies, especially by re-
searchers based in Wageningen, in the Netherlands, have also been based directly on the actor-
oriented approach proposed by Norman Long. 
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 of a complex interplay of factors, of which the development intervention is but one. 
Moreover, these studies inform us that ‘a development project necessarily has un-
predicted effects’ (Olivier de Sardan, 1988: 217).  
The insights drawn from this large group of studies categorised under the head-
ing ‘the anthropology of development’ clearly offer a great deal to the understand-
ing of aid. Among the most important implications are: 
 
1. The vivid descriptions of the development arena have partly opened the black 
box of development interventions by illuminating the multitude of meanings 
of development and the struggle for power b among the various actors in-
volved in the development arena. 
2. The actor-oriented approach calls for a rejection of a linear conception of do-
nor interventions in which plans are agreed, implemented with certain inputs 
and outputs, and evaluated. 
3. Context is being acknowledged, that is, development interventions are not 
seen as happening in a vacuum. Rather, they are implemented in societies 
characterised by complex political, economical and cultural processes, the in-
tervention being only one of many processes taking place simultaneously.75 
Time and space matters, and therefore the experience of one intervention 
cannot readily be transferred to another context. 
4. This approach places emphasis on the unintended effects of donor interven-
tions and that outcomes are not directly linked to inputs. 
5. The anthropology of development literature pays attention to problems re-
lated to the use of technical language in, for instance, policy papers, in order 
for donor organisations to be able to deal with development interventions. 
 
However, the approach has a few shortcomings in relation to the study of aid 
impact in the context of private-sector development in Ghana: 
 
• At a general level, new forms of aid of aid are emerging. Project aid is now 
being abandoned in favour of programme and policy aid. This makes the ap-
proach difficult to pursue methodologically, as interventions become even 
harder to delimit in time and space, and actors more difficult to define.76 
                                                 
75 David Mosse criticises many of these studies for losing sight of the ‘problem of policy’; the 
actor-oriented approach puts too much focus on the realities faced by the different actors and 
thereby, it neglects the struggles encountered at the policy formulating level (Mosse, 2005). 
76 It has been claimed by, for instance, Nielsen (2004) that since in reality programme aid con-
sists of numerous small projects, the approach can still be applied. However, in the case of the Gha-
naian PSDP this would imply approximately a hundred projects. At a more general level, the idea of 
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 • Similarly, a large part of this literature deals exclusively with development at 
the village level and places great emphasis on local politics and on how con-
figurations of local politics change with development. The Ghanaian PSDP 
does not avoid local politics, but the mere fact that the enterprises are located 
all over the southern part of the country makes these aspects harder to study. 
In a similar vein, the magnitude and diversity of the people and institutions 
involved in the politics of the PSDP may make other factors more powerful in 
explaining how the intervention has impacted upon the target group, as well 
as upon others. 
• The approach centres on conflicts in the development arena. Hence, there is a 
risk that conflicts are sought where none exist. Linked to this, there is a risk 
of overemphasising the intentionality of the social actions (Nielsen, 2000a). 
• The ethnographic approach to the study of aid contains an inherent conflict: 
its focus on inductive inference requires that the development arena be spa-
tially as well as periodically delimited in order for researchers to explore the 
interplay between intervention and actors. On the contrary, the approach calls 
for the acceptance of unintended ‘outcomes’ and a lack of boundaries to the 
intervention. 
3.3 Impact: the new buzzword in development 
The preceding section explained how evaluations of aid interventions have become 
an integral part of the development business. It also described how one particular 
type of evaluation, that is, summative evaluation, has become the dominant type. 
Most evaluations are conducted by professional consultants on a short-term basis. 
This has had consequences for the sort of information we may obtain about aid in-
terventions. First, it relates mostly to the fulfilment of donor objectives. Secondly, 
institutional settings, political and economic environments and power relations are 
treated only superficially. Thirdly, it seldom takes derived consequences into ac-
count. Finally, it is confined to the intervention area. These limitations seem to be 
recognised now by many donors, who are now generally demanding information 
regarding impact,77 which is now an integral term in the development business.  
Unfortunately, the intense focus on impacts does not imply that we now have a 
great knowledge of how aid works. Of course, an increasing number of studies are 
                                                                                                                                        
numerous small projects overlooks the qualitative changes in development aid, from technology 
fixes to organisational changes, and from one-way interference to the idea of partnerships. 
77 External stakeholders are increasingly demanding that donors demonstrate impact (Hopkins, 
1995). Likewise, NGO projects funded by bilateral and multilateral donors are increasingly made 
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 being conducted, and a renewed focus on the processes of aid has meant that our 
knowledge is increasing. However, a large proportion of the impact literature does 
not seek to enhance our knowledge of the processes of aid, but simply tries to refine 
the methods used to measure whether aid has worked or not. 
Table 3.1 reviews a dozen recent contributions to the aid impact literature. On 
the face of it, the definitions of impact presented in the literature only differ from 
one another slightly. However, placed on a continuum stretching from a linear defi-
nition of impact – that is, as something beyond outputs and effects in a logframe, to 
a complex one perceiving impact as something that happens through interplay be-
tween intervention and society – it becomes obvious that the differences are of a 
more fundamental character: the former stem from a blueprint planning perspective 
to development, while the latter are inspired by insights from the anthropology of 
development.  
In line with LFA, impact sometimes refers to the achievements of the objectives 
of the project (White, 1996). More often, impact is perceived as the last (and sel-
dom reached) stage in a process of linear monitoring and evaluation, in which case 
impact refers to a more thorough examination of the effects, that is, the conse-
quences, of a project or programme on the intended beneficiaries (Oakley, Pratt et 
al., 1998). Common to these definitions is the search for answers to the problem of 
accountability. This type of definition seems to draw heavily on the planning litera-
ture in general and the impact-assessment literature in particular.78 Experiences 
from these fields have been included in framing of today’s aid-impact ap-
proaches.79 Alongside these more conventional definitions, more complex defini-
tions of impact have also seen the light of the day. On the one hand, these defini-
tions draw inspiration from the ‘anthropology of development’ approach. On the 
other hand, a line can also be drawn from developments within the field of evalua-
tion to the more complex definitions of impact.  
                                                                                                                                        
conditional on a commitment to evaluate the impact of the programme (Earl, Carden et al. 2001). 
Hence, impact in this sense implies more thorough information as well as greater accountability. 
78 A greater part of the aid-impact literature stems directly from the impact-assessment literature, 
especially literature related to Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and Social Impact Assess-
ment (SIA). EIA emerged in the late 1950s as a way to put pressure on the US government to im-
prove controls over pollution. Later EIA was introduced as a systematic method to predict the likely 
environmental consequences of a project (Roche, 1999). The form and procedures of the SIA derive 
from the EIA: SIA was created to guide governments in making the right social decisions and in-
vestments (Ingersoll, 1990). SIA is now an integrated part of the framework for incorporating par-
ticipation and social analysis into the design and delivery of development projects in multilateral 
donor organisations such as the World Bank (Baker, 2000; Vanclay, 2000) and the Inter-American 
Development Bank (Dietz and Pfund, 1988). 
79 Even though both EIA and SIA are predictive in nature, they still seem to form the basis of 
new approaches to (ex post) impact assessment. One such approach is the ‘integrated impact as-
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 Table 3.1. Definitions of impact: some illustrations 
Success or failure? Linear definitions of impact 
-the achievements of the objectives of the project (White, 1996) 
-the contribution the outputs have made to achieving the goal of the interven-
tion (Hubbard, 2000) 
-the outcomes and effects of a development project, as part of the process of 
project implementation (Phillips and Edwards, 2000) 
-the achievements of objectives and consequences of a particular intervention 
(Adams, Batchelor et al., 2000)  
-the positive and negative changes which …[the] programmes have produced in 
the lives of all members of the target group (Marconi and Mosley, 2004) 
-to determine more broadly whether the programme had the desired effects on 
individuals, households, and institutions, and whether these effects are attribut-
able to the program intervention (Baker, 2000) 
Im
pa
ct
 a
ss
es
sm
en
t 
-both positive and negative consequences, whether foreseen and expected or 
not (Danida, 1999a: 56) 
-to assess what changes had been experienced by people and how the organisa-
tion had or had not contributed to these changes (Kelly, Kilby et al., 2004) 
-the backward and forward linkages to enterprises not directly assisted by the 
project (Hyman and Dearden, 1998) 
-the systematic analysis of the lasting or significant changes – positive or nega-
tive, intended or unintended – in people’s lives brought about by a given action 
or series of actions (Roche, 1999) 
-incorporates both the intended and the unintended effects while and at the 
same time including an analysis of changes during a longer time-span, and sees 
the intervention as one of several factors influencing a particular development 
(Folke, 1998) 
Im
pa
ct
 st
ud
y 
 
-the social processes that are initiated when development projects are installed, 
expected or not, included in the objective of the project or not, and among the 
project target group or among other social groups (Nielsen, 2000b: 33) 
How does aid work? Complex definitions of impact 
 
Even though ‘impact’ as defined in the upper half of Table 3.1 hardly has any 
meaning beyond that of the expected consequences on the intended beneficiaries, it 
is still the most common meaning of the word. Lately, numerous different aid im-
pact-assessment methods have been proposed by NGOs and academics alike. Most 
of these approaches fall within the spectrum depicted in Table 3.1, that is, from a 
very instrumental definition of impact to a more complex one.  
Beginning with an example from the upper half of the table, let us consider the 
‘potential impact’ approach proposed by Hubbard (2000). This approach draws 
heavily on the LFA; impact is defined as the contribution the outputs have made to 
achieve the goal of the intervention. In that sense, impact is perceived as a stage 
beyond efficiency and effectiveness and is closely linked to the logframe catego-
                                                                                                                                       
sessment for sustainable development’, integrating economic, environmental and social dimensions 
in the assessment; this has been proposed by (Bond, Curran et al., 2001). 
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 ries: purpose and goal. The very word ‘potential’ makes this approach different 
from most others, as it attempts to compare the actual impact of a project with its 
potential impact, that is, its potential benefits for the intended beneficiaries.80 Not 
surprisingly, the ‘potential impact’ approach does not offer any new insights into 
the social or political processes of an intervention. 
The various approaches that emerged from NGO circles show some similarities. 
They take the financial and organisational constraints into account, that is, they 
seek a fast and relatively cheap way to assess the impact of their projects. In gen-
eral, these approaches seek to address questions such as: are we having an impact? 
is it sustainable? for whom? and, what is the nature of this impact? The goal for 
many NGOs is to have common methodological guidelines. Therefore, there is a 
tendency for smaller NGOs to copy a set of methods and indicators used by larger 
NGOs (Hopkins, 1995). However, there are also notable differences. Broadly 
speaking, NGO aid impact assessments seem to fall in either of the two following 
categories: participatory impact evaluations or effect studies,81 that is, Type III or 
Type I studies. The former refers to an approach used by, for instance, Oxfam and 
Action Aid to locate impact assessment at field level. It places a high value on the 
involvement of local people in gathering as well as analysing data and negotiating 
its meaning and validity. In addition, it tries not to follow a pre-determined path, 
but rather places the emphasis on the community perspective. Effect studies, on the 
other hand, derive from the effectiveness view of assessing foreign aid. Examples 
of the latter are the ODI impact studies on the alleviation of rural poverty (Adams, 
Batchelor et al., 2000; INTRAC, 2001). Analogous to the discussion in previous 
sections, in reality these two types of assessment serve two different purposes. Par-
ticipatory impact evaluations aim to increase knowledge about how the project or 
programme is perceived locally as well as serves accountability purposes, while ef-
fect studies only serve the latter.  
Due to a combination of practical difficulties in developing countries (data is of-
ten limited, and baseline or monitoring data with which to compare them are often 
lacking) and the costly and time-consuming nature of some participatory methods, 
some NGOs have adopted an approach ‘in between’ the two presented above. The 
Christian relief organisation, Tearfund, uses the phrase ‘impact assessment’ to refer 
                                                 
80 The potential benefits are derived from an exercise that focuses on the obstacles to achieving 
the objective, the extent to which development assistance can help to remove these obstacles, and 
any external costs imposed by the project. Following this logic, the highest potential benefits (and 
thus highest potential impact) are to be found where the positive effects of a project are prevented 
by obstacles that can only be removed by the development assistance and that inflict no costs on 
others. 
81 Of course, other approaches exist, as a large NGO evaluation synthesis study demonstrated 
(Kruse, Kyllönen et al., 1997). 
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 to an evaluation of the achievement of objectives and the consequences of a par-
ticular intervention. They include a number of fashionable terms in the policy 
guidelines, such as holistic approach, joint accountability and learning. However, 
when it comes to the methodology used to assess impact, the guidelines recom-
mend that rigorous and feasible methods should be applied, that benchmark analy-
sis should be used, and that attempts should be made to compare data (Adams, 
Batchelor et al., 2000).  
Other NGOs have tried to incorporate more complex definitions of impact in the 
assessments of their projects and programmes. Hyman and Dearden (1998) de-
scribe the impact assessment of four American NGOs that support or implement 
business-development programmes. The ‘broader impact’ of a particular project is 
here described in terms of the backward and forward linkages to enterprises not di-
rectly assisted by the project. Moreover, various levels are included in the analysis, 
namely the enterprise level, the household level and the community level. Thus on 
the one hand it is possible to assess whether or not the projects have met their ob-
jectives, while on the other it is possible to obtain a brief overview of the derived 
impacts of the projects, for example, how the changed income levels of the in-
tended beneficiaries have affected the way they purchase inputs, and who they sub-
contract to, respectively.  
The late 1990s also saw an increased interest in systematic impact studies in 
Denmark. Danida and a few large Danish NGOs commissioned a large-scale NGO 
impact study, which was conducted by Danish and foreign researchers in 1998-99. 
These NGOs had in fact been attempting to measure the impact of their projects for 
some time, but their results vis-à-vis determining the actual impact were meagre, in 
the sense that they did not know how to cope with the lack of base-line data, lack of 
systematic registration of the results of the projects, lack of clear targets etc.82 
(Kaare and Nielsen, 1999; Madsen, 1999; Oakley, 1999; Sultana and Folke, 1999). 
Experiences from this study formed the basis for the four-year AID- research 
programme at the Danish Institute for International Studies (formerly Centre for 
Development Research).83 Slightly different definitions of impact have been ap-
plied in this programme’s impact studies. However, common to them all is their 
adoption of a so-called ‘broad’ (or complex) definition of impact that is based on 
                                                 
82Major impact studies of NGO programmes were also conducted elsewhere.  Madsen (1999: 
36f) highlights studies in Finland, Sweden and Norway from the mid-1990s. Insights from these 
studies have greatly informed the Danish NGO Impact Study.  
83 Several impact studies have been conducted as part of this research programme, including 
(Adam and Nielsen, 2002; Boesen, Ravnborg et al., 2003; Folke, 2001; Sørensen, Bekele et al., 
2004; Wilson, 2004). More recently, the experiences of this programme have been compiled in an 
anthology entitled ‘Aid Impact and Poverty Reduction’ (Folke and Nielsen, 2006a).  
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 the work of Roche (1999), who, referring to an NGO impact study, defines impact 
assessment as ‘the systematic analysis of the lasting or significant changes – posi-
tive or negative, intended or not84 – in people’s lives brought about by a given ac-
tion or series of actions’.85 This definition has been modified several times by the 
research group in order to take into account, amongst other things, the time dimen-
sion (some changes happen during the implementation of a project or programme, 
while others are only experienced long after its end ) and the spatial dimension (are 
changes limited to the project area, or can unintended consequences be found in 
neighbouring villages or regions too?) (Folke and Nielsen, 2006b). 
3.4 ‘No common recipe for wider impact studies’: designing the PSDP 
impact in Ghana 
Before proceeding with the design of the aid impact study of the PSDP in Ghana, 
the main conclusions of this chapter so far will be highlighted: 
 
• Knowledge about aid interventions based on aid evaluations is at best spo-
radic, clustered around the expected positive results. At worst the goal-
boundedness, the close link to aid management tools, and especially the de-
mands from external stakeholders, result in empty political judgements re-
garding the merits of the intervention. 
• Neither goal-free evaluations nor participatory evaluations have won general 
acceptance. Interesting insights may be drawn from a few of these studies, 
but in general they do not provide insights about impact that are not dealt 
with by Type IV studies.  
• The anthropology of development has enriched our understanding of devel-
opment interventions with regard to local communities. Insights from this 
area have paved the way for present-day impact studies. 
o However, the ethnographic methods used in these studies are less suit-
able for a study of aid intervention in the Ghanaian private sector with a 
very heterogeneous group of actors spread over the whole of southern 
Ghana than the mostly technical interventions in rural areas that have 
been the main focus of the ‘anthropology of development’. 
                                                 
84 In relation to, for instance, Danida’s definition of impact (see Table 3.1), the important word 
here is ‘intended’, in as much as Gasper (2000: 23) reminds us that ‘unintended is a broader cate-
gory than unexpected, since all unexpected effects are unintended but so are some expected ones’. 
85 This definition is not without its problems. For instance, it does not define what ‘lasting and 
significant changes’ are (Nielsen, 2000b), it does not include temporary changes, even though they 
can be just as important as lasting ones, and the momentary effect of a project may eventually have 
a considerable impact on the wider society (Sørensen, 2000). 
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 • The interest in impact has escalated recently from donors and academics 
alike, and new methods and study designs are constantly being put forward. 
However, new insights into the aid--society relationship have lagged behind: 
while a few studies have sought to dig more deeply into the impact of aid in-
terventions, most studies (or rather assessments) have used impact and effects 
interchangeably. 
 
This enquiry is informed by insights from the anthropology of development as 
well as from so-called wider impact studies. While the former makes a case for 
ethnographic studies, the latter maintains that methods should ideally be adapted to 
the specific study: ‘There is no common recipe for wider impact studies. A key 
point is that the studies must be contextualised and tailor-made in order to uncover 
the relationship between context, intervention, development process and impact’ 
(Folke and Nielsen, 2006b: 14). 
This study takes as its point of departure an understanding of aid interventions as 
complex situations in which different actors with different degrees of influence 
over the intervention pursue different strategies according to their own needs. As 
described in section 1.3, it seeks to provide a deeper understanding of the changes 
that are associated with Danida’s PSDP in Ghana.  
The target beneficiaries of the programme are the Ghanaian enterprises that take 
part in the PSDP via business collaborations with a Danish private company. These 
enterprises form the foundation of the study. The main instrument in this interven-
tion is the transfer of technology and skills from the Danish company to the Ghana-
ian company. In order to increase the understanding of impacts, the concept of 
technological capabilities is applied to the study of changes among the target bene-
ficiaries. However, development interventions become unpredictable phenomena 
by default (Olivier de Sardan, 2005: 186), so that the study must take into account 
other changes related to the target beneficiaries. Moreover, interventions also affect 
non-target groups (elsewhere). The study must therefore also include these groups 
if it is to extend knowledge of the impacts of the intervention. 
In contrast, the PSDP is but one of several developments taking place simulta-
neously. Hence, only some changes may be associated with the development inter-
vention: others are brought about by changes in, for instance, the domestic or world 
economies. What is attributable to the intervention and what is attributable to other 
developments may only be determined with any accuracy on a case-by-case basis. 
For some target beneficiaries, the financial as well as technical inputs related to the 
PSDP lead to considerable transformations with respect to the potential to enhance 
company performance, while the inputs only set minor changes in motion in other 
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 companies. These differences refer to aspects like size, relevance and timing of the 
PSDP in relation to the needs of the target beneficiary (cf. section 8.2.5), but they 
are not confined to these aspects. Just as important for the observed changes are 
changing market preferences, changing demands, changing exchange rates etc. For 
non-target groups, the distinction between what is attributable to the intervention 
and what is not becomes even harder. 
In order to make the study of impacts manageable, three analytical levels have 
been singled out, namely, the enterprise level, the private-sector level, and the level 
of the society as a whole.  
 
1. Impacts at the enterprise level refer to changes among the target group of the 
programme. The analysis at this level seeks to single out changes in partici-
pating Ghanaian enterprises that have come about as a consequence of col-
laboration with a Danish partner via Danida’s PSDP.  
2. Impacts at private-sector level: specifically, how the programme impacts on 
other businesses in Ghana through direct collaboration, competition or trans-
fer of skills. 
3. Impacts at society level, that is, changes in Ghanaian society at large that may 
be associated with the PSDP. Of special importance here is an analysis of 
who benefits from the intervention and the changes in the target group’s la-
bour force, and its competitiveness. 
 
Following the definition of impact presented in section 3.1 above, at the enter-
prise level a distinction is made between the intended impacts on the target group 
and the unintended impacts. The analysis of intended impacts places the emphasis 
first on the role of the PSDP in the enhancement of performance in the Ghanaian 
enterprises, that is, in the shifts in activities which sustain higher incomes for the 
target group. This is done via a scrutiny of changes in technological capabilities in 
these enterprises (see Chapter 4 for further elaboration of the link between busi-
ness-to-business support and the building of technological capabilities). Secondly, 
it focuses on developmental issues, which are only vaguely listed by Danida but in-
clude among other things job creation, production increases, increased product 
quality and variety, and greater profitability for the Ghanaian enterprises that have 
participated in the programme (cf. sections 2.2.2, 8.2). Here unintended impacts in-
clude both positive and negative changes, as well as direct and derived changes that 
affect the target group. Unintended impacts come about because of strategies of se-
lection and sidetracking. Strategies vary from actor to actor and from case to case. 
They include strategies to minimise risks, leverage available resources and appro-
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 priate resources. However, unintended impacts cannot be reduced to strategies of 
selection and sidetracking alone, but also come about simply because two busi-
nesses (from different business systems) are collaborating, facilitated by a devel-
opment organisation. It is therefore impossible to present strict indicators to meas-
ure the unintended impacts of the programme at this level. Instead, actor strategies, 
as well as sidetracking of the programme, will remain the centre of attention in this 
analysis. These strategies find expression in changing trustworthiness, access to 
credit, non-repayment of loans and declining earnings, as shown in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2. Impact indicators at various levels 
Level/focus Indicators 
Investment capabilities 
Production capabilities Core focus Technological capabilities Linkages capabilities 
Employees 
Earnings 
Productivity  
Intended 
impacts Developmental 
measures 
Products (quality/range) 
Trustworthiness  
Access to credit 
Non-repayment of loans 
En
te
rp
ris
e 
Unintended impacts Selection / Sidetracking 
Declining earnings 
Job rotation 
Forward linkages 
Backward linkages 
Competitors 
Business organisations Pr
iv
at
e 
se
ct
or
 
Broader impacts Diffusion of knowledge 
Second-hand machinery 
Employment structure 
Competitiveness 
Im
pa
ct
 in
di
ca
to
rs
 a
t v
ar
io
us
 le
ve
ls 
So
ci
et
y 
Broader impacts 
Access to funding 
 
The analysis of impact at the private-sector level rests on two strands of the litera-
ture. The first is related to the upgrading discussion just mentioned: it deals with 
technology change and how technology transfer from one company to another may 
lead to technological capability building. The second strand of literature, more im-
portant in this context, is that on the business-system approach, which deals with 
how institutions influence the way firms act and interact in a specific (national) 
context. The business-system approach is applied in order to explain possible con-
straints in the diffusion of impacts from the enterprise to the private-sector level. 
The analysis of impacts at this level focuses on how knowledge, skills, and tech-
nology spread from the target group to non-target groups – more specifically to 
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 other private entities in Ghana. Of specific importance here is the diffusion of tech-
nological capabilities to suppliers, retailers and competitors via different forms of 
(close) collaboration, the diffusion of skills through job rotation or the sale of sec-
ond-hand machinery, and the diffusion of technological capabilities through mem-
bership of business organisations.  
The business-system literature also informs the discussion of impact at the soci-
ety level by focusing on significant institutions in Ghanaian society. It thus aids 
analysis of the factors that facilitate or hinder the spread of impacts from the target 
group to society at large. In order to study the broader impacts at this level, atten-
tion is paid to how the PSDP impacts upon the employment structure, competitive-
ness and local stratification by power or wealth. 
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 4. SMALL ENTERPRISES, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, 
TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITIES AND UPGRADING 
This chapter takes the changing conditions for small enterprises in developing 
countries as its point of departure. Small enterprises still constitute the majority of 
enterprises in developing countries, but they are faced with competition from new 
areas, especially cheap imports of consumer goods. The literature on enterprise 
clusters86 and global value chains87 (GVC) suggests that small enterprises have to 
link up locally as well as globally in order to stay competitive. Several donors per-
ceive the small enterprise sector as a potential source of economic growth. They 
therefore spend lots of resources in facilitating their growth either through direct 
support to the enterprises themselves or through support to institutions that help 
them. Most of these programmes share a focus on the improvement of technologi-
cal capabilities, that is, the information and skills that allow productive enterprises 
to use equipment and technology efficiently, through technology transfer and in-
struction (Lall and Latsch, 1999). This is also the case for Danida’s PSDP, which 
seeks to facilitate economic development through company-to-company coopera-
tion (cf. Chapter 2). However, technology transfer does not necessarily lead to a 
strengthening of technological capabilities. The literature suggests that the ability to 
use the new technology and apply it to (new) commercial ends is closely related to 
the technological efforts of the firm (cf. Figure 4.1 page 79). Thus, in order to build 
technological capabilities at company level, efforts must be put into the learning 
process. Moreover, technological capabilities have to be associated with a general 
upgrading process to facilitate enhancement of the firm’s economic performance. 
The overall rationale for donor agencies to support technology transfer to selected 
companies in developing countries rests on the donors’ confidence in knowledge 
and technology spillovers from supported companies to other parts of the private 
                                                 
86 Basically, clusters are sectoral and spatial concentrations of firms. Clusters have recently 
achieved much attention, as they are seen to be a way for (mainly) small enterprises to compete. The 
theoretical heritage of the literature stems mainly from the writings on so-called ‘new industrial dis-
tricts’ in the mid-1980s. Recently, it has been acknowledged that many types of cluster exists, not 
only in developed countries, but also in developing countries (Helmsing, 2001; McCormick, 1999; 
Schmitz and Nadvi, 1999). 
87 A value chain is here defined as a sequence of complementary activities within a certain sec-
tor: it thus incorporates the full range of activities that are required to bring a product or service 
through its various phases, from design, via production and marketing, to consumption and recy-
cling. In line with this, following Gibbon (2003: 616), a global value chain is defined as a sector-
based structure of international trade that develops from the twin phenomena of the dispersal of pro-
duction and market integration. 
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 sector in developing countries. Thus, company-level support is perceived as foster-
ing economic growth at the society level. Knowledge and technology spillovers are, 
however, not straightforward, but are based on horizontal and vertical linkages, that 
is, linkages among companies at the same stage of the production process and link-
ages among companies at different stages respectively.  
Figure 4.1 seeks to outline the basic relationship proposed in this chapter. Thus, 
after an introductory presentation of small enterprises in SSA and the changing 
situation in which they are operating, the chapter continues with a short account of 
technology transfer in section two. Numerous studies deal with the generation, dif-
fusion, adaptation and transfer of technology within companies, between compa-
nies, between countries, and at various levels. This chapter will not offer a compre-
hensive account of this literature but instead place a special focus on clarifying im-
portant concepts in the debate. Moreover, it will point to a much neglected issue in 
the literature, namely the linkage between the transfer of technologies and the 
building of technological capabilities.  
Figure 4.1. Building technological capabilities via technology transfer 
 
 
Section three sets out the main line of reasoning underlying this chapter. It re-
jects orthodox approaches to technological change and instead proposes a more 
heterodox line of reasoning, which maintains that technology is not readily avail-
able for all enterprises. Rather, the mere process of choosing and acquiring tech-
nologies bristles with obstacles and difficulties, being characterised by a degree of 
uncertainty and following certain trajectories. Consequently, the process of turning 
transferred technologies into technological capabilities necessitates technological 
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 efforts. It is precisely these technological efforts that are essential in the building of 
technological capabilities at the enterprise level that will be elaborated further in 
section four, which also considers the obstacles to the process of learning. This sec-
tion argues that learning is not without or incidental: rather, it is costly and targeted. 
Moreover, learning often builds on previous knowledge and most often happens in 
the vicinity of what is already familiar to the company. 
The fifth section scrutinises the upgrading literature. It argues that concrete 
processes of upgrading are only vaguely understood, and that upgrading does not 
solely depend on firm-internal aspects, as described in the previous sections, but 
also on firm-external aspects. Thus, in addition to technological efforts, the particu-
larities of the business system are of the utmost importance (cf. Chapter 5). Up-
grading has a multitude of connotations, and in order to obtain a better understand-
ing of the process, it is of the greatest importance to specify exactly what is meant 
by it. This study focuses on specific aspects of upgrading, namely firm-internal im-
provements in products and processes that come about via inter-firm collaboration 
facilitated by a development agency. The concept of technological capabilities en-
compasses precisely these processes. The aim of the sixth section of this chapter is 
therefore to review critically the literature on technological capabilities in order to 
construct a framework to assess changes in technological capabilities in Ghanaian 
PSDP companies.  
Figure 4.1 depicts the most important aspects of the process of building techno-
logical capabilities in small Ghanaian enterprises via technology transfer from a 
Danish enterprise. For the sake of clarity, the role of the development agency is ex-
cluded – the figure is limited to the description of the processes from the technol-
ogy transfer to the building of technological capabilities. It illustrates that even 
though, in this case, technology transfer is a major ingredient in the process, it is 
not the sole ingredient. Technological capability building also depends on techno-
logical efforts and learning, which is also affected by key institutional features in 
Ghanaian society, as illustrated by the dotted line. Moreover, these key institutional 
features also tend to influence the absorption capacity of the Ghanaian enterprises. 
Lastly, the spread of technological capabilities from one enterprise to others in the 
Ghanaian private sector depends on how companies collaborate and compete, this 
again being determined by the business system. 
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 4.1 The changing situation for ‘the small-enterprise sector’ in Sub-
Saharan Africa 
Small enterprises dominate the economic landscape of most SSA-countries: they 
employ the majority of the population in both rural and urban areas, and form a 
large proportion of the income-earning activities of the population.88 Moreover, it 
has been argued that they ‘constitute the driving force of economic development in 
general and industrial development in particular’ in both developed and developing 
countries (Kaplinsky and Readman, 2001: 2). They are thus the backbone of the 
private sector in developing countries and are seen as being able to ‘alleviate pov-
erty by contributing to economic growth, job creation and poor people’s incomes’ 
(UNDP, 2004: 1).89 Over a period of three decades, these small enterprises have 
become the major target for development agencies seeking to promote employ-
ment, economic development and improved welfare for both owners and employ-
ees. As John Sayer puts it in a recent introduction to a special issue of Development 
in Practice regarding development and the private sector, ‘SMEs tend to be fa-
voured by those concerned with development because they are usually labour in-
tensive and so create more employment - often at the lower end of the market, most 
suited to the poorest people, and in areas where no other job opportunities exist’ 
(Sayer, 2005: 252). Moreover, small enterprises have recently been seen as a poten-
                                                 
88 These enterprises are designated in several ways: micro- and small-scale enterprises compris-
ing companies with up to 10 and up to 50 employees, respectively (Mead and Liedholm, 1998); 
small enterprises (Tendler and Amorim, 1996); small- and medium-size enterprises (Kaplinsky and 
Readman, 2001); microscopic firms (classified into small (under 5-10 employees), medium (5-10 to 
50-100 employees), and large enterprises (over 50-100 employees)) (Fafchamps, 1994); the infor-
mal sector (Meagher, 1995); and the subterranean economy (Hope, 2001). Definitions are not lim-
ited to the number of employees but may also be based on a company’s scale of operation. Due to 
the sensitivity to type of activity of the scale of operation compared to number of employees and the 
statistical ease of use of number of employees, this parameter is most often used to define small en-
terprises. The ambiguity of the classification is partly a result of the lack of data for and changing 
character of this sector, and partly a result of the scale of the economy concerned, its degree of de-
velopment and the economic structures present. No further attempts to categorise the sector will be 
made here. Suffice it to say that although the sector is very heterogeneous, it is mostly populated by 
very small companies, mostly one-person companies. Henceforth, the term ‘small enterprise’ will be 
used. 
89 Even though the World Bank advocates ‘unleashing the growth potential for smaller firms’ in 
its 2005 World Development Report through better access to credit and business development ser-
vices, the fostering of clusters and improving access to markets, it also refers to macroeconomic 
data that casts doubt on the claimed importance of small enterprises in creating economic growth 
and reducing poverty (World Bank, 2004: 63f, 165f). Likewise, the very idea of small enterprises as 
the driving force of economic development has been criticised for its lack of clear definitions of the 
sector; lack of clear arguments for support to the sector, wide variety of policies, and lack of evi-
dence that small enterprises are indeed capable of fostering development (Castel-Branco, 2003). Ac-
tually, ‘almost all significant cases of countries developing to the point where poverty is dramati-
cally reduced have occurred in situations where larger companies have become a major part of the 
economy’ (Sayer, 2005). 
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 tial competitive factor in developed as well as developing countries (Humphrey and 
Schmitz, 1996). 
However, praise for the role of the small enterprises, as well as many donor in-
terventions that aim to increase their role as a guarantor of economic development 
and poverty alleviation in developing countries, often neglect the heterogeneity of 
the small-enterprise sector in SSA. First, the characteristics and structure of the 
small-enterprise sector differ widely between countries, between rural and urban 
areas, and between genders: while less than fifty percent of small enterprises in 
Kenya were one-person enterprises, almost eighty percent of Lesotho’s small en-
terprises were one-person enterprises at the beginning of the 1990s; while more 
than eighty percent of the small enterprises in Malawi were located in rural areas, 
the corresponding figure for Botswana was less than half; and while more than 
eighty percent of Swaziland’s small enterprises are owned by women, this should 
be compared with less than fifty percent in Kenya and Malawi (Liedholm and 
Mead, 1999: table 1.1).90 Secondly, the role of manufacturing vis-à-vis commerce 
also differs between countries.91 Thus, the typical perception of small enterprises as 
primarily vendors and small traders is only partly correct, and only in certain set-
tings: in urban areas in Kenya, for instance, roughly three-quarters of small enter-
prises are engaged in commerce, and this is the case for only one-third of small en-
terprises in urban Zimbabwe. Likewise, big differences exist between rural and ur-
ban areas, but generally, manufacturing activities are more important in rural areas 
than in urban areas92 (Liedholm and Mead, 1999; Mead and Liedholm, 1998). 
Thirdly, and related to the above, small enterprises have different contributions to 
make in relation to the dual objective of growth and poverty alleviation. Broadly 
speaking, two kinds of small enterprise may be singled out in the African context: 
on the one hand numerous ‘survivalist’ enterprises exist, that is, one-person enter-
prises or enterprises with very few employees (often family), which only rarely 
grow beyond this size,93 and on the other hand a limited number of ‘growing’ en-
terprises, which are seeking to expand their activities and add to their workforce.  
                                                 
90 Although the figures are slightly different, a similar picture of heterogeneity is provided in 
(Schulpen and Gibbon, 2001). 
91 Construction only accounts for a very small percentage of the activities of small enterprises, 
and service and repairs fluctuate between five and thirty percent in three SSA countries (Pedersen, 
1998: table 2). 
92 Figures from Pedersen (1998: table 2) also show that, within the broad category of manufac-
turing activities, big differences exist between rural and urban areas. The following three types of 
activity dominate the manufacturing sector in both rural and urban settings: textiles and clothing, 
food and beverages, and wood and forest products (Mead and Liedholm, 1998: 64). 
93 Data from the GEMINI project, in which more than 20,000 small enterprises in five southern 
African countries were studied, suggest that only one percent of these enterprises grew above ten 
employees (Mead and Liedholm, 1998: 67). 
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 The last distinction is especially important in relation to both donor interventions 
and changing economic and political conditions. Survey results from developing 
countries indicate that even a small increase in company size for the very small en-
terprises is reflected in a substantial increase in economic efficiency. Moreover, the 
increase in economic efficiency often results in higher levels of income for people 
who are immediately associated with the company. Thus, donor support aimed at 
increasing the company size of ‘survivalist’ enterprises may have a large positive 
impact on poverty alleviation. Since these companies often lack access to capital 
(both working capital and fixed capital), provision of even a small amount of capi-
tal can increase the company’s performance considerably.94 Recently, other con-
straints have been mentioned such as property rights and reforms of labour market 
regulations (Liedholm and Mead, 1999: table 6.2; Mead and Liedholm, 1998: 64; 
Rogerson, 2001: 120; World Bank, 2004). 
For ‘growing’ enterprises, survey results indicate that access to capital becomes 
less of a problem compared with obtaining the tools and equipment required for the 
expansion. Moreover, new problems arise that are not present for ‘survivalist’ en-
terprises, such as access to raw materials and intermediate inputs, and finding suit-
able employees (Liedholm and Mead, 1999: table 6.2). There is a general consen-
sus that the most cost-effective way to obtain tools and equipment for producers in 
developing countries is to tap technologies developed elsewhere, instead of trying 
to upgrade through innovation (World Bank, 2004). 
Concurrent with the trend among donors to see the business community as an 
increasingly valuable partner in the pursuit of development-oriented activities 
(Kaplinsky and Readman, 2001: iii), globalisation95 has caused a shift in manufac-
turing production from developed to developing countries. However, development 
has been very uneven: figures from UNIDO indicate that all but a few countries in 
SSA have lost ground in the past decade, while conversely Southeast Asian coun-
tries in particular have gained considerable ground. UNIDO even goes as far as to 
state that ‘SSA, as a whole, has deindustrialized since 1970’ (UNIDO, 2004: table 
2.6 & 39, emphasis in original). This trend leads UNIDO to conclude that: ‘On the 
whole, SSA benefits little from globalization at its current low levels of productiv-
ity’ (UNIDO, 2004: 119).96 It has been claimed that small enterprises are less ex-
                                                 
94 A note of caution here, however: Mosley and Hulme (1998: 788) demonstrate that the poorer 
the borrower, the lower the impact of credit to small enterprises. Furthermore, their data indicate 
that the poorest borrowers may actually become worse off by obtaining a loan.  
95 Following Schmitz (1999: 1628), globalisation is here ‘referring to the erosion of barriers to 
international flows of goods, finance and know-how’. 
96 This de-industrialising thesis has not won universal agreement: more likely most SSA coun-
tries have experienced declining manufacturing production since the 1960s, but not all. Moreover, 
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 posed to the forces of globalisation, as they either produce non-traded goods for a 
local market or else benefit from the proximity of the market (Elkan, 2000; Weiss, 
2000). However, recent trends indicate that this is at most true for a segment of the 
small enterprises, while the ‘growing’ enterprises are increasingly exposed to the 
global market through globalisation. First, many inputs are imported. Secondly, 
some small enterprises have been integrated into global value chains. Thirdly, ex-
ports of manufacturing goods are increasing relative to total exports. Lastly, im-
ported products are penetrating local markets (Caniëls and Romijn, 2004).97
To sum up, donors perceive the private sector, and especially small enterprises, 
in the developing world as a potential partner in the task of increasing economic 
growth and alleviating poverty. However, some disagreements persist as to how 
best to unleash this entrepreneurship: some donors favour micro-credits, while oth-
ers want to minimise risks and uncertainty by changing labour regulations and land 
rights and removing the impediments to doing business, but all in all donors seldom 
differentiate between different categories of small enterprises, although it is occa-
sionally mentioned that country differences may require support programmes to be 
modified (UNDP, 2004).98 This is interesting because, as this section has shown, 
the small-enterprise sector covers a wide spectrum of enterprises, which differ ac-
cording to size, gender, locality and, most importantly, the contributions they can 
make to economic growth and poverty alleviation. In relation to the latter, two 
types of enterprise were singled out, namely ‘survivalist’ and ‘growing’ enterprises. 
In so far as donors distinguish between interventions, support to the group of grow-
ing enterprises generally includes some type of technology transfer in order to 
overcome what are perceived to be the main obstacles for growth, namely access to 
tools and equipment. The following section discusses the content and different 
modes of technology transfer. 
4.2 Technology transfer: facilitates but insufficient to grow 
Technology transfer suggests a movement of technology from one place to another. 
However, the phrase ‘technology transfer’ does not have a universal meaning. 
                                                                                                                                        
data availability and reliability is problematic, and the definition of industrialisation applied in dif-
ferent studies varies (Lawrence, 2005). 
97 Gibbon (2002) goes even further. In his assessment of the consequences in SSA of the new 
trends in globalisation, he argues that the New Trade Regime (Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights, Trade-Related Investment Measures, and Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures) 
will not bypass SSA. Instead, it will benefit the very few contract manufactures while at the same 
time eroding the traditional comparative advantage of smaller-scale producers.  
98 It should be noted, though, that many donor programmes implicitly differentiate among the 
various categories of small enterprises simply by requiring a certain contribution to capital, profit or 
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 Rather, it has numerous connotations: the transfer itself may take place through, for 
instance, a market transaction (import of capital goods, licensing etc.); through for-
eign direct investments, strategic (technological) alliances and joint ventures be-
tween companies; through subcontracting and Original Equipment Manufacture 
(OEM) arrangements;99 through standards; through personal exchange or exchange 
of documents; and through international development agencies.100 Likewise, defini-
tions of technology vary widely: narrow definitions equate technology with the 
technical information contained in patents, while broader definitions include tech-
nical knowledge communicable in written form, machines, the knowledge of the 
engineer, and institutional knowledge (Enos, 1989). Recently, broader definitions 
have gained considerable ground, and a consensus has emerged that technology is 
more than just hardware (the technique). Müller (2003), for instance, argues that 
technology embraces four components: technique (the physical means of produc-
tion); knowledge (both tacit and codified); organisation (division of labour, man-
agement, coordination); and product (immediate result), while Grosse (1996) dis-
tinguishes between product, process and management technology. Suffice it here to 
acknowledge that technology consists of interdependent forms of knowledge, skills 
and artefacts (products and methods of production), and that technology may be 
used to carry out productive transformations (Metcalfe, 1995: 34). 
To make the confusion worse, technology transfer has been defined as being 
product-embodied, process-embodied or personnel-embodied. Moreover, it may in-
clude different objectives: the introduction of new techniques, the improvement of 
existing techniques and/or the generation of new knowledge (Saad, Cicmil et al., 
2002: 618). In addition, technology transfer can be categorised as either vertical, 
that is, the transfer is a process in which the technology moves from basic to ap-
plied research; or horizontal, that is, the transfer takes the form of use in one place 
to its application in another place (Grosse, 1996: 782). Likewise, concepts such as 
formal and informal channels have been used to distinguish technology that has 
been paid for from technology that is transferred through observation, publications, 
imitation etc. Packaged technology transfers refer to transferred technology that ar-
rives with all the elements required to ensure its effective application (equipment 
plus organisational and managerial knowledge), whereas unpackaged technology 
                                                                                                                                        
turnover; or by demanding audited reports. These conditions effectively exclude the survivalist en-
terprises.  
99 OEM designates an arrangement in which the final product is manufactured by the subcontrac-
tor under the principal’s brand name (Enos, Lall et al., 1997: 59). 
100 In general, technology transfer vehicles are dealt with from the private sector’s point of view 
(Enos, Lall et al., 1997; Enos, 1989; Kim, 1991), but other vehicles are added in technology transfer 
in the public sector, as has been shown by (Kremic, 2003). 
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 transfers do not include this knowledge (Pietrobelli, 2000: 211ff). Internalised and 
externalised technology transfers have been used describe investments where con-
trol resides with the foreign partner (FDI technology transfer) and all other forms of 
this (non-FDI technology transfer), respectively (Lall, 1993). 
The main part of this literature relates to private forms of transfer, mostly in the 
form of FDI or joint ventures. Only a minority of the more recent studies directly 
deal with development aid and technology transfer.101 What is more, these studies 
only seldom discuss the substance of technology transfer or how technology trans-
fer relates to other development objectives. This neglect has given rise to the fol-
lowing harsh introductory statement by Thomas Grammig in his recent book on 
technology change, development aid and social actors: ‘technology transfer remains 
the most persistent conceptual blank spot in all development aid by the industrial-
ised countries’ (Grammig, 2002: 1). 
There is hardly any doubt that technology transfers have played, and will con-
tinue to play, an important role in the development of productive capacity102 in de-
veloping country firms. While technology transfers to developing country compa-
nies were previously limited mostly to the manufacturing sector, this is now chang-
ing, since they have now become an integral part of inter-firm collaborations in 
other sectors as well.103 However, the transfer of technology to provide new or ex-
pand existing productive capacity does not by itself contribute to building techno-
logical capabilities in the recipient company (Chantramonklasri, 1990). The extent 
to which the transferred technology contributes to the development of technological 
capabilities depends not only on the supplier of technology and the technology it-
self, but also on the technological efforts of the recipient company.  
Put differently, technology transfers may be necessary but not sufficient for 
firms in developing countries to respond to changing needs and to grow. Thus, im-
porting inputs for new or expanded productive capacity does not by itself contribute 
to the creation of technological capabilities in the importing companies. Technol-
ogy has to be transferred, absorbed,104 adopted and mastered effectively. This re-
                                                 
101 For exceptions, see (Alänge, 1987; Crewe and Harrison, 1998; Grammig, 2002; Kuada, 2003; 
Motoki and Taichi, 1999; Olsen, 1995; Pedersen, 1990; Romijn, 2001; Tendler and Amorim, 1996). 
102 Capacity is here defined as the ‘snapshot’ of a company’s ability to make use of existing pro-
duction facilities. It thus refers to static attributes in a company. This contrasts with the dynamic re-
source of capability (Albu, 1997: 7; Lall and Latsch, 1998: 445). Technological capability is further 
elaborated in section 4.5. 
103 See, for instance, Enos, Lall et al. (1997: table 1) for an overview of the literature. 
104 Absorption capacity has been defined by Wesley Cohen and Daniel Levinthal as the ability to 
recognize the value of new information, assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends based on prior 
related knowledge. It may come about as a by-product of R&D activities, as well as of manufactur-
ing operations that provide a company with the necessary background to recognize the value of new 
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 quires a knowledge of procedures, an understanding of their underlying mecha-
nisms, and the skills to put them to good use. In other words, the extent to which 
technology transfers contribute to technological capability building depends not 
only on the technology as such or the exporters of technology, but to a large degree 
on importers’ efforts to intervene and interact in the transfer process. Technological 
efforts are therefore indispensable in building technological capabilities. These ef-
forts may take different forms, for instance, hiring staff with new skills and knowl-
edge, training existing staff, seeking information about new markets and technolo-
gies, and collaboration with other companies. They pave the way for technological 
learning that may result in the creation and development of technological capabili-
ties (Albu, 1997; Archibugi and Coco, 2004; Bell and Pavitt, 1993; Caniëls and 
Romijn, 2004; Chantramonklasri, 1990). 
4.3 The study of technology, technology change, and private-sector 
development 
As indicated above, this study leaves aside more orthodox approaches to techno-
logical change,105 which are based on neoclassical thinking that perceives technol-
ogy as information that is generally applicable and easy to produce and reuse; re-
gard technology as codifiable knowledge, which is easily transferable, often with-
out cost; see the world as one where firms could produce and use innovations by 
dipping freely into a general pool of technological knowledge; and hence assume 
that the key to economic progress for firms lies in the selection of the most appro-
priate technology, given local factor endowments and relative prices (Dosi, 1988: 
1130; McKelvey, 1991: 121f; Romijn, 1999: 12ff).106  
Instead, this study is inspired by heterodox approaches to the study of technol-
ogy, technology change and private-sector development. These studies cover a 
                                                                                                                                        
knowledge and provide it with methods to reorganise its manufacturing processes (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990). 
105 Technical change is here perceived as improvements in the transformation of inputs to out-
puts, including improvement in the quality of outputs. See also Albu (1997: 9). 
106 A substantial part of the current literature dealing with technological change in developing 
countries offers the reader a very simplified version of the theoretical debate. This debate is pre-
sented as a dichotomy between neoclassic economic assumptions of technology as information that 
is generally available and applicable and therefore easy and costless to transfer, and evolutionary 
approaches that stress the tacit nature of knowledge, the fundamental uncertainty of searches for 
new technologies, and the cumulative nature of technological progress, which makes transfers of 
technology costly (Lall, 1995; Niosi, Hanel et al., 1995; Romijn, 1999; Teitel, 2000). This is only 
partly correct: the static notion of technology that these writers put forward is no longer representa-
tive of the neoclassical discourse. In more recent contributions, neoclassical economists treat inno-
vations as endogenous, based on search and limited information. Therefore this approach has incor-
porated many of the findings of, for instance, the evolutionary approaches. For the case of simplic-
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 broad array of approaches that deal with technology change at different levels and 
in different countries. One thing these approaches share, however, is their starting 
point, namely the evolutionary theories expressed by, for instance, Nelson and 
Winter (1982). The starting point of these theories is a critique of orthodox micro-
economic theory, which on the one hand assumes that the behavioural patterns of 
the firm are based on rules that reflect the search for maximisation (usually profit or 
present value), and on the other is guided by the concept of equilibrium. Moreover, 
orthodox microeconomic theory emphasises the similarities between firms and ar-
gues that in so far as differences exist, they are a product of differences in market 
environments. These neoclassical economists did not focus on the causes of techno-
logical change, but rather on the labour and capital intensity of technology and an 
estimate of the economic contribution of technology by its move outwards from the 
production function (Fransman, 1984: note 9; Nelson and Winter, 1982). In con-
trast, the evolutionary approach draws attention to the heterogeneity of firms 
caused by, for instance, different learning routines and differences in work efforts 
between firms – that is, the efficiency with which firms operate a given technology 
and the efforts with which they pursue technological improvements (Romijn, 1999: 
14). Moreover, this approach does not accept the notion of readily available tech-
nology that can easily and instantaneously be transferred and utilised, which was 
put forward by the neoclassical economists. Instead, proponents of this line of 
thought argue that technology is not simply available from the ‘international tech-
nology shelf’, given that the very choosing and acquisition of technologies creates 
obstacles and difficulties (Archibugi and Pietrobelli, 2003). Thus, a central theme 
of the evolutionary theory is the analysis of the acquisition and adaptation of new 
technology at the national, sector and enterprise levels. 
The evolutionary school of thought has been the inspiration for a number of dif-
ferent scholars based in different academic traditions. It has become the framework 
for studies dealing with such varied subjects as the competitive advantage of firms 
in industrialised countries, the role of product development in capability building, 
and different learning mechanisms for capability building in developing country-
based firms.107 This line of reasoning has been developed through this process, and 
it is no longer possible to refer to one school of thought, but only to one common 
theoretical heritage. However, in relation to the study of technology, technology 
                                                                                                                                        
ity, however, the traditional distinction between orthodox and heterodox approaches is maintained 
here in order to highlight the origin of the heterodox approaches. 
107 This study will mostly relate to the literature on capabilities in developing countries, even 
though it will also draw on studies based on industrialised-country firms where, appropriately, the 
literature has much to offer in the analysis of technological capabilities in developing countries 
(Cooper, 1991; Teece, 2000: 106). 
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 change and private-sector development, three common features may be singled out: 
technological development is perceived as an ongoing process; the studies focus on 
the building of technological capabilities and capacities; and technological transfer 
is perceived as an important factor in this process (Lorentzen and Granerud, 1999). 
The evolutionary school of thought, as for instance Dosi (1988) explains, points 
out that technological knowledge is neither shared equally among firms, nor trans-
ferred easily between them. According to the evolutionary approach, two inter-
linked concepts are crucial in the understanding of firms’ behaviour, namely search 
and fundamental uncertainty. Firms seek to progress, but their gains from the 
search are uncertain. Therefore, firms have to feel pressurised by, for instance, 
anomalies or bottlenecks in the production process to engage in the search for new 
technologies. Moreover, they will most often concentrate the search process in the 
vicinity of the firm’s initial point of production, that is, it will be localised inas-
much as it tends to be easier and less costly. These bottlenecks and anomalies are in 
part a product of the initial technology and peculiarities in the particular firm, and 
in so far as the search is triggered by these bottlenecks and is localised, the techno-
logical progress will be cumulative, or put another way, the firm will follow certain 
trajectories (Romijn, 1999: 15ff). 
Central to this line of thinking is the distinction between tacit and codified 
knowledge, which refers to Michael Polanyi’s theory of knowledge. Polanyi distin-
guished between tacit and explicit knowledge and stated that there is no totally ex-
plicit knowledge in the domains of human activity, since behind each element of 
explicit knowledge there are many elements of tacit knowledge which we are not 
aware of (Polanyi, 1966). Thus, tacitness refers to those elements of personal 
knowledge that are ill-defined and therefore cannot be fully articulated. This type 
of knowledge differs from person to person, but may to ‘some significant degree be 
shared by collaborators and colleagues who have a common experience’ (Dosi, 
1988: 1126). However, tacitness is not an absolute term: the same knowledge is 
more tacit for some people than for others, and it is possible to convert (some) tacit 
knowledge into codified knowledge (Gong and Keller, 2003). 
The important aspect in relation to the transfer of technology is the possibility of 
transferring tacit knowledge. Everybody seems to agree that the codified compo-
nent of knowledge can be transferred easily from one context to another, even at a 
low or negligible cost, whereas the tacit elements are less mobile and transferable, 
since they require person-to-person communication in order to be diffused. How-
ever, in order to benefit from codified knowledge, the receiver has to know the 
codes, which unfortunately is seldom the case in developing countries (Archibugi 
and Pietrobelli, 2003). 
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 Although many evolutionary contributions do not have an explicit microeco-
nomic perspective, their focus on differences in productive capabilities points to the 
need for a more microeconomic focus in order to understand fully the concepts of 
knowledge, information and learning. According to Lall (1992: 166), this school of 
thought has provided inspiration for most subsequent micro-level analyses of tech-
nology in developing countries. It is therefore no coincidence that central terms are 
directly derived from the evolutionary school of thought, that is, competences, ca-
pabilities, resources and capacities. These terms refer to different levels of techno-
logical skills and abilities within a given enterprise. 
Before proceeding with a discussion of technological capability building, how to 
measure it and how it relates to upgrading, the next section will examine the tech-
nological efforts that are essential in the pursuit of such capability building.  
4.4 Technological efforts 
Transferred technology contains both codified and tacit elements; only very few 
components of technology may be acquired ready-made and brought into use ac-
cording to some blueprint.108 Embodied elements of technology must be comple-
mented by tacit elements that are taught and learned through practice and that have 
to take the specific context of both exporter and recipient into account. These em-
bodied and tacit elements are thus difficult, costly and time-consuming to transfer. 
Hence, for the success of transfers of technology requires indigenous technological 
efforts. Technological efforts are here defined as the broad range of efforts that an 
enterprise must itself undertake to access, implement, absorb and build on the 
knowledge that is required in a production process (Lall and Latsch, 1998: 445). 
Associated with this, different kinds of knowledge are required in order to for a 
company to perform productive activities. Lundvall (1996: 4ff; 1998: 35f) has dis-
tinguished between the following four types of knowledge, which have different 
targets and which are acquired differently. First, know-what is what is normally un-
derstood as information, the specific elements of knowledge that can be broken 
down into bits and thus, to a large extent, may be acquired through books, manuals, 
lectures and databases. Secondly, know-why refers to the underlying causes and ef-
fects of events and performances and is frequently associated with scientific 
knowledge that is often produced and reproduced in specialised institutions, but it 
may also be acquired through the employment of scientific personnel. Thirdly, 
know-how is essentially the capability to do something, that is, the skills. Know-
                                                 
108 To make matters worse for developing country firms, codified elements are increasingly be-
ing restricted by intellectual property rights. 
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 how is created and kept within the firm and is based on experience. Finally, know-
who involves information about who knows what, as well as the social ability to es-
tablish relationships with certain groups in order to draw on their expertise; it can-
not be learned in a specific way but develops through day-to-day social interac-
tions. In addition, it is possible to distinguish between direct and indirect knowl-
edge. Thus, a person may know how to do something him- or herself, or may know 
how to get something done (Bångens and Araujo, 2002: 572). Put differently, 
knowledge is not necessarily possessed in-house if a company has access to the 
relevant knowledge elsewhere. It should be mentioned, however, that access to 
relevant knowledge also requires know-how.  
4.4.1 The cumulative discontinuous process of learning 
Central to the heterodox line of reasoning spelt out in section 4.3 above is the rec-
ognition that technical change and thus the creation of technological capabilities 
involves learning. The process of learning has been defined as ‘the acquisition of 
additional technical skills and knowledge by individuals and, through them, by or-
ganisations’ (Bell, 1984: 188). More precisely, learning is the process ‘by which 
repetition and experimentation enable tasks to be performed better and quicker and 
new production opportunities to be identified’ (Teece, 2000: 110f). This definition 
highlights several important aspects of learning, among them the trial-and-error ex-
perimentation involved in learning, which is associated with learning-by-doing and 
learning-by-using. The former is especially important in relation to capabilities 
closely related to already existing ones and is often related to routine production, or 
in the SSA context, to apprenticeship-like learning mechanisms.109 The latter learn-
ing mechanism relates to the type of learning that may be provided by markets 
through standardised goods and services. The definition also points to the formality 
of the learning process, which indicates that learning is targeted, as it builds on pre-
vious learning. Similarly, the organisational character of learning, that is, organisa-
tional learning, is basically individual learning taking place in a social context.110
                                                 
109 Apprenticeship-like learning mechanisms have often been presented as a way for developing 
country companies to acquire technological capabilities, but one should be aware of the limitations 
of this kind of learning-by-doing, as experiences gained in, for instance, production operations only 
generate a rough idea of how the systems work, including an idea of what problems may be encoun-
tered and what changes are required. However, learning-by-doing ‘is unlikely to provide any sig-
nificant information and knowledge about how the improvements and changes might be made’ 
(Chantramonklasri, 1990: 45). 
110 An intense debate as to where knowledge resides – in the individual or in the organisation – 
as well as whether intra-organisational learning (learning taking place in organisations) or inter-
organisational learning (learning taking place between organisations) is more efficient, is taking 
place in various journals, among them Organization Studies, the Strategic Management Journal and 
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 Besides the learning-by-doing and learning-by-using methods mentioned above, 
other kinds of learning may be singled out, such as learning-by-interacting (deriv-
ing from the relationship of entities with dissimilar capabilities), learning-by-
searching (deriving from research and research-like activities), and learning from 
spillovers (deriving from the connectedness of firms). Some of these are internal to 
the firm, while others are external to it. Moreover, some are related to the product 
or the production process, while others are related to interactions with suppliers, 
customers and competitors. Yet some types of learning are related to research proc-
esses, either internal to the company or external to it. Even though learning may 
take many forms, it seems to uphold certain attributes in relation to technical 
change: it is costly, it is targeted, and it may take place in various parts of a firm; it 
involves interaction between firm-internal and firm-external sources of knowledge; 
and it is cumulative and local (Bångens and Araujo, 2002; Malerba, 1992). 
A number of aspects distinguish the process of learning from the gathering of in-
formation. First, learning is neither automatic nor passive, but involves explicit ef-
forts and investments. Secondly, the process of learning is hazy and poorly under-
stood, which is partly related to the fact that learning has to be learned, and partly 
to the tacit aspects of the knowledge involved. Finally, learning to master different 
forms of knowledge takes place through different channels (Bell, 1984; Lall, 2000). 
Following Lauridsen (n.d.: 12f), it is possible to distinguish between skills, knowl-
edge and experiences that are acquired through firm-internal learning mechanisms, 
such as routine production activities, imitation and reverse engineering, and skills, 
knowledge and experiences that are accumulated through firm-external sources, 
such as movements of staff, inter-firm collaborations, use of consultants or, more 
passively, as the by-products of interactions with other companies or institutions. 
Moreover, learning may be augmented through training and education, either inter-
nally or externally.  
It has been argued that the learning process exhibits elements of cumulativeness 
because both individuals and organisations tend to move along particular trajecto-
ries defined by past learning experiences, instead of just ‘jumping’ from one field 
to another (Bell and Pavitt, 1993: 168f). It is thus rare to find textile industries initi-
ating the production of semiconductors, simply because these companies do not 
have the ability to acquire sufficient knowledge about the production process of the 
latter. Likewise, the opposite example is also rare, even though the techniques used 
                                                                                                                                        
the Scandinavian Journal of Management. This discussion will not be gone into here. For literature 
reviews of the different positions adopted here, see (Holmqvist, 2003; Levitt and March, 1988). 
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 in the semiconductor industry111 are more advanced than those in the textile indus-
try. However, the cumulative nature of learning does not mean that learning is al-
ways incremental. Discontinuities in the learning process stem from the introduc-
tion of new technologies or new processes into the system. Thus, technology trans-
fers often result in discontinuities, which may impose problems of assimilating the 
new technology in the recipient company, such as ensuring efficient production or 
linking up with suppliers (Wei, 1995). The cumulative nature of learning, combined 
with the routines, that is, the history, of the firm, creates path dependencies, mean-
ing that ‘history matters’.112 Put differently, path dependency indicates that the op-
portunity for learning lies in the vicinity of what is already familiar (Teece, 2000). 
Therefore, learning is not only a good thing, as it can create competency traps – 
that is, it may lead to situations in which a company lacks the necessary experience 
to use new technologies because it has achieved positive results with inferior tech-
nologies (Levitt and March, 1988: 322). Thus, effectiveness of learning ‘in the 
neighbourhood’ of current knowledge interferes with long-term learning in com-
pletely new areas. Put differently, learning and the subsequent creation of capabili-
ties can improve the immediate performance of a company while simultaneously 
reducing the incentives for and competences with new technologies (Levinthal and 
March, 1993: 97).  
However, it seems that path dependency is likely to be more pronounced the 
more specialised individual knowledge becomes. Skills obtained at primary school 
are transferable from one activity to another, but those skills acquired in vocational 
training centres and tertiary-level institutes of technical education are only transfer-
able within a specific sector of the economy, while skills acquired at postgraduate 
university level or in Research and Development (R&D) departments are hardly 
transferable at all (Enos, 1991: 122). 
To sum up, technology cannot easily be transferred from one context to another, 
since it contains both tacit and codified elements. Therefore, the transfer requires an 
indigenous technical effort to be complete. This technological effort is closely as-
sociated with the process of learning, which may take many forms, and which ex-
hibits elements of cumulativeness and path-dependency. Technological efforts in 
SSA should therefore not be thought of as investments at the global frontier of 
technology, but rather as a wide range of efforts that the enterprise must undertake 
                                                 
111 Industry is here perceived as a collection of firms engaged in similar activities. It is thus syn-
onymous with the term ‘sector’. 
112 The idea of path-dependency is not new. Nelson and Winter (1982) maintained that knowl-
edge creates routines (the general term for all regular and predictable behavioural patterns of firms) 
that make firms path-dependant and therefore less flexible and less able to adapt to major changes in 
society.  
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 in order to access, implement, absorb and build on the knowledge required in pro-
duction. The aim of technology transfers is most often to build technological capa-
bilities (see section 4.5 below). Studies have shown that the factor distinguishing 
success from failure with respect to building technological capabilities is exactly 
the extent to which firms deliberately devote resources to learning mechanisms, 
that is, devote resources to technological efforts (Romijn, 1999: 22). However, sev-
eral studies have found limited technological capability building in a SSA context, 
due precisely to a lack of effort-based learning (see, for instance, (Biggs, Shah et 
al., 1995; Wangwe, 1992).  
4.5 Upgrading in small enterprises in developing countries 
The concept of ‘upgrading’ has acquired considerable attention recently from vari-
ous political economy approaches, such as the GVC approach and the cluster ap-
proach.113 Moreover, leading development institutions such as UNIDO have inte-
grated the term ‘upgrading’ into their policy strategies (Kaplinsky and Readman, 
2001; UNIDO, 2002). Upgrading may refer to the type of labour employed 
(Pavcnik, 2003); the process of maximising value creation and learning through the 
insertion in value chains (Gereffi, Humphrey et al., 2001: 5); the shifts in activities 
that sustain higher incomes (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002: 19); the improvement 
in the value content of local industries and the broadening of activities performed at 
the local level (Palpaucer and Parisotto, 2003: 106); the establishment, consolida-
tion and diversification of manufacturing capacity (Fold, 2000: 263); the process of 
improving the ability to move to more profitable and/or technologically sophisti-
cated capital and skill-intensive niches (Gereffi, 1999: 52); and the increase of 
value added produced by innovation (Giuliani, Pietrobelli et al., 2005). The term 
upgrading thus refers both to the use of additional skilled employees and to the 
more efficient production of better quality goods.  
It is not surprising that many of the above definitions derive from studies of 
global value chains: it is exactly the advantage of this approach that it allows for an 
analysis of upgrading within the chains. Particular attention has been given to the 
governing role of lead firms in a chain to ensure that the internationally dispersed 
activities of the GVC are functionally integrated and co-ordinated. By governing 
the chain, these lead firms also structure the upgrading opportunities of the local 
                                                 
113 Humphrey and Schmitz (2000) rightly point to the differences between the GVC and the clus-
ter literature with respect to upgrading both opportunities and trajectories for developing country 
firms: while the ends are the same, the means are different. Both strands of literature underscore the 
importance of upgrading so as to face the challenges of globalisation, but while the GVC literature 
stresses links to the external world, the cluster literature emphasises local cooperation as a means to 
upgrade.  
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 producers (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002), governing, so to speak, the information 
and knowledge flows within the chains. Unfortunately, actual upgrading processes 
are seldom discussed. Instead upgrading is sometimes taken for granted by its very 
inclusion in a chain: Gereffi, for instance, concludes that producers that acquire ac-
cess to the apparel chain have good prospects of upgrading products, since design, 
marketing and branding capabilities will be upgraded automatically through various 
learning mechanisms and organisational changes (Gereffi, 1999). However, this 
may not be an accurate picture of upgrading opportunities for developing country 
firms. First, different sorts of lead firm have different governance strategies, and 
therefore upgrading possibilities vary accordingly. Secondly, it is questionable 
whether the upgrading process is as passive as is suggested in this case. Finally, 
lead firms may not have an interest in local upgrading. It is probably more accurate 
to follow the suggestion of Raikes, Jensen et al. (2000: 393) that participation in a 
GVC ‘is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for subordinate agents to up-
grade’. 
Despite the vagueness of the concept, attempts have been made to deconstruct it 
further in order to facilitate an operationalisation. Among the most cited typologies 
is that suggested by John Humphrey and Hubert Schmitz (2002: 19) of an abstract 
classification114 of process upgrading (the transformation of inputs to outputs more 
efficiently through superior technology or reorganisation of the production system), 
product upgrading (moving into more sophisticated product lines either through the 
introduction of new products or improvements in existing products), functional up-
grading (adding or abandoning the existing function with the aim of increasing the 
overall skill content of the activities performed in the firm), and intersectoral up-
grading (the application of functions obtained in one sector to uses in another sec-
tor that are more skill-intensive). 
This classification implies that firms may pursue different strategies in order to 
upgrade, but according to Kaplinsky and Readman (2001: 34) it is not unimportant 
in what order they are pursued: they suggest that an upgrading trajectory exists that 
begins with process, continues to product, then moves on to functional upgrading 
and ends with intersectoral upgrading. This is not only interesting from a GVC per-
spective, but also more generally for small enterprises in developing countries, as it 
indicates that these enterprises must try and upgrade processes and products before 
they increase, for instance, the overall skill content of their activities. 
Upgrading opportunities, however, vary according to the type of GVC (espe-
cially the specific type of lead firm), the specific cluster network, or inter-firm col-
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 laboration that local companies are inserted into. Gibbon (2001: 352ff), for in-
stance, argues that crucial differences exist between retailer-driven and trader-
driven primary products’ GVCs with respect to the potential of local firms’ to up-
grade. In contrast to the abstract classification of upgrading set out above, Gibbon’s 
analysis of the primary products’ GVC suggests that upgrading should be studied 
on a case-by-case basis. ‘As such, it [Gibbon’s analysis] is based on an explicit re-
jection of the notion that upgrading follows a distinct “life history” of stages or that 
it can take forms that can be defined in the abstract’ (Larsen, 2004: 14). Recently, 
Gibbon and Ponte (2005) have taken the critique even further. They point out the 
difficulties involved in distinguishing between different typologies of upgrading 
and instead suggest that upgrading should be determined according to the reward 
structures available to suppliers in a given chain. 
It should be mentioned, however, that upgrading does not solely depend on firm-
internal aspects of learning and technological capability building (even though most 
studies deal, by and large, with upgrading within the chain) but also on broader re-
gional and national aspects. The cluster literature, for instance, suggests that firms 
that increase cooperation show greater improvements in performance. Moreover, 
this line of argument suggests that networks of public- and private-sector institu-
tions facilitate upgrading. In other words, from the cluster perspective the role of 
business associations and inter-firm linkages becomes of utmost importance for up-
grading (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2000). Research conducted within the realm of 
GVC has also stressed firm-external (and chain-external) aspects of upgrading. 
Fold (2000), for instance, has emphasised state regulation as a key explanatory fac-
tor for upgrading in the oil-seed industry in Malaysia and Brazil. Likewise, Raikes, 
Jensen et al. (2000) have questioned the sole role attributed to the lead agent re-
garding upgrading: what is the role of governments (national regulation and de-
regulation) and other regulatory agencies in this process? Thus, besides firm-
internal aspects, it is clear that the particularities of the business system (cf. Chapter 
5, below) within which local firms are embedded play an important role in deter-
mining firms’ willingness to engage in a learning process and thus acquire opportu-
nities to upgrade (Palpaucer and Parisotto, 2003: 107). 
To sum up, this section has argued that, even within the narrow lens of GVCs, 
universal upgrading typologies are problematic. It goes without saying that it be-
comes even more problematic to apply universal upgrading typologies for inter-
firm collaborations in general. Following Gibbon’s (2001) argument presented 
above, the processes that lead to upgrading will be studied here on a case-by-case 
                                                                                                                                        
114 A similar, yet slightly different, classification is proposed by Gereffi, Humphrey et al. 
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 approach. Due to the vagueness of the concept, however, processes ranging from 
changes in type of labour employed, via learning mechanisms, to the diversification 
of manufacturing capacity may be included in such a study. More precisely, there-
fore, it is important to single out what is meant by upgrading and how it is going to 
be studied.  
This chapter seeks to provide a better understanding of the firm-internal proc-
esses that may foster improvements in processes and products through the transfer 
of technological and managerial skills from Danish companies to developing coun-
try enterprises. These processes are captured by the concept of technological capa-
bilities. This concept, however, is blurred, and approaches to measure changes in 
technological capabilities often stem from radically different contexts to the Ghana-
ian one. Therefore, it is essential to disentangle the concept and propose a frame-
work that can be used to measure changes in technological capabilities in small 
Ghanaian enterprises.  
4.6 The concept of technological capabilities 
The concept of capabilities within the firm stems directly from the notion of rou-
tines and was originally introduced in order to draw attention to the dynamic evolu-
tion and creation of competitiveness through innovation at the firm level (Nelson 
and Winter, 1982). Today, the notion of capabilities is widely used, as it encom-
passes both the information and the skills that are required to utilise technology ef-
ficiently. Bångens and Araujo (2002: 573) even state that ‘the notion of capabilities 
dissolves clear-cut boundaries between knowing and learning’. These technological 
capabilities are firm-specific in the sense that they are a form of institutional 
knowledge that is made of the combined skills of its members over time (Lall and 
Latsch, 1999; Lall, Navaretti et al., 1994). Moreover, the very process of develop-
ing technological capabilities is evolutionary, as it builds upon past efforts and 
choices. The process itself involves buying skills and information from the market, 
as well as providing some in-house. As argued in section 4.4 above, the process is 
neither spontaneous nor passive, as technological efforts and choices depend on 
past knowledge, the particular technology, market conditions and the specific firm 
strategy. Hence, the process of developing technological capabilities is driven by 
conscious, purposive efforts that are undertaken by the enterprise; moreover, it is 
time-consuming. 
A consensus has emerged that building and development of technological capa-
bilities is of the utmost importance for developing country firms to be able to com-
                                                                                                                                        
(2001:5), who distinguish between product, process, intra-chain and inter-chain upgrading. 
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 pete in the globalising economy. Caniëls and Romijn (2004: 50) even go so far as 
to state that ‘Accumulation of technological capabilities is crucial for the ability of 
small and medium-sized manufacturing enterprises to make a significant contribu-
tion to local industrial development in the context of liberalisation and international 
economic integration’. 
Most definitions of technological capabilities stress similar features, namely that 
such capabilities consist of more than the knowledge residing in the company (or 
among its employees), that they cannot be reduced to physical equipment, blue-
prints and patents, and that they are better described as the ways in which firms 
combine physical equipment, blueprints and patents, and skills in order to function 
as organisations. Thus, Lall, Navaretti et al. (1994: 5) define technological capabili-
ties in an industry as the information and skills (technical, managerial and institu-
tional) that allow productive enterprises to utilise equipment and technology effi-
ciently, while Bell and Albu (1999: note 5) assert that ‘Technological capabilities 
can be thought of as bundles of complementary skills and knowledge, which to-
gether with the organisational structures in which they are embedded facilitate par-
ticular activities in the production system’. However, these definitions miss out one 
important aspect, namely that technological capabilities are not only the skills, 
knowledge etc. required to utilise the technology efficiently, but also the capacity to 
generate and manage change, as Bell and Pavitt point out (1993: 159). 
Technological capabilities can be classified vertically as well as horizontally. 
The vertical classification essentially pays attention to the distinction between utili-
sation and change. Thus, it may be argued that it is conceptually helpful to make a 
vertical distinction within the range of technological capabilities, namely between 
the degree of innovativeness, the technological complexity and the technological 
depths of the capabilities. Technological capabilities may thus relate to as diverse a 
spectrum of activities as simple routine activities, duplicative activities, or even to 
original, innovative activities. Put differently, some capabilities relate mostly to the 
use of technology, that is, the use, replication and recirculation of knowledge that is 
already established in the company, while others relate more to the change of tech-
nology, that is, the acquisition, creation and processing of new knowledge in order 
to bring it to play in the company (Bell and Albu, 1999: 1724; Bell and Pavitt, 
1993). According to Lauridsen (n.d.: 9f), it is generally acknowledged that invest-
ments in technology-using capabilities may enhance the productivity of a company 
to a remarkable extent, but in order to achieve longer-term dynamic changes, in-
vestments in technology-changing capabilities must be made. However, companies 
seldom invest in such capabilities.  
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 The horizontal classification refers above all to the functional competences re-
lated to the technological capabilities. The exact headings of these sets of techno-
logical capabilities may vary. Lall and Latch (1999: 48ff), for instance, differentiate 
between investment, production and linkage capabilities, which are equivalent to 
the technological tasks facing manufacturing companies.115 Each of these functions 
are performed either implicitly or explicitly by all manufacturing companies. 
The phrase investment capabilities is an umbrella category for the skills and in-
formation that an entrepreneur or manager requires to be able to identify (realistic) 
investment projects, to (systematically) search for and buy appropriate technologies 
for the enterprise at the right price, and to install and absorb the tacit elements of 
the technology. The investment capabilities required vary according to the level of 
technology used, the scale of the operation and the nature of the market. For some 
enterprises, the required level of investment capabilities is high, while others can 
make do with a lower level, either due to contracts with specialised agents who 
handle the investment interest of the enterprise,116 or because the activities per-
formed in the enterprise involve mature technologies or simple processes.117 How-
ever, as Teitel stresses (2000), technology transfer is hardly ever a spontaneous 
process in the sense that the successful transfer presupposes the existence of quali-
fied personnel and an appropriate organisation that can receive the technology. 
Production capabilities are related above all to the skills and knowledge re-
quired to run a firm and are subsequently related to the improvement of the produc-
tion process. Production capabilities can be subdivided into three headings.118 First, 
process-centred refers to the general organisation of production (for instance, 
scheduling, quality control and productivity monitoring) and thus the improvement 
of the process as such. Secondly, product-centred includes the design, re-design 
and improvements of products. Thirdly, equipment-related refers to activities like 
                                                 
115 Others, like Romijn (1999: 19f), propose to use ‘adaptive innovation capability’ in stead of 
‘linkage capability’. The adaptive innovation capability refers to the skills and knowledge required 
to make changes to established plants. However, this is included in Sanjaya Lall’s ‘production capa-
bility’ category. Among other useful typologies of capabilities are capabilities for technology use, 
compilation, acquisition and generation proposed by Sharif (1994); and production, investment, and 
invention capabilities proposed by Evenson and Westphal (1994). 
116 In an African context, there is a risk that the technology being provided by a specialised agent 
is likely to be a ‘turnkey’ operation in which the recipient is passive and likely to remain dependent 
on outside assistance, and which subsequently has to be adopted to fit the particular purpose of the 
enterprise. Hence, there is a risk that the capital costs of a project increase due to the use of special-
ised agents (Lall and Latsch, 1999; Lall, Navaretti et al., 1994). 
117 The significance of investment capabilities to the success of the enterprise increases with the 
capital-intensity of the facility and the complexity of the process (Lall, Navaretti et al., 1994: 112). 
118 Lall, Navaretti et al. (1994) have proposed slightly different subgroups, namely process tech-
nology, product technology and industrial engineering, but due to the fact that only the former two 
have any relevance in a Ghanaian context (Lall, Navaretti et al., 1994: 123f), production capabilities 
have been subdivided differently. 
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 maintenance, adaptation to new materials etc. This classification may seem some-
what arbitrary, because change in one alters the other: for example, change in the 
design of a product has consequences for the production process. However, the 
separation is maintained here for analytical purposes. 
Linkage capabilities are defined as the skills needed to establish, maintain and 
exploit production and technological links with other firms and institutions. These 
linkages go beyond the anonymous purchase of products and services. Instead, they 
involve exchanges of information, know-how and skills, and thus they work as effi-
cient ways to diffuse technology. In the SSA context, the linkages to other firms 
and to institutions are both generally weak. As regards linkages to other companies, 
there are hardly any relationships between large formal enterprises and small (in-
formal) sub-contractors. In the few isolated instances of collaboration, it often takes 
the form of ‘coaching’, rather than being an interactive forum for the exchange of 
information and skills (Lall, Navaretti et al., 1994). However, this category is of the 
greatest importance, as not all technology flows generate technological capabilities, 
and because linkages with local suppliers and other groups within the local econ-
omy are critical in enhancing technological capabilities (Wei, 1995). 
As stated above, the concept of technological capabilities originally refers to the 
level of the firm, but since its introduction it has been applied in studies of various 
levels, that is, the firm, industry, regional and national levels. However, the various 
levels and themes introduced in the literature on technological capabilities mostly 
seem to have been included in order to shed light on what is the primary focus of 
most studies, the individual firm (Gammeltoft, 2001: 29). However, not all firms in 
all countries are equally interesting: the focus in the greater part of these studies has 
been centred on the acquisition and building of technological capabilities in large 
companies, and only a few have scrutinised these processes in small enterprises in 
developing countries119 (Romijn, 1999: 11). 
4.6.1 Measuring changes in technological capabilities 
As technological capabilities cannot be measured directly, indicators or proxies 
have to be constructed in order to examine the acquisition and building of techno-
logical capabilities. These indicators naturally depend on the objective and level of 
the study. Thus, several authors have recently attempted to quantify technological 
                                                 
119 Romijn (1999: 33) claims that many of the firms covered in these studies are not only among 
the largest in the country, but also the leaders of their particular sector, and are sometimes large 
even by international standards. Thus, the image that is generally presented is biased towards the 
large-scale sector. However, most of the studies she refers to relate to some Asian or Latin Ameri-
can context. In the SSA context, the picture is somewhat different, given that the many works 
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 capabilities at the national level in order to capture how well various nations are 
creating and diffusing technology and thus facing new challenges such as globalisa-
tion and the network age. Among the most prominent attempts is UNDP’s Tech-
nology Achievement Index (TAI), which uses indicators for the creation of tech-
nology, the diffusion of recent as well as old innovations, and human skills in order 
to establish the overall TAI (between 0-1) (UNDP, 2001). Another is Daniele Ar-
chibugi and Alberto Coco’s ArCo Index, which is constructed by combining the 
creation of technology (patents, scientific articles), the technological infrastructure 
(Internet penetration, telephone penetration, electricity consumption) and the de-
velopment of human skills (tertiary science and engineering enrolment, mean years 
of schooling, literacy rate)120 (Archibugi and Coco, 2004). 
Likewise, researchers have sought to measure technological capabilities at other 
levels. Broadly speaking, these indicators can be classified into three headings: in-
put indicators, output indicators, and combinations of the two (Babu, 1999: 26). In 
subsequent paragraphs, the most widely used indicators will be examined to facili-
tate a discussion of relevant indicators in the case of the transfer of technology to 
small Ghanaian enterprises.  
Among the key input indicators is R&D spending, which is often used as a proxy 
for technological capability, as R&D spending data exists, which are, in addition, 
easy to compare. However, as rightly pointed out by Figueiredo (2002b: 6), one 
should be wary, even in developed countries, in assuming that innovative activities 
only are confined to R&D laboratories. Rather, technical change in companies is 
most often associated with trial and error in the process of designing products and 
processes. Moreover, R&D activities are mostly confined to larger companies. In 
small companies, technological activities are performed on a part-time basis and of-
ten not categorised as R&D but rather as design or product engineering (Bell and 
Pavitt, 1993: 166). In firms based in the developing world, the innovative activities 
that are normally equated with R&D spending are more often associated with in-
cremental activities not covered by R&D statistics. Thus, R&D does not capture the 
full extent of technological activity in a developed-country context and it has hardly 
any relevance in the SSA context.121  
                                                                                                                                        
(Alänge, 1987; Biggs, Shah et al., 1995; Lall, Navaretti et al., 1994; Teitel, 2000; Wignaraja, 2001) 
that include small enterprises in their analysis. 
120 To comply with a referee’s comments, the authors added yet another measure, namely the 
importation of technology, which is composed of FDI, technology licensing payments and capital 
goods imports. 
121 Within this category, one could also add the availability of scientists and engineers relative to 
GDP, or science expenditures relative to GDP. However, both indicators share the same fundamen-
tal problems relative to the measurement of technological capabilities in small enterprises in SSA: 
they do not grasp the kinds of technical change that take place in these enterprises. 
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 Educational enrolment rates are also frequently used as input indicators. Enrol-
ment rates represent the human capital base in a country. However, education by no 
means equals technological capabilities but simply provides the basis on which 
learning takes place. Thus, ‘enrolment data can serve as a reasonable proxy in the 
absence of other comparative human capital formation data’ (Lall, 2000: 41). 
Pietrobelli (2000: 216) suggests that the pupil/teacher ratio should be included in 
order to take the effectiveness of the educational system into account. However, 
neither enrolment rates nor this proxy for the availability of education tell us any-
thing about the quality of the educational system. Moreover, enrolment data do not 
exist in a disaggregated form and therefore cannot be used to measure changes in 
technological capabilities in small companies. However, a variety of this proxy has 
been suggested by Biggs, Shah et al. (1995: 49ff), who suggest using the educa-
tional levels of both the production manager and the general manager as an indica-
tor of production capabilities. The advantage of this proxy is its focus on the firm 
level, its main shortcoming the lack of information on the quality of the education 
that was obtained. 
Enrolment at the tertiary level in technical subjects and vocational training rep-
resent another commonly used input indicator (see, for instance, Lall (1999; 2000). 
One may argue that, in the SSA context, the skills needed to create (basic) produc-
tion capabilities are ultimately formed within the framework of the enterprises and 
not in the formal schooling system. However, it is important to note that even the 
most basic technological capabilities often demand skills acquired at primary 
school, such as the ability to read and write, and to carry out arithmetical calcula-
tions. More advanced capabilities are normally partly acquired in universities and 
R&D departments, and partly within the company itself (Enos, 1991). This is fur-
ther supported by a study of capability building in the Indonesian manufacturing 
sector, which concluded that there is a positive relationship between the availability 
of technical personnel and the ability to cultivate technological capabilities. This 
same study also established a positive relationship between the level of training 
within a particular firm and the potential for enhancing technological capabilities 
(Kumar, Kumar et al., 1999). 
With respect to the two proxies above, the number of days of training of em-
ployees is sometimes used as an indicator for technological capabilities. This meas-
ure, like the percentage of the workforce participating in internal or external train-
ing, assumes a direct link between training and technological capability building, 
but this causal relationship does not always exist. Moreover, this narrow focus on 
hours spent on training does not take the quality of the training into account. 
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 Lastly, investment in (technologically more advanced) machinery is also used as 
an input indicator in some studies. It does not by itself lead to new technological 
capabilities, but according to Romijn (1999: 84f) the literature on the small-scale 
metal sector in developing countries suggests that the introduction of new produc-
tion equipments leads to the acquisition of new skills and most often also to product 
development and technological capabilities. In reality, however, this indicator only 
informs us that new machinery has come into use – that is, it is a very static indica-
tor, which does not inform us about the dynamics of technological capabilities. 
However, if information about new machinery were coupled with information re-
garding production methods, this indicator could be an important indicator of tech-
nological capabilities. 
Output indicators may also take a variety of forms. One of them is production 
output, which, inasmuch as this indicator can quantify capabilities at all (a number 
of external factors, such as foreign exchange and raw material shortages, can make 
the company stand idle for longer periods of time), it only captures a part of the 
technological capability development, since it does not take quality changes into 
account (Alänge, 1987: 27). Romijn (1997; 1999) uses a specific type of this sub-
category in her study of the small-scale capital goods sector in Pakistan, namely the 
product range. She quantifies the manufacturing complexity of products by break-
ing down each product into a limited number of standard operations and giving 
these operations scores. In this way, she is able to quantify the level of production 
capability incorporated in each product.122  
Patent data, another output indicator, has regularly been used as a substitute for 
technological capabilities in developed-country companies, but as Evenson and 
Westphal point out (1994: 28), patent data on the one hand articulates differences 
of inventive activity between countries, while on the other hand it reflects differ-
ences in the laws governing intellectual property rights (IPR). Moreover, hardly 
any developing countries have functioning IPR systems. Similarly, indicators such 
as number of performance awards and number of publications are regularly used in 
a developed-country context,123 though they are of no use here. 
Export may be regarded as an indicator for technological capabilities on an in-
ternational scale and is seen as one of the most serviceable indicators in measuring 
                                                 
122 In addition to the indicator, she includes data on general education, formal technical educa-
tion, prior working experience, internal efforts to assimilate and improve products, the search for 
new technological information outside the firm, external technical assistance, and the age of the par-
ticular firm. 
123 Here it is worth mentioning that the economic benefits of basic research are not the published 
information, but rather the problem-solving skills, international networks and background knowl-
edge that many researchers have (Bell and Pavitt, 1993: 175). Thus, it is questionable whether this 
indicator is of any use even in an industrialised country context. 
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 national technological capabilities, as it is easy to calculate while simultaneously 
measuring international efficiency (Lall, 2000: 31).124 However, automatically ex-
port data neither distinguish between different levels of technology used in the pro-
duction process, nor differentiate between domestic and foreign firms. Moreover, 
they can only be used on a national scale, not at the enterprise level. 
Total Factor Productivity (TFP) is the most widely used proxy to combine both 
input and output indicators. It is the most frequently used single indicator for tech-
nological capabilities by the proponents of the new growth theories.125 Basically 
TFP is a combination of capital productivity and labour productivity. The indicator 
itself does not measure capabilities but technical (in)efficiency. However, advo-
cates of TFP argue that, by including both physical and human capital and labour, 
this indicator measures technical progress. Lall (2000: 50), on the other hand, re-
minds us that it captures a range of influences other than technology, for example, 
capacity utilisation and imperfect competition. Moreover, it covers the entire econ-
omy and not a particular sector. 
As shown above, there is no agreement as to what constitutes the optimal indica-
tor for an assessment of technological capabilities, nor is there any objective indica-
tor that can be used to assess systematically changes in technological capabilities 
across countries, sectors, or even companies. The indicators listed above have been 
used in a wide variety of studies covering national inquiries (Lall, 1992, 2000), in-
dustrial branch-level studies (Putranto, Stewart et al., 2003) and firm-level investi-
gations in both developed and developing countries (Okejiri, 2000). Most of these 
indicators tend to be focused at the highest technological level, while technological 
activities at lower levels tend to be ignored (Ariffin and Figueiredo, 2004). In addi-
tion, all the input indicators presented above have a common weakness: they are 
valuable only when the inputs they represent are directly linked with the output of 
the related technological activity, which is seldom the case (Babu, 1999). Serious 
questions may thus be raised in relation to the use of most of these proxies for the 
study of technology transfer-induced changes in technological capabilities in small 
enterprises in SSA. 
It may be argued that in general firms are capable in some areas, less so in other 
areas, and consequently, a single measure of technological capabilities would pro-
vide a misleading picture of the technological capabilities in a particular company. 
Therefore, a combination of indicators is often applied for each type of capability in 
order to avoid the greatest pitfalls involved in the use of proxies to assess techno-
                                                 
124 Closely related to this sub-category are export intensity and export destination. 
125 See (Biggs, Shah et al., 1995: 37ff) for an example of how to calculate TFP in three African 
countries. 
 105
 logical capabilities. Gammeltoft (2001: 253), for example, uses four to eight differ-
ent indicators for each of his four different sub-capabilities in his study of techno-
logical capabilities among Indonesian electronics manufacturers.  
However, even a combination of indicators may not avoid all the pitfalls: almost 
every new article or paper that deals with technological capabilities proposes a new 
categorisation. In most cases, the particular technological capabilities are conceptu-
alised as the ability to undertake a corresponding set of technological activities, but 
very few intend actually to measure the capabilities in a disaggregated form. Hence, 
some degree of overlap is generally not a key concern. However, overlap does be-
come a concern when the aim of the study is to assess changes in technological ca-
pabilities rather than develop theory. In this case, the construction of indicators 
with a minimum of overlap is important. Moreover, the indicators should corre-
spond to the performance of a given firm in the study. In order to overcome these 
hurdles, the following illustrative framework within which to assess changes in 
small enterprises in Ghana is proposed. This framework takes both the horizontal 
and vertical classifications into account. Moreover, it builds on the discussion of 
indicators presented above.  
The columns in the Table refer to the horizontal classification of the technologi-
cal capabilities. In this framework, the categories of technological capabilities set 
out above have been subdivided into the following functions. Investment capabili-
ties have been split into ‘pre-investment’ and ‘preparation and implementation’. 
Production capabilities have been broken up into product-centred, process-centred 
and equipment-related capabilities. It is, of course, difficult to distinguish between 
activities that relate to the product, the process of producing the product, and the 
equipment used to produce the products. Notwithstanding these problems, this ana-
lytical distinction will be retained here. Linkage capabilities have not been broken 
down further. The rows in the proposed framework determine the technological 
depths of the capabilities as well as the development over time. Hence the various 
cells in Table 4.1 point to an activity that a company is able to undertake on its own 
at a given point in time. Thus, following Figueiredo (2002a), the accumulation of 
capabilities in a company is identified when that particular company has acquired a 
technological ability that had not been available to it before. 
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 Table 4.1. Technological capabilities in small Ghanaian enterprises 
TC Forms Investment Production Linkage 
TC levels Pre-
investment 
Prepara-
tion & 
imple-
mentation
Product–
centred 
Process-
centred 
Equipment  
Decision re-
garding com-
pany/ plant 
location 
    
Identification 
of a suitable 
project  
Initial pro-
ject outline 
prepara-
tion 
 Routine pro-duction control
Basic equip-
ment main-
tenance 
 
Pre-
investment 
studies 
Simple 
plant erec-
tion 
Replicat-
ing part-
ner speci-
fications  
Basic quality 
control 
Simple produc-
tion planning 
Routine re-
placement of 
components 
Local pro-
curement of 
goods and 
services 
Search for 
suitable tech-
nologies 
Installa-
tion of 
equipment 
Minor ad-
aptations 
to market 
needs 
Minor adapta-
tions incl. ma-
terial substitu-
tions 
Trouble 
shooting 
Linkages to 
suppliers/ 
subcontrac-
tors 
B
asic 
Sim
ple          →
    
Technology 
transfer nego-
tiation 
Project 
specifica-
tion (prod-
uct mix, 
input re-
quire-
ments, 
scale etc.) 
Adapta-
tion to 
export 
market 
needs 
Obtaining cer-
tification for 
routine process 
quality control 
 
Links with 
technology 
suppliers, 
and private 
sector asso-
ciations 
 
Equipment 
procure-
ment, 
training 
and re-
cruitment 
of skilled 
personnel 
Quality 
improve-
ment & 
reverse 
engineer-
ing 
‘De-
bottlenecking’, 
‘capacity-
stretching’ and 
cost-saving 
Minor adap-
tations in 
equipment to 
adjust to lo-
cal materials 
Supply of 
technical 
advise to 
buyers 
Expan-
sions of 
product 
mix 
 Equipment repair 
Transfer of 
know-how 
to buyers 
Interm
ediate 
Sim
ple    →
    C
om
plex 
Full execu-
tion of feasi-
bility studies 
incl. search, 
evaluation 
and selection 
of technology 
Basic en-
gineering 
of individ-
ual facili-
ties, and 
plant ex-
pansion  
Inventive 
adapta-
tions 
Integrated 
automated op-
eration systems
Modifica-
tions of core 
technology 
 
T
im
e &
 ‘depth of know
ledge’ 
A
dvanced 
 
  
In-house 
product 
innova-
tion and 
R&D 
In-house proc-
ess innovation 
and R&D 
In-house 
manufactur-
ing of equip-
ment, design 
and R&D 
Turn-key 
capability 
Sources: (Ariffin and Figueiredo, 2004; Figueiredo, 2002a; Gonsen, 1998; Lall, 
1992; Lall, Navaretti et al., 1994; Wei, 1995). 
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 As will become apparent in subsequent chapters, the Ghanaian companies that 
have collaborated with Danish companies as part of Danida’s Private Sector Devel-
opment Programme span a wide variety of sectors. Moreover, they differ substan-
tially in size, type of customer, outlook etc. Therefore, some categories in Table 4.1 
may seem arbitrary for some companies, while others may seem too broad to grasp 
fully the changes that have taken place since the collaboration was initiated. How-
ever, the intention is not to provide a clear-cut quantitative assessment of the 
changes, but merely to put forward a framework to guide the study of technological 
capability building. Moreover, it is important to note that the above framework 
does not take the source of a particular change into account: it merely provides a 
checklist for assessing changes in the various categories of technological capabili-
ties. 
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 5. UNDERSTANDING HOW FIRMS ACT AND INTERACT: THE 
BUSINESS SYSTEM APPROACH 
This chapter aims to establish an analytical framework based on the Business Sys-
tem Approach to examine the factors that are shaping the development of the Gha-
naian private sector. This framework identifies certain institutions in Ghanaian so-
ciety that are of specific importance in understanding how private companies act 
and interact. This chapter focuses on the theoretical arguments underpinning the 
Business System Approach. In the first section, it introduces the background for the 
framework. The point of departure here is a critique of the orthodox economic ap-
proach. It is argued that economic action is not undertaken by rational agents in the 
market. Rather, personal relations and structures impact upon the economic actions 
that agents undertake. Thus, the socio-economic environment of the agents has to 
be taken into account in order to understand how and why private entities operate. 
The socio-economic environment is scrutinised further in section two. The Busi-
ness System Approach essentially deals with the nature of the economic agents in 
the economy, the structure of relations between agents, and the prevailing system of 
authoritative co-ordination and control. In this section the basic mechanisms of the 
system are accounted for. Thus, section two points out the relevant institutional fea-
tures that shape the distinctive business system, the business system characteristics, 
and how these two are related. Section three adapts the overall Business System 
Approach to a Sub-Saharan African context. 
5.1 The embeddedness of economic action into wider institutional and 
social frameworks 
Research on embeddedness is research into how social and institutional structures 
affect economic life. The term ‘embeddedness’ originally derives from Joseph 
Schumpeter’s work on economic action and inter-firm networks (Schumpeter, 
1950) and Karl Polanyi’s description of how the social structure of modern markets 
impacts upon the form of exchange in a given economy (Polanyi, 1944).126 Nowa-
                                                 
126 Polanyi’s The Great Transformation includes a number contradictory arguments and incon-
sistencies, including a fuzzy distinction between the embedded and disembedded market economy, 
due to his shifting relationship to the Marxist academic tradition. According to Block (2003), the 
main reason for these contradictions should be sought in the time span between the outline for the 
book, which was drawn up in the 1930s, and the book itself, which was written in 1941-43. During 
this period Polanyi’s theoretical framework shifted, and thanks to his eagerness to publish the book 
before the end of World War II, he did not have time to iron out the inconsistencies.  
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 days, however, most people refer to Mark Granovetter’s notion of embeddedness, 
namely that economic action is embedded in ongoing social ties that sometimes fa-
cilitate exchange, and at other times derail it (Granovetter, 1985).  
The notion of embeddedness therefore opposes the neoclassical approach to in-
ter-firm relations. Whereas orthodox economists argue that, in the ideal-type mar-
ket, partners are linked by arm’s-length ties, the proponents of the embeddedness 
approach argue that business partners are linked by embedded ties based on trust 
and personal relations (Granovetter, 1985).127  
Granovetter therefore disagrees with the perception of economic exchange as ra-
tional economic behaviour organised in impersonal institutional arrangements. He 
claims that this understanding of economic action is under-socialised, inasmuch as 
it does not allow actual personal relations to influence the outcome. In contrast, he 
argues that the claim of some sociologists, who wanted to correct the under-
socialised form of understanding, that general morality provides the basis of human 
behaviour, is over-socialised, as it calls for an automatic and unconditioned re-
sponse to economic action. However, these two apparently contrasting approaches 
have one theoretical trait in common, namely the notion that action and decision are 
carried out by atomized actors, in the sense that behavioural patterns are treated as 
internalised and thus as unaffected by ongoing social relations (Granovetter, 1985: 
485; Granovetter, 1992: 6). This theoretical notion is the central point of Granovet-
ter’s critique of mainstream economics and the reason for his approaching the firm 
from a sociological viewpoint: ‘The embeddedness argument instead stresses the 
role of concrete personal relations and structures (or “networks”) of such relations 
in generating trust and discouraging malfeasance’ (Granovetter, 1985: 490).  
Numerous studies have been based on Granovetter’s notion of embeddedness 
and his argument that networks should be used to analyse the economy. These stud-
ies have shown us that economic institutions are embedded in wider social rela-
tions. However, this does not imply that culture and social values predetermine 
economic organisation. Rather, the notion of embeddedness signifies the interaction 
between the two (Schaumburg-Müller, 2001). 
The concept of embeddedness has undergone a change over time, as already de-
scribed in the introduction to this section. Moreover, the level of analysis has 
changed, as depicted in Table 5.1. Thus, embeddedness in the Polanyian sense of 
the word is based on a macro-level analysis of the market economy within a nation-
                                                 
127 Between these two extremes are variations of revisionist economic frameworks, such as 
transaction costs theory, agency theory and game theory, which try to incorporate the social struc-
ture into the economic analysis, but these approaches still perceive these relations as having only a 
marginal effect on economic performance relative to the logic of the market (Uzzi, 1996). 
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 ally framed context. It refers to the notion that ‘markets’ are not naturally given, but 
rather, socially structured and governed. Thus, the economy is seen to be embedded 
in social and cultural structures. 
Table 5.1. Different notions of embeddedness 
Who? What? In what? Where? 
Polanyi The economy Social and cultural structures The nation state 
Granovetter128 Individuals and firms 
Networks of ongoing social rela-
tions NA 
Whitley Firms Institutional framework The nation state129
Source: Hess (2004: table 1). 
 
Embeddedness in the Granovetterian sense of the word, in contrast, refers to the 
micro-level analysis of the economic behaviour of individuals and firms. This be-
haviour is then embedded in ‘networks of ongoing social relations’. Business part-
ners are thus linked by embedded ties based on trust and personal relations. How-
ever, Granovetter’s main aim is not confined to the micro-level. Even though his 
‘embeddedness’ focuses on the proximate mechanisms of economic life, his stated 
aim is to explore macro-level patterns, that is, to carry out an in-depth analysis of 
the networks of interpersonal relations in order to facilitate an understanding of the 
overall economic structure (Granovetter, 1985: 506f). 
However, the exact focus of Granovetter’s analysis remains unclear. His main 
argument is that concrete personal relations and trust impact upon the economic 
outcome, and thus one would imagine that the ‘actors’ were individuals, but as 
Hess (2004: 170) points out, he also stresses the importance of social relations be-
tween firms. Granovetter’s concept of embeddedness has often been criticised for 
its vagueness (Henderson, Dicken et al., 2002). Stated crudely, Granovetter only 
argues that individual economic behaviour is embedded in networks of interper-
sonal relations. However, he does not specify how these networks are shaped, nor 
how the links between these networks and wider social structures –the state, institu-
tions, educational system, law, religion, kinship etc. – are formed (Barber, 1995). 
As will become apparent in the next section, the business-system approach tries to 
                                                 
128 This categorisation refers to Granovetter’s 1985 article, ‘Economic Action and Social Stuc-
ture’ (Granovetter, 1985). In later writings, Granovetter moves the study into a larger framework of 
analysis in order to capture how and why economic institutions exist. He is especially puzzled by 
overseas Chinese in East Asia and the Korean Chaebols (Granovetter, 1992). 
129 Even though Richard Whitley has recently admitted that business systems may vary within 
nations – for instance, between regions or sectors – or may overlap across national boundaries, he 
still maintains that regulatory institutions that impact upon economic outcomes have a distinct na-
tional character, and thus business systems will remain national for some time to come (Whitley, 
2003). 
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 overcome this critique by focusing on the institutions that shape how firms act and 
interact. 
Polanyi’s and Granovetter’s writings have both inspired several lines of re-
search, for example, the interest of economic geographers in spatial embeddedness 
and the ‘culture’ of economics,130 and of business organisation researchers on firms 
and their networks, as in the work of Halinen and Törnroos (1998). In this context, 
however, the discussion will be limited to a third line of thought inspired by the 
concept of embeddedness, namely the Business System (BS) approach. Although 
the BS literature does not use the term ‘embeddedness’, it is clearly inspired by 
these writings. Thus, the link between the way firms act in a given economy and 
the specific social-institutional environment in the business system literature is 
clearly inspired by Polanyi’s idea that markets are governed by society. At the same 
time, however, it departs from Polanyi’s focus on the economy as such and has 
more similarity with Granovetter’s concentration on individual actors. 
5.2 The business-system approach: a theoretical outline  
The BS literature is therefore directly related to the literature on the embeddedness 
of economic action. Moreover, it builds on the work of Hamilton and Biggart 
(1988), who oppose both purely market-focused and purely cultural131 explanations 
of industrial arrangements and practices in three East Asian economies. Instead, 
they propose a political-economy approach that incorporates economic and cultural 
factors but also stresses the relationship between the state and business and struc-
tures of authority in the explanation of organisational differences. This approach 
aims to explain how these relationships, as well as structures, have come into being, 
and how they impact upon industrial arrangements. 
In a similar vein, the BS approach focuses on particular organisation and the 
governance structures of certain types of economic institution. The main aim of the 
BS approach is to explain the differences in the nature of the firm and the ways in 
which it competes and co-ordinates inputs and outputs in the market in terms of key 
social institutions (Whitley, 1996a).132 Therefore the BS approach also opposes the 
orthodox economic understanding of firm–market relations, offering instead the 
possibility to analyse these relations in a specific (national) context. 
                                                 
130 For a critique of the increased use of the concept of embeddedness in economic geography, 
see Martin and Sunley (2001). 
131 Cultural explanations cover a wide array of approaches. In general, however, they link organ-
isational patterns with cultural practices, such as explanations of Japanese organisational arrange-
ments through an examination of the Japanese value, wa (harmony), which seems to subordinate the 
individual to the group. 
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 The BS represents a distinctive way of coordinating and controlling economic 
activities. According to Whitley (1999b: 33), business systems ‘vary in their degree 
and mode of authoritative coordination133 of economic activities, and in the organi-
sation of, and interconnection between, owners, managers, experts, and other em-
ployees’. As pointed out above, one of the objectives of the proponents of the BS 
approach is to explain how these distinctive business systems have come into be-
ing. According to Whitley, for example, a number of factors influence the forma-
tion of business systems, the most important being variations in key institutions in 
society that influence BS characteristics.  
Figure 5.1 sketches out the essential components of the BS approach, namely in-
stitutional features that help to generate and reproduce certain business systems, BS 
characteristics that define the business system, and the link between them. The 
components will be discussed in the following.  
Figure 5.1. Business system analysis framework 
Institutional features: 
• State-business relationship 
• Capital market 
• Skill formation and the role of 
Unions 
• Dominant conventions regard-
ing family, authority, loyalty 
and trust 
Business System  
characteristics: 
• Ownership coordination 
• Non-ownership coordi-
nation 
• Employment relations 
and work management 
 
5.2.1 Institutional features  
Proponents of the BS approach stress its historical dimension: the current firm-
market relationship in a given context is shaped by the development of certain insti-
tutions in society during and after industrialisation. Thus, even though a BS is not 
static, it does not change overnight. The reason for this stability is the role of the in-
stitutions that govern access to labour and capital in shaping the way firms act and 
interact. The BS literature is very vague in stating exactly which institutions are 
important. During the past decade, several institutions have been singled out in, for 
instance, Richard Whitley’s writings, but they may all be grouped into the follow-
                                                                                                                                        
132 Firms are here perceived as ‘units of financial control, which coordinate economic activities 
through authority hierarchies on the basis of unified ownership’ (Whitley, 2002: xx). 
133 Authoritative coordination is defined by Whitley as ‘common obedience to established rules 
of conduct in the pursuit of collectively agreed goals’ (Whitley, 1999b: 31). 
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 ing four main types of institutional feature:134 the state, the financial system, the 
skill development and control system, and dominant conventions governing trust 
and authority relations.135 In Whitley’s writings from the early 1990s, these fea-
tures are grouped into ‘proximate’ and ‘background’ institutions respectively (see, 
e.g., Whitley ((1992a; 1992b; 1994)). The former institutions are directly related to 
the economic system, and in general, they have developed with the modern nation 
state. They are thus the product of industrialisation. The latter institutions refer 
broadly to the social institutions that underpin a given society and that impact upon 
how firms act and interact. Thus they relate to the underlying principles of coopera-
tion and include trust relations, family relations, subordination and obedience. In 
Figure 5.1, the background institutions are highlighted. 
These institutional features condition access to labour and capital, affect how la-
bour power is developed and the attitudes and values of individuals, influence the 
norms and rules controlling private property, and shape the wider social structure, 
which may affect individuals’ capabilities. The institutional features cover a wide 
variety of relations that vary in strength and degree. Therefore different institutional 
features tend to shape the nature of, for instance, ownership relations, inter-firm 
connections and employment relations, thus impacting on how business systems 
materialise (Whitley, 1999b). In the following, these features are briefly explained. 
The state-business relationship refers above all to the role of the state with re-
gard to leading economic actors, thus reflecting the relative dependence of private 
businessmen on state policies. Secondly, it refers the state’s ability to develop and 
implement coherent policies for economic growth, thus reflecting the state’s de-
pendence on dominant groups upon economic growth. Thirdly, it refers to the ex-
tent to which the state encourages intra- and inter-sectoral organisations between 
individuals, firms and the state, thus reflecting the state’s support for industrial de-
velopment through risk sharing and the encouragement of long-term cooperation 
between employers and employees, and between the state and private companies. 
Lastly, it refers to the extent of market regulation. 
The capital market is closely related to the state–business relationship, as the fi-
nancial system impacts on how the state supports industrial development. Broadly 
                                                 
134 For a critique of this lack of consistency in the BS literature, see, for instance, Lundvall 
(1999). 
135 Richard Whitley easily ends up in a circular argument as regards the institutional features. For 
instance, he argues that exactly these institutions are singled out because they ‘guide and constrain 
the nature of ownership relations, inter-firm connections, and employment relations’ (Whitley, 
1999b: 47) – the exact content of the BS characteristics! What is important here, though, is that 
these four institutional features govern most aspects of the private sector, for instance, the technical 
skills of workers, the attitudes to work of employees, exchanges of inputs and outputs, and rules 
regulating the use of human and material resources.  
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 speaking, two types of capital market can be distinguished, namely the capital mar-
ket-based financial system and the credit-based financial system. In the former re-
sources are made available by capital markets, which are often specialised financial 
institutions, and lenders and users are relatively remote from one another. The rela-
tionship between users and lenders also tends to be short-term and specific to par-
ticular transactions. The latter, on the other hand, are weak capital markets that only 
play a minor role in mobilising funds for the private sector. Instead credit is often 
provided by commercial banks or long-term credit banks or a combination of both.  
Skill formation and the role of unions denotes the overall system for developing 
and controlling skills. As regards skill development, it is possible to distinguish be-
tween a system that is dominated by formal academic standards and a system that 
separates technical/practical skills from academic skills. In the former system, aca-
demic skills are standardised, practical skills only rarely so, often being provided 
through intra-firm training. The latter system, on the other hand, encourages fewer 
task-specific practical skills, therefore in theory this system is better prepared to ac-
commodate technical change. This distinction not only impacts on future learning, 
but also on the ‘extent to which employers, unions, and the state are jointly in-
volved in developing and managing such training’ (Whitley, 1999b: 50). Skill de-
velopment is also related to the role of unions: some unions are defined by separate 
crafts and thus certify specific skills, whereas others are either industry-specific un-
ions or more general unions that do not identify special expertise. 
The dominant conventions regarding family, authority, loyalty and trust is a 
broad category that influences relations between business partners and between 
employers and employees. These so-called ‘background’ institutions were initially 
perceived as underlying the ‘proximate’ institutions and thus producing their spe-
cific characteristics (Whitley, 1992b). In later writings, the causal relationship be-
tween these two types of institution has been omitted. Instead, they have been com-
bined and constitute part of the institutional features. However, most of the compo-
nents of the original ‘background’ institutions still feature in this category. Among 
the most important elements are the degree and basis of trust between non-kin – 
that is, the extent to which trust is granted and guaranteed through formal social in-
stitutions; the commitment and loyalty to collectivities beyond the family; the rela-
tionship between superordinate and subordinate; and the degree to which authority 
rests on widespread appeals to common interests, as opposed to specific agreements 
between separate contractors – that is, a shared understandings of priorities versus 
the pursuit of self-interest (Whitley, 1992b, 1996b, 1999b). 
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 5.2.2 Business System characteristics 
Essentially a BS is a coordination and control system that can vary on two basic 
dimensions in relation to economic activities, namely ownership coordination and 
non-ownership coordination (or alliance integration). Ownership coordination re-
fers to the connection between the owners and controllers of private property rights 
and economic resources. Thus, whereas direct control over economic activities by 
the owner of a company indicates high ownership coordination, delegation of con-
trol to trusted agents points towards lower levels of ownership coordination.136 
Non-ownership coordination refers to the integration of economic activities through 
alliances, joint routines and cooperation, which are not predicated upon joint own-
ership (Whitley, 2002). These activities may be organized in cooperative arrange-
ments with a high degree of commitment, thus indicating high levels of non-
ownership coordination, or else be dominated by anonymous, ad hoc or one-off ar-
rangements and thus indicate low levels of non-ownership coordination. The com-
binations of these dimensions – that is, ownership and the non-ownership – and 
levels of coordination make up the following four distinctive ideal business sys-
tems: Fragmented BS, Coordinated industrial districts, Compartmentalised BS, and 
Collaborative BS. 
The most important characteristics of the ownership coordination category in-
clude the extent of the owner’s involvement in the management of the business (di-
rect control, alliance control, market control) and the extent of horizontal (across 
sectors) and vertical (in chains) ownership integration. These characteristics are in-
terrelated. Thus, the direct control of family businesses theoretically counteracts the 
horizontal spread of business activities, as owners of these firms tend to develop 
certain capabilities related to a certain activity. In the non-ownership coordination 
category, the characteristics can be divided into joint activities between the mem-
bers of a production chain, among competitors and across sectors. Ownership coor-
dination and non-ownership coordination are interrelated in such a way that the 
type of ownership influences how non-ownership coordination takes place. Direct 
ownership, for instance, creates a personal identity with the company and a reluc-
                                                 
136 For reasons of simplicity, only two levels have been chosen, namely high and low. However, 
ownership and non-ownership coordination both cover various categories. Ownership coordination, 
for instance, refers to the primary means of owner control over the company (direct, alliance, or 
arm’s length), the extent of ownership integration in production chains, and across sectors. Like-
wise, non-ownership coordination refers to the integration of members in a chain, the alliance be-
tween competitors, as well as alliances between firms in different sectors. These alliances range 
from competition or short-term arrangements to long-term cooperative arrangements. In some in-
stances, like the collaborative BS, the high levels of ownership coordination in reality cover a high 
level of ownership coordination in production chains, but only a limited ownership integration 
across sectors (Whitley, 1999b). 
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 tance to share information and control, thus limiting the possibility of cooperation 
with competitors. 
Table 5.2. Coordination systems and ideal types of BS relationship 
 Ownership  
coordination 
Non-ownership  
coordination 
Fragmented BS Low levels Low levels 
Coordinated industrial districts Low levels High levels 
Compartmentalised BS High levels Low levels 
Collaborative BS High levels High levels 
 
In addition to the two coordination systems, employment relations and work 
management may be used to categorise distinctive business systems because BS 
characteristics relate to the degree of employer-employee interdependence and 
managerial delegation to and trust of employees, respectively. However, since em-
ployment relations and work management are dependent on ownership coordina-
tion, this category has been omitted from Table 5.2. Direct control of a firm, for in-
stance, tends to limit the interdependence between employers and employees, while 
alliance forms of ownership can lead to a higher level of dependence between the 
two parties (Whitley, 1999b). 
Like the specifications of specific institutions that influence the BS described in 
the previous section, the literature on BS in general, and Whitley’s papers in par-
ticular, have not been at all consistent as regards the most important BS characteris-
tics.137
In sum, four ideal business systems can be distinguished, namely the Frag-
mented BS, the Coordinated Industrial Districts, the Compartmentalised BS, and 
the Collaborative BS (see Table 5.2). Fragmented Business Systems are character-
ised by limited ownership as well as non-ownership-based coordination. They are 
dominated by small owner-controlled firms that specialise in a narrow range of 
economic activities, and employment relations are typically short-term. Coordi-
nated Industrial Districts combine low levels of ownership integration with more 
extensive inter-firm cooperation, both within chains and across sectors. Non-
                                                 
137 The specific BS characteristics have changed considerably during the past decade. In 1992, 
the BS had sixteen different characteristics. In 1994 the number was reduced to thirteen. Then in 
1996, Whitley simplified his framework considerably and mentioned only five key features of the 
economic actors, though in 1999 this was raised again to eight key dimensions (Whitley, 1992b, 
1994, 1996b, 1999b). However, the idea remains the same: particular social institutions that govern 
access to labour and capital shape the way firms act and interact. 
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 ownership coordination is often stimulated by government agencies, trade unions, 
educational facilities etc. Like the fragmented BS, units in this type of BS are gen-
erally small, and firms are often owner-controlled. Compartmentalised Business 
Systems are dominated by large firms that integrate activities within chains and 
across sectors, but display low levels of inter-firm cooperation and thus normally 
operate at arms’ lengths through financial markets. Lastly, Collaborative Business 
Systems combine large entities with high levels of inter-firm cooperation. Firms are 
often vertically integrated and seldom diversify across sectors, while owner-control 
is typically alliance in nature.  
Two variations of these business systems are often mentioned in the BS litera-
ture, namely the State-organised BS, a sub-type of the compartmentalised BS, and 
the highly coordinated BS, a sub-type of the collaborative BS. It is important to 
bear in mind that these distinctive business systems are ideal types – that is, empiri-
cal examples often reveal conflicting features and contradictory tendencies. 
5.2.3 The link between institutional features and BS characteristics 
Figure 5.1 assumes a one-way causation between key institutions in society and BS 
characteristics. However, the link between these two aspects of the system is under-
emphasised by the proponents of the BS approach. Basically, the relationship be-
tween these two entities is not straightforward: it is neither linear nor reversible. In 
other words, Whitley argues that the institutional features on the left-hand side of 
the figure are not correlated with the BS characteristics on the right-hand side. In-
stead, he argues, certain features tend to produce certain BS characteristics. More-
over, not all institutional features have the same significance in this process. 
Rather, extreme features tend to dominate. Put differently, different institutional 
features do not necessarily go hand in hand. Hence, if two institutional features pull 
in opposite directions, the most extreme one will dominate. Lastly, the relationship 
between institutional features and BS characteristics does not necessarily apply in 
reverse: ‘the existence of an effective legal system governing contractual trust does 
not necessarily lead to extensive delegation of control…although the lack of such 
formal institutions is likely to encourage strong owner control’ (Whitley, 1999b: 
55).  
5.3 The Ghanaian BS: an analytical framework  
The previous section (5.2) considered the institutional features and characteristics 
of the BS in an ideal world. It informed us that institutions that govern capital and 
labour in a given (national) context constitute the most important features of the 
BS. However, we should bear in mind that a BS only represents the general pattern 
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 of economic coordination and control in a market economy. In other words, we 
should expect to find variations within the national economy (Whitley, 1999b: 31f; 
Whitley, 2002: xx). 
Moreover, it is important to remember that the BS approach was not intended to 
apply to the Ghanaian case, but was first developed in East Asia (Whitley, 1990, 
1992a) and then transferred to a European context (Kristensen, 1996; Whitley, 
1992b). Recently, however, it has been applied to one Sub-Saharan African context 
(Pedersen and McCormick, 1999; Sørensen and Kuada, 2001; Whitley, 2001). The 
BS approach was thus developed on the basis of rather well-established business 
systems in East Asia and Europe, which were characterised by firmly established 
institutions and solid social groupings. In contrast, many Sub-Saharan African 
countries have only recently begun rebuilding key institutions in society. Moreover, 
social groupings are often weak, as traditional loyalties are breaking down and new 
ones have not yet been fully developed.  
This section begins with a critique of the BS approach and then proceeds with a 
proposal for an analytical framework based on the BS approach just outlined. This 
framework takes the major critique of the approach into consideration, but more 
importantly it identifies the specific institutional features in Ghana that must be 
taken into account if we are to understand how Ghanaian firms act and interact, and 
why they do so. Lastly some reflections are offered regarding changes in the BS. 
5.3.1 Challenges to the BS approach  
The BS approach has been challenged from various perspectives. The most intense 
debate relates to the role of globalisation vis-à-vis the national character of the BS. 
Critics argue that globalisation tends to neutralise the effect of distinctive national 
institutions, whereas proponents of BS maintain that, even if global institutions are 
‘imported’, as the critics claim, these institutions will be affected by the existing 
framework and thus be distinctive (Kristensen, 1999). Moreover, Whitley (2003: 
30) insists that, even though the international business environment (IBE) – that is, 
the internationalisation of ownership and regulation – may in theory weaken the na-
tional specificity of the BS, in reality the IBE is still so weakly institutionalised that 
there is a greater chance that specific national institutions will impact on the IBE 
than that international institutions will influence national ones. In a similar vein, 
Whitley (1999b) maintains that the social and economic organisation of migrant 
communities depend to a large degree on the host nation’s institutional structures, 
and therefore these ethnic communities will not have any noticeable effect on the 
national BS as such.  
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 However, it is worth restating that most studies of business systems have been 
conducted in nations with relatively stable institutions. Thus, the proponents of the 
distinctiveness of the BS approach base their arguments on quite stable institutions, 
which have so far been able to maintain their specific features and thus preserve the 
distinctiveness of their BS. In most developing countries key institutions have only 
recently been developed, and in many cases they are still very fragile. Therefore, 
these institutions are likely to be more receptive to change than the institutions that 
are most often studied in the BS literature. Moreover, the way firms act and interact 
in developing countries may depend not only on key national institutions, but also 
on changes in the management and organisation of production resulting from sub-
contracting arrangements with foreign companies, mergers, joint ventures etc. 
Likewise, business systems in developing countries often consists of several dis-
tinct segments that only interact in limited ways (Pedersen and McCormick, 1999; 
Whitley, 1999a). 
As spelled out already in section 4.1, the large majority of small enterprises in 
SSA do not have an international outlook, but process and sell products for the lo-
cal market. Thus, the impact of globalisation on these ‘survival’ enterprises is at 
best indirect. However, the situation is slightly different for ‘growing’ enterprises, 
as to a large extent their market is being squeezed precisely by globalisation. More-
over, it is worth noting that the differences between developing countries, as well 
as between sectors in the same country, are considerable. While the impact of glob-
alisation on the structure and organisation of many home-based industries is ex-
pected to be insignificant, the effects on, for instance, the garment industry in 
Bangladesh are likely to be considerable, as Schaumburg-Müller shows (2001: 
230). Here, he argues, international trends have radically changed the industry: a 
new labour force has been created, which consists mainly of female wage labourers 
formerly living in rural areas. Thus, how companies in this sector are organised dif-
fers markedly from other parts of the Bangladeshi private sector. It may therefore 
be more appropriate to discuss changes in certain sectors resulting from globalisa-
tion, not changes in the economy as a whole. 
Furthermore, international financial institutions, such as the World Bank and the 
IMF, have played an essential role in the development of key institutions in LDCs, 
especially since the introduction of structural adjustment and stabilisation pro-
grammes at the beginning of the 1980s.138 Likewise, major bilateral and multilat-
eral donors alike have placed a major emphasis on changing the room for manoeu-
                                                 
138 In Richard Whitley’s only paper to deal with developing countries, he goes so far as to state 
that ‘many developing economies are quite “internationalized” in the sense that much industrial ac-
tivity and trade is coordinated by foreign organization’ (Whitley, 2001: 34). 
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 vre of the private sector in developing countries during the last decade through, for 
instance, legislative reform, the implementation of new incentive structures, and fi-
nancial support for certain segments of the private sector (cf. Chapter 0, above).  
The BS approach has also been criticised for not being able to take change into 
account (Yeung, 2000a), and for not allowing for sector and product specifics when 
dealing with the international dimension (Gereffi, 1996; Raikes, Jensen et al., 
2000). In other words, business systems are generally considered to be relatively 
stable, with only a small tendency to converge. This argument builds on an assump-
tion that the institutional features that provide the foundation for the business sys-
tem are stable and enduring. However, this is seldom the case in developing coun-
tries. Thus, one might argue that various aspects of globalisation, including the role 
of donors, puts pressure on business systems in developing countries. On the con-
trary, however, institutional features reflect configurations of power and interest in 
a society. Thus, any attempt to change them provokes intense opposition from af-
fected groups. Moreover, proponents of the business system approach specifically 
argue that the relationship between the institutional features and the business sys-
tem characteristics is irreversible, that is, even though key actors change due to in-
fluence from donors, multinational companies, international traders, foreigners etc., 
these changes do not necessarily lead to institutional changes, at least not in the 
short run. 
5.3.2 An analytical framework for the Ghanaian context 
Figure 5.1 spelled out the relationship between the institutional features on the one 
hand and the specific patterns of coordination and control, that is, the business sys-
tem characteristics, on the other. This framework does not take specific historical 
developments into account. Instead, it focuses on the abstract relationship between 
the two. However, and in line with the notion of embeddedness, not all institutional 
features are equally relevant in all settings. This section singles out the most rele-
vant institutional features in the Ghanaian context. 
State–business relations are of the utmost importance in developing countries 
that have pursued a state-led industrialisation strategy. The majority of these coun-
tries are now committed to a private sector-led development strategy. Ghana is no 
exception. Thus, an analysis of the state-business relationship from a historical per-
spective can enhance our understanding of how private businesses react to new ini-
tiatives. The state-business relationship comprises four subgroups. The first relates 
to how the state has managed the industrialisation process and the role of the pri-
vate sector in it. The second deals with corruption and how the state tackles this. 
The third is related to the former two groups in that it considers official state poli-
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 cies towards the private sector. The last group deals with organised private-sector 
responses to the state. 
Access to capital has a major impact on how private enterprises operate. Capital 
forms a basic premise for enterprises to operate, and thus access to capital may fa-
cilitate, as well as hinder, the development of local private-sector activities. In 
Ghana, the financial system is dual in the sense that only a very few foreign com-
panies and large-scale Ghanaian companies have access to capital from formal fi-
nancial institutions: the great majority of Ghanaian companies have to rely on rela-
tives, informal moneylenders and a few business organisations to obtain capital.  
The educational system trains the skills that are available for the private sector. 
In Ghana, as elsewhere in SSA, this system was established by missionaries and 
later taken over by the colonial administration. Throughout this period, the focus 
was on elite education for white-collar clerks and junior bureaucrats. This focus 
continued after independence. The types of skills produced in the educational sec-
tor, that is, formal academic or technical skills, tend to determine what kind of ac-
tivity the private sector can undertake and therefore influences its characteristics. 
Likewise, institutions that reveal the cultural values of Ghanaian society, such as 
the role of the family, trust between non-kin, commitment and loyalty beyond the 
family, and authority relations, have an effect on the relationship between business 
partners and between employers and employees. These institutions determine how 
private entities are managed and how and to what degree companies collaborate. 
This is of the greatest importance in studying donor-induced business collabora-
tions. 
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6. NO SUCH THING AS A COOKBOOK FOR DOING 
CRITICAL REALIST RESEARCH: METHODOLOGICAL CONSID-
ERATIONS 
The topic of this thesis is the impact of development aid. In order to unpack this, it 
is important to scrutinise the dynamics of both aid and context. Moreover, it is of 
the utmost importance to be aware of the underlying structures and mechanisms 
that affect the interplay between these two aspects. A meta-theoretical position that 
acknowledges internal dynamics, as well as the importance of underlying structures 
and mechanisms, and that rejects naïve demands for universal validity is therefore 
essential. Critical realism serves exactly these purposes and will therefore consti-
tute the starting point for the choice of methods.  
This chapter begins with a short outline of critical realism, in particular the spe-
cific category of critical realism that is identified as methodological realism. The 
purpose of this section is to present the key concepts and features of critical realism 
that lead the researcher from theory to empirical data and back. Inspired mainly by 
the writings of Andrew Sayer and Henry Wei-chung Yeung, this section applies 
critical realism to the study of the impacts of the PSDP in Ghana, outlining the par-
ticular method of reasoning applied in this study, and introducing the research 
methods.139 Section two departs directly from this application and describes the de-
sign of the study, the choice of cases, the construction of interview guides and the 
search for the validation of empirical data. In the last section of this chapter, issues 
of specific relevance to the question of validity are discussed in more detail. In par-
ticular, this section deals with the struggles encountered when interviewing foreign 
elites, an acknowledgement of the nature of the interviewer’s position vis-à-vis the 
interviewee, and the challenges related to the researcher’s ‘closeness’ to the devel-
opment organisation. 
6.1 Critical realism in brief 
The critical realism of today was developed in the 1970s in the writings of Roy 
Bhaskar and Rom Harré. They aimed to establish an alternative to Humean positiv-
                                                 
139 Following Yeung (2000b: 3), I define methodology as the entire process of practising re-
search, and methods as the specific techniques used in research. 
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 ism, or empirical realism, as they dubbed it, that is, an alternative to an ontology of 
atomistic events, comprising objects of experience.140 Their concern was entirely 
philosophical. 
Critical realism has since been dealt with by a number of different researchers 
from various branches of the social sciences.141 Each contribution has its own dis-
tinct focus. However, it is possible to categorise the contributions according to their 
main points of departure, involving respectively ontological and epistemological 
questions, the relationship between theory and methods, and the comparison of dif-
ferent theories. The argumentation adopted here is inspired by the writings of Dan-
ermark (2002), Danermark, Ekström et al. (2002), Sayer (1992; 2000) and Yeung 
(1997), among others on methodological realism, the special branch of critical real-
ism that deals with analytical strategies and outlines of methods.  
Critical realism in essence is a  
 
philosophy that celebrates the existence of reality independent of human consciousness 
(realist ontology), ascribes causal powers to human reasons and social structures (realist 
ontology), rejects relativism in social and scientific discourses (realist epistemology) 
and reorientates the social sciences towards its emancipatory goals (realist epistemol-
ogy). (Yeung, 1997: 52) 
 
Critical realism basically seeks to answer the question of what reality must be like 
to make the existence of science possible and thus what researchers are doing when 
they do research, as well as what the structure of the world must be like to make 
scientific research possible (Danermark, Ekström et al., 2002: 18). The answers to 
these questions constitute the foundation of critical realism. The essence is that 
since scientific practice is possible, it is possible to conclude that a reality exists in-
dependent of our knowledge of it. Moreover, reality is not immediately accessible 
to researchers, otherwise science would not have been required. Reality is thus not 
transparent, but it has ‘mechanisms which we cannot observe but which we can ex-
perience indirectly by their ability to cause – to make things happen in the world’ 
                                                 
140 Harré presented his all-embracing critique of positivism in The Principles of Scientific Think-
ing of 1970 (Macmillan, London). This critique was later taken up by Bhaskar in 1978 in A Realist 
Theory of Science (Harvester Press, Hassocks). Nowadays, critical realism is normally associated 
with Bhaskar’s writings. 
141 The label critical realism was applied subsequently: it is a contraction of two central terms: 
transcendental realism (a philosophy for and of the natural sciences) and critical naturalism (a meth-
odological question relating to the possibility of practising a natural science of society) (Harvey, 
2002). 
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 (Danermark, Ekström et al., 2002: 20, emphasis in original). Reality is thus an open 
system.142  
6.1.1 The idea of a stratified reality 
Mechanisms and structures are often referred to as either the deep dimension of re-
ality or the generative mechanisms. Reality, according to critical realists, is there-
fore not only constituted by events and our experience of those events, but also by a 
deep dimension that triggers actual events and directs them (Lawson, 1995: 13). In 
other words, reality is composed of three ontological domains: the empirical do-
main (direct and indirect experiences), the non-empirical, actual domain (events, 
whether experienced or not), and the non-actual real domain (underlying causal 
structures, mechanisms, powers and tendencies). Thus, the real is whatever exists, 
the actual refers to what happens if and when the powers of the real are activated, 
and the empirical is what can be experienced (Sayer, 2000).  
These domains are, furthermore, structured, that is, although changes at the level 
of the actual may change the nature of the real, the latter is irreducible to the for-
mer. Likewise, changes at the empirical level may influence what happens at the 
actual level, but they need not. According to critical realism, the objects under 
study therefore exist and act independently of the process of their identification.143
Mechanisms relate to the domain of the real. Mechanisms denote the reasons 
and causes of the events, that is, they have the power to produce events. However, 
the outcome of the mechanisms is dependent on the context. The empirical mani-
festation of contextually determined mechanisms should be regarded as a tendency, 
not an empirical regularity (Danermark, 2002: 59). A tendency is thus the feature of 
a mechanism that makes it able to produce certain events.  
It is not the intention of critical realist-inspired research to predict what will 
happen at the level of concrete events. According to Sayer (1997), this demand is 
simply unanswerable due to the open nature of social systems, which implies that 
                                                 
142 ‘Openness’ here stands in direct opposition to the positivist’s ‘closeness’, that is, the idea that 
the world can be discovered by experience, the possibility of making experiments, and thus making 
predictions and formulating laws. 
143 This last statement is a preliminary outcome of a continuing debate between critical realists 
and social constructivists on the role of the researcher vis-à-vis the object under study. Critical real-
ists now acknowledge that the researcher may influence the social world under scrutiny, but they 
maintain that the influence is insignificant. Fairclough, Jessop et al. (2002: 3), for instance, insist 
that most of the physical and social worlds can exist regardless of whether researchers are observing 
them. Likewise, Sayer (2000) claims that in most cases it is not the knowledge of contemporary re-
searchers that influences the social world we are researching, but past knowledge. Thus, even 
though these critical realists maintain one of the central tenets in the realist ontology, they have 
opened the door to new interpretations. 
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 the activation of generative mechanisms depends on contingent conditions and is 
therefore not pre-determined.  
6.1.2 Creating connections between the empirical, the actual and the real: 
explanation in critical realism 
Opposed to the orthodox, positivist view of explanation, which calls for a direct re-
lationship between events, or regularities between these events, critical realists ar-
gue that causality concerns the causal powers and liabilities of phenomena (Sayer, 
1992: 104f).144 Causality is therefore not a matter of regularity between separate 
events (cause and effect), but of what an object is like and what it can do. Specifi-
cally, causality in the critical realist sense establishes connections between the three 
domains of reality. Hence, it is essential to establish an account of the underlying 
structures and mechanisms that are responsible for identification of phenomena in 
the social sciences.  
An explanation in the critical realist sense provides just such an account. It en-
tails the interpretation and re-contextualisation of phenomena within a conceptual 
or theoretical framework, as well as a description and analysis of concrete phenom-
ena and a reconstruction of the basis conditions for those phenomena in order for 
them to be what they are. Explanation in the critical realist sense of the word thus 
denotes a process of constant reflection and immanent critique that seeks to recon-
struct the causal structures and mechanisms that create the phenomena. Explanation 
therefore seeks to reveal the relationship between an empirical problem (a concrete 
phenomenon) and the deeper causal structures (Danermark, Ekström et al., 2002: 
42ff; Yeung, 1997: 57). 
6.1.3 Putting critical realism to work 
It has been claimed that critical realism is: ‘a philosophy in search of a method’ 
(Yeung, 1997: 51), that ‘critical realism lacks clear guidelines for empirical work’ 
(Downward, Finch et al., 2002: 482), and that the main problem ‘concerns the in-
adequately worked through practice of critical realism’ (Pratt, 1995: 62, emphasis 
in original). In spite of the fact that several authors have dealt with different tech-
niques for doing research in relation to critical realism, only a very few have 
                                                 
144 According to Sayer (1992), objects are internally related to other objects, as are their causal 
powers. Hence, an object is dependent on its relation to another object, but whether or not its causal 
powers are activated depends on external factors. In critical realist terms, although the objects are 
necessarily related, activation of their causal powers is a contingent matter. Moreover, different ef-
fects may be activated by different mechanisms. Thus, different mechanisms and different contin-
gent conditions may both set events in motion. What eventually happens depends on the specific 
context, that is, the specific political, economic, social and spatial developments that frame the phe-
nomenon. 
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 spelled out how critical realism has actually been applied in concrete research pro-
jects. What is at stake here is very central to critical realism, namely that the very 
process of doing critical realist research is by its very nature tortuous, being charac-
terised by numerous iterations in which the basic model is constantly being refined. 
Hence, the unilinear presentation of the structure of this thesis in Figure 6.1 is by 
definition different from the actual stages in this research process: certain stages 
have been omitted altogether; other stages have been included along the way, and 
yet others have been moved from one section to another. 
Figure 6.1. critical realism applied 
 
 
Inspired by Henry Wei-chung Yeung’s description of his research into Hong 
Kong-based transnational companies’ activities in Asia, Figure 6.1 outlines the dif-
ferent phases in the present research (Yeung, 1997). The aim of the figure is to pre-
sent the relationship between the critical realist methodology, the chosen theories 
and the methods applied. The figure includes the main stages in this research proc-
ess, namely the description of the phenomenon under study; the abstract research, 
which concerns the conceptualisation and reconceptualisation; the concrete re-
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 search, which deals with the aspect of empirical validation; and the link between 
the two, which fosters the causal analysis of the phenomenon based on the genera-
tive mechanisms. Hopefully, the double arrows from the level of concrete research 
to that of abstract research and vice versa, as well as from both concrete and ab-
stract research to the level of research questions and objectives, indicate that the 
process has by no means been linear. Rather, insights from one part have informed 
another, which have then been applied in the former. For the sake of clarity, the dif-
ferent stages correspond to the chapters of this thesis if they are read from the top 
downwards. 
According to Yeung (1997: 65), any explanatory study inspired by critical real-
ism must begin with a conceptualisation through an immanent critique of existing 
work, followed by a reconceptualisation. This has also been the case in the present 
study, which thus begins with the contextualisation of the field of research and an 
outline of preliminary research questions. These questions are refined and reformu-
lated throughout the research process, as represented by the double arrows in the 
figure. 
The research is based on the premise that the great majority of studies of aid in-
terventions conducted in the past forty years or so do not provide us with much 
knowledge regarding the ‘hows’ and ‘whys’ of aid interventions. One strand of lit-
erature, however, has provided in-depth knowledge about the interface between aid 
interventions and local actors, though it is an approach that has certain limitations 
with respect to the study of development aid to the private sector in Ghana. Re-
cently interest in the impact of aid has resumed, and much work has been done to 
propose new methods of studying aid interventions. Some of the current work takes 
its point of departure in traditional evaluation studies, while another part is inspired 
by the literature on the interface of aid. None of these studies, however, has dealt at 
any length with context, whether in the form of economic and political develop-
ments, or in the form of the social developments framing the intervention. More-
over, these studies by and large lack any deeper theorisation of why certain inter-
ventions impact in certain ways (cf. Chapter 3, above). This study, by contrast, ac-
cepts that all knowledge is theory-laden and builds its analytical framework on two 
strands of literature, one dealing with the transfer of technology, technological ca-
pabilities and upgrading, the other considering how institutional features affect the 
way companies act and interact in a certain setting. 
A central feature of the PSDP in Ghana is the transfer of technology. In order to 
probe how such transfers have impacted on the intended beneficiaries, as well as on 
other actors in the Ghanaian private sector, it has been felt necessary to review the 
relevant literature. A central feature in this process is the relationship between 
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 technology transfer, technological capability building and eventually upgrading. 
The technology transfer literature is broad: it covers a long time-span, stems from 
many meta-theoretical disciplines, and covers many sub-categories. Therefore, it 
has proved to be of great importance to single out the most relevant parts of the lit-
erature, namely the building of technological capabilities and upgrading. Literature 
that deals with these two aspects covers many levels (from regional, through na-
tional and sectoral, to enterprise) and many types. The literature review on the one 
hand singled out the relevant theoretical contributions, and on the other hand 
pointed out areas that are under-researched, in particular how to measure changes 
in technological capabilities in the small enterprise sector in developing countries. 
A major task of this part of the abstract research was thus to reconceptualise and 
operationalise changes in technological capabilities.  
The varieties of capitalism literature inform us that there is no single way of or-
ganising economic activities. Rather, several distinct ways can be singled out. It has 
thus been of great importance to increase the understanding of how Ghanaian firms 
act and interact in order to grasp first, why the PSDP impacts the way it does, and 
secondly, how impacts at the enterprise level spread to other parts of the Ghanaian 
private sector. Based on the literature on embeddedness, a single theoretical line of 
reasoning has been chosen as a point of departure, namely the business system ap-
proach. This literature, however, has some shortcomings in relation to the study of 
private businesses in Ghana. Therefore the approach has been adapted and refined 
in order to fit this context. 
This conceptualisation and reconceptualisation, which aim to abstract out impor-
tant concepts and underlying mechanisms, belong to the level of abstract research, 
that is, the level of research in critical realism that aims to link the actual and real 
domains. From here, the research process entered the phase of concrete research, 
that is, the empirical validation of the underlying mechanisms and search for links 
between the actual and the empirical domains.145 Concrete research, in the critical 
realist’s sense of the word, is normally employed through two different kinds of re-
search designs: the intensive and the extensive research designs. According to Dan-
ermark, Ekström et al. (2002: 161), the terms intensive and extensive are used in 
order to go beyond the typical dichotomy between qualitative and quantitative 
methods.146 Within the framework of critical realism, then, intensive research is 
concerned with how processes work in a particular case or a limited number of 
                                                 
145 In critical realism, no provisions are made as regards the order between concrete and abstract 
research: the process may begin with abstract research and proceed to concrete research or vice 
versa.  
146 Usually, quantitative methods are associated with positivist traditions, qualitative ones with 
hermeneutic and phenomenological traditions.  
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 cases, while extensive research is concerned with uncovering regularities and 
common patterns in a large collection of cases. This in itself is not essentially dif-
ferent from the characteristics of qualitative and quantitative methods, respectively. 
What is different, then, is that, by changing the terms, critical realists avoid the 
clash between the underlying meta-theories of qualitative and quantitative methods, 
simply arguing that both intensive and extensive research strategies may help the 
researcher to uncover underlying structures and mechanisms. Thus, instead of being 
perceived as competing methods, critical realists argue that intensive and extensive 
research designs should be seen as complementary (Sayer, 1992: 246). 
This project, as will be apparent from section 6.2.1, applies both extensive and 
intensive research strategies. Actually, the research design spans a wide spectrum 
of strategies, relating to available statistics and secondary literature to build up 
background descriptive information, conversations with most Danish PSDP part-
ners, company-related information, interviews with the owner-managers of almost 
fifty different PSDP collaborations in Ghana, interviews with key actors in Ghana 
and in Denmark, and in-depth studies of seven Ghanaian PSDP enterprises. 
6.2 The study design 
Since Robert K. Yin (1989) published his much cited book on case-study design 
and methods, numerous other books and articles have dealt with the challenges en-
countered when choosing one or more cases as the object of research. Most of these 
publications have one feature in common: they all define the case study in relation 
to other types of study. However, this is hardly surprising, as the majority of these 
publications have argued against the then dominant positivist paradigm in social 
sciences. Therefore, like Yin (1989), for instance, they have not defined the case 
study itself, but rather presented a list of relevant situations for various research 
strategies, including the case study. Similarly, Gomm, Hammersley et al. (2000) 
compare central aspects of the case study with central aspects of the experiment 
and the survey, for instance, the amount of information gathered on each ‘case’, the 
possibility of quantifying the data, the aim of the study etc. In contrast to many 
previous studies, including Yin’s, the advantage of the latter is that it incorporates 
the aims of the research strategies. 
Many of the contributions also share another feature, namely that they do not 
distinguish between different types of case study: the case study is simply seen as a 
research strategy that is distinct from other, more widely disseminated research 
strategies. Some publications, however, make the distinction that Stake (1994) 
makes, between intrinsic, instrumental and collective case studies, that is, between 
particular reasons or interests that guide the selection of phenomena to be studied. 
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 Finally here, Flyvbjerg (1991; 2004) distinguishes extreme, maximum-variation, 
critical and paradigmatic cases, which in essence refer to the type of information 
yielded by the study of cases. 
These distinctions are of particular relevance here, as they point to a specific fea-
ture of the case study that is only seldom mentioned, namely that case studies may 
be applied to research with totally different aims. Thus it may be a critical case 
suitable for theory testing, an extreme or paradigmatic case that acts as an eye-
opener with respect to existing knowledge, an intrinsic case that may form the 
background for a new narrative, or an instrumental case that facilitates the under-
standing of a specific phenomenon by playing a supporting role. Moreover, cases 
may be analysed with different degrees of intensity. Some case studies take their 
point of departure in the study of one entity (a single person or a unique group of 
persons), while others depart from an interest in a specific concept (the entrepre-
neur) and study several individuals. Yet other case studies pay attention to a phe-
nomenon that is best studied across time and space.  
This study sees cases as being instrumental to the analysis. They provide in-
sights into the concrete phenomena that constitute an essential part of the analysis 
and that form a building block in analysing the structures of mechanisms (cf. sec-
tion 6.1.2). In accordance with the critical realist tradition, a combination of exten-
sive and intensive research strategies has been used in this study. As regards the lat-
ter, a choice of maximum variation was aimed for in order to reveal the signifi-
cance of various circumstances for the impact of the PSDP. However, as described 
in section 6.2.1 below, this did not fully materialise. 
6.2.1 Obtaining knowledge about the PSDP in Ghana 
In order to unfold the impact of the PSDP at various levels in Ghanaian society it 
was necessary to obtain knowledge from different sources that were expected to 
have different viewpoints. Among the key actors in Ghana were the owner-
managers of the PSDP companies located in the country,147 the companies’ em-
ployees, representatives of business organisations, representatives of key ministries, 
researchers, the owner-managers of non-PSDP companies, embassy staff, other do-
nors etc. The main actors and the most important reasons for including them in the 
study are listed in Table 6.1. 
In line with the critical realist idea of adopting both extensive and intensive re-
search methods, and guided by the lack of available information regarding the mer-
its of past and current PSDP collaborations in Ghana, an approach was adopted us-
                                                 
147 The majority of companies were Ghanaian-owned, but a few were owned by Lebanese mi-
grants and a small number by Danes now living in Ghana. 
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 ing a mixture of methods. This section will deal with the challenges related to 
studying the owner-managers of the PSDP companies located in Ghana. It will be-
gin with an account of the difficulties involved in locating the owner-managers be-
fore proceeding with a discussion of the selection of cases. 
Table 6.1. Main actors in the study of PSDP impacts in Ghana 
Actors  Main reason for inclusion 
Owner-managers of 
PSDP enterprises in 
Ghana 
To gain insights into how they perceive the interven-
tion, and to obtain knowledge about the collaboration 
and how a range of other actors influence the current 
situation in the company 
Representatives of 
PSDP enterprises in 
Denmark  
Basic data regarding the collaboration, their Ghanaian 
partner and additional material regarding the PSDP 
Employees in the Gha-
naian enterprises 
To gain insights into how they have perceived the in-
tervention, to be able to assess changes in technologi-
cal capabilities, and to acquire a better understanding 
of how capabilities spread and how impacts diffuse 
Representatives of Gha-
naian business organisa-
tions 
Knowledge about the Ghanaian private sector, espe-
cially as regards constraints and challenges for SMEs 
Donors and brokers Information about the PSDP, management of the inter-
vention, selection of enterprises, evaluation of out-
comes, and sharing of knowledge 
Other key actors in 
Ghana (civil servants, 
researchers, and private 
sector agents) 
To gain insights into the Ghanaian business system, 
that is, data on institutions that affect the way Ghana-
ian mall enterprises act and interact and information 
about the impacts of the PSDP on unintended groups 
of actors. 
 
The Danish embassy in Accra does not keep track of past collaborations, and in-
formation beyond what is legally required, that is, beyond the grant awarded, the 
contact address and a brief description of the business goals, is considered confi-
dential. Hence, available information is limited to simple facts about current par-
ticipants in the PSDP and does not provide any insights into the ‘hows’ and ‘whys’ 
of the intervention.  
The list of disbursed grants (1993-2001) contained both the Danish and Ghana-
ian company names, the names of the responsible persons in Denmark, the amount 
of money granted, and a brief description of the aim of the collaboration. As indi-
cated in Table 6.2, the list contained the names of 86 PSDP collaborations (37 part-
nerships and 49 start-up facilities). However, not all of these collaborations quali-
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 fied for this study: some did not have a private partner; some had no partner; others 
had gone on from the start-up facility to the business partnership; some have had 
more than one Danish partner; one had been cancelled before it took off; and finally 
one had received two full partnership grants. Therefore, the potential number of 
distinct PSDP companies located in Ghana was reduced by 22 to a total of 64. 
Table 6.2. Potential PSDP company cases in Ghana from 1993 to 2001 
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Partnerships 37 10 27 28 4 2  1 1 1 
Start-up facilities 49 6 43 36 1  7 5149   
Total 86 16 70 64 5 2 7 6 1 1 
 
In order to obtain more information about the Ghanaian partners and to aquire 
access to documents relating to the PSDP,150 letters were written to all responsible 
persons in the Danish companies informing them about the research,151 asked their 
permission to obtain access to relevant material, and last but not least, asking for in-
formation regarding the whereabouts of their current or former Ghanaian partner(s). 
Not all Danish partners possessed information about their former Ghanaian partner: 
in some cases, the responsible person(s) in the Danish company was no longer em-
ployed; in others, the information had been disposed of. Every possible Ghanaian 
company was initially contacted by mail (and if possible also by fax or e-mail) to 
ask their permission to conduct interviews with the owner-managers. If possible, 
mails were followed up with phone calls. In order to track down enterprises that 
had either closed down or moved, current as well as past participants in the PSDP 
were asked for their whereabouts.152 Likewise, owner-managers were sought out in 
business directories, business associations and among former neighbours.  
                                                 
148 Between the first and the second periods of fieldwork, a further five start-up facilities had 
been approved for business partnerships. 
149 Three Ghanaian companies have had two different start-up facilities, and two have had one 
start-up facility and one partnership with different Danish partners. 
150 Documents related to the PSDP may include confidential information regarding the enter-
prises involved. Therefore, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would not forward me copies of applica-
tion forms (which include, among other things, the development objectives of the different collabo-
rations), feasibility studies, environmental studies, progress reports etc.  
151 Enclosed in the letter was a one-page summary of the research proposal, which described the 
rationale of the project, its goals and objectives, and the methodology being used. 
152 The omission of companies that have disappeared may be analytically problematic, as it is 
unclear just why they have disappeared. Therefore, much effort was expended in trying to track 
down closed enterprises. However, closure rates are high (as far as I am aware, no studies of closure 
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 Table 6.3. Location of total, potential and actual Ghanaian PSDP companies 
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Partnership 27 2 - 1 3 3 1 37 Total 
Start-up 35 7 3 3 - - 1 49 
Partnership 21 2 - 1 2 2 - 28 Potential 
Start-up 25 5 3 2 - - 1 36 
Partnership 13 2 - - 2 2 - 19 Actual 
Start-up 18 4 2 1 - - - 25 
 
Eventually, interviews were conducted with owner-managers and employees of 
44 of the 64 potential enterprises in the study during two periods of fieldwork in 
Ghana comprising just over half a year.153 These enterprises consisted of 48 differ-
ent collaborations, as four enterprises have had two PSDP collaborations. The total 
number of cases thus comprises 21 Business Partnerships and 27 Start-Up Facili-
ties. In addition, interviews were conducted with the representatives of private 
companies that did not take part in the PSDP, business organisations, development 
agencies, relevant ministries and research institutions.154
My fieldwork was divided into two parts. During the first part, from April to 
June 2002, attention was paid to trying to locate, contact and interview as many 
owner-managers of the Ghanaian PSDP enterprises as possible. The majority of 
these enterprises were only visited once during the first period of fieldwork. The in-
terviews typically lasted from one and a half to two hours (some lasted longer and 
included a lunch or a beer at a nearby bar, while a few were quickly done with). 
They were based on interview guides (see section 6.2.2) and were most often con-
ducted in the owner-manager’s office. After the interview, I always asked permis-
sion to see the premises, and usually I was shown around the company. Special at-
tention was normally given to the sections of the company that had directly been af-
fected by the collaboration, either because a new machine had been placed there, or 
because the restructuring of production processes had altered this very part of the 
production.  
                                                                                                                                        
rates have been conducted in an Ghanaian context, but figures from Nigeria indicate that more than 
half of all small enterprises are closed after approximately twenty years of operation: some of the 
closures are related to inheritance, while others close in their infancy (Sam, 2003), and it was not 
possible to track down all closed or disappeared companies. 
153 Some companies could not be tracked down at all, while the owner-managers of others were 
not in Ghana during the two periods of fieldwork. I have corresponded with a handful of them by 
mail or fax.  
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 Due to the fact that employees in the PSDP enterprises were not unionised, con-
tact with and permission to interview them had to be sought through the workplace. 
At the end of each interview, therefore, owner-managers were also asked for per-
mission for me to have an informal conversation with relevant employees, both the 
‘main learners’, that is, the employees who had directly participated in the pro-
gramme through training and technical assistance, and also employees who had in-
directly experienced the programme as part of, for instance, a restructuring process. 
This did not always prove to be a successful strategy: many owner-managers ac-
companied me in order to introduce me to the employees, but unfortunately, their 
presence most often meant that the employees were reluctant to talk to me. This 
was either because they were suspicious of my reasons for being there, or simply 
because the mere presence of the owner-manager created a certain degree of sub-
missiveness in the employees, which was reflected in them giving me very short 
answers, if any at all, even to non-controversial issues. A number of employee in-
terviews were therefore brought to an end before they really began.155 In more suc-
cessful interviews, I often chose to gain trust and establish a rapport by letting the 
interview become an unstructured conversation with the aim of obtaining an under-
standing of their situation and their perception of the collaboration. I therefore often 
chose not to take notes, or only a minimum of notes, in these situations.156
The second period of fieldwork was mainly devoted to in-depth studies with se-
lected PSDP companies in Ghana and studies of the Ghanaian business system. 
Originally, ten companies had been selected on the basis of their expected level of 
new insights. Thus, a strategy of maximum variation was aimed at in order to re-
veal the range of variation and differentiation in the field (Flick, 1998). In order to 
pursue this strategy, the following criteria were initially decided on to delimit the 
sample: the duration of the collaboration;157 the ‘success’ of the collaboration;158 
                                                                                                                                        
154 The information gathered from interviews and direct observation has been matched with fea-
sibility studies, application forms and progress reports generously given to me by many partners. 
See Appendix A for a list of the people who were interviewed. 
155 In retrospect, it would have been more fruitful to limit the interview to a brief introduction 
and a request for permission to conduct a simple questionnaire subsequently. In this way, it would 
have been possible to minimise the impact of the relationship between the owner-managers and the 
employees and thus obtain more reliable information. See Mullings (1999) for a similar case in in-
formation-processing companies in Jamaica. 
156 Of course, mental notes were taken, and these were written down in the taxi, away from the 
company. See Fontana and Frey (1994) for a discussion of how to establish rapport and conduct un-
structured interviews. 
157 As already described in Chapter 3, impacts happen immediately, as well as over time. Like-
wise, the process of transfer of technology (hardware, knowledge and organisational routines), the 
building of technological capabilities and upgrading are ongoing processes. It was thus desirable to 
include collaborations initiated in both Phase I and Phase II of the PSDP. 
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 links with the rest of the Ghanaian economy;159 the composition of the work-
force;160 and ownership.161 However, it turned out that it was impossible fully to 
turn these ideas into practice: some owner-managers were unwilling to let me inter-
view them again,162 two companies had changed general managers, and the actual 
start-up of one collaboration company had been postponed. Instead, the in-depth 
study includes the seven companies listed in Table 6.4. Five of these were included 
in the original list, and two new ones have been added (P19/P20)..  
Table 6.4. Selected characteristics of seven in-depth studies 
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P1 - 2000 Medium Foreign Danish/m Unskilled/m Local NA 
P6 1996 2000 Small Ghanaian Ghanaian/f  Unskilled/f Int. Denmark  
P13 1999 2000 Small JV Ghanaian/m Skilled/m National Denmark 
P16 - 2001 Small Ghanaian  Ghanaian/m Skilled Local Imported 
P17 1998 2001 Micro Ghanaian Ghanaian/f Mix/f Int. Local 
P19 1999 2002 Small Ghanaian Ghanaian/m Unskilled Local Denmark 
P20 1999 2002 Small JV Ghanaian/m Unskilled/m National Local 
 
Even though maximum variation could therefore not be achieved completely, the 
selected characteristics in Table 6.4 nonetheless indicate a fair degree of variation: 
the initiations of the collaborations span a five-year period; they cover both col-
                                                                                                                                        
158 ‘Success’ is an ambiguous term that is related to the objective of the intervention rather than 
the intervention itself (cf. Chapter 3, above). However, the intention was to include collaborations 
that have had largely positive impacts, as well as ones with largely negative impacts. 
159 In order to study the impacts at the private-sector and society levels, forward and backward 
links were examined. The aim was to include enterprises producing for the home market as well as 
for the world market. Likewise, a distinction was made between enterprises using local sub-
contractors and enterprises relying mostly on imported inputs in their production. 
160 Here, a distinction was made between salaried and non-salaried workers; skilled and unskilled 
labour; blue and white collar labour; and female and male employees. 
161 Ownership was classified according to nationality, that is, Ghanaian (both local and non-
African) and foreign, in order to obtain further insights into the impact of the programme on differ-
ent parts of the population. 
162 Only one owner-manager directly informed me that he was unwilling to participate in any 
further investigations. The remainder simply did not answer my calls, continuously postponed the 
meetings, or did not show up for the interviews.  
163 The numbers correspond to the numbers given to the enterprises in Appendix B and used 
throughout the study, especially in Chapters 8 and 9. 
164 The size of the company is constantly changing, and therefore size in this context refers to the 
number of employees at the beginning of the collaboration. Following Mead and Liedholm (1998), 
‘micro’ represents companies with fewer than 10 employees; ‘small’ represents companies with 10-
50 employees; and ‘medium’ represents companies with more than 50 employees (cf. the discussion 
of terminology regarding small enterprises in SSA in note 88 on page 82). 
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 laborations that began as start-up facilities and collaborations that were set in mo-
tion as business partnerships; they include various sizes (from a company with one 
non-salaried employee to a company with almost a hundred full- and part-time em-
ployees); four companies are fully Ghanaian-owned, while two are joint-ventures 
and one is in effect in foreign hands; some have predominantly skilled labour, oth-
ers unskilled; some are dominated by female staff, some by male staff, and two 
have a mixture; three cater exclusively for the local Ghanaian market, while two ca-
ter for the national market, and a further two are mainly linked with their Danish 
partner; and lastly these cases comprise companies that obtain most of their inputs 
locally, from Denmark, and from other places. However, these seven cases are not 
representative of all the PSDP companies in Ghana. If anything, the aim of this in-
tensive research is to identify the structures in which these cases are situated 
6.2.2 Constructing interview guides 
This section focuses on the construction of the interview guides used in owner-
manager interviews. Interviews with 48 owner-managers were conducted, embrac-
ing 44 different companies during the two periods of fieldwork.165 Interview 
guides166 were chosen because on the one hand they offer a sense of order and 
structure, as the main aspects to be studied of a given phenomenon are predeter-
mined. On the other hand, interview guides offer flexibility, for the reason that they 
can be adapted en route. They therefore ensure that the interviewer remembers all 
the important aspects (some aspects may be omitted for reasons of, for instance, 
relevance or trust), but they avoid the rigour of questionnaires. 
It is not the intention here to go through the guide from A to Z (but see Appen-
dix C). Instead certain key points will illustrate the fundamental idea behind the 
method. The aim of the guide was to pose questions that targeted different spheres. 
Some questions aimed at increasing knowledge about the PSDP, the relationship 
between the partners, and the perception of the intervention. Others dealt specifi-
cally with training, technology transfer and upgrading. Yet others related to the 
specific activities of the company, its employees, its products, and its links with 
                                                 
165 The actual number of interviews with owner-managers adds up to more than 48, as some 
owner-managers were interviewed more than once. See also Appendix A. 
166 The term ‘interview guide’ is chosen here instead of the more widely used ‘structured inter-
view’ to avoid misunderstandings. Some researchers perceive the structured interview as being simi-
lar to a survey: the only difference is that in a survey the respondent fills in the forms, while in a 
structured interview ‘an interviewer asks each respondent a series of preestablished questions with a 
limited set of response categories…. The interviewer controls the pace of the interview by treating 
the questionnaire as if it were a theatrical script to be followed’ (Fontana and Frey, 1994: 363). The 
interview guide, by contrast, should more be seen more as a list of topics that I, as a researcher, want 
to know more about in order to understand the complex situation in which the interviewee is situ-
ated.  
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 other companies. And yet others sought to establish how a range of actors influ-
enced the situation in the company, for instance, how the current New Patriotic 
Party (NPP) administration has affected the business climate, the role of Asian im-
ports vis-à-vis the company’s products, the changing rules and regulations govern-
ing export markets (FSC certification,167 ISO standards168 etc.), access to credit, the 
rule of law, etc.  
The interviews always opened by me introducing the issues I wanted to discuss. 
It was stressed that they did not necessarily have to be dealt with in that order. 
Moreover, the interviewee was informed that I would take written notes rather than 
using a tape-recorder, as the aim was not to analyse their statements, but instead to 
understand particular issues. Moreover, notes enabled me to make sure that I had 
understood what was said correctly. Lastly, they made it easier for me to keep track 
of the interview and thus maintain control over it: several interviewees began talk-
ing immediately after my introduction, before I had had the chance to ask particular 
questions, and many talked at some length. In order to change the subject, I usually 
picked up something they had already said and used that as an introduction to an-
other subject: notes were invaluable in this respect. 
Naturally, due to the fact that the companies interviewed were very different in 
character, not all questions suited all enterprises. The guide was simply used as a 
guide: it provided a structure, but at the same time allowed for flexibility. Thus, if 
an interesting subject was taken up by the interviewee, it was followed up and dis-
cussed before the interview proceeded to other themes.169 In general, however, sen-
sitive questions were left until near the end of the interview, in order to build up 
trust and confidence between myself as interviewer and the interviewee (see also 
section 6.3.2 below).170 Likewise, so-called simple questions were normally posed 
at the beginning of the interview, then being followed by more complex questions. 
But flexibility was nonetheless of the utmost importance, as the same questions 
may mean vastly different things to different interviewees. The flexibility of the in-
terview guide allows the interviewer to respond to and follow up on such variations 
(Sayer, 1992: 245).  
However, even the simple questions I posed to owner-managers are open to dif-
ferent interpretations, thus blurring the very notion of simplicity. This problem be-
                                                 
167 See note 291 on page 252 for a description of FSC certification. 
168 International Organization for Standardization (ISO). 
169 This strategy corresponds roughly to Ostrander’s suggestions (1993: 22) about how to con-
duct elite interviews (see also section 6.3.1). 
170 Some authors, like Fontana and Frey (1994: 371), would argue that ‘breaking the ice’ with 
general questions before proceeding to more complex ones is outdated as a technique. Interviews, 
according to them, should be more honest and therefore expose the interviewer’s real intentions 
from the very beginning. 
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 comes intensified in a foreign context, as terms may have different meanings in 
Denmark than in Ghana. What, for instance, does ‘employment’ denote? Salaried 
employees? Family members? Casual labourers? Does this include drivers or 
cleaners? More complex questions relating to, for example, values and norms inevi-
tably become open to an even greater range of interpretations. In order to minimise 
potential misinterpretations, most issues were probed from different perspectives in 
the interviews. Thus, employees were divided into different categories: salaried vs. 
non-salaried; family vs. non-family; owner(s), manager(s), expatriate(s), adminis-
trative and operative personnel; and skilled, semi-skilled, or unskilled. Moreover, 
the issue of employment was dealt with under various other headings, for instance, 
training, cost composition and managerial changes. Additional material provided 
by the business partners themselves, as well as material from evaluations and other 
studies, was used to assess interview data. In addition, many owner-managers were 
interviewed more than once. 
Interview guides were used throughout the study. Hence, conversations with the 
representatives of Danish PSDP companies171 were also guided by a certain struc-
ture: information was sought about their Ghanaian partner on the collaboration and 
the donor’s role. Likewise, interviews with representatives of Ghanaian business 
organisations were based on a pre-formulated structure that aimed to reveal infor-
mation on the Ghanaian private sector, constraints for small enterprises, and of 
course, specific knowledge about the particular organisation.  
On the whole, the seven in-depth studies included interviews with the owner-
managers, interviews with key employees, participation in training sessions with 
Danish ‘technicians’, participation in board or planning meetings, and casual con-
versations with other staff. However, the cases were very different, and therefore 
slightly different information-gathering approaches had to be adopted. In order to 
illustrate how the in-depth studies were conducted, a schematic example (P16) is 
provided below. 
Through my initial contact with the Danish PSDP companies, I was informed 
that the responsible person for the collaboration would be in Ghana for a short stay 
just after I arrived for fieldwork. A machine had been shipped to Ghana, and the re-
sponsible person therefore brought two technicians with him to install it and train 
the Ghanaian staff to operate it. Meanwhile, the owner-manager of the Ghanaian 
PSDP company was having planning meetings with the responsible person from 
                                                 
171 Almost all these conversations were conducted by telephone. In some cases additional infor-
mation was exchanged by mail or e-mail. Only two interviews were conducted on the premises of 
the Danish partner. These two are included in the list of interviews in Appendix A, but telephone 
conversations with Danish partners have been omitted from the list. 
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 Denmark. I met up with him a couple of days after I arrived, had dinner with him 
and discussed the collaboration, the current situation in Ghana and the intervention 
itself. Concurrently, I spent time in the company during the following couple of 
days in order to interview the owner-manager, observe the training, and participate 
in the planning meetings. After the Danish group had returned to Denmark, I went 
back to the Ghanaian owner-manager to seek another interview, this time without 
the representatives of his Danish partner being present. Following this second in-
terview, I was introduced to the rest of the staff, those who had not taken part in the 
training, and a Canadian volunteer who had been working with the company for a 
couple of months, trying to implement new workflows. I talked casually with the 
staff during lunch and then had an interview with the Canadian volunteer, whom I 
subsequently met twice for follow-up information. One and a half years later, I re-
turned to the same company three times in order to interview the owner-manager, 
conduct informal conversations with the staff, and observe how the company had 
implemented the planned changes. In addition to the knowledge gained through 
these visits, I was generously provided with all the project documents by the part-
ners, and I also maintained intermittent contact with the Danish PSDP representa-
tive. 
6.2.3 Validating data through a multiple, iterative set of tactics  
Since different methods produce different results (and because different perspec-
tives lead to different methods), there now seems to be agreement that a certain de-
gree of triangulation – that is, the use of, for instance, different methods in order to 
valorise data – is to be recommended. Triangulation may also take other forms. 
Jenesick (1994) distinguishes between data, methodological, theory and interdisci-
plinary triangulation, but usually only the first two, that is, the use of different data 
sources and the use of multiple methods, are discussed in the literature. 
The triangulation of different methods in the sense advocated by critical realists, 
that is, a mixture of extensive and intensive methods, need not yield new insights. 
Winchester (1999) even goes as far as to state that intensive research methods can 
stand alone. Conversely, she is worried by the fact that triangulation is applied in 
order to validate data on positivist premises, that is, to support replicability and the 
possibility of generalisation.172 In the critical realist tradition, however, validity 
                                                 
172 Based on her fieldwork, she concludes that: ‘In hindsight, I felt that the questionnaire re-
vealed nothing of the causal structures and underlying mechanisms which produced a particular 
[phenomenon]’ (Winchester, 1999: 65). Likewise, Danermark, Ekström et al. (2002: 153) fear the 
use of mixed methods to validate date, especially if one is seeking to validate phenomena through 
quantitative methods that are originally explored by means of qualitative methods: this does not cor-
respond to the critical realist ontology because it fails to ‘realize that an empirical connection in it-
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 does not rest on the generalisation of data but rather on whether the chosen research 
methods are able to reveal the structures and mechanisms that underpin the ob-
served phenomena. Thus, what is at stake here is not so much triangulation, but 
rather different ways of validating the data, such as noting patterns and themes, 
checking results with peers, and following up surprises. In the words of Huberman 
and Miles (1994: 429), ‘there is a multiple, iterative set of tactics in play’ when 
data is validated.  
Validation relates to the specific phenomena under scrutiny. The aim is to verify 
that the results obtained actually apply to those phenomena that have been studied 
(Sayer, 1992: 246). Thus, validation in relation to the study of one person’s life his-
tory is inevitably different from validation in the case of, for instance, Ghanaian en-
trepreneurs. In this, study an effort has been made to validate along the following 
lines:  
 
• Statements from parties that have not directly been involved in an inci-
dent or in the progression of a PSDP collaboration have been included in 
the data analysis. Likewise, statements from third parties that have been 
linked to the intervention, whether as evaluators, students or researchers, 
have been used to check the plausibility and credibility of the findings. 
• Observation in the companies themselves, along with participant obser-
vation in training sessions and board meetings, has facilitated a deeper 
knowledge of the processes at play, while simultaneously enabling me to 
crosscheck certain information. 
• Written material alongside information about the specific sector of the 
business under scrutiny, more general knowledge of the Ghanaian busi-
ness system, and theoretical knowledge related to the transfer and build-
ing of capabilities have been used in handling post-facto rationalisations, 
that is, the phenomenon that an interviewee, in an attempt to be helpful, 
may give answers that he or she either thinks will please the interviewer 
or will justify certain actions (Healey and Rawlinson, 1993: 348).173 
• ‘Transparency’ has been aimed at in the methods, as well as through data 
displays that provide the reader with a more thorough picture of the data 
and enable him or her to assess the credibility of the subsequent analysis 
                                                                                                                                        
self cannot identify the active mechanism or mechanisms, nor does it contribute to any profounder 
information about the interaction of the forces behind the observed pattern’. 
173 This problem may be intensified in relation to events that happened several years prior to the 
interview. Both broad-based knowledge and specific information relating to the case is thus essential 
in order to assess the information obtained through an interview. 
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 (Dahler-Larsen, 2002; Huberman and Miles, 1994; Miles and Huberman, 
1994). 
• Findings have been discussed several times with staff at the embassy and 
presented at seminars in Ghana, Denmark and elsewhere (see, for exam-
ple, Kragelund (2004b; 2005c)) in an effort to acquire new insights and 
new perspectives from both key actors and colleagues regarding the pre-
liminary results. 
• Findings have also been presented in publications (Kragelund, 2004a, 
2005a, 2005b; Kragelund and Folke, 2005) so that colleagues can check 
the main conclusions and the analysis leading to these conclusions. 
 
For the case of clarity, it should be noted that not all information could be vali-
dated through the above means: in some cases, I only had information from one 
source. In addition, some sources conflicted with one another, without there being 
any easy way to sort out the inconsistencies. These particular sources have thus re-
mained in conflict.  
6.3 Reflections on the interviewer–interviewee relationship 
The previous sections dealt with validity in a very technical sense: it was shown 
how cases were chosen, which themes were discussed, and how data were vali-
dated. However, these technical aspects do not make much sense if my position as a 
young, white, male, doctoral student in relation to the middle-aged black business-
men who constituted the majority of my interviewees is not taken into account. 
This section begins with a discussion of access and power in relation to the study of 
foreign elites and continues with a discussion of trust and of the quality of the data. 
6.3.1 Interviewing foreign business owners and managers: a double-edged 
sword 
The majority of interviews in Ghana were conducted with parts of the Ghanaian 
elite, that is, with high-level employees in the Ghanaian public administration, di-
rectors and chief executive officers in both public and private organisations, the 
owner-managers of Ghanaian PSDP companies, and key representatives of other 
private entities.174 Previously, elite status was only ascribed to Ghanaians perform-
                                                 
174 The very notion of an elite may, of course, itself be problematised. As an analytical term it 
has hardly any depth, but merely indicates that someone is relatively more powerful or privileged 
than someone else. However, it is not the intention here to delve further into the definition of the 
concept, which has been chosen to point out some of the challenges involved in researching the 
powerful, instead of the tradition within development studies of researching down (Bradshaw, 2001; 
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 ing roles and jobs that were formerly held by the Europeans, but this situation has 
gradually changed. Elite status now partly derives from related attributes, for in-
stance, education and language, and partly from sheer economic and political 
power. Thus, even though none of the owner-managers I interviewed can be con-
sidered to be key players in the global economy, they derive power from their 
status through their ability to create and maintain jobs in the local community. 
Moreover, many are well-connected and hold high positions elsewhere.175 Among 
the owner-managers I interviewed were chiefs, board members of large state-
owned enterprises, the chairmen of local branches of the Association of Ghana In-
dustries, members of the board of Empretec, members of the board of Ghana’s Em-
ployers Association, politicians, a spouse of a former high-ranking and influential 
Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) politician and successful business-
man (cf. Table 9.2; Table 9.3). 
 There is a general agreement that interviews with owners and managers are a 
prime source of information on business activities (Healey and Rawlinson, 1993; 
Yeung, 1995).176 However, they are not always straightforward, especially if the 
owners and managers belong to the elite of a foreign country in which they are em-
bedded (Herod, 1999; Oinas, 1999). It is precisely the fact that they belong to a for-
eign elite that may make access more difficult, it may turn time into a serious con-
straint, and it may complicate communication. However, since elites belong to eas-
ily defined groups, identifying elites may be easier than identifying other groups 
(Mullings, 1999).177  
Studying foreign business owners and managers in many ways resembles study-
ing other groups of actors, the concrete methods that are adopted being very simi-
lar.178 Thus, this section sets out to discuss issues related to conducting research 
                                                                                                                                        
Desmond, 2004; Ward and Jones, 1999). It should be noted, though, that some of the challenges de-
scribed relate more to the specific Ghanaian context than to ‘studying elites’ per se. 
175 Oinas (1999: 352) characterises elites in terms of their involvement in a broad range of social 
relations. 
176 Even though a profusion of information about business elites (especially in a developed coun-
try context) may be available, it may not be the information one requires: in many countries, share-
holder-owned companies are required by law to name top officers; in some countries information 
such as the company shares held by members of the board and salaries is also accessible; extensive 
news coverage from business magazines provide a picture of the corporation in question; and corpo-
rations often provide their own information. However, these publicly accessible sources seldom 
provide the researcher with knowledge about, for instance, restructuring processes or training pro-
grammes. To obtain insights into such issues, one has to ask specifically or observe (Useem, 1995). 
177 One should beware of generalisations. In a description of the very different experiences of 
studying elites in Scotland and in France, Sabot (1999: 330) writes: ‘I did not receive the same 
amount, and the same kind of information in the two countries, despite being the same person, inter-
viewing the same kind of people’.  
178 Parallels may be drawn between the challenges involved in interviewing elites and the use of 
key informants in the research process, but there are also important differences: key informants do 
not necessarily belong to the elite, and vice versa; interviewing elites entails certain challenges re-
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 among Ghanaian owner-managers of small- and medium size enterprises. It turns 
out that this is a double-edged sword: on the one hand their relation to Danida’s 
PSDP made access easy, while on the other hand the very fact that they belong to 
the elite made it impossible just to pass by and strike up a conversation. 
Businesses constitute well-defined organisational structures, which on the one 
hand may cause problems, due to the fact that one needs to seek and gain access to 
them in order to make research possible.179 On the other hand, it may create access 
to information such as annual reports,180 feasibility studies etc. that is not available 
when interviewing non-elites, whether at home nor in a foreign country. These 
documents are invaluable because reliable information concerning business activi-
ties in Ghana is non-existent, with the exception of the few (mostly transnational) 
companies that are listed on the stock exchange (Grant, 2002).181 In just under half 
of the total start-up facilities (23) and just over one third of the total business part-
nerships (14), additional information (feasibility studies, application forms, pro-
gress reports) was made available to me from the partners.  
It is often easier to make initial contacts with foreign elites than foreign non-
elites, as in general the former have more resources (including access to telecom-
munications) than the latter. Moreover, elites often belong to clearly identifiable 
groups, making identification less complicated. Closely linked to this is the 
straightforwardness of singling out the ‘right’ person(s) within a given organisation 
to interview (Herod, 1999). Moreover, it may be argued that my interviewees’ elite 
status vis-à-vis my status as a young white doctoral student made communication 
easier (see also section 6.3.2 below). In the words of Welch, Marschan-Piekkari et 
al. (2002: 622): ‘Where elites may differ from non-elites is in their cross-cultural 
experience and their facility to communicate with people from different cultures’. 
Relative ease of access may also have its disadvantages: if access to the elite is 
gained through an organisational affiliation, for instance a development agency, it 
                                                                                                                                        
garding access, quality of data and power, which are not necessarily present when interviewing key 
informants; and, as Undheim points out (2003), elites are often generalists, while key informants are 
chosen for their expected specific knowledge. 
179 Ostrander (1993: 9) maintains that the difficulties of gaining access are exaggerated. By ap-
plying well-thought-out strategies, such as making the right contacts in the right order, ‘snowball-
ing’ and activating one’s own networks, access to elites becomes unproblematic. However, getting 
in is not the same as gaining real access, that is, obtaining useful information (Ostrander, 1993: 16). 
180 It should be noted that the progress reports that the partners are obliged to submit to the em-
bassy are routinely faulty (Rigsrevisionen, 2003). 
181 Most of the literature on ‘studying elites’ relates either to corporate elites (Oinas, 1999; Tho-
mas, 1995; Welch, Marschan-Piekkari et al., 2002) or to local political elites (Hunter, 1995; Sabot, 
1999; Ward and Jones, 1999) in developed countries: only very few treat this research issue in a de-
veloping world context (for an exception, see Mullings (1999)). Therefore, it is often argued that in-
formation such as company reports, public statements to the press or to shareholders, company 
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 may limit access to interviewees outside the range of this organisation as well as to 
other organisations, because the researcher becomes a prisoner, as it were, of the 
structures of this very organisation. The insights of the researcher are thus informed 
by his or her organisational affiliation. In the case of researching PSDP companies 
located in Ghana, this might very well have been the case if strategies of ‘snowball-
ing’ – that is, locating actors by asking other interviewees – had not been adopted. 
As described in section 6.2.1 above, information on past PSDP collaborations was 
at best incomplete, as the following example shows. During the first years of the 
programme, Danida, with additional funding from the Industrialisation Fund for 
Developing Countries and the Ghana Venture Fund, decided to support the estab-
lishment of an airline company in Ghana. The collaboration ended after less than 
two years of operation. The Danish company had to stop its operations due to fi-
nancial losses, and shortly afterwards the Ghanaian company went bankrupt. More-
over, complaints against the Danish training personnel for racist behaviour were 
lodged by the Ghanaian staff. Due to fraud and corruption, the Ghanaian partner 
and the financial controller are now in hiding in the UK and Zimbabwe, respec-
tively. This was not an exemplary example of Danish-Ghanaian business collabora-
tion, to say the least. It appears that neither Danida nor the Danish Embassy in 
Ghana wanted anyone to delve further into this story: at any rate, they did not in-
form me that the former managing director of the company182 was still living in 
Ghana.183 Actually, I was informed that the Embassy had no information whatso-
ever regarding this particular company. This, and many other cases were only lo-
cated through ‘snowballing’. 
In addition, the notion of ease of access must be qualified. Access to elites, for-
eign as well and local, is severely restricted by the fact that it is impossible just to 
enter an office and expect to strike up a conversation, as would be possible in, for 
instance, a rural setting: interview arrangements therefore have to be made well in 
advance. In the Ghanaian business context this is not easy: the great majority of 
companies only have a P.O. box number, but no address indicating their physical 
location. Hence, the only reliable information about the company was the city it 
was located in (even this might not be helpful, as some owner-managers used the 
P.O. boxes of other companies as their mailing addresses).184 It was therefore im-
                                                                                                                                        
newspapers etc. are readily available. However, in a Ghanaian context this information is only 
available for the largest transnational companies. 
182 In the last phase of the collaboration, changes were made to the board of directors and a new 
Danish managing director recruited in order to restart the ailing company. He is now running his 
own company and has had frequent contact with the Embassy since the airline company was for-
mally closed down. 
183 For a more detailed description of this PSDP collaboration, see Case XXI on page 276. 
184 The location of the PSDP companies in Table 6.3 refers precisely to this P.O. boxnumber. 
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 possible just to pass by a company in order to make an arrangement for an inter-
view: to do this, I had to contact the owner-manager by telephone.185 A common 
characteristic of Ghanaian owner-managers, similar to elites in general, was their 
busy life: many owner-managers had other businesses, pursued political careers, 
lived partly abroad etc. Therefore, a great deal of time was spent trying set up in-
terviews with them, and even though the two periods of fieldwork lasted approxi-
mately seven months in total, divided by one year, I failed to interview some 
owner-managers with whom I was in contact because an interview could not be fit-
ted into their schedule (an alternative reading would, of course, suggest that this 
business conceals a resistance to cooperating in the research project). 
Some researchers even go as far as to argue that, by their nature, elites establish 
barriers around themselves in order to set themselves apart from the rest of the so-
ciety. Access to elites is therefore made relatively more difficult than access to non-
elites (Welch, Marschan-Piekkari et al., 2002). As indicated in note 181 on page 
144, the literature on elites mostly views them from the perspective of the devel-
oped world, in which elites tend to mean something else than in the developing 
world. Whatever the reason, I did not experience any barriers of this sort during my 
fieldwork. 
Access is not the only parameter related to interviewing foreign elites: the litera-
ture also stresses issues of power. It is to be expected that the power balance fa-
vours the interviewee over the interviewer (Healey and Rawlinson, 1993; Welch, 
Marschan-Piekkari et al., 2002). Desmond (2004: 265) even goes so far as to sug-
gest that ‘with elite interviewees the relationship [between the interviewer and the 
interviewee] is inevitably asymmetrical regardless of the research strategies de-
ployed’. The question of power is not only related to elite status, but may also refer 
to age difference, gender and race, which may be closely linked to elite status any-
way.186 Asymmetrical power relations may be reflected the interviewee acting in a 
patronising manner towards the interviewer, but not necessarily so. Power relations 
are most often reflected in dependence on a relatively small number of people 
                                                 
185 In most cases, the secretary or receptionist, if any, were not authorized to make appointments 
on behalf of the owner-manager. Therefore, I had to wait until I could reach him or her. Moreover, 
the telephone network was regularly out of order. In a comment in the Daily Graphic for 26 No-
vember 2003, Nana Owuso-Sekyere suggests that it may not always be network failures that made 
me wait for hours or days to get through to a company: ‘Telephones ring endlessly without any re-
sponse whatsoever.... This is not because the offices are closed for lunch, empty or closed for the 
day. I found to my utter surprise that one such office, which I had tried endlessly to reach one morn-
ing, had all the staff at post. I drove over, stood in front of the office, called from my cell phone and 
it was unbelievable! The endlessly ringing telephone was actually nobody's business and the staff 
couldn't be bothered!’ (Owuso-Sekyere, 2003). 
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 (Cormode and Hughes, 1999). Thus, my status as a seeker of information vis-à-vis 
the owner-managers was constantly reiterated: I was wholly dependent on them for 
information and insights into their perception of the PSDP, as well as access to 
their employees. As yet another illustration of the power relationships involved, in-
terviews were often cancelled (some prior to the appointment, but most often at the 
scheduled time and place: the person with whom I had made the appointment was 
simply not present) and if not, then almost always delayed.187 I was repeatedly re-
minded that I was fully a part neither of this business community, nor of the group 
of funding agencies present in Ghana. As will become apparent in section 6.3.2 
below, power relations, like positionality, are by no means static but rather highly 
dynamic. Thus, what at first seems like a skewed balance of power may upon closer 
examination reveal a more nuanced picture involving mutual respect and trust. 
In conclusion, the issue of time will be discussed. Elites are often constrained by 
time: by definition, they have influential positions and are embedded in extensive 
networks. Time constraints are reflected in the pre-interview as well as interview 
situations. In the pre-interview situation, it is of the utmost importance that any op-
portunity be taken to convince the potential interviewee that it is worthwhile par-
ticipating in the interview (Mullings, 1999: 329), while in the interview situation it-
self, the interviewer has to be prepared for several interruptions, such as telephone 
calls or members of the staff coming into the office for a signature or instructions. 
6.3.2 Building trust between interviewer and interviewee: the question of 
positionality and the relationship with the donor 
Local elites distribute their knowledge very differently to foreign and 
local researchers. Paradoxically, foreigners are given more information 
as they easily generate confidence in local elites. However, foreign re-
searchers are not really the best people to understand and use such in-
formation most effectively, because they are not natives of the place and 
do not understand completely the local context. (Sabot, 1999: 334) 
 
While I do not contest Emmanuèle Sabot’s statement that foreign researchers do 
not completely understand the local context (even though one might question 
                                                                                                                                        
186 Most of the literature dealing with ‘studying elites’ has been written by women. Reflections 
on ‘studying elites’ may be seen as a continuation of the methodological reflections on power, race 
and gender that were especially vibrant in feminist studies in the 1980s and 1990s. 
187 These issues, however, should not be over-interpreted: time is generally not regarded an im-
portant issue in a Ghanaian context. In the words of Samuel N. Woode, senior lecturer at the School 
of Administration, University of Legon: ‘time is not seen as a scarce resource [for most Ghana-
ians]…people attending meetings congratulate each other when they get a quorum twenty minutes 
after the meeting was scheduled to have started’ (Woode, 1999: 13). 
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 whether or not local researchers do this per se), I find the rigid distinction between 
local and foreigner, that is, between insider and outsider, unproductive. This section 
argues that positionality is not fixed but may change during the course of fieldwork 
and may be different in relation to different interviewees. Of course, the very fact 
that I am a young, white Danish researcher makes me an outsider vis-à-vis a mid-
dle-aged black Ghanaian businessman, but the fact that a large proportion of the in-
terviewees had a university degree from either a European or North American uni-
versity, had business experience from these parts of the world, and interacted on a 
regular basis with Danes made me a ‘temporary insider’, in the words of Mullings 
(1999: 340), or more precisely it made me ‘multi-positioned’ (Desmond, 2004: 
263).188 Moreover, not all relevant actors in Ghana were middle-aged black Ghana-
ian businessman: some were women, some employees, both white- and blue-collar, 
some researchers, some civil servants, some Lebanese and yet other Danes. 
Building trust between the interviewer and the interviewee(s) is of the greatest 
importance in order to increase the quality of the knowledge being exchanged and 
thus the quality of data. Trust makes interviewee(s) more open and frank and thus 
willing to explain, for instance, how they are really experiencing the collaboration 
with the donor agency, or perceive the training in relation to the needs of the com-
pany. As indicated above, trust is related directly to positionality. However, trust is 
not fixed but should be seen as constantly changing: some interviewees were inter-
viewed several times, some were introduced to me through other interviewees, and 
I first met yet others at business meetings or seminars, so that the initial contact had 
been made prior to the interview. Trust is related to respect, both personal and pro-
fessional, in as much as the latter may enhance the former: if an interviewee notices 
that an interviewer possesses in-depth knowledge about his or her area of activity 
or interest, the person in question may feel flattered and thus be ready for a more 
open dialogue. 
The development of trust between interviewer and interviewee is not confined to 
the issue of positionality. In studying PSDP impact in Ghana, positionality may be 
overshadowed by the researcher’s perceived ‘relationship’ with the donor. Even 
though I constantly tried to distance myself from Danida, there is hardly any doubt 
that some actors in the Ghanaian enterprises, whether owner-managers, expatriates 
or employees, had difficulties in distinguishing me from representatives of Danida. 
As spelled out in section 6.2.1 above, most Ghanaian companies were contacted by 
mail in advance. These letters stressed that this was an independent research project 
                                                 
188 The more knowledge I gained about the PSDP, the Ghanaian business system and the specific 
sector in which a company operated, the more I could opt for a position as a temporary insider, or at 
least being multi-positioned. 
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 and that my purpose was not to assess their work with reference to either Danida or 
their Danish partners. Rather, the aim was to understand how their particular com-
pany operated, which factors were influencing the operation, and how the PSDP fit-
ted into all that. At the beginning of each interview, the independent nature of the 
research was once again stressed. Moreover, in order to minimise the risk of an in-
terviewee perceiving me as a potential donor, I stressed that I had no access to 
funding. However, not even these tactics always worked successfully.  
One case in particular is worth discussing in some detail. After one interview, 
which had been interrupted several times by telephone calls and by employees 
coming in and out of the office, and which had dealt mostly with issues not directly 
concerning the PSDP collaboration, the owner-manager of a former Ghanaian 
PSDP company invited me to lunch in a nearby restaurant. Here, the topic of the 
dialogue naturally changed. While, during the interview, we had mostly discussed 
the changing political and economic climate in Ghana since he first participated in 
the PSDP in the mid-1990s (because he did not reply to my questions concerning 
the collaboration), during lunch he changed tack and informed me of his future 
business plans, told me about all the new jobs that his company could create in the 
near future, all the tax revenues that could be earned, and so forth. Every now and 
then he mentioned that he needed a business partner in order to kick-start the pro-
ject. During the course of the conversation, I tried to inform several times that I had 
no connections to Danida and therefore could not help him, but merely inform him 
about the content of the programme and the existing guidelines for applications. 
After a while, he asked me directly to plead his cause at the embassy to help him 
obtain access to donor funding again. I told him that I was not in a position to plead 
his cause and that I could not make his way through the application jungle any eas-
ier. The lunch ended shortly thereafter.  
Fortunately, I did not have this type of experience in most interviews. In by far 
the majority of them, I felt I had managed to get rid of the initial suspicion that 
most owner-managers undoubtedly had regarding the real motives of the interview. 
I sensed that an awareness of the issues at stake at the levels of both the programme 
and the Ghanaian private sector provided me with a degree of credibility. More-
over, by attending meetings in such places as the Ghana-Denmark Business Club, 
even owner-managers whom I had only interviewed once had a chance to meet me 
several times and thus acquire a more nuanced picture of myself and my research 
project.189 In addition, some companies were visited more than once, and trust 
                                                 
189 Only approximately half of the owner-managers I interviewed were members of the Ghana-
Denmark Business Club, and not all of these attended meetings regularly (this was especially the 
case for companies located outside the Accra-Tema metropolis). 
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 therefore gradually built up. Actually, the interviews often ended as dialogues dis-
cussing the state of the Ghanaian economy, political developments, the advantages 
and disadvantages of private-sector development programmes (Danida’s as well as 
other donors’), possible ways forward, etc. 
Even though I gradually acquired a better understanding of the Ghanaian private 
sector, the motives of the Ghanaian partners in entering the programme, the expec-
tations they had etc., I still fell short of uncovering the real intentions, motives or 
even stories that the various people had to tell. Several agendas were in play simul-
taneously. This study shows how I was able to uncover these agendas, but certainly 
many other agendas and stories remain to be uncovered. 
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 7. POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS, KEY 
INSTITUTIONAL FEATURES, AND BUSINESS SYSTEM CHARAC-
TERISTICS IN GHANA  
The aim of this chapter is to set the scene for the discussion of how the observed 
impacts of Danida’s PSDP are accounted for (cf. Chapters 8, 9). The chapter is di-
vided into two main parts. The first part (section 7.1) aims to provide an account of 
Ghanaian history from colonial times to the present that focuses exclusively on 
economic and political aspects of relevance to the private sector. Continuing the 
description of how the private sector in Ghana was crowded out in the first part, the 
second part departs from the theoretical framework presented in Chapter 5 to pre-
sent the most important institutional features and relevant characteristics of the 
Ghanaian business system vis-à-vis the impacts of the Danida PSDP (sections 7.2-
7.6). 
Part one is structured chronologically, though the aim is not to give a compre-
hensive historical account of economic and political developments in Ghana, as this 
has been done adequately in numerous other books (for instance, (Buah, 1998; 
Chazan, 1983; Herbst, 1993; Leith and Söderling, 2003; Nugent, 1995; Rimmer, 
1992; Rothchild, 1991). Instead, it will point to aspects of specific relevance for the 
subsequent discussion of institutional features and business system characteristics.  
The Ghanaian private sector was squeezed both in the process of state-led indus-
trialisation in the first years following independence, and again in the process of 
putting these industries back into private hands. This state-led industrialisation 
penetrated all areas of the economy, including the sectors that were dominated by 
Ghanaian entrepreneurs. It thus either marginalised these small-scale entrepreneurs 
or forced them into other businesses, especially petty trade. Moreover, since the 
SOEs were in constant demand for money, hardly any credit was available for the 
private sector. When privatisation really took off in the late 1980s, the result was 
not a booming Ghanaian private sector. Instead Ghanaian entrepreneurs were fur-
ther marginalised, as most did not have the financial means to buy the former SOEs 
and did not trust the government; furthermore, the banking system in Ghana was 
not geared to lend them money. 
The first part also tells the story of the economic downturn in Ghana starting just 
after independence and continuing for approximately fifteen years, when it reached 
an absolute low. Since then, the Ghanaian economy (in general) has grown, albeit 
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 with some oscillations, but now, almost half a century since independence, it has 
just about recovered to its former level.  
Ghanaian private entrepreneurs have faced several constraints during the last 
century. Numerous industrial development policies have been formulated by suc-
cessive governments, but until recently, only a few economic achievements were 
realised (Arthur, 2002). Just as important, however, in determining the characteris-
tics of the Ghanaian business system is the relationship between the state and pri-
vate businessmen, which has been characterised by suspicion and uncertainty, and 
sometimes even outright hostility, ever since independence. This is partly the result 
of the overall developmental strategies pursued in Ghana and partly of the large-
scale corruption that was one consequence of precisely these policies. Moreover, 
private-public interaction has been influenced by the low capacity and inadequate 
coordination of Ghanaian business organisations.  
Section 7.2 describes the relationship between the state and business in Ghana. It 
analyses the dependence of private businessmen on state politics through an ac-
count of the development doctrines of changing Ghanaian governments since inde-
pendence. This analysis is followed by an examination of how widespread corrup-
tion and brutal anti-corruption campaigns have both influenced the room for ma-
noeuvre of the private sector. This section then scrutinises the Ghanaian state’s 
policies for economic growth vis-à-vis the Ghanaian private sector. Lastly, it exam-
ines the role of business organisations. Section 7.3 deals with the Ghanaian capital 
market. It reveals the distinct duality of this market and examines how this duality 
impacts upon Ghanaian entrepreneurs’ investments. Section 7.4 briefly looks at 
skill development and the control system in Ghana. Section 7.5 takes a step back 
and considers some of the Ghanaian ‘background’ institutions that are influencing 
relationships between business partners, as well as between employers and employ-
ees.  
Section 7.6 applies information about institutional features in Ghana in order to 
portray central aspects of the business system’s characteristics. The argument in 
this section is that the combination of these trends, that is, the state-business rela-
tionship, which makes up some of the institutional features of the Ghanaian busi-
ness system (cf. Chapter 5), has made the development of a prosperous national 
private sector almost impossible. The Ghanaian private sector currently comprises 
some (former state-owned) dormant, largely run-down large-scale enterprises, a 
small number of ‘growing’ small enterprises, and numerous ‘survival’ enterprises. 
Alongside these Ghanaian-owned enterprises, there are a few modern large compa-
nies, mostly owned by foreigners, and some ‘growing’ small enterprises owned by 
local non-Africans. 
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 7.1 Crowding out the private sector: economic and political develop-
ments in Ghana 
The overall conclusion of this chapter is that the policies pursued by various gov-
ernments throughout the period have all resulted in the domestic private sector be-
ing crowded out in Ghana. Policies have varied from plain harassment, via mere 
exclusion, to counterproductive efforts to revitalise the sector and limited state 
autonomy in defining economic policies. In colonial times a combination of Euro-
pean oligopolies and Lebanese businessmen excluded Ghanaians from profitable 
markets. . The establishment of state-owned enterprises financed by external loans 
in the post-independence period and widespread corruption became a huge finan-
cial burden, which constrained the availability of capital for small Ghanaian-owned 
companies while also holding back the development of small manufacturing enter-
prises, as the parastatal enterprises dominated all spheres of the economy. The later 
Structural Adjustment Programmes that were intended to revitalise the economy 
did indeed manage to turn the economy around, but the liberalisation of the econ-
omy that, it was claimed, would give Ghanaian producers access to the world mar-
ket also opened a huge door for imported products and thus forced many Ghanaian 
producers out of the consumer goods market. Finally high inflation in the early 
years of the democratically elected government also impacted negatively upon the 
private sector, as it reduced the amount of credit available. Lately, political rhetoric 
has changed: in agreement with the international donor community, the current 
government in Ghana perceives the private sector as the engine for growth. How-
ever, this new rhetoric does not seem to have changed the basic premises for small 
Ghanaian companies to operate: they are still by and large being squeezed out.  
This tendency has contributed to a widespread lack of entrepreneurial experience 
among Ghanaians. This characterised the years just before and just after independ-
ence, but it remained a factor when Ghana started out on the road to adjustment, 
paved with devaluations and liberalisation. Widespread corruption forced entrepre-
neurs away from productive activities to speculative ones. Thus, when the economy 
opened up, the Ghanaian private sector was generally not ready to face competition. 
The private sector came to be characterised mostly by small ‘surviving’ enterprises 
catering for a very local market with low added value. Now, more than two decades 
after Ghana opened up its economy, the structure of the private sector remains es-
sentially unchanged (cf. section 7.6).  
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 7.1.1 The exclusion of local private entrepreneurs by the British colonial 
administration 
At independence from Britain, hardly any Ghanaians were involved in manufactur-
ing industries, due to a combination of relatively cheap European imports – for in-
stance, print, cotton and salt – and restrictions in colonial legislation to limit com-
petition to Britain’s own industries. Even though cocoa was abundant, no cocoa-
processing factories existed, and fruit was exported to Britain to be re-imported as 
soft drinks. A mere 259 manufacturing establishments were registered in Ghana 
two years after independence. Almost half were in the timber industry, and the rest 
were divided between furniture, food-processing, printing and ceramics. Moreover, 
both forward and backward linkages in Ghana were weak, apart from the agricul-
tural base in the export sectors. The Ghanaian economy as it had evolved was basi-
cally a trading economy, but Ghanaians were mostly excluded from the profitable 
import-export business (Agbodeka, 1992; Andræ, 1981; Grant, 2001).  
One of the reasons for the latter was the role of the Levantine trader.190 World 
War I was followed by a short economic boom that was succeeded by a rapid re-
cession. Already in 1921-22, export prices for most commodities fell sharply. 
Crowder (1968: 293) estimates that there was a fifty percent decline from the 1920 
level. This forced Ghanaian traders to sell their stocks to the European import-
export houses, which were characterised by well-established commercial networks 
extending to Europe and were therefore able to withstand the economic downturn. 
Within a short space of time, Ghanaians thus ceased to be important in trade in 
Ghana, except in the case of cocoa. Concurrently, a large number of Lebanese ar-
rived in West Africa from the late nineteenth century and in the first two decades of 
the twentieth century,191 fleeing poverty. Most of them intended to go to the United 
States or Brazil, but they were rerouted in southern France due to a lack of funds, 
                                                 
190 The term ‘Levantine’ in general denotes Lebanese, Syrians and Indians (including present-
day Pakistanis and Bangladeshis) in Ghana. However, it sometimes also includes immigrants from 
Ceylon and Armenia. Even though this term is analytically vague, it is often used in the literature. It 
seems to stem from P. T. Bauer’s (1954) West African Trade. The Lebanese were the first to arrive 
in West Africa, and they still comprise the largest element among the Levantines. In the literature, 
the Lebanese have often been confused with the Syrians, whose numbers were very small (Falola, 
1992: note 3). This may derive from the historical development of Lebanon, which was part of the 
Ottoman empire, became a French mandate, and finally became independent in 1943. Consequently, 
the name used for the citizens of Lebanon changed from Mount Lebanon Arabs, Turks and Syrians 
to Lebanese (Falola, 1990). It suffices here to describe the role of the Lebanese, as other nationali-
ties were treated similarly in Ghana. 
191 Lebanese migration to West Africa rose sharply from the late nineteenth century to the mid-
twentieth century, but especially in the inter-war years, when Lebanon was facing difficulties at the 
same time that migration laws in the United States were effectively reducing the number of possible 
Lebanese migrants. An estimated 2,200 Lebanese had settled in Ghana by 1962. Due to strong kin-
ship ties, migrants from the same part Lebanon tended to settle in the same areas. Thus, most of the 
Lebanese in Accra are Sunni Muslims from Tripoli (Falola, 1992; Khuri, 1965: 385,389). 
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 missing documents, or because they could not meet the strict health requirements in 
the US. In many cases they did not even know that they had been rerouted.192
Once in Ghana, they started businesses. In general, they were excluded from 
farming, factory and office work, and therefore they opted for trade, even though 
competition from the Europeans was fierce. The first immigrants who came had 
neither the capital to start a proper business nor the language skills to obtain a 
proper job. Therefore, they were forced to find other means of survival. Most 
Lebanese chose small-scale trading, serving a specific market sector that was not 
catered for by Europeans or local Africans. Many reasons have been suggested as 
to why they managed to develop their businesses. Their relative advantages in rela-
tion to the Europeans included the lowness of their costs (lower profit margins and 
cheap family labour), their readiness to live in the countryside, to bargain, and their 
ability to speak African languages.193 In relation to the Ghanaians, the Lebanese 
trader benefited from the relatively lenient financial obligations to family members. 
Moreover, and probably most importantly, both in the retail shops and on the 
streets, the Lebanese trader had access to capital from prosperous fellow country-
men, from large European companies like the United Africa Company (U.A.C.)194 
and from the banks. The Ghanaians were not offered credit by the wholesalers nor 
by the banks (Buame, 2003; Buame, 1996; Crowder, 1968; Falola, 1992; Khuri, 
1965). The result of this European domination and the role of the Levantine mid-
dlemen was therefore overwhelming. By independence, only five percent of 
Ghana’s imports were controlled by Ghanaians, the rest being divided between 
these two outside groups (Asamoa, 1996: 40). Moreover, with their relative success 
in trade, most Lebanese diversified into manufacturing, mining and the timber in-
dustry. 
                                                 
192 Lebanese businessmen in Accra told me stories about their great grandfathers’ arrival in 
Ghana on several occasions. Common to these stories was the fact that they actually thought that 
they had reached the United States upon arrival in Ghana. They had paid middlemen for a trip to the 
US. but disembarked on the Gold Coast. This explanation runs counter to the claim by Falola (1992: 
122) that some migrants: ‘were simply ignorant of their destinations’. Most Lebanese migrants, 
however, were well aware of their geographical destination, as they were sponsored by kin already 
in West Africa. However, they were probably unaware of the living conditions they were facing, as 
West Africa was frequently portrayed as a place ‘where money making is shovelling in sand’ 
(Khuri, 1965: 393). 
193 The first immigrants actually opted for the cities, setting up shops that specialised in selling 
imported manufactured goods. They made use of local agents, who bought and sold on behalf of the 
Lebanese. In this way, they were able to penetrate a larger geographical area. 
194 European firms were generally willing to supply credit to the Lebanese because they often 
sold their goods in small quantities to the Ghanaians and thus had a role that was secondary to the 
European trade houses. Moreover, data from Burkina Faso, Sierra Leone and Nigeria indicates that 
this was not the sole reason. Due to the relatively small size of both the European and the Lebanese 
communities, the Lebanese trader could not escape his loan obligations – he would be blacklisted 
immediately (Falola, 1990, 1992; Khuri, 1965). 
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 Another reason for the exclusion of Ghanaians was the dominance of the Euro-
pean oligopolies. In the inter-war period, the import-export trade became increas-
ingly dominated by the European banks and a few major European trading compa-
nies. The price of primary products constantly fluctuated, but during the recession 
Ghanaian traders and small European traders were squeezed out of the market, 
leaving basically only the European oligopolies195 and the Levantines. The British 
colonial administration did not actively control business in the Gold Coast colony 
except for some involvement in mining and the timber industry through the estab-
lishment of support institutions, like the necessary infrastructure196 and the Geo-
logical Survey Department set up in 1913. The trading companies were rather un-
sophisticated, and most of their profits were returned to their European sharehold-
ers. Hardly any capital investments were made in the Gold Coast itself. Key staff in 
these oligopolies were Europeans living with their families in special quarters and 
consuming imported goods. Actually, the European trading firms were often allied 
with the manufacturing companies that exported goods to the expatriate West Afri-
can market. Thus, local manufacturers were excluded from this profitable market 
too.  
Thus neither the colonial administration nor the commercial European busi-
nesses, were interested in developing local industries, let alone human resources, in 
the Gold Coast. Hardly any Ghanaians were employed in managerial posts in the 
European companies. ‘Mighty U.A.C. offered one £300 scholarship for a Ghanaian 
student…. This was how far as any company, French or British, went towards en-
couraging Africans’ (Crowder, 1968: 304). 
World War II changed the situation considerably. For the first time, the colonial 
government began taking an economic interest in the European companies, and at 
the same time, nationalism started to emerge in the Gold Coast. During the war, the 
colonial government stipulated that only goods from the British Empire could be 
imported freely. The trading companies thus came under administrative control. 
However, the law meant that British firms gained an even greater advantage over 
local firms because the British as well as other European firms united in the Asso-
ciation of West African Merchants. In order to increase profits, the Association in-
troduced ‘conditional sales’, whereby customers were obliged to buy additional 
                                                 
195 The giant of the European trading companies was U.A.C. amalgamated from a number of 
smaller companies in 1929.  
196 Haulage and shipping were controlled by individual firms. Only the railways were controlled 
by the colonial administration, being expanded under the auspices of Sir Gordon Guggisberg’s ten-
year development plan. In 1923, the Accra-Kumasi line was completed in order to reach the mines, 
and a couple of years later the railway line was extended into the Central Province to open up new 
areas of cocoa production and timber exploitation (Buah, 1998; Crowder, 1968). 
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 goods (that they did not ask for) in order to buy those they needed. As locally pro-
duced substitutes did not exist for most articles, they were forced to buy these extra 
goods.  
The war, however, also had some positive impact on the domestic private sector. 
A whole range of small-scale industries mushroomed because German submarines 
prevented many goods from entering the Gold Coast, and within a few years nu-
merous enterprises producing leather goods, furniture, building materials and pre-
served fruits had been established.  
By the end of World War II, people had become very frustrated by the increas-
ing marginalisation in both the economic and political spheres. This frustration re-
sulted in a growing nationalism that took diverse forms. The United Gold Coast 
Convention was formed by the black elite, the main objective being winning inde-
pendence of Britain (1947); European goods were boycotted (1948), and a general 
strike was launched (1950). However, the growing nationalism scared away new 
foreign investments (Buah, 1998; Crowder, 1968; Manu, 1999). Meanwhile, the co-
lonial administration made efforts to change the structure of the economy. Eco-
nomic advisors were appointed to guide the economic plans, marketing boards to 
determine producer prices for primary commodities were established, and the In-
dustrial Development Corporation was founded in 1947, its role being to supervise 
and support manufacturing corporations. However, its funding was rather small, 
and it did not manage to reach local entrepreneurs.  
At the end of the colonial era, therefore, the Ghanaian entrepreneur was ex-
cluded from all profitable businesses. Even more important, however, was the lack 
of entrepreneurial experience.197 Aside from some relatively prosperous cocoa pro-
ducers, the Ghanaians were excluded from the world market. Michael Crowder de-
scribes the role of the Ghanaians during colonial rule as follows:  
 
The African found himself the simple producer of raw materials for 
which Lebanese were the agents of sale and the European companies 
the exporters. Conversely these same companies imported the goods 
which the African bought, mainly at the shops or through the agencies 
                                                 
197 Contrary to what Ayee, Lofchie et al. (1999: 6) suggest, I do not see any evidence that 
‘Ghana’s population was well endowed with entrepreneurial talent as evidenced by the wide variety 
of medium scale business enterprises that flourished throughout the country’. Rather, numerous 
Ghanaian-owned micro-scale enterprises in certain lines of business had been established during 
World War II. 
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 of Lebanese traders, with the money he earned from sale of his crop. 
(Crowder, 1968: 345)198
7.1.2 From Nkrumah to SAP: from high expectations to rapid decline 
On 6 March 1957, the Gold Coast colony was proclaimed the sovereign independ-
ent nation of Ghana, thus becoming the first sub-Saharan African colonial territory 
to regain independence. Ghana’s first leader, Kwame Nkrumah, had been prime 
minister of a self-rule government since 1952, and his ruling party, the Conventions 
People’s Party (CPP), enjoyed majority support in Ghana. In order to push Ghana 
into the ‘modern world’ in the shortest time span possible, Nkrumah’s government 
pursued a ‘Big Push’ strategy based on import-substitution industrialisation. 
Nkrumah wanted heavy industrialisation with heavy imported machinery, but for-
eign capital was scarce. Ghana actually experienced its first foreign exchange crisis 
only four years after independence, in December 1961, as a response to which 
Nkrumah restricted import licences and access to foreign capital, as well as issuing 
Ghana’s own currency, delinked from sterling.  
The new independent government needed to break away from its previous 
dominance by foreigners. The establishment of SOEs was perceived as the most ef-
ficient way to fulfil both obligations, but in 1966, after 88 SOEs had been set up, 
Ghana had still not embarked on the road towards the ‘modern world’.199 Instead, 
the SOEs were mismanaged due to political inference and corruption, and Ghana’s 
debt rapidly increased, as many of these SOEs were financed through external 
loans (cf. section 7.2.1). In addition, many parastatal enterprises were established 
not for economic but for nationalistic reasons and had hardly any linkages with 
other sectors of the economy. According to Richard Sandbrook and Jay Oelbaum 
(1997: 610), ‘[v]irtually none of the import-substituting industries…could be justi-
fied on the basis of cost calculations, and most had extremely low rates of capacity 
utilisation…. Even monopoly enterprises were not profitable’.  
Meanwhile, foreign-owned companies, especially in certain sectors of the econ-
omy, acquired more and more economic influence. For small Ghanaian companies, 
the competition from Nigerian and Lebanese entrepreneurs became fiercer and 
fiercer under Nkrumah. This was partly a result of the fact that the Nkrumah gov-
ernment was to some extent financed by the Lebanese, but also partly a result of 
                                                 
198 It should be noted, however, that the vast majority of people living in the Gold Coast were 
unaffected by the European trade houses and Levantine businesses, since they lived in the rural ar-
eas and did not purchase imported goods. 
199 SOEs include wholly state-owned enterprises, ones under joint state and private ownership, 
and public boards. See section 7.2.1, page 173 for a more detailed discussion of SOEs in Ghana. 
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 Nkrumah’s pan-Africanism. Therefore, his government did not impose any restric-
tions to foreign entrepreneurs (Peil, 1971: 212). 
One result of the first years of independence, therefore, was the crowding out of 
local entrepreneurs, most of the remaining privately owned industries being owned 
by foreigners. This was partly due to the import licences, which ‘worked in favour 
of the Ghana National Trading Corporation, which received generous allowances 
mainly at the expense of the small Ghanaian traders’ (Tangri, 1999: 70), and partly 
due to the establishment of SOEs in all sectors of the economy, including those in 
which Ghanaians had experienced some success during World War II. On the other 
hand, the restriction of both import licences and access to foreign exchange led to 
widespread corruption (cf. section 7.2.2) (Agbodeka, 1992; Asamoa, 1996; Herbst, 
1993; Hutchful, 2002; Jeffries, 1982; Kennedy, 1994).  
The National Liberation Council (NLC), which overthrew Nkrumah, did not 
manage to change the Ghanaian economy fundamentally. The NLC government 
initiated negotiations with the IMF only two weeks after it took power in February 
1966. In May it managed to acquire a stand-by credit from the IMF, and in Decem-
ber of the same year it signed an agreement with the Fund, prescribing liberalisa-
tion policies and attempting to reorganise the increasingly corrupt state administra-
tion. After the agreement was signed, both credibility among aid agencies and the 
inflow of long-term concessional loans rose substantially (Rimmer, 1992). Balance 
of payment problems, however, persisted, and economic growth was marginal. One 
observer even goes as far as to state that ‘the programme was almost a complete 
flop’ (Jonah, 1989: 100). The reason should be sought not only in the inadequate 
design of the programme (it devalued the cedi as well as liberalised trade, but paid 
no attention to industrial bottlenecks or external constraints), but also in the lack of 
any commitment to implement the policies. Within the NLC, one faction wanted to 
pursue economic policies similar to those of Nkrumah, whereas another faction 
wanted to introduce more liberal policies. At the end of the day, these internal con-
flicts meant that the Rehabilitation Programme designed by the IMF was not fully 
implemented, and the NLC failed to break with past economic policies. 
The eventual break did not come until December 1971, when the democratically 
elected Progress Party (PP) announced a 90 percent devaluation of the cedi. The 
PP, led by Kofi A. Busia, was in direct opposition to Nkrumah’s Conventions Peo-
ple’s Party and also more committed to liberalisation than the former military re-
gime of the NLC.200 Busia officially continued the privatisation of SOEs that had 
                                                 
200 It is difficult to be sure whether the Progress Party was in reality pursuing genuine liberalisa-
tion or only wanted to win Western sympathy, as Nugent (1995: 25) suggests. On the one hand, the 
PP’s manifesto promised to abandon the import licensing schemes, and the proportion of imports to 
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 been initiated in the Rehabilitation Programme, and like the NLC, the PP made 
many public-sector employees redundant. However, for a number of reasons these 
policies did not succeed, among them a fall in the world market price for cocoa 
from 1971 onwards, excessive government spending, a lack of policies to counter 
the effects of the liberalisation of imports on the balance of payments, and a rapid 
decline in foreign assistance. Moreover, new SOEs were also established. The re-
forms were never fully implemented, which has made Douglas Rimmer describe 
them as ‘reform at half-cock’ (Rimmer, 1992). Overseas suppliers and donors real-
ised that Busia’s liberalisation measures were not adequate and forced him to pur-
sue stricter ones. Busia therefore devalued the cedi at the end of 1971, his aim be-
ing to change the structure of the economy. However, the devaluation never had the 
intended economic effect, as it created widespread urban disapproval, which even-
tually led to the military overthrowing the Busia government in January 1972201 
(Gyimah-Boadi and Jeffries, 2000; Rimmer, 1992). As Gyimah-Boadi and Jeffries 
(2000: 34) describe the matter, ‘Colonel Ignatius Acheampong judged, correctly, 
that a coup d’etat would meet little opposition in the politically crucial urban areas 
so long as the incoming regime reversed these measures.’ 
Therefore, one of the first actions of Acheampong’s National Redemption Party 
(NRP) was a revaluation of the cedi.202 The NRP was generally popular in the ini-
tial phase. The revaluation was a highly populist measure, and Acheampong also 
gained support from those who felt that Busia’s politics were governed by Ashanti 
interests, and as the NRP in many ways followed in Nkrumah’s footsteps,203 it also 
                                                                                                                                        
open general licenses actually rose by almost 60 percent during the first year of the Busia regime 
(Rimmer, 1992: 123). On the other hand, only a few SOEs were privatised during that regime, and 
in fact new SOEs were established (cf. section 7.2.1, page 173). It seems that the exceptionally high 
cocoa prices in 1969-1970 influenced the PP’s political choices. The party faced initial opposition to 
its privatisation policies, and the country’s foreign earnings from cocoa meant that it was not forced 
to change the state-market relationship radically. 
201 There are signs that Acheampong had been planning the coup for some time. Thus, the De-
cember devaluation was not the only cause, but probably the factor that made it happen at that par-
ticular time.  
202 The exact extent of the revaluation is hard to determine. One reference puts it at 44 percent 
(Gyimah-Boadi and Jeffries, 2000: 34), another at 67 percent (Jeffries, 1982: 312). What is impor-
tant here is not the exact figure, but rather the fact that the fierce opposition to the devaluation and 
the subsequent revaluation meant that the military regime could neither reverse the revaluation nor 
use devaluation as a policy measure in the future. Even more important, however, was the impact 
the coup had on later governments, when ‘they contemplated resorting to market mechanisms to ad-
dress their foreign exchange shortages’ (Herbst, 1993: 23). 
203 Until Rawlings’ second coming in 1981, in reality only two political traditions existed in 
Ghana. One consisted of Nkrumah loyalists and adherents of the CPP. The other consisted of adher-
ents of Danquah’s United Party. Initially, the division between these two traditions was ideological, 
but ideology soon faded out, and even though the PP belongs to the Danquah tradition, Busia did 
continue some of the more socialist-oriented policies of former regimes. Sandbrook and Oelbaum 
(1997: 632) have even gone so far as suggesting that adherence to either tradition ‘has much more to 
do with style than substance’. Some authors, like Ayee, Lofchie et al. (1999), actually argue that 
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 gained support from those who still supported him.204 In many ways the NRP, 
which later changed its name to the Supreme Military Council (SMC) and in 1978 
to SMC II, reversed the policies of Busia’s Progress Party (Brydon and Legge, 
1996). 
Corruption and maladministration in the public sector was widespread through-
out Ghana’s first years as an independent nation. It started with the import license 
restrictions after the 1961 foreign exchange shortages and ‘reached almost unbe-
lievable heights [during the Acheampong regime] when government decisions on 
fundamental issues such as import permits were made largely on the basis of per-
sonal connections’ (Herbst, 1993: 24). It seems that everybody, including the ruling 
party, was aware of the increasing corruption. For instance, when the NLC took 
power, it immediately started commissions of inquiry to report on these activities. 
However, the commissions excluded senior civil servants from inquiry, and in real-
ity they were only used to remove chiefs appointed by the CPP and to replace them 
with new ones (Rimmer, 1992). Corruption therefore did not cease, as the follow-
ing quote from Chazan (1983: 102) indicates: ‘If Busia could state that with himself 
excluded “there is not a single honest person in my cabinet”, then it is hardly sur-
prising that many people felt that the patrons who had sprung up under his aegis 
had gone beyond permissible bounds’.205 Busia actually initiated an investigation 
into the causes of corruption, but a leading member of the presidential commission 
was pulled to pieces by Busia’s fellow ministers when he demanded that ministers 
should declare their assets. The investigations were therefore quickly halted.206  
In June 1979, two weeks before the first elections since Busia had come to 
power in 1969 were due, a group of junior officers overthrew Akuffo. The major 
aim of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), led by Flight Lieutenant 
Jerry Rawlings, was to conduct a ‘house-cleaning exercise’ in the military forces 
and society at large. The exercise lasted approximately three months, after which 
the newly elected Hilla Limann took office. Corruption was to be eliminated once 
and for all. Eight senior military officers, among them Achaempong and Akuffo, 
were executed. 
Corruption, of course, was not eliminated at all after these three months, and by 
the time ‘Limann took office, the working assumption was that the larger mer-
                                                                                                                                        
Rawlings has been able to combine the two traditions into a single radical (CPP) populist United 
Party tradition. 
204 The NRP even revived some of Nkrumah’s industrial projects, which had been abandoned by 
the governments intervening between the two regimes (Buame, 2003). 
205 The quote from Busia is taken from The Spokesman, 25 May 1971. 
206 I provide a lengthy discussion of corruption and its implications for the private sector in 
Ghana in Chapter 9 in order to shed light on how corruption, among other factors, has affected 
PSDP companies. 
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 chants were hoarders and smugglers; that contractors were almost certainly bogus; 
and that the senior managers of state corporations were by definition corrupt’ 
(Nugent, 1995: 28). On the one hand, there are no signs that President Limann 
genuinely tried to combat corruption. Actually, the liberalisation of both trade and 
price controls in relation to the agreement with the IMF helped to pave the way for 
even more petty corruption, as traders could increase the profits of black market 
sales because the cedi continued to be highly overvalued. On the other hand, Li-
mann faced an overwhelming task: the economy was collapsing, the shops were 
empty, the infrastructure was run down, schools were without teachers, clinics 
without staff and medicine, and institutions had to be rebuilt. In addition, Limann’s 
People’s National Party was split over economic policies, and Limann himself 
knew that if he did not fulfil the expectations of the Ghanaian people, Rawlings 
would return to power again by force207 (Africa Confidential, 1980, 1981a, 1981b; 
Brydon, 1999; Leith and Söderling, 2003). Limann neither fulfilled these expecta-
tions nor combatted corruption, and Rawlings took power on the last day of 1981, 
following which the attacks on corruption were also revived.  
Summing up, the industrialisation policies pursued by Nkrumah, which were 
characterised by heavy investments in SOEs, especially in the mining sector, were 
also pursued by subsequent governments. On paper the policies may seem differ-
ent, but they display a great deal of similarity. Even though the PP in particular, and 
the NLC to a lesser extent, openly showed their aversion to Nkrumah’s socialism, 
more than eighty percent of the SOEs that existed when Nkrumah was overthrown 
were still operating when the NRP took power six years later. Public-sector em-
ployment did not change much either: in late 1965 it numbered approximately 
277,000; at the end of 1971 the figure had grown to approximately 289,000 
(Rimmer, 1992: 126).  
By SSA standards, the manufacturing sector in Ghana was diverse and dynamic 
by 1970. However, the costs of establishing these enterprises were huge, and Ghana 
had incurred large foreign debts on account of them. In addition, they were highly 
dependent on imports, and Ghana experienced declining revenues from the primary 
exports that were expected to finance them. By the beginning of the 1970s, they 
had become a drag on the economy rather than an engine of Ghana’s economic 
growth (Agbodeka, 1992; Lall, Navaretti et al., 1994). 
                                                 
207 Rawlings, the former head of state, never left Accra, but stayed at the Burma Camp Barracks, 
watching the political situation. Limann constantly feared that Rawlings would capitalise on social 
instability, which constrained his room for manoeuvre. Ever since Acheampong’s coup in 1971, de-
valuations meant coups in Ghanaian politics. See also note 202 on page 160 for a description of the 
consequences of the devaluation.  
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 Thus, by the late 1970s, the structure of large-scale manufacturing enterprises in 
Ghana resembled that of many other developing countries that had adopted import-
substitution industrialisation strategies but not been able to go beyond the first 
phase. The industry was numerically dominated by beverage and vehicle-assembly 
plants. Strategically, however, the large-scale heavy industrialisation projects, such 
as the Valco Aluminium Company (an aluminium smelting facility), the Iron and 
Steel Project and large refining industries, dominated manufacturing. Also of im-
portance were textiles, garments, sawmilling and furniture. A large proportion of 
these industries were SOEs. During this period, the state also possessed majority 
equity in mines, banks, iron and steel products, and insurance companies (Andræ, 
1981; Tangri, 1999). 
The medium- and large-scale industries shared one feature: capacity utilisation 
fell drastically throughout the period. Although there were differences between 
various sub-sectors and abnormal fluctuations appeared, the overall trend is clear: 
capacity utilisation decreased by more than fifty percent in the decade from 1971 to 
1981 (Asante, Nixson et al., 2000: table 13.4). Manufacturing production in 1981 
was approximately sixty percent of its 1977 value, mining production followed a 
similar trend and dropped by roughly thirty percent in these four years, production 
of vital cereals like maize, rice, cassava and yams all dropped by more than fifty 
percent from 1974 to 1982, and real wages fell by almost seventy percent from 
1977 to 1983. Moreover, fiscal deficits were huge, and by 1981 Ghana had the 
most overvalued African currency, estimated at 816 percent overvalued in 1982 
(Aryeetey and Harrigan, 2000: 8; Hutchful, 1996: 143f). 
7.1.3 Revitalising the private sector or marginalising the local economy? 
Structural Adjustment Programmes in Ghana 
When the PNDC took power, it had no party structures and no real ideology. The 
rhetoric was genuinely socialist, and among its main supporters were the urban 
poor and left-wing intellectuals, including the National Union of Ghanaian Students 
(NUGS), but it soon became apparent that Rawlings was approaching politics 
pragmatically. The PNDC itself was made up of military members from all ranks 
and with different ethnic backgrounds, and civilian members with different political 
backgrounds. Nomination of cabinet members seems to have followed the same 
pragmatic approach, including a former trade unionist, three former right-wing 
politicians and four young politicians with a more radical background. Thus, while 
the PNDC proclaimed a revolution, in reality no revolution happened. The eco-
nomic policies presented in the initial phase included ‘revolutionary’ initiatives, 
such as the confiscation of 50 cedi notes, and a freeze of bank balances of more 
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 than 50,000 cedis, ‘monetary’ issues to cut the budget deficit through currency ad-
justments and strict fiscal policies, and ‘structuralist’ policies with the emphasis on 
self-reliance. 
Before long it became clear that these measures would not be sufficient to 
change the economic downturn. The urban poor demanded immediate improve-
ments in their living conditions, neighbouring Nigeria wanted payment for US$ 130 
million worth of oil, export earnings from cocoa dropped, and due to the inclusion 
of former right-wing politicians in the cabinet, the NUGS became part of a fierce 
opposition demanding a genuine socialist revolution.208 Libya provided Ghana with 
emergency shipments of oil, while the PNDC looked towards the Eastern bloc for 
economic help and guidance, though the response was negative.  
In the meantime, the PNDC launched its Programme for Reconstruction and 
Development. This programme in essence synthesised the economic policies of the 
monetarists and the structuralists. The combination of the failed mission to the 
Eastern bloc and the launch of a programme that included strategies resembling the 
IMF’s guidelines paved the way for the April 1983 budget agreement with the IMF 
(Africa Confidential, 1982a, 1982b, 1983, 1984a; Herbst, 1993; Hutchful, 2002; 
Nugent, 1995). 
However, the budget agreement and the subsequent Economic Recovery Pro-
gramme (ERP) did not look at all like PNDC’s programme. The state monopoly of 
the import trade, increased public control of the banking sector and the distribution 
of essential goods through people’s shops were all discarded. Moreover, the reality 
of the monetary policies, especially the devaluations, was harsher than anyone had 
expected.  
In 1983, after several years of political instability and economic decline, Ghana 
embarked on the ERP sponsored by the IMF, the World Bank and many Western 
donors. The poor performance of the Ghanaian economy in past decades was per-
ceived as resulting from a combination of inappropriate state actions and erroneous 
macroeconomic policies, that is, purely internal causes in line with the prevailing 
neo-liberal line of thought in the IMF and the World Bank. Thus, central to the pol-
icy prescriptions were a change in the balance between the state and the market, an 
improvement in the balance of payments, and the expansion of the ability of the 
economy to adjust to shocks, just as the neo-liberal orthodoxy prescribed. The ERP 
therefore included a liberalisation of prices, the rationalisation and privatisation of 
                                                 
208 During the first twenty months of its existence, the PNDC survived a number of major 
threats, namely its own collapse and subsequent restructuring, two attempted coups, two strike calls, 
and the alleged involvement of Rawlings himself in the murder of four judges.  
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 SOEs, devaluation, and of the withdrawal of subsidies for food and social services 
(Aryeetey and Tarp, 2000).  
The ERPs in Ghana evolved in three phases: ERP I (1983-86), II (1987-93), and 
III (1993-95).209 ERP I included a stabilisation package (devaluation, reduction of 
price controls, reduction of import tariffs etc.) and an economic development pro-
motion programme that included the repair of essential infrastructure and the stimu-
lation of traditional exports by reforming the State Cocoa Marketing Board and im-
proving producer incentives. ERP II concentrated on extending the ongoing re-
forms through structural and institutional reforms and exchange rate liberalisation. 
During ERP II a number of reforms were launched that aimed at shrinking the role 
of the state by making public-sector employees redundant and privatising SOEs 
(Hutchful, 2002). 
The effects of the ERPs are disputed. The IMF and World Bank maintain that 
Ghana is a successful adjuster in as much as the economic downturn was reversed 
and key economic indicators stabilised. Others, however, focus on the social costs 
of ERPs and argue that the programmes have forced people into self-employment, 
increased inequalities and greater poverty. 
A number of reasons account for the different interpretations of the effects of the 
ERPs. Most obviously, interpretation of effects is related to area of interest. Thus, 
on the one hand, there is no doubt that, during a period of more than a decade of 
structural adjustment and stabilisation, inflation was halted, the exchange rate re-
valued and the balance of trade improved. On the other hand, the outcomes of the 
institutional restructuring are ambiguous. Likewise, there is general agreement that 
the majority of Ghanaians were not able to enjoy the benefits of the economic im-
provements, but instead experienced negative social consequences during these 
years. Put differently, the shops filled up with goods, but hardly anyone could af-
ford to buy them. Besides this, different ways of evaluating the results provide dif-
ferent interpretations (Aryeetey and Harrigan, 2000). Moreover, as Lall has shown 
(1995), since various indicators can be chosen to measure the outcome, different re-
sults are obtained. These discussions will not be pursued further here.210
                                                 
209 ERP III will be dealt with in section 7.1.4. 
210 For insights into the various assessments of the effects of ERPs on the development of the in-
formal sector, see, for instance, (Barwa, 1995; Nikoi, 1995), on micro- and small-scale enterprises 
(Arthur, 2003; Boeh-Ocansey, 1995; Steel and Webster, 1991), on medium and large-scale enter-
prises (Acheampong and Tribe, 2001), on SOEs (Adei, 1990; Christensen, 1998; Djokoto-Asem, 
2003), on the response of the entrepreneurs (Amponsah, 2000), on employment (Fine and Boateng, 
2000; Mazumdar and Mazaheri, 2002), on exports of traditional products (Owusu, 2001), on mobili-
sation of action (Awuah, 1997), on urban lives (Brydon, 1999), and on the female workforce 
(Panford, 2001). 
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 During ERPs I and II, imports increased dramatically, even though the value of 
the cedi continually depreciated. Oduro (2000: table 9.4) suggests an increase in the 
value of imports of almost 200 percent from 1983 to 1992. This growth was con-
siderably larger than the growth in export earnings211 and was only possible be-
cause foreign loans and grants also increased concurrently.212 Import licensing to 
some degree directed the increased funds towards inputs and supplies for industry, 
but imports were unfortunately not confined to essentials and capital goods for pro-
duction: they also included consumer goods that squeezed out local production. 
Table 7.1. Manufacturing production in Ghana 1985-1992 (1977=100) 
Industry 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Food-manufacturing 41.8 40.6 50.5 53.6 48.0 57.5 59.3 62.8
Beverages 59.3 75.1 85.2 89.0 98.0 94.0 93.0 112.2
Tobacco and tobacco prod-
ucts 61.3 57.6 54.9 58.0 51.0 57.1 49.6 47.1
Textile, clothes and leather 
goods 19.2 22.9 26.1 28.7 24.0 37.7 39.1 23.7
Sawmill and wood products 75.4 79.5 79.3 98.3 80.0 74.2 133.6 120.2
Paper products and printing 65.1 70.5 59.7 52.8 48.0 53.5 49.3 54.6
Petroleum refinery 80.6 76.6 62.7 67.7 87.2 70.5 92.2 65.0
Chemical products other 
than petroleum 31.8 38.0 51.9 67.5 62.0 57.6 44.7 56.7
Cement and other non-
metallic mineral prod. 63.6 47.4 49.7 73.4 100.0 117.3 125.6 177.0
Iron and steel products 46.2 38.8 42.9 18.3 12.1 5.2 NA 356.0
Non-ferrous metal basic in-
dustries 28.4 72.5 90.3 97.3 100.5 103.8 104.6 115.8
Cutlery and other non-
ferrous metal products 34.6 55.2 51.9 46.2 47.9 55.2 63.2 83.3
Electrical equipment and 
appliances 28.4 51.0 31.5 47.1 13.5 25.5 40.0 46.3
All manufacturing indus-
tries 39.3 49.3 54.2 56.8 63.0 63.5 71.3 76.9
Source: Quarterly Digest of Statistics 
 
As depicted in Table 7.1, manufacturing production in Ghana did improve dur-
ing ERP. The overall trend shows an increase from index 39.3 in 1985 to 76.9 in 
1992, that is, an increase of 96 percent. However, what is more important here is 
the fact that in 1992, nine years after the start of ERP I, manufacturing production 
                                                 
211 Export earnings rose by 125 percent during the same period. Unfortunately, exports remained 
undiversified. After a decade of structural adjustment in Ghana, approximately 85 percent of exports 
were still made up of traditional primary products, that is, timber, minerals and cocoa (Oduro, 2000: 
178f). 
212 This was especially true in the first years after the ERP was signed. In 1983, ODA/capita was 
US$ 9.35. This increased to US$ 45.18 in 1989, that is, by almost 400 percent (Harrigan and 
Younger, 2000: 190). 
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 in Ghana had still not reached its 1977 level. This general trend, however, hides 
enormous differences among the various sectors. Some sectors, like tobacco, paper 
products and petroleum refining, had declined by roughly twenty percent, whereas 
others, like iron and steel products, non-ferrous metal industries and cement, had 
reached production levels that clearly exceeded the 1977 level. 
The sector developments for manufacturing shown in Table 7.1 are by no means 
unexpected. The economic liberalisation of the 1980s and the 1990s in Ghana on 
the one hand gave the producers access to the market. On the other hand, however, 
liberalisation also increased the competition from imported products and the expo-
sure to market fluctuations for primary goods. Therefore, a large increase in pro-
duction is to be expected in industries that are dependent on imported inputs and 
capital equipment, while a drop is to be expected in industries that face foreign 
competition directly. 
At the beginning of the 1980s, capacity utilisation in manufacturing industries 
was so low that literally no production was taking place. The medium and large-
scale enterprises experienced a relatively high increase in capacity utilisation after 
the start of an ERP. On average, capacity utilisation in manufacturing industries 
rose by fifty percent from 1983 to 1992, but from an extraordinarily low level at the 
beginning of the 1980s, when ERP I was started (Asante, Nixson et al., 2000: table 
13.4). 
The aim of the ERPs was to establish the framework for a dynamic private sec-
tor. However, this did not happen. Rather, people were forced into various forms of 
self-employment. Many explanations have been put forward for this result, includ-
ing the poor institutional environment (Amponsah, 2000), structural rigidities in the 
Ghanaian economy (Government of Ghana, 2003b), and the lack of private invest-
ment (Africa Confidential, 1988; Asante, Nixson et al., 2000). Nevertheless, some 
recovery did occur in the private sector. A considerable proportion of the recovery 
of manufacturing production was due to improvements in capacity utilisation rather 
than capacity expansion and technological change, and as such was of a short-term 
nature. Moreover, much of the growth occurred because of the special attention that 
was given to the manufacturing sector in the ERPs. In addition, the 1983 budget, 
the announcement of the ERP in April (signed in February) and the presentation of 
a relief programme at the Paris Club meeting for major donors in November213 
                                                 
213 1983 marked the bottom of Ghana’s economic decline. Any comparisons with this year are 
misleading. In January 1983, the Nigerian government announced the expulsion of alien workers 
whose papers were not in order. An estimated 1.2 million Ghanaians or approximately ten percent of 
the Ghanaian population were expelled from Nigeria and returned to Ghana in the first months of 
the year. In addition, the dry season of 1982-83 was exceptionally long, as a consequence of which 
most food crops failed.  
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 meant an injection of aid flows and loans to Ghana. An indication of the almost 
bankrupt state of the Ghanaian economy was the fact that the programme requested 
items like nails, screws and light bulbs (Brydon and Legge, 1996). 
7.1.4 Continuity rules: the PNDC without the ‘P’ wins Ghana’s first 
democratic elections in more than a decade 
In late 1992, Ghana again held presidential elections. Thus, democracy did return to 
Ghana, but Rawlings stayed too. Rawlings won 58.3 percent of the votes in the 
presidential elections and was therefore entitled to another four years as president. 
Elections to the National Assembly were scheduled for 29 December that year, but 
the opposition parties, led by Adu Boahen and his NPP, accused the PNDC of fraud 
and therefore boycotted the elections, which were easily won by the National De-
mocratic Congress (NDC) and its fellow pro-Rawlings parties, the National Con-
vention Party and the Egle Party.  
Several reasons can be given to account for Rawlings’ victory, but the relative 
success of his economic policies since the beginning of the 1980s is definitely 
among the most important. Moreover, opposition leaders presented no alternative to 
Rawlings’ ERPs. Thus, even though most Ghanaians, especially in the urban areas, 
were still poor and had to diversify their sources of income in order to survive, the 
steady economic growth was appreciated.214 Moreover, Rawlings had already 
shown that he was able to change the direction of the economy. Due to the eco-
nomic progress, the future was generally viewed with optimism. In the words of 
Jeffries and Thomas (1993: 362), ‘Rawlings won, then, in part because he enjoyed 
the advantages of incumbency and because the majority of Ghanaians cared more 
about their material standard of living than about “human rights”’.  
Rawlings was the first Ghanaian head of state to implement across-the-board 
structural reforms designed by the IMF and the World Bank. It is arguably easier to 
implement these kinds of reform during an era of executive authority and political 
autonomy than in a democracy, as in the latter case accountability and popularity 
become central aspects of day-to-day politics. As pointed out in the preceding sec-
tion, the ERPs did cause the macro economy to stabilise and spurred continuous 
economic growth, but at the same time inequality and poverty also rose. Therefore, 
it looked doubtful whether the NDC administration would be able to continue its 
close alliance with the Bretton Woods Institutions.  
                                                 
214 Of course, many groups opposed the ERP, such as the Trade Union Congress, which opposed 
the layoff of workers in the SOEs; businessmen, who complained about the high interest rates and 
the liberalisation of trade; and intellectuals, who criticised the ERPs on the grounds of their social 
costs. At the same time, however, most people acknowledged the improvements in the economy. 
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 However, soon after the inauguration of the fourth republic, ERP III (1993-
1996), or the Accelerated Growth Strategy, as it was rightly called, was launched. 
This took a different approach than the two previous programmes, as it emphasised 
economic growth instead of economic recovery, because both the NDC administra-
tion and the major donors saw sustained economic growth as essential for eradicat-
ing poverty. The priority areas of ERP III were thus poverty alleviation, private-
sector development and human resource development. The fundamentals of the 
programme, however, turned out to be incorrect. When the programme was initi-
ated, the economy was no longer stable. After almost a decade of economic recov-
ery, it was still highly vunerable to domestic as well as external shocks. Moreover, 
the 1992 elections had placed huge fiscal pressures on the economy. In order to 
gain support from the large number of people employed in the public sector, the 
PNDC increased civil servants’ salaries by sixty to eighty percent, thus causing 
government expenditures to rise by almost 25 percent in a year. As a result, both in-
flation and interest rates increased rapidly (Aryeetey and Harrigan, 2000; CEPA, 
2001: figure 3.1; Hutchful, 2002; Sandbrook and Oelbaum, 1997: 628). 
In the first couple of years, the new democratically elected government also 
faced the burden of major macroeconomic imbalances. To a large degree, the gov-
ernment financed these deficits through domestic borrowing that on the one hand, 
made inflation sky rocket, and on the other hand reduced the amount of credit 
available for the private sector, thus again crowding it out. To guide Ghana’s eco-
nomic policies, Rawlings and his ministers launched the Vision 2020 programme, 
which was presented as ‘Ghana's road map to achieving middle-income country 
status by the year 2020’. The main aim of the programme was to reduce poverty 
and inequalities, and increase employment opportunities and average incomes. 
Closely linked to the government’s own visions, a new reform package, the En-
hanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF), was approved by the IMF in 1995. 
However, the relationship between the major donors and the NDC administra-
tion soon cooled down. The story of the 1992 elections is repeated in the 1996 elec-
tions. Due to expensive campaigning, heavy fiscal pressures were once again 
placed on the economy, and inflation increased from approximately twenty percent 
in mid-1994 to more than seventy percent just before the 1996 elections. The do-
nors suspended the ESAF until the beginning of March 1998, when it was renamed 
the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF). Concurrently, the Ghanaian 
economy revived again; inflation fell to one-digit levels for a short while and inter-
est rates slowly fell too. In May 1999, therefore, the donors were ready to sign a 
new three-year phase of the PRGF (IMF, 2002; IMF and IDA, 2002). According to 
CEPA (2003: 35), its objective was ‘to remove structural bottlenecks and create an 
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 environment for sustained balanced growth whilst at the same time addressing mac-
roeconomic imbalances’. 
The PRGF was successfully reviewed a little more than a year after its imple-
mentation. The NDC administration seemed to be able to fulfil most of the per-
formance criteria stated in the programme, but then elections were due again. As 
soon as the election campaigns began, the economy started a downward spiral; in-
flation tripled in 2000, credit for the private sector became more expensive, and the 
cedi depreciated. Thus, the situation became bad for import-dependent manufactur-
ing companies, as they faced high lending costs and costly imports. Small enter-
prises also faced difficulties during this phase; the high costs of formal credit were 
transferred to the informal credit market (see section 7.3), and liberalisation caused 
an increasing influx of imported manufactured products into Ghana (CEPA, 2003). 
Manufacturing production increased 24 percent in 1993-1999, substantially 
lower than in the preceding period. Moreover, it was only eight percent higher than 
the 1977 level. As opposed to the PNDC era, manufacturing production under the 
NDC administration oscillated considerably, and there were large differences be-
tween the various sub-sectors. What should have been a period of sustained eco-
nomic growth was instead a period of very uneven economic performance. The pri-
vate sector was prioritised on the official agenda, but in reality little was done to 
enhance room for manoeuvre in this sector. Rather, it seems that the political deci-
sions and economic policies that the NDC administration pursued during its eight 
years as a democratically elected government squeezed the room for manoeuvre for 
the Ghanaian private sector: high levels of uncertainty, fluctuating rates of infla-
tion, high interest rates and increased liberalisation all in some way or another in-
fluenced the private sector negatively. CEPA (2001: 12) describes the situation 
more directly: ‘In the last few years, fiscal indiscipline also resulted in severe 
crowding out of the private sector through the accumulation of payment arrears and 
non-payment of bills to businesses and individuals for goods and services supplied 
to government’. 
7.1.5 Pragmatism returns to Ghana: Ghana goes HIPC 
On 7 December 2000, presidential and parliamentary elections were held again in 
Ghana. However, this time they were different from the previous elections since 
they marked the definite exit of Jerry Rawlings from Ghanaian politics: under the 
constitution ‘a presidential candidate may serve for a maximum two terms of four 
years and is not eligible for re-election thereafter’ (Ayee, 2002: 151). Moreover, the 
outcome of the elections was a way of assessing the strength of Ghana’s democ-
racy. The political parties that participated in the elections did not differ signifi-
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 cantly on the three main issues debated in the campaign, that is, the national econ-
omy, development and change, and ways of enhancing democracy. For instance, all 
the parties pursued market-oriented economies, all wanted to combat corruption, 
almost all suggested a programme of national health insurance, and the two major 
rivals, the NDC and NPP, both proposed public-private partnerships in order to 
boost the economy. Thus, what people really voted for were personalities rather 
than policies. Moreover, they seem to have voted for change (Africa Res Bull Pol, 
2001; Ayee, 2002; Smith, 2002). 
After a presidential run-off on 28 December 2000, John Agyekum Kufuor of the 
NPP was sworn in as President on 7 January 2001. The NPP administration inher-
ited a highly destabilised economy. One of the worst droughts since 1982-1983 
reached the northern part of the country in 1997-1998 and destroyed significant 
quantities of agricultural production. In addition, in the fiscal year 1999-2000 
Ghana experienced severe terms of trade. Cocoa prices reached a 27-year low, gold 
prices deteriorated, and oil prices tripled. Concurrently, aid disbursements were de-
layed due to the NDC’s inability to meet the performance criteria of the ESAF in 
the latter part of 2000. Moreover, fiscal indiscipline in the months leading up to the 
presidential elections caused the money supply to increase by almost forty percent 
in the same year. Meanwhile, inflation tripled from 13.8 percent in December 1999 
to 40.5 percent in December 2000, and interests rates also rose noticeably in the 
same period (CEPA, 2001: table 3.1; ISSER, 2001: table 3.2). 
On the other hand, donors were delighted that the change of power after the 
2000 elections went smoothly. For the first time in Ghana’s history, one elected 
president handed over power to another from a different political party. This ‘de-
mocracy dividend’ paved the way for negotiations between the NPP administration 
and the donors to implement the HIPC. More importantly in the short term, how-
ever, the ‘democracy dividend’ was transformed into increased inflows from both 
donors and private individuals. Already in his inaugural speech, Kufuor called for 
support from the international donor community in order to revitalise the ailing 
Ghanaian economy (Africa Confidential, 1999; Africa Res Bull Econ, 2001; CEPA, 
2001, 2003). CEPA (2002) estimates that the increased inflows amounted to ap-
proximately ten percent of GDP. 
As a result of the increased inflows, the NPP administration managed to stabilise 
the Ghanaian economy within its first year in power. Inflation dropped from 40.5 
percent in December 2000 to 21.3 percent in December 2001. Likewise, currency 
depreciation reached historically low levels (3.7 percent compared to 49.5 percent 
in 2000). However, interest rates were still high, and credit to the manufacturing 
industries was therefore constrained. 
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 One of the most important steps that the NPP government has taken is the deci-
sion to apply for the Enhanced HIPC Initiative215 (henceforward HIPC) in February 
2001, which immediately caused an additional increase in inflows from abroad. 
Concurrently, the NPP administration was able to suspend debt payments to bilat-
eral donors worth approximately four percent of GDP (ISSER, 2004). The HIPC 
has three components, namely the calculation of debt relief, the PRSPs guiding the 
use of funds made available through the HIPC, and the IMF PRGF, which is basi-
cally is a continuation of the ESAF. However, while the ESAF focused mostly on 
macroeconomic stability through tight monetary policies, the PRGF focuses on 
achieving both macroeconomic stability and poverty reduction through economic 
growth (CEPA, 2002).  
On 26 February 2002, Ghana reached the HIPC decision point. The NPP ad-
ministration had completed the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS), that is, 
the Ghanaian version of the PRSP, just prior to this date. In eight years, 49 percent 
of Ghana’s debt-service obligations should be delivered. The GPRS sets out five 
main policy priorities, namely infrastructural development, agricultural modernisa-
tion, improvements in social services, good governance and private-sector devel-
opment. These policy priorities are meant to enhance economic growth and reduce 
poverty by stabilising the macro-economy, promoting production and employment, 
human resource development, implementing special programmes for the vulnerable 
and excluded, and improving governance (Government of Ghana, 2003a). 
There is hardly any doubt that the NPP government has been able to achieve a 
relatively stable macro-economic environment, with low inflation rates. In contrast 
to the NDC administration, it has also been able to keep the economy on track in 
election year (EIU, 2005a). Furthermore, Ghana has qualified for HIPC debt relief, 
which may free money for development purposes in the future (HIPC funds have 
an estimated value of US$ 80-120 million per year, which can be transferred to 
other sectors of the economy). Up until now, however, the stable macro-economy 
has to produce economic gains for the Ghanaian population. According to the EIU 
(2005b: 7), the NPP has failed to deliver any noticeable reduction in poverty. 
Moreover, the all-embracing private-sector rhetoric has failed to create any benefits 
for the Ghanaian private sector either: ‘He [John Agyekum Kufuor] promised his 
                                                 
215 The HIPC was first introduced in 1996. However, it failed to deliver its stated goal of provid-
ing a lasting reduction in debt burdens, and therefore it was decided to enhance the HIPC in 1999. 
Concurrently, changes in the rules were made that entitled Ghana for debt relief. A country that opts 
for HIPC has to go through two critical stages. The first is the decision point, that is, debt is deemed 
inappropriate, structural adjustment programmes have been adopted, and a Poverty Reduction Strat-
egy Paper has been prepared. The second is the completion point, that is, the agreed debt cancella-
tion takes place. The completion point is only reached if the debtor can demonstrate a track record 
of good performance. 
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 party’s wealthy patrons a golden age for business; so far mostly foreigners have 
benefited’ (Africa Confidential, 2004a).  
The business community, especially the most important business associations, 
are therefore placing increasing pressure on the NPP government to protect local 
producers against the forces of globalisation. According to the EIU (2005b), so far 
the business community have only called for minor protectionist interventions, such 
as higher duties on textile imports. Up to now the NPP government has been able to 
withstand this pressure, but its room for manoeuvre seems constrained by its rela-
tions with the IFIs. The NPP government simply cannot impose interventionist 
measures due to its dependence on the international aid community. Rather, it has 
to continue the economic liberalisation measures that began more than twenty years 
ago and which have hitherto been unable to meet the needs of the Ghanaian private 
sector. In the words of the EIU (2005a: 20): ‘In general, the Ghanaian government 
will have to demonstrate very clearly to the IMF that it is committed to carrying out 
further economic reforms, including unpopular measures such as increases to water 
and electricity tariffs, and to further improving fiscal disciplining’. 
7.2 State-business relations in Ghana 
In accordance with the outline of the theoretical framework presented in chapter 5, 
my account of institutional features is chronological in form, in order to explain 
how the characteristics of the current Ghanaian business system are shaped by de-
velopments in key institutions in society. It starts with an account of the change 
from state-led industrialisation to private sector-led development that was largely 
fuelled by the donor community. It then deals with how the combination of large-
scale corruption and brutal anti-corruption measures has affected the business 
community in Ghanaian society, and how Ghanaian government attitudes and spe-
cific policies are still having an impact on how Ghanaian businessmen perceive 
new state-led initiatives. Lastly, this section takes a quick glance at business or-
ganisations in Ghana, organisations that in theory could make up for the develop-
ments mentioned above, but which, due to a lack of legitimacy, do not play an ac-
tive role in advocating the views of the Ghanaian private sector. 
7.2.1 From parastatals to privatisation: the Ghanaian private sector under 
changing development doctrines 
Even though the history of SOEs in Africa is often portrayed as part of the history 
of the industrialisation strategies of the newly independent countries, the roots of 
SOEs often go back beyond this point to colonial times. This is also the case in 
Ghana. At independence, there were just six SOEs, namely the West African Pro-
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 duce Marketing Boards, the Industrial Development Corporation, the Cocoa Pur-
chasing Company, the Agricultural Development Corporation, Ghana Commercial 
Bank, and the Bank of Ghana.216  
However, the establishment of SOEs really took off after independence, as they 
were perceived as a crucial and necessary instrument of industrialisation (Table 
7.2). In 1965, Ghana had 47 fully state-owned enterprises. This grew by 13 percent 
in only one year to 53 state enterprises. On top of that, Ghana had 12 state/private 
sector joint ventures and 23 public boards in 1966. These SOEs constituted an 
amorphous group of companies that covered most areas of the Ghanaian economy, 
including banking and insurance, mining, transportation, construction, laundries, 
and various manufacturing industries such as bakeries, bricks and tiles, and phar-
maceuticals. However, the establishment of the SOEs was not only a matter of in-
dustrialisation: they also served as suppliers of cheap products to urban constituen-
cies. Christensen (1998: 282) also indicates that the creation of SOEs was not de-
tached from the political sphere as ‘[p]erhaps the single most important objective 
was the need to create well-paid jobs in the “modern” (i.e. non-agricultural) sector 
of the economy, especially for supporters of the ruling party’. 
Exact figures for SOEs are not easy to come by, and most authors do not cite 
their references. Moreover, they seldom define SOEs. Figures from various sources 
have been used in constructing Table 7.2. Even though the figures in this table are 
hardly reliable, one trend can be observed, namely that the number of SOEs in-
creased rapidly from independence to the beginning of the 1980s, after which it de-
creased, albeit slowly. 
However, the rather sporadic data also hide some stories. When the NLC took 
power in February 1966, it initiated negations with the IMF and the World Bank. 
The agreement between the parties stipulated that Ghana should initiate a privatisa-
tion process. As described in section 7.1.2, although the reform programme was not 
fully implemented, it did result in the dissolution of a number of SOEs, sales to the 
Ghanaian private sector of some fairly small companies (a bakery and a laundry 
among other things), and joint ventures with foreign companies, for example a tyre, 
a cement and a textile factory. However, SOEs were still regarded as a symbol of 
national sovereignty, and the sale of some SOEs to foreigners created a national 
outcry. Indeed, the privatisation process was cancelled in some cases due to the 
                                                 
216 The exact definition of what constitutes an SOE is disputed. Unless otherwise stated, SOEs 
here denote fully state-owned enterprises, joint ventures between the state and private businessmen, 
and public boards. In 1987, the Ghanaian state held a 100-percent interest in 56 percent of the 324 
SOEs, majority shares in 17 percent , and 30 to 49 percent in the rest (Appiah-Kubi, 2001: note 4). 
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 sensitive political situation surrounding the sale of SOEs to foreigners. Meanwhile, 
the NLC established five new SOEs. 
Table 7.2. SOEs in Ghana, 1957-1995 
Year 
19
57
21
7
19
65
21
8
19
66
21
9
19
80
22
0
19
83
22
1
19
83
22
2
19
87
 
19
88
22
3
19
90
22
4
19
95
 
State enterprises 4 47 53 NA 181 NA NA NA 
Joint ownership - NA 12 NA 54 345 NA 194 NA NA 
Public boards 2 NA 23 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
SOEs total 6 NA 88 280 NA NA 324 NA 329 277 
 
The PP officially continued these liberal policies, but the Busia administration 
feared provoking fierce attacks and therefore suspended the privatisation policies. 
Meanwhile, the ‘Two Year Plan’ and the ‘One Year Plan’ of 1968 and 1970 respec-
tively in many ways resembled Nkrumah’s development strategies: that is, the PP 
pursued an all-embracing industrialisation strategy based largely on SOEs. Thus, 
while PP on the one hand opted for pro-private sector policies, on the other hand it 
established a number of new SOEs, especially public boards. Among the most fa-
mous ones was the Ghana Industrial Holding Corporation (GIHOC), the biggest 
manufacturing concern in Ghana, organised as a conglomerate, and with many sub-
sidiaries organised as self-accounting limited-liability companies. 
Thus, by the beginning of the 1970s, when the NRP took power, the number of 
SOEs was probably more or less the same as in the mid-1960s.However, this 
changed soon thereafter. The first years of NRP rule show conflicting signs as re-
gards the industrialisation process: on the one hand, Acheampong demonstrated a 
willingness to reform many of the poorly performing SOEs through the establish-
ment of a Board of Government Business, which was responsible for the reform 
process that, among other things, consisted of large-scale retrenchments. On the 
                                                 
217 Figures for 1957 are contested. Appiah-Kubi (2001: 199) states that there were four SOEs by 
independence, although he actually mentions six . To make the picture even more blurred, Ag-
bodeka (1992: 146) informs us that one of the SOEs, the Industrial Development Corporation, actu-
ally took over a few industries before independence. Therefore, the figures are most probably de-
flated. 
218 These SOEs were all in the non-agricultural production sector (Frimpong-Ansah, 1991: 101). 
219 Figures for 1966 and 1987 are taken from Appiah-Kubi (2001: 199, 201). 
220 Brownbridge, Gockel et al. (2000: 133). 
221 Tangri (1991: 524). 
222 According to Hutchful (2002: 93), the number of SOEs at the beginning of ERP I was re-
counted twice, in 1987 and in 1990. The recounts revised the figure from 235 (181+54) to 345. 
223 194 entities responded to a survey that the State Enterprise Commission made in early 1988 
(Davis, 1991: 989). 
224 Figures for 1990 and 1995 are taken from White and Bhatia (1998: table 5.7). 
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 other hand, the NRP reversed the privatisation process that had been initiated by 
previous governments. Instead they created numerous new SOEs, while at the same 
time nationalising a large number of foreign companies, for instance, gold mines, 
banks, insurance companies, and aluminium and timber companies; all in the name 
of controlling the ‘commanding heights of the economy’. Related to this, the 
NRP/SMC regime aimed for self-sufficiency in a number of critical consumer 
goods. Thus, SOEs were established within the following sectors: animal feed, bev-
erages, caustic soda, edible oils, electrical appliances, fertilisers, footwear, metals, 
milk, salt, soap, sugar and textiles. The NRP/SMC regime therefore pursued a de-
velopment strategy to serve a double purpose, namely to capture economies of 
scale, and to fulfil socio-political concerns. Moreover, this strategy made it possible 
for the regime to pay off its supporters. 
Throughout the period, the SOEs were a financial burden of the economy. Many 
SOEs ran at a loss, and others were heavily dependent on imports, therefore becom-
ing a burden on government savings and the balance of trade. Meanwhile, Ghana 
lost its international creditworthiness, with the result that foreign capital could not 
compensate for the low level of savings. The SOEs were in general overstaffed, and 
management was chosen on the basis of political connections rather than manage-
rial abilities. Meanwhile, capacity utilisation fell throughout the latter half of the 
1970s, partly due to the lack of creditworthiness. However, it was not until the sec-
ond half of the NRP/SMC regime that SOE performance (as well as the economy in 
general) deteriorated markedly.225 Neither the short Rawlings interlude in 1979 nor 
the Limann administration were able to change this. In fact, it is actually more 
likely that the relationship between the SOEs and the private sector became even 
more skewed, as Rawlings’ attack on private capital (see section 7.2.2) and the 
general economic situation caused private enterprises to close down. In a similar 
vein, Limann’s Peoples National Party (PNP) followed the Nkrumah tradition and 
by not objecting to the state-led industrialisation process, thus further marginalising 
the domestic private sector.226 Therefore, by 1983, when the PNDC signed ERP I, 
the total number of SOEs exceeded, three hundred, and the private sector in Ghana 
                                                 
225 Exact figures for the deteriorating economic performance of the SOEs are unavailable, but the 
following data indicate the extent of the decline: from 1979-82 the losses of 101 SOEs increased 
from 92 million cedis to 2894 million cedis (Shaikh, 1990: 307), while net budgetary transfers to the 
SOEs amounted to approximately ten percent of annual total government expenditure from 1979 to 
1983 (Tangri, 1999: 22f).  
226 However, it should be noted that Limann passed the 1981 Investment Code, which that pre-
ceded the PNDC’s liberal Investment Code of 1985, and thus laid the basis for the opening of the 
economy. 
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 was almost non-existent227 (Appiah-Kubi, 2001; Aryeetey and Harrigan, 2000; 
Christensen, 1998; Davis, 1991; Dotse and Agbeko-Kra, 1990; Frimpong-Ansah, 
1991; Sandbrook and Oelbaum, 1997; Tangri, 1991, 1999). 
ERP I did not deal directly with the SOEs. Rather, it targetted industrial output 
as such and sought to increase capacity utilisation through the removal of produc-
tion bottlenecks. However, the sheer size of the SOE sector, as well as its poor per-
formance, was perceived ‘to be crowding out the private sector’ by both the IFIs 
and the PNDC itself. Therefore, privatisations – or divestures, as they are called in 
Ghana228 – became an essential part of ERP II. Divestures were formally initiated 
in 1987 with the establishment of the Divesture Implementation Committee (DIC), 
which was responsible for planning, monitoring, co-ordinating and evaluating all 
divestures of former SOEs. However, not all SOEs were scheduled for divesture. 
The SOE reform programme essentially distinguished between core SOEs – that is, 
companies that, ‘no matter what the circumstances’, should continue to be owned 
by the government and hence restructured rather than divested – and non-strategic 
SOEs that would be available for divesture. The first group consisted of mining, 
electricity and infrastructure companies, the second mostly of manufacturing indus-
tries. The process of deciding which companies should belong to which group took 
some time, but by 1988 the first list of SOEs for divestment was announced and in 
1989 the first divestures actually took place.229 However, in the spring of 1990 Af-
rica Confidential (1990a) could report: ‘Not a single enterprise of any significance 
has been divested’. From then on, however, more lists were drawn up (some were 
made public, while others were not), and the divestures of former SOEs were initi-
ated (Appiah-Kubi, 2001; Dotse and Agbeko-Kra, 1990; Tangri, 1991).  
Table 7.3. DIC divestures of former SOEs in Ghana, 1989-1998 
 1989-1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Total %
Sale of assets 16 4 3 30 19 18 15 7 112 53
Sale of shares 11 5 2 2 6 1 2 2 31 15
Joint ventures 6 3 1 4 0 4 1 2 21 10
Leases 3 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 6 3
Liquidations 24 2 5 5 6 0 0 0 42 20
Total divesture 60 15 11 42 31 23 19 11 212 101
Source: Appiah-Kubi (2001: table 2). 
                                                 
227 Private borrowing formed only 11 percent of domestic credit in 1983 (Brownbridge, Gockel 
et al., 2000: 135). 
228 The term ‘divestesture’ connotes various different processes, such as leasing, liquidation and 
transfer of ownership. 
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Table 7.3 presents the number of divestures completed through DIC from 1989 
to 1998. It should be noted that several other former SOEs were divested through 
other channels (mostly sector ministries), most famously the Ashanti Goldfield 
Corporation. Thus, the figures in Table 7.3 are deflated. In addition, different 
sources refer to different figures. For instance, the World Bank has estimated a fig-
ure that is five percent higher than the DIC figure (White and Bhatia, 1998: appen-
dix A). This could have accounted for former SOEs divested outside DIC, but in-
formation from the various years differs markedly.230 Thus, it seems unlikely that 
this should be the case. Instead, many SOEs were in fact conglomerates like GI-
HOC, and disagreement regarding the figures therefore probably relates to how the 
divesture of conglomerates is accounted for. 
Table 7.2 and Table 7.3 demonstrate the increasing participation of the state in 
the economy up until the late 1980s, after which the donor community forced the 
Ghanaian state to introduce an SOE reform programme. This programme initiated a 
relatively large-scale divesture process,231 which was initially slow and dominated 
by liquidations. By the mid-1990s the rate of divestures had increased, and strategic 
companies began to be included in the list of SOEs for divesture. It might be 
thought that the divesture process would open up more domestic private-sector par-
ticipation in the economy, especially because more than half of the divested enter-
prises were in the industrial sector (Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 2002: table 4). However, it 
seems that this has not been the case. 
Like other data related to the divesture process, the degree of participation of lo-
cal investors in the process is also highly contested. But most sources agree that the 
Ghanaian private sector became marginalised in this process. Referring to the initial 
phase of the divesture process, Tangri (1991: 531) argues that the Ghanaian private 
sector was unwilling to participate in the process mainly due to the low economic 
viability of the SOEs, the considerable economic difficulties facing the Ghanaian 
private sector, and the lack of confidence in the PNDC administration. These argu-
ments are reiterated by Christensen (1998), who also highlights the lack of venture 
capital available for the private sector, the lack of transparency in the divesture 
                                                                                                                                        
229 In the event, most of these companies were not actually divested. Instead, they were liqui-
dated, as they were either running with considerable deficits or proved unattractive to private inves-
tors due to their relatively small size (Hutchful, 2002: 98). 
230 White and Bhatia (1998: appendix A) provides the following divesture data: prior to 1990 (4), 
1990 (33), 1991 (13), 1992 (14), 1993 (9), 1994 (83), 1995 (24), 1996 (12). Likewise, Tangri’s data 
(1991: 527f) differ from DIC’s data. Tangri states that no SOEs were divested in 1988, a few in 
1989, and just over twenty in 1990. 
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 process, and the related suspicion that the reform programme was put together in 
such a way that it favoured the allies of the state administration. Based on this, he 
concludes that the ‘divestment programme has suffered from a lack of domestic in-
vestors’ (Christensen, 1998: 290). Eboe Hutchful (2002: 100) essentially agrees 
with this view, arguing that the ‘Ghanaian participation has been minimal. What 
participation has existed, has been confined to the lower end of the scale’. Kayizzi-
Mugerwa (2002: table 5) presents us with a slightly more nuanced picture. He 
claims that foreign sales accounted for 71 percent of the total value of divestures in 
Ghana,232 It should be noted, however, that one transaction, namely the sale of 45 
percent of the Ghanaian state’s shares in the Ashanti Goldfield Corporation in 
1994, accounts for approximately fifty percent of all sales. If the divesture of the 
Ashanti Gold Fields at the London Stock Exchange is excluded, foreign sales ac-
count for just over forty percent of Ghanaian divestures. It is likely that these three 
sources are in agreement with each other, as Ghanaian private-sector participation 
increased from the mid-1990s onwards, due especially to the implementation of the 
financial sector reform in 1990, but also because more economically viable SOEs 
were listed for divestment, and hence private capital became more interested. 
In contrast to the views presented above, Appiah-Kubi (2001: 218), using the of-
ficial figures, states that ‘[a]bout 169 transactions of the total 212 DIC divestures 
had been completed with local investors, in addition to the 20 joint ventures involv-
ing local and foreign investors’. Bearing in mind that only 212 SOEs were divested 
through DIC, of which 42 were liquidated (see Table 7.3), it seems unlikely that 
169 of the remaining 170 divestures were completed with local investors. More-
over, these figures do not take into account the joint ventures. Thus, any idea that 
there was an extreme degree of domestic participation in the divesture process be-
ing discussed here can probably be ruled out.  
7.2.2 Extensive corruption and brutal anti-corruption policies: the marginali-
sation of Ghanaian small enterprises 
Since Kufuor took office in Ghana at the turn of this century, he has declared a pol-
icy of ‘zero tolerance for corruption’ and promised to run a clean government by 
establishing ethical codes of conduct; also, his government has enhanced the capac-
ity of the courts to pursue the anti-corruption strategy, especially through the estab-
lishment of the computerised fast track courts. Whether or not Kufuor has fulfilled 
                                                                                                                                        
231 In SSA, the total value of the divestures in Ghana (1988-96) has only been exceeded by South 
Africa. The value of the divestures in Ghana adds up to one-sixth of the value of divestures in SSA 
(White and Bhatia, 1998: 71). 
232 This figure includes divestures conducted by DIC as well as divestures outside DIC. More-
over, it relates to the period from 1987 to 1997. 
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 his promises is unclear: while in office he has jailed a serving minister on charges 
of corruption; openness towards the media has increased; a Public Procurement 
Act, largely funded by donors, has been passed; and according to the EIU (2005b: 
15), there ’have been no serious incidents of corruption surrounding him prior to 
taking office’. By contrast, several recent studies suggest that corruption in Ghana 
is endemic and perhaps on the increase: Ghana scored 3.6 in Transparency Interna-
tional’s ‘Corruption Perceptions Index 2004’,233 only a slight improvement over the 
3.3 scored in 2003, but still lower than the 3.9 scored in 2002. This indicates first, 
that only a little has changed recently, and secondly, that there is still a long way to 
go to combat corruption fully. More importantly, however, the score is only slightly 
better than the 1999 score of 3.3, when Rawlings was in office (Takyi-Boadu, 
2005). Similarly, local survey reports from Ghana indicate that approximately 75 
percent of the Ghanaian population perceive corruption to be on the increase (EIU, 
2005b). Moreover, occasional headlines, such as ‘Chop chop at SMA?’234 (claim-
ing large-scale corruption and misappropriation at Sunyani Municipal Assembly) 
and ‘“Grab and chop” at Ghana Water Company (reporting considerable corruption 
relating to tenders in the Water Company, as well as in the Community Water and 
Sanitation Department), also suggest that full-scale anti-corruption policies have 
yet to materialise (Gyebi, 2004; Ohene, 2002). Lately, Kufuor himself has been ac-
cused of corruption in respect of the purchase of a hotel opposite his home (Africa 
Confidential, 2005b). 
Alongside the consensus that the private sector should to generate economic 
growth while the state should play its designated role in enabling an efficient and 
reliable market economy and simultaneously ensuring that the benefits of the eco-
nomic growth are distributed among the population (cf. section 1.1.2), there is gen-
eral agreement that large-scale corruption slows down investments and restricts the 
productive private sector’s room for manoeuvre.  
In this section, I argue that corruption in Ghana is by no means a new phenome-
non. Rather, it has been an integral part of economic activities in the country, espe-
cially since the 1970s. Moreover, and more importantly, I suggest that both corrup-
tion and the brutal fight against it observed in Ghana have made the Ghanaian pri-
vate sector unproductive and ineffective while simultaneously forcing affluent, 
                                                 
233 The Corruption Perception Index reflects the perceptions of business people and country ana-
lysts, both resident and non-resident, of the level of corruption in a country (corruption here only re-
fers to corruption in the public sector and is defined as the abuse of public office for private gain). 
The score ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt). For further information regard-
ing the index, see http://www.transparency.org/cpi/2004/cpi2004.en.html#cpi2004. 
234 Normally, corruption in Ghana is understood in terms of consumption, or in everyday par-
lance, of ‘chopping’. “Consuming the goods of the state is likened to eating voraciously and conse-
quently becoming literally or figuratively fat” (Hasty, 2005: 275). 
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 well-established (and corrupt) businessmen out of the country. Moreover, it has 
been a major reason why the antagonistic relationship between the state and the 
private sector has not changed markedly during the past two decades (cf. section 
7.2.3). To begin with, the Ghanaian economy as a whole was negatively affected by 
corruption, as described in section 7.1.2. Moreover, with the liberalisation of the 
Ghanaian economy at the beginning of the 1980s, a large proportion of the domes-
tic private sector (as well as the SOEs) had carried out virtually no production for 
years. Thus, the competition from imported goods became fiercer than would have 
been the case had the productive sectors actually continued producing. Conse-
quently, Ghana currently lacks entrepreneurial capacity and private-sector role 
models. 
In direct relation to the increased participation of the state in the economy during 
the 1970s, large–scale corruption also increased. Corruption became so fierce that a 
new word, kalabule, entered the Ghanaian vocabulary. Kalabule probably derives 
from the Hausan ‘kara bude’, literally ‘keep it quiet’ or ‘hide it’ (Frimpong-Ansah, 
1991: 116), and referring to ‘profiteering, either by manipulation of the state ma-
chinery or merely by evasion of official controls’ (Nugent, 1995: 27). It thus de-
noted corruption, hoarding and ruthless profiteering. All entrepreneurial activity in 
this period was increasingly associated with kalabule activities and regarded as un-
derhand and parasitic.235 Referring to her field notes from the end of the 1970s, 
Lynne Brydon states: ‘This was also an era when the basis for giving out govern-
ment contracts was at its most blatantly corrupt. It was widely rumoured and be-
lieved that in order to secure a contract for work a bribe had to be given and often 
the cost of the bribe was such that the contract could not be fulfilled’ (Brydon, 
1999: 368). 
During the NRP-SMC regime in the 1970s corruption increased steadily, and by 
the time Rawlings took power the first time, kalabule was everywhere – in both 
public as well as private spheres. In order to conduct his ‘house-cleaning exercise’ 
to eliminate kalabule, Rawlings established a ‘People’s Court’ that scrutinised the 
activities of senior government officials as well as private businessmen. A number 
of people were imprisoned, and still more had to refund large sums of money that 
had supposedly been obtained by fraud. A number of small private Ghanaian-
owned manufacturing firms were confiscated on the grounds of kalabule, and nu-
merous businessmen were interrogated (Agyeman 2003). The most famous single 
action during AFRC’s three-month reign was the burning to the ground of Makola 
No. 1 market, which had been the centre of commercial activity in Accra for half a 
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 century, and its subsequent replacement by a car park. The burning down of Ma-
kola No. 1 was not necessarily an indication of Rawlings’ perception of the private 
sector as such, but it might be interpreted in the same way as the killings of the 
former heads of state, namely it was undertaken to demonstrate that fraud and mal-
practice would be forcefully dealt with. No matter what the real magnitude of at-
tacks on private capital had been, the burning of Makola No. 1 remains imprinted in 
most businessmen’s minds today, including those who have taken part in the 
Danida PSDP. In direct relation to the house-cleaning exercise, AFRC declared that 
‘it would conduct unannounced searches of traders and stated that if any were 
found with hoarded goods they would be “taken away to be shot by firing squad”’ 
(Herbst, 1993: 26).236  
Rawlings’ campaigns did not end corruption. Even though Limann’s PNP was 
under constant surveillance from Rawlings, all accounts mention an increase in cor-
ruption, both in the state apparatus and among businessmen, during the PNP era. 
Meanwhile the economy deteriorated, and only private businessmen who were able 
exploit this downturn, for instance, through exploitation of the difference between 
the official exchange rate and black market rates, made a profit. 
When PNDC took power on New Year’s Eve 1981, it re-launched AFRC’s at-
tack on kalabule activities, initiating intensive interrogations, searches, punish-
ments and arrests of private businessmen. These attacks were most intense in the 
first years of its regime. The following quote from one of the PNDC members in 
the People’s Daily Graphic for 26 January 1983 informs us that they continued 
well into 1983, at least: ‘we have already set up institutions that are slowly but 
surely and painstakingly smoking out all the big-time frauds. But we need to re-
mind ourselves that the counter-revolutionary activities of our small-scale traders 
are also not just mere inconveniences’237. There are indications, however, that the 
attacks continued up until the elections in 1992, as the cases of the arrest of the 
owner of International Tobacco Ghana and the seizure of a large-scale pharmaceu-
tical factory by the military shows (Africa Confidential, 1992). Africa Confidential 
(1998b) also reports that Rawlings reintroduced his war against corruption by let-
ting the police general in Accra evict hundreds of street hawkers.238
                                                                                                                                        
235 According to Jeffries (1982: note 1), the term kalabule was coined in 1974. The creation of a 
new term indicates the magnitude of corrupt activities in Ghana.  
236 The quotation is from the Ghanaian Times for 12 June 1979. 
237 Quoted from Nugent (1995: 111). 
238 When hearing these stories, one should bear the following quote in mind: ‘It is well known, 
or at least should be, that the London-based media dealing with Ghana are heavily manned by Gha-
naian political exiles seeking every opportunity to present the PNDC regime in the worst possible 
light’ (Jeffries, 1992: 208). 
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 The fierce attacks on private capital in the months after Rawlings took power for 
the second time were largely carried out by workers, who, under the PNDC’s lead-
ership, attacked ‘the imperialists and their internal collaborators’ (Ninsin, 1989: 
30). The workers concentrated their attacks on individual factories, enterprises and 
offices, the official being to expose their alleged corruption and mismanagement. 
The workers dismissed the management or seized goods diverted into the wrong 
channels and sold them at the official price. Private capital in general, and kalabule 
activities in particular, were perceived as the main cause of the economic decline 
that Ghana had been experiencing since the beginning of the 1960s: ‘Across the 
country, “big men” who had grown up used to flaunting their wealth woke up to 
discover that conspicuous consumption attracted hostile scrutiny rather than admi-
ration’ (Nugent, 1995: 58). 
There is hardly any doubt that Rawlings’ accusations had solid foundations: 
kalabule was certainly widespread among Ghanaian businessmen in the 1970s. In-
deed, it was all over the place, among senior government officials as well as small-
scale entrepreneurs. Certainly, these activities had to be stopped in order to restart 
the economy. However, the unprecedentedly high-level of brutality in Ghanaian 
politics that was associated with the burning down of Makola No.1 and the subse-
quent public punishment of small-scale traders and manufacturers may have im-
peded the development of a dynamic private sector. The most affluent and best es-
tablished businessmen fled Ghana when Rawlings took power for the second time, 
but small-scale entrepreneurs and street hawkers were seldom able to migrate.  
Fleeing Ghanaians often blame the military government for the abuses of human 
rights and the sometimes random attacks on private enterprises. Undoubtedly, these 
allegations contain some truth; human rights abuses, as well as random attacks by 
PNDC factions, have frequently been reported. However, one has to view the full 
picture. The motives for the flight of entrepreneurs were probably not entirely po-
litical but also pragmatic – many businessmen migrated because of the economic 
climate they expected to develop under a military regime. As pointed out in Africa 
Confidential, a number of well-established entrepreneurs actually considered re-
turning to Ghana in mid-1984 because multinational oil companies expected to be 
able to explore oil reserves in Ghana. The PNDC’s attitude towards private enter-
prises therefore did not worry them (Africa Confidential, 1984b). 
7.2.3 Ghanaian politics and the private sector: constraints on development 
According to Tangri (1999: 14), African states have always seen an independent 
indigenous private sector as a potential political force capable of overthrowing the 
existing regime. Of course, given the influence of the IFIs, this has changed to 
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 some extent, as the IFIs see the private sector as the engine of growth. In Ghana, 
however, close collaboration with the IMF and the World Bank in the 1980s did not 
fundamentally change Rawlings’ perception of the private sector. Thus, in June 
1993, after a decade of structural adjustment programmes, and only half a year after 
he was elected as the president of the fourth republic, Rawlings urged people not to 
buy goods from certain local businesses, as he maintained that they were using their 
profit to support opposition parties. Concurrently, the NDC administration estab-
lished the Confederation of Indigenous Business Associations (CIBA), which was 
composed of politically acceptable business partners, that is, partners that did not 
support the opposition parties in the 1992 elections (Tangri, 1999: 78, 93). Thus, on 
the one hand, in line with its stated objectives, the NDC administration sought to 
establish a closer relationship with the private sector by sponsoring an umbrella or-
ganisation. On the other hand, it favoured certain entrepreneurs who were closely 
associated with the government and tried to force others out of business.239  
The harassment of businessmen, hostility towards the domestic private sector, 
and the lack of transparent policies are not exclusively confined to the Rawlings 
era. Rather, they have been the rule in respect of government attitudes towards the 
private sector in Ghana since independence. This section scrutinises the relation-
ship between these two spheres. It argues that, due to the magnitude and longevity 
of these policies, new government initiatives aimed at increasing the Ghanaian pri-
vate sector’s room for manoeuvre are being met with scepticism, even though the 
current NPP administration is renowned for it pro-business policies.  
Soon after Nkrumah came to power in 1957, a fierce attack on private capital 
was launched. During the first years of independence a large number of MPs actu-
ally were private businessmen. Nkrumah initially pursued a policy of a mixed 
economy, in which he encouraged private participation, but he soon changed his 
mind, drawing up a gigantic state-led development plan that focused on education, 
health, infrastructure, energy and industries. The main intention was to break the 
near-monopoly of foreign companies, but private Ghanaian businessmen were 
squeezed out too. With the development plan, private entrepreneurs in Parliament 
were kept away from influence, and after the presidential elections of 1960 they 
were practically out of positions of influence. Businessmen were thus effectively 
kept out of politics.  
                                                 
239 In theory, CIBA was supposed to represent small entrepreneurs before governmental agen-
cies, but in reality, it seems to have been merely an instrument of the NDC’s patronage: ‘The CIBA 
appears to have acted as a major conduit of NDC patronage, notably by providing pay-offs to the 
leaders and employees of those associated organisations…’ (Sandbrook and Oelbaum, 1997: 625). 
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 With the exception of the Busia regime (1969-72), subsequent governments in 
Ghana continued to keep businessmen effectively out of politics (Asante and Addo, 
1997).240 In the first year of the Busia regime, two important laws for the Ghanaian 
private sector were passed, the Aliens Compliance Order and the Ghanaian Busi-
ness Promotion Act.241 Both aimed to increase the ‘Ghanaianisation’ of the Ghana-
ian economy by preserving major industries for Ghanaians only and expelling 
aliens respectively. Moreover, the PP government established the Small Business 
Credit Scheme, which was aimed directly at Ghanaian manufacturing enterprises 
(Buame, 1996). 
The Aliens Compliance Order, which was issued on 18 November 1969, gave 
foreigners without a residence permit two weeks to leave Ghana. It resulted in the 
expulsion of over 100,000 people in a period of approximately two weeks,242 The 
official reason for the passing of the Order was that most ‘undesirable persons’, in-
cluding criminals, were foreigners (Schildkrout, 1970: 269). However, the real 
cause should probably be sought in the economic problems that were facing Ghana 
in the 1960s.243 There were many unemployed, ‘aspiring businessmen found that 
Nigerians, Lebanese and Indians were established in many of the best locations and 
were often more successful in getting import licences than local people’ (Peil, 
1974: 368). This dissatisfaction soon spread and eventually resulted in the passing 
of a law that in reality only applied to the self-employed, as the government en-
couraged public-sector employees, people employed in formal private corporations, 
the mines, the docks, the cocoa farms etc. to stay in Ghana (Peil, 1971: 226).244 As 
a result of the many foreigners, especially traders, who were forced out of the coun-
try, Ghanaians took over numerous market stalls and some small businesses. Unfor-
                                                 
240 Some authors claim that the NLC regime pursued pro-private sector development, as it initi-
ated the ‘Ghanaianisation’ policies that reserved some economic activities for enterprises owned or 
controlled by Ghanaians. However, it seems more likely that these policies had other aims than 
helping the domestic private sector. As one member of the NLC executive council put it, ‘It is no 
secret that this legislation was directed against the Lebanese and the Indians’ (quoted from Rimmer 
(1992: 126)). Moreover, similar policies were adopted elsewhere in SSA, that is, not to promote 
businesses but to increase the ‘national’ share of the economy.  
241 The Ghanaian Business Promotion Act in effect enforced the Ghanaian Enterprise Decree of 
1968. 
242 The exact figure is unclear: Peil (1971: 206) states that more than 100,000 aliens were ex-
pelled, Rimmer (1992: 126) 150,000, and Peil (1974: 367) approximately 200,000. 
243 Three aspects are important to bear in mind with respect to the Compliance Order. First, it re-
lated to all foreigners in Ghana, that is, Togolese, Upper Voltans and Nigerians (the largest three 
foreign nationalities in Ghana at the time), as well as Gaos from Mali, Lebanese, Indians etc. Sec-
ondly, things quickly quietened down again, and many ‘aliens’ were able to stay in Ghana by hiding 
or by bribing the right people. Thirdly, many foreign investors were not expelled but simply chose 
to sell their interests after the expiry of tax concessions because of the deepening economic crisis 
(Adei, 1990; Peil, 1971, 1974). 
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 tunately, the Order did not lower unemployment significantly: outside Accra many 
stores remained closed, the new Ghanaian owners having neither the capital nor the 
networks of the former ‘alien’ owners, and thus they had difficulty in importing 
goods; also, while business-owners had been expelled, so had customers (Peil, 
1971, 1974).  
In the late 1960s, the private sector in Ghana was skewed in the sense that cer-
tain groups controlled a large proportion of activities in certain sectors. In order to 
change the situation, the PP government led by Busia passed the Ghanaian Busi-
ness Promotion Act approximately half a year after the Compliance Order had been 
passed. The Act gave foreign small businessmen (wholesale and retail traders with 
sales of less than N¢ 500,000 in the 1967-68 tax year, and anybody dealing in 
commercial transport by land, printing, beauty culture, baking, advertising and pub-
licity, and the manufacture of cement blocks) two months to close their businesses 
or sell out to Ghanaians. The Act also prohibited foreigners from trading in the 
markets or from kiosks or from hawking. Thus, the law affected the Lebanese, Syr-
ian and Indian communities that owned small businesses, as well as the numerous 
Africans from neighbouring countries who were engaged in trading. However, the 
Lebanese and the Nigerians comprised the largest groupings in small-scale business 
and trading respectively, and therefore it is fair to say that this ‘Ghanaianisation’ 
policy was not directed at all foreigners, but mainly at the Lebanese and the Nigeri-
ans present in the Ghanaian private sector245 (Ofosu-Amaah, 1974).  
Relations between the state and business returned to ‘normal’ during the course 
of the military regime of Acheampong and, after 1978, Akuffo: that is, private 
businessmen were kept away from influence, and most economic policies adopted 
in Ghana were hostile to the private sector. However, in his first couple of years, 
Acheampong largely continued Busia’s policies towards the Ghanaian private sec-
tor, including those adopted in the Business Promotion Act of 1970 (Acheampong, 
1973).  
In 1975, a Nationalisation Decree was issued. This stipulated the minimum level 
of Ghanaian holdings in the banking, mining and timber-sectors and the large-scale 
manufacturing industries. However, private Ghanaian businessmen were effectively 
                                                                                                                                        
244 A residence permit, and thus authorization to stay in Ghana, could be obtained by showing a 
tax-clearance certificate. In the months following the announcement of the law, the tax authorities 
experienced a great rush of people wishing to pay taxes (Peil, 1971: 228). 
245 The true impact of these ‘Ghanaianisation’ policies, however, is unclear. Most authors con-
firm that they were intended to prohibit foreign firms from operating in certain sectors of the econ-
omy. However, Kennedy (1994: 202) argues that most often they failed to dislodge foreign firms 
from their designated activities because they were used by the ruling group to establish themselves 
as sleeping partners in Asian or Levantine businesses. In Ghana, government leaders thus secretly 
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 kept out of these sectors due to the high amounts of capital needed. It is therefore 
not surprising that the SMC passed an Investment Decree in 1977 that set the level 
of public shareholding in all large-scale businesses of national interest, such as tim-
ber, minerals and basic necessities such as fertilisers, soap etc. Moreover, as Rim-
mer (1992) reminds us, in order to compensate for the revaluation of the cedi, 
Acheampong was forced to re-introduce import licences. These licences were the 
mainstay of the increasing corruption of society (cf. section 7.2.2), but they were 
also of importance for the relationship between the state and business, since they 
effectively squeezed out local small- and medium scale entrepreneurs altogether 
and pushed the economy away from productive activities into more speculative 
ones. Most manufacturing industries during this period were merely fronts for ob-
taining import licences. Machines stood idle, and nothing was produced. The prem-
ises were used as warehouses for imported goods (Agyeman, 2003). Thus, even 
though on the surface the NRP-SMC pursued pro-private sector policies, in reality 
a large proportion of the domestic private sector was being squeezed out by unfair 
competition from subsidised parastatals and the increasing levels of corruption.  
As shown in section 7.2.2, Rawlings’ first and second comings were both char-
acterised by a pronounced anti-capitalist rhetoric. Thus, even though Rawlings was 
soon being pressed by the international donor community to moderate his anti-
business rhetoric and officially recognise the private sector as an ‘engine of 
growth’, ‘[b]usiness people continued to bemoan the stigma attached to private 
profit and entrepreneurship by various PNDC leaders, and objected to being pub-
licly reviled as exploiters’ (Tangri, 1992: 99). Moreover, the PNDC continued de-
taining both domestic and non-African entrepreneurs without formal charges long 
after the initial ‘cleaning exercise’ had come to an end, and members of the PNDC 
regime continued to question the morality of Ghanaian businessmen throughout the 
1980s (Tangri, 1999). 
In accordance with the ERPs, the Ghanaian state withdrew from certain areas of 
the economy in order for the private sector to take over. Pulling itself out of key 
sectors of the economy, however, took the state almost a decade. In a similar vein, 
the PNDC established the National Board for Small Scale Industries in the light of 
the essential role played by micro- and small enterprises in Ghana. Its role was to 
promote industrialisation through small-scale operations initiated by a special en-
trepreneurship development programme. Thus, officially the state-business rela-
tionship changed in 1983. In reality, however, it worsened, at least until the begin-
ning of the 1990s. 
                                                                                                                                        
encouraged Asian and Levantine businesses, even while making strongly anti-imperialist speeches 
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 For a long time the PNDC regime faced difficulties in convincing private inves-
tors that it was serious about reforming the economy. Even though it pursued lib-
eral economic policies, it failed to encourage private businessmen to invest suffi-
ciently. All previous governments in Ghana had made similar statements about 
their intentions to reform the economy, and liberal economic policies had also been 
adopted before. Moreover, on several occasions Rawlings attacked foreign inves-
tors for their ‘neo-colonial’ attitudes (Africa Confidential, 1990a, 1990b; Herbst, 
1993; Jeffries and Thomas, 1993).  
The stressed relationship between business and the Ghanaian state continued 
throughout the PNDC era. Thus, in the campaign for the 1992 elections, business-
men were warned not to have any contact with the opposition. Moreover, rumours 
indicate that government contracts were given on the grounds of political affilia-
tions, practically ensuring that disadvantaged businessmen would openly support 
the opposition (Jeffries and Thomas, 1993).  
Following the democratic elections of 1992, the relationship became less tense. 
The NDC was eager to convince both the domestic private sector and potential for-
eign investors that the government was indeed in favour of private-sector develop-
ment. It therefore took a tough line in bargaining for a minimum wage and adopted 
a liberal fiscal policy (Africa Confidential, 1993). However, even though in theory 
the return of democracy made it possible for exiles to return to Ghana, in reality 
many refugees felt safer abroad, because the new democratic government resem-
bled the previous military regime in all fundamental respects. 
The Fourth Republic headed by Rawlings launched Ghana’s Accelerated 
Growth Strategy in 1994. This strategy aimed at making the private sector a dy-
namic partner of the government’s in the development process. Rawlings appar-
ently managed to convince parts of the business community that his policies were 
indeed pro-private sector in as much as important financiers for the 1996 election 
campaign came from the private sector. As Africa Confidential remarked just be-
fore the elections: ‘Rawlings no longer denounces business as a whole but saves his 
rhetoric for unpatriotic (meaning opposition) business people’ (Africa Confidential, 
1996: 5). 
Meanwhile a new business class emerged, consisting of expatriate Ghanaians 
investing in enterprise and real estate,246 but the Ghanaian economy was still highly 
vulnerable to shocks, levels of corruption continued to increase, and economic 
                                                                                                                                        
condemning the presence of foreigners in the national economy. 
246 It is estimated that Ghanaians in the US send US$ 250-350 million per year back to Ghana. 
The Ghanaian house-building industry in particular depends on these remittances. Likewise Ghana-
ians staying in London spend a large proportion of their income on building houses back in Ghana 
(Peil, 1995b: 359ff). 
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 growth never really took off. Moreover, the actions taken by Rawlings still remain 
deeply imprinted in the memories of local entrepreneurs. They still affect the rela-
tionship between the state and private enterprises, and even though the government 
changed in 2001, entrepreneurs are still suspicious about the real aims of new state-
led initiatives. They simply do not believe that the state can benefit the private sec-
tor as such (Agyeman, 2003; Asante, Nixson et al., 2000; Djelic, 2004; Hutchful, 
2002; Kraus, 2002; Kuada, 1994; Nugent, 1995; Tangri, 1992).  
There are some signs that the relationship between the NDC and the private sec-
tor improved in the last years of the Rawlings era. In collaboration with the Ghana 
Investment Promotion Centre (GIPC), for instance, the NDC planned a Home 
Coming Summit for Ghanaians living abroad. Since a large fraction of the Ghana-
ian diaspora actually fled Ghana during the Rawlings era, this summit can be seen 
as Rawlings’ way of inviting these people back to Ghana. However, the NDC lost 
the elections in 2000 and the summit was cancelled.  
Nonetheless in 2001 the NPP took up the idea. As part of its strategy to boost the 
Ghanaian economy, the NPP government has been looking outside the country. Of-
ficially, 2½ million Ghanaians, but probably more likely 3 million, live outside 
Ghana, mostly in the United States, Canada, Europe (especially the UK) and other 
parts of Africa. Kufuor and his economic team, especially Yaw Osafo-Maafo, the 
Minister of Finance and Economic Planning,247 have recognised that Ghanaians liv-
ing abroad represent a huge investment potential.248 Therefore, the Government of 
Ghana finally sponsored the three-day Home Coming Summit at GIPC in July 
2001. The main aim of the Summit was to enhance the dialogue between the Gha-
naian diaspora and the Government of Ghana and thus improve investment poten-
tials in Ghana. The Summit resulted in the establishment of a National Economic 
Dialogue to give voice to the views of Ghanaian businessmen in both Ghana and 
abroad as regards national economic policies. Moreover, it led to the passage of a 
law enabling Ghanaians living abroad to obtain dual citizenship. By giving the di-
aspora a say in political matters, the NPP government hopes that the many Ghana-
ian businessmen living outside Ghana will make long-term investments in the 
country (Africa Confidential, 2004b; EIU, 2005b; West Africa, 2001, 2002). 
                                                 
247 Until recently, Dr Paa Kwesi Nduom was also part of this team as the Minister of Economic 
Planning and Regional Planning. In April 2003, however, Kufuor reshuffled his cabinet and Nduom 
became the Minister of Energy. Similarly, Kwamena Bartels was appointed Minister of Private Sec-
tor Development. Previously, he had been Minister of Works and Housing. 
248 Remittances have risen sixfold during the NPP administration (Africa Confidential, 2004b). 
However, part of the increase is probably due to better statistics and the lower costs of money trans-
fers (EIU, 2005b). 
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 When the NPP government came to power in 2001, it continued and expanded 
the focus of former regimes on the private sector as an engine of growth. President 
Kufuor has even dubbed his presidency ‘the Golden Age of Business’. Specifically, 
the government seeks to create ‘an enabling environment for improved private sec-
tor-led agro-based industrial production propelled by the application of science and 
technology’ (Government of Ghana, 2003a: iii). Central to its development strate-
gies are the Coordinated Programme for Economic and Social Development and 
the GPRS. Recently, the government published its National Medium Term Private 
Sector Development Strategy 2004-2008, outlining the strategies that the NPP gov-
ernment wants to pursue in order to reach its goal, that is, to reach an eight percent 
annual growth rate (Government of Ghana, 2003b: 13). These three central devel-
opment strategies envisage a special role for the private sector as the engine of 
growth leading the country towards poverty reduction. In this process, the govern-
ment perceives its role as a development partner and a provider of assistance, that 
is, to create a well-functioning market in which the private sector can thrive 
(Government of Ghana, 2003a; Government of Ghana, 2003b: 31). In order to 
reach these goals, the government has set up a special Ministry for Private Sector 
Development and introduced the President’s Special Initiatives (PSI) to boost non-
traditional export commodities under the auspices of the Ministry of Trade, Indus-
try and Special Presidential Initiatives (MOTI). These ministers, like many other 
ministers in the Kufuor government, themselves have prior personal experience of 
the private sector.249
The idea behind the PSI is of a public-private sector partnership programme de-
signed to put the NPP government’s export-led growth strategy into practice. The 
idea is to create four pillars of growth: textiles and garments, industrial salt, palm 
oil and cassava starch. These pillars all are based on Ghanaian resources; they are 
perceived as having a strong potential for employment generation, as they typically 
apply labour-intensive technologies, as well as having strong linkages both forward 
and backward; and they are perceived as having a growing export market.250 
Within each of the four pillars, selected entrepreneurs are offered training, and ter-
tiary training facilities for their workforce are provided. Inputs are also provided, 
credit facilities developed, and products certified. In essence, therefore, the PSI is 
intended to develop new pillars of growth for the Ghanaian economy by accelerat-
                                                 
249 Mr Kyerematen of MOTI is a former senior executive in one of the largest TNCs in Ghana, 
and he was also responsible for establishing EMPRETEC in Ghana. Similarly, Mr Bartels of the 
Ministry of Private Sector Development has prior experience as a professional lawyer. John A. Ku-
fuor is himself a Kumasi-based lawyer and businessman. 
250 MOTI plans to expand the PSI to cover also cocoa-processing, sorghum, groundnut oil, cot-
ton, fruits, vegetables and crafts. 
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 ing the development of selected products into leading export earners, thus generat-
ing employment and eradicating poverty through the creation of wealth, particu-
larly in rural communities. It is, however, still uncertain whether or not the PSI has 
succeeded in boosting exports for any of these products. According to the director 
of the Policy, Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Division of MOTI, the results 
still have to be seen. The PSIs have experienced setbacks partly due to poor infra-
structure and partly because of opposition from the private sector (Amoako, 2003). 
Likewise, Africa Confidential concluded, just after the 2004 elections, that the PSIs 
‘have become victims of bureaucracy, chieftancy and land disputes or of worker 
agitation’ (Africa Confidential, 2004c). Thus, these much publicised Initiatives 
have probably yet to materialise. 
As far as small enterprises are concerned, a directorate has been established 
within MOTI to cater for their specific needs. Among the initiatives are support for 
business associations, credit schemes, and the establishment of flagship enterprises 
in rural communities. However, the positive effects of these initiatives and the all-
embracing private-sector rhetoric are apparently having difficulties in coming to 
fruition in Ghana. In June 2005, peer review reports for the first two African coun-
tries (Rwanda and Ghana) were presented at the African Peer Review Forum organ-
ised by the secretariat of the African Union’s New Partnership for Africa’s Devel-
opment. According to Africa Confidential (2005a), the report criticised the Ghana-
ian government for promoting private-sector development before completing pub-
lic-sector reforms. The lack of public-sector reforms is seen to be behind the slow 
start-up of investments, both domestic and foreign. 
7.2.4 Business organisations in Ghana: no real challenger to the state 
The role of business organisations in Ghana, as elsewhere, is to promote the views 
of the private sector vis-à-vis the state that sets the rules of the game. As pointed 
out in the preceding section, some Ghanaian business organisations have been es-
tablished by the government, but they were never regarded as being free. Instead, 
they were established in order to create patron-client relationships in the private 
sector. The Private Sector Advisory Group is an example of this sort of relation-
ship. It was established by the NDC with the stated purpose of consulting the pri-
vate sector in important matters, such as changes in the investment code and the re-
view of laws regarding the private sector. However, its members were handpicked 
by the government. In other words, the majority of these business organisations 
were never meant to be the voice of the entire private sector, but only a selected 
part of it. 
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 Lately, the role of business organisations has changed. As pointed out above, the 
current government in Ghana is indeed pro-private sector, and even though results 
have been meagre in certain areas like investments and the combating of corrup-
tion, at least no incidents of private-sector harassment have been reported. Quite the 
reverse, at least on paper the NPP government is trying to establish a consensus on 
its economic policy among important stakeholders in the private sector.  
The most important player for the Ghanaian private sector is the Private Enter-
prise Foundation (PEF), an umbrella body established by the NDC government in 
the context of Ghana’s Accelerated Growth Strategy in 1994. In theory, the PEF 
organises all private enterprises apart from the logging industry and the agricultural 
sector, but in practice non-African Ghanaians are excluded, as they tend to organise 
in other associations. Furthermore, only enterprises in the major cities in the south 
are represented, and the PEF’s advocacy role is still limited because advocacy is a 
recent phenomenon and the PEF has not yet been allowed an active role in formu-
lating policies (Agyeman, 2003).  
However, the PEF has been successful in bringing together various selected pri-
vate-sector stakeholders with representatives of the state. Lately it has launched a 
National Economic Dialogue in order to create a shared vision on issues such as the 
role of government, the responsibilities of ministries, departments, agencies and lo-
cal authorities, and the roles of workers associations and civil society, including tra-
ditional authorities, civil groups and ordinary citizens.  
The PEF is not, of course, the only business organisation in Ghana. Actually a 
survey captured 1824 such organisations in Ghana in 2003 (PEF, 2003). Many have 
existed for quite some time, but they have never come to constitute any real power 
vis-à-vis the state, as most of them have neither branches nor funding. This rela-
tively high figure therefore does not indicate a high level of activity, whether 
among the organisations themselves or among the members. Actually, most busi-
ness organisations in Ghana, including the most important ones, like the AGI, the 
Ghana National Chamber of Commerce and Industry (GNCCI), the Federation of 
Associations of Ghanaian Exporters and the Association of Small-Scale Industries, 
lack member support. Their databases include a relatively high number of mem-
bers, but only a few pay membership fees.251 This is increasingly seen as a problem 
of legitimacy. In the words of the director of policy and communication in the AGI: 
‘The small and declining number [of members] constitutes a real problem for AGI 
vis-à-vis the government as AGI only speaks for a small percentage of all manufac-
turing companies in the country’ (Kosiba, 2003). 
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 Besides the dwindling membership of the major business associations in Ghana 
and the total lack of real content in most of the smaller associations, the private sec-
tor, and especially the PEF, is facing another big problem: in order to maintain le-
gitimacy in relation to their members (and to the donor community that supports 
these organisations financially), every business organisation needs its own distinct 
objective, as well as its own distinct programmes. The AGI naturally caters to its 
own members, that is, manufacturing industries in Ghana. With financial support 
from the PSDP, it has created a Business Development Centre, which is thought to 
provide business services to the private sector. Unfortunately, since the Ghanaian 
private sector cannot afford to pay the fees for these services, the centre is practi-
cally dormant (Kosiba, 2003). Likewise, the GNCCI has its own agenda: even 
though formally it includes manufacturing industries like the AGI, in reality it is an 
organisation for trade and commerce. A major concern for the GNCCI is the liber-
alisation of the economy. On the one hand, the GNCCI by definition advocates free 
trade. On the other hand, its members are concerned about the large and increasing 
importation of goods from China (Addo, 2003).  
Summing up, the Ghanaian private sector is fragmented and speaks with numer-
ous voices: numerous business organisations are seeking to provide for the needs of 
the sector, but in general these organisations lack either financial resources or a 
broad-based membership, while the larger business organisations, united under the 
umbrella of the PEF, sustain their own advocacy programmes either because they 
do not agree with the strategy of the PEF, or because they feel obliged to pursue 
contrary policies by their own constituencies.  
7.3 Capital formation 
The Ghanaian capital market is essentially dual. Formal structures exist, including 
the stock market, banks and non-bank financial institutions, but only a minority of 
private enterprises in Ghana have any access to them. The large majority of enter-
prises, including most of the Ghanaian-owned small enterprises, are in reality ex-
cluded from this capital market. They have to rely instead on access to capital from 
informal sources, like rotating savings and credit associations, professional money-
lenders, family and friends. These sources are known as susu. This section will de-
scribe further the Ghanaian credit market and its implications for private enterprises 
in Ghana.  
                                                                                                                                        
251 The AGI for instance, had less than 300 and GNCCI approximately 500 paying members in 
2003 (Addo, 2003; Kosiba, 2003).  
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 This section argues that the nature of the financial market tends to restrict the 
growth of small enterprises in Ghana. Small enterprises are excluded from the for-
mal banking system as they are not perceived as being either profitable or in a posi-
tion to comply with the rules. Although they do have access to the informal capital 
market, either the loans offered in this sector are too small or the interest rate too 
high.  
7.3.1 Formal banks 
In July 1989, the Ghana Stock Exchange was set up to help Ghanaian companies 
obtain long-term capital. Moreover, it also gave the government an opportunity to 
boost the divestures of SOEs, as the Stock Exchange could generate domestic capi-
tal for these. The Stock Exchange was formerly inaugurated in November 1990, 
and three years later, in June 1993, it was opened for investments to both non-
resident Ghanaians and foreigners. The vast majority of Ghanaian enterprises, how-
ever, cannot comply with the rules and regulations. Moreover, liquidity on the Ex-
change is low, and the Ghanaian market small. Therefore, a mere 25 companies are 
listed on the Exchange fourteen years after its inauguration. Most of these compa-
nies are in manufacturing, financial services and beverages. These sectors only 
dominate by number. As regards stock market capitalisation, the Stock Exchange is 
dominated by the mining giant, the Ashanti Goldfields Corporation. In 1998, this 
corporation accounted for 57 percent of the entire stock market capitalisation in 
Ghana. The rest was divided among big international companies like Guinness, 
Standard Chartered Bank and Fan Milk (Africa Confidential, 1998a).252 The only 
two indigenous companies listed on the Exchange are Mechanical Lloyd and 
Camelot Ghana Ltd. The Ghana Stock Exchange has therefore not been able to 
reach Ghanaian-owned companies. In order to overcome this, a second window in 
the Ghana Stock Exchange has recently been opened, with less strict rules and 
regulations. The criteria for listing on the Exchange include profitability, several 
years in existence, management efficiency and capital adequacy. The aim of this 
window is to make long-term capital available to small enterprises. So far, how-
ever, such enterprises have not made use of the second window to obtain long-term 
capital. The reason probably lies in the lack of experience of information-sharing 
                                                 
252 As of 31 May 1999, the listed companies were Accra Brewery, Ashanti Goldfields, Alu-
works, British American Tobacco, CFAO, Enterprise Insurance, Fan Milk, Ghana Brewery, Ghana 
Commercial Bank, Guinness Ghana, Home Finance, Metalloplastica Ghana, Mechanical Lloyd, 
Mobil Oil of Ghana (now ExxonMobil Ghana), Pioneer Aluminium Factory, Paterson Zochonis 
(now PZ Ghana), Standard Chartered Bank, Super Paper Products, Social Security Bank, Unilever 
& UTC Estates (Ghana Stock Exchange, 1999). Since then, Aluworks, Camelot Company, Cocoa 
Processing Company, Produce Buying Company and Trust Bank have been listed on the Exchange, 
and UTC Estates removed (Databank Securities Limited, 2004).  
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 among Ghanaian small enterprises, the fear of takeovers by investors, and the im-
possibility of complying with the rules (Agyeman, 2003; Baah-Nuakoh, 2003).  
Even though their outreach is far greater than the Ghana Stock Exchange, formal 
banks in Ghana only serve a small minority of private enterprises in the country. In 
general banks do not regard lending to small enterprises as a profitable endeavour, 
and in addition competition has been weak in the banking sector. Thus, banks only 
cater for large and successful medium-scale enterprises, and do not seek to reach 
smaller clients at all. Moreover, they demand collateral, feasibility studies and au-
dited reports; most small enterprises cannot comply with this. Apart from these 
problems, a mismatch exists between the banks concentration on making short-term 
loans and the needs of small enterprises for longer-term funding. Thus, bank loans 
in Ghana essentially represent working capital for large-scale companies and are 
inadequate for capital investments in small enterprises.  
In general, Ghanaian banks have no way of guaranteeing repayment by the small 
enterprises, as the latter seldom use banks for sales and procurement. Thus, banks 
cannot directly deduct money from entrepreneurs’ accounts. Larger companies, on 
the other hand, regularly interact with banks when paying for salaries, imports, 
large-scale transactions etc. Therefore, it is easier to keep track of a loan. Likewise, 
banks often make loans to civil servants, as their salaries are paid via the bank, 
which is therefore able to deduct repayments of the loan directly.  
Recently competition has increased, and major banks like Barclays have opened 
business clubs that include many non-core bank activities in order to reach a larger 
proportion of the small enterprises. However, recent figures state that sixty percent 
of the money supply in Ghana is outside the commercial banks. Until recently, real 
interest rates in Ghanaian banks on deposits have been negative. Therefore, entre-
preneurs and other individuals have hardly had any incentive to become involved 
with the commercial banks. Remembering Rawlings’ anti-capitalist politics at the 
beginning of the 1980s, for instance, confiscation of 50-cedi notes and the freezing 
of bank balances of more than 50,000 cedis (see section 7.1.3), many entrepreneurs 
still lack confidence in the banking system. Thus, the negative real interest rates 
and the lack of confidence may also have been instrumental in the lack of domestic 
private-sector response to the new initiatives (Aryeetey, 1996; Steel and Andah, 
2003; ter Haar, 2003; World Bank, 1995). 
Following the liberalisation of foreign-exchange markets and the elimination of 
import licensing during ERP I, other sectors of the Ghanaian financial market were 
liberalised. In 1993, the government passed the non-banking law (PNDCL 328), 
which promoted the entry into the market of various non-banking financial institu-
tions, including savings and loan companies, leasing companies, a finance house, 
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 and a venture capital company, among others. Overall, these new institutions ‘were 
competing largely for the same large-scale clients of the commercial banks, with 
relatively little impact in broadening the range of clients’ (Aryeetey, Nissanke et 
al., 2000: 220). Savings and loan companies show some signs of being able to 
reach the small-enterprise sector on a commercial basis (ter Haar, 2003). However, 
their loans are still issued on a very short-term basis (6-12 months), which does not 
satisfy the demand of ‘growing’ enterprises’ for long-term investments in techno-
logically more advanced equipment. 
7.3.2 Informal credit or susu 
Most entrepreneurs are thus excluded from the formal banking and non-banking in-
stitutions in Ghana and have to rely on informal institutions to provide susu, that is, 
saving products to help clients accumulate their own savings or loans from friends 
and relatives. Susu clubs have become especially popular since the mid-1990s, and 
even some commercial banks are now applying susu methods in respect of certain 
financial products. But the amounts available through susu are generally too low to 
cater for entrepreneurs who want to expand their businesses. In addition, many en-
trepreneurs do not have cash on a daily basis and therefore cannot meet the credit 
obligations of the collectors. Small enterprises are also excluded from credit from 
suppliers, as relationships between an enterprise and its suppliers are seldom long-
term. Rather, these relationships are characterised by arm-length, spot-market inter-
actions (Funkor, 2003; Steel and Andah, 2003). 
7.4 From white-collar education to practical skills enhancement: 
developments in the educational sector in Ghana 
Even though the Ghanaian educational system has undergone major changes, most 
recently in 1987, what is perceived relevant as compared with less relevant knowl-
edge in Ghana dates back fundamentally to the colonial system of education. This 
section outlines the major changes in the educational system in Ghana in order to 
provide an account of the relative difficulties facing the Ghanaian private sector as 
regards entrepreneurial skills and qualified staff. The history of education in Ghana 
is partly a history of changing educational systems, from a system dominated by 
formal academic standards to a system that separates technical and practical skills 
from academic skills. However, as will become apparent, the change has not been 
fully implemented, mainly due to lack of resources. 
The formal schooling system in Ghana, as elsewhere in SSA, was established by 
missionaries who created numerous missionary schools in order to teach Africans 
about both Christianity and modernity, that is, literacy and fluency in the colonial 
 196
 language. By World War I, mission schools were providing the great majority of 
education in the Gold Coast. The colonial system of indirect rule was in great need 
of white-collar clerks and junior bureaucrats and therefore established its first sec-
ondary school in 1876. By the beginning of the twentieth century, three secondary 
schools had been founded in the Gold Coast, all of them located in the southern part 
of the country. Soon ‘[s]chooling became part of the governmental dream of con-
trol and organization; schools became crucial instruments for directing the future of 
the country…’ (Coe, 2002: 25). The colonial administration did not aim to provide 
mass education. Rather, it sought to produce an African intelligentsia through elite 
education. Among the most famous Ghanaians who benefited from this elite educa-
tion was Kwame Nkrumah, who attended the most eminent of these schools, the 
Achimota Teacher Training College, in the 1930s. Elite education was also the rea-
son behind the founding of the University College of the Gold Coast in 1948. Its 
mandate was to produce people to take over the administration of the central gov-
ernment and public services. Therefore, by independence Ghana possessed a highly 
educated elite that could easily fit into the bureaucracy established by the British 
colonial administration, but who had hardly any technical skills. Elsewhere among 
the population, the functional illiteracy rate in Ghana was high, as most people had 
not attended schools, and hardly any who had had gone beyond middle school.253
Even though Nkrumah prescribed mass education, the educational system did 
not change fundamentally.254 Nkrumah and the rest of the political elite of the self-
rule government and the first republic had all been educated in the highly elitist 
system of the British colonial administration. Thus, even though enrolment rates 
increased rapidly from 1951 onwards, the content of the teaching did not change.255 
The focus at the lower formal educational level was the production of white-collar 
clerks and junior bureaucrats, scientific education and technical training being ab-
sent. At the elite level, for instance, in secondary schools and universities256 the fo-
                                                 
253 In 1951, for instance, only 2,937 pupils were enrolled in secondary schools in the entire Gold 
Coast (Panford, 2001: table 10.2). Enrolment figures are generally few and unreliable. However, 
some figures are provided. Clignet and Foster (1964: 351) inform us that in 1950 281,000 individu-
als out of a population of approximately five million (or just over five percent) had been enrolled in 
formal schools. 
254 That is, six years of primary school, followed by four years of middle school (middle school 
leaving certificate). The best students could continue with five years of secondary school and two 
years of sixth form passing an exam, after which students could continue for a further three years in 
university. 
255 The total number of pupils enrolled in Ghana rose from 226,218 to 624,575 in the eight years 
from 1951 to 1959. The great majority (97 percent) of these pupils were enrolled in primary and 
middle schools in 1959. However, the largest increases took place in secondary, technical and uni-
versity education, which grew more than 5½ times during this period (Panford, 2001: table 10.2). 
256 These were the University College of the Gold Coast (now the University of Ghana, Legon), 
the University of Science and Technology in Kumasi (1962) and the University of Cape Coast 
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 cus was still mainly on subjects of relevance to a political career. Enrolment rates 
increased so rapidly that by the mid-1960s the proportion of pupils who went be-
yond primary school was higher than anywhere else in SSA – Ghana had become 
an exporter of educated people. However, hardly anyone had a technical degree257 
(Berman, 2003; Coe, 2002; Djangmah, 2000; Nugent, 1995; Peil, 1968, 1995a). 
Lall, Navaretti et al. (1994: table 2.5) have calculated the number of people en-
rolled in tertiary education in Ghana in 1965 –only one percent of the age group. 
From this figure, one has to deduct all the tertiary education that is not technical. In 
the end, the number of people with technical skills is so small that Lall, Navaretti et 
al. (1994: 37ff) end by concluding that ‘the base of manufacturing skills in Ghana 
seems very small’. Even more dismissively, Agbodeka (1992: 146) suggests that 
‘[t]he paucity of technical education meant that education for skills and compe-
tences which was the bed-rock of industrial and technical development of a new na-
tion was almost non-existent’. 
Nonetheless it is important to remember that to a large degree the educational 
system satisfied the perceptions of success of most students; that is, the character of 
the occupational structures erected during colonialism and the first years after inde-
pendence, which emphasised employment in government, SOEs and transnational 
corporations, corresponded with the perception that white-collar work indicated 
status. Thus it was rightly believed that a formal education could pave the way for a 
secure, well-paid job with numerous fringe benefits, in the modern sector. As Fos-
ter (1980: 223, emphasis in original) puts it, based on fieldwork in Ghana in the 
1960s, ‘African populations still clearly believe that formal education is the royal 
route to success’.258  
However, the economic situation in Ghana deteriorated dramatically throughout 
the 1960s and 1970s. Thus even though jobs in the public sector continued to be 
perceived as being high in status, officially they could not pay an adequate salary; 
on the one hand public-sector employees had to take extra employment, most often 
as hawkers or taxi-drivers, while on the other hand the level of corruption in the 
public sector grew tremendously (cf. section 7.2.2).  
By 1983, with the signing of ERP I, the relationship between the state and the 
private sector slowly changed. In line with this new ideology, the educational sys-
                                                                                                                                        
(1962). Later the University of Development Studies in Tamale (1992) and the University College 
of Winneba (1994) were added. Lately, a number of private Christian universities have been estab-
lished in Ghana. 
257 King and Martin (2002) remind us that in theory middle schools offered elements of craft and 
practical work, but it is uncertain whether these courses were actually taught or not. At the secon-
dary school level, there were certainly no technical or vocational elements. 
258 Even though the educational system has changed, Ghanaians still believe that the longer you 
stay at school, the more you will earn (Yamada, 2005). 
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 tem needed an overhaul. Hitherto, it had solely catered for white-collar jobs. In or-
der to boost the private sector, blue-collar skills were now required. 
Thus, in 1987 the educational system in Ghana was reformed. The aim of the re-
form was first, to reduce the number of years spent in school: ‘As policy-makers 
saw it, the average Ghanaian spent too many years in school, learned too few prac-
tical skills, and had little chance of advancing into higher education with the “book 
knowledge” he or she did acquire’ (Nugent, 1995: 173). A new 6-3-3-4 system was 
introduced, that is, primary (6 years), junior secondary (3), senior secondary (3) and 
training college (4), the total number of years before university therefore being re-
duced from 17 to 12. Secondly, the reform aimed to institute vocational and techni-
cal skills in the lower grades. Thus, subjects such as agricultural sciences and Gha-
naian craftwork were taught alongside Ghanaian languages, English, mathematics, 
religious and moral education, social studies etc. In line with this, students from 
junior secondary could choose vocational and technical training259 instead of senior 
secondary, and technical subjects were included in the curriculum for the latter. 
Thirdly, in line with the neo-liberal ideology of the ERPs, state funding for further 
and higher education was reduced as part of the reform programme. Prior to the 
programme, essential educational materials could not be imported due to economic 
problems. The reform programme sought to solve this problem by putting the eco-
nomic burden of tertiary education on the ‘consumers’ while transferring state 
funds from this level to the primary level. Finally, the reforms emphasised new 
problem-solving teaching methods. It was acknowledged that the previous system 
had to a large extent focused purely on recall. The new system was instead to em-
phasise practical and analytical skills of relevance to employers (CEPA, 2001; 
Dull, 2004; Hutchful, 2002; Nugent, 1995; Peil, 1995a). 
Thus, in theory the educational reform was to make education more relevant to 
the needs of the Ghanaian economy. However, the 1987 reform also had a moral 
side to it. First, according to Yamada (2005: 74), ‘Vocationalism in JSS [Junior 
Secondary School] aims to eliminate the distaste of manual work and plant a work 
ethic and attitude in the minds of students, that is, to orient students’ minds, rather 
than to transmit specific skills’, and she continues: ‘Vocationalism is seen more as 
a strategy of moralistic socialization than as skill training for employment’ 
(Yamada, 2005: 76). Secondly, the Ghanaian private sector is dominated by self-
employed people, or ‘survival’ enterprises, as they were called in Chapter 4. Only 
approximately one-tenths of the population are occupied in manufacturing produc-
                                                 
259 Vocational education denotes training for particular jobs for skilled persons at lower levels of 
qualification. Conversely, technical education prepares technicians and middle-level management 
with broader theoretical as well as practical technical skills. 
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 tion in (fully) registered private companies (Ghana Statistical Service, 2000). The 
intended beneficiaries of the educational reform, that is, the ‘formal’ private com-
panies in the industrial sector, through their access to skilled employees, only con-
stitute a very small fraction of the private sector. The majority of the private sector, 
by contrast, requires skills developed through apprenticeships. 
The ERPs in Ghana had effectively downsized the jobs in the public sector, as 
described in sections 7.1.3 and 7.2.1. Thus, the educational system was not only to 
educate students for these general tasks, but also for more specific tasks demanded 
by the private sector. However, in practice numerous problems have emerged. The 
laboratories in the technical schools, for instance, either do not exist or are under-
equipped, and qualified teachers are lacking, especially in the rural areas, as are 
textual materials and equipment. Then again, a number of public technical institutes 
have been established throughout the country to provide training in various voca-
tional skills, ranging from hairdressing via bookkeeping to computer technology. 
Among these centres is the National Vocational Training Institute, which is charged 
with organizing apprenticeship training, developing training standards and trade 
testing. Alongside these, the private sector and NGOs also run technical training in-
stitutes.260 However, there is neither formal coordination nor formal evaluation of 
these institutes, most of which are anyway only known to a very small fraction of 
their potential students.261
Neither the public nor the private technical institutes reach great numbers of stu-
dents. The majority of the vocational training and technical education continues to 
be done by private businesses, especially the small enterprise sector. This type of 
training mainly takes the form of an apprenticeship, that is, of job-specific knowl-
edge acquired through learning-by-doing in the workplace. Most often the training 
is conducted by the ‘master’; only very seldom is it linked to established institutes, 
either private or public. Apprentices exist in all parts of the Ghanaian private sec-
tor. However, they are more common in tailoring and carpentry than, for instance, 
electrical work. The apprenticeship institution complements the vocational training. 
Most apprentices actually have to pay a fee in order to receive training. Unfortu-
nately, many studies on this highlight the lack of adequate tools, lack of up-to-date 
                                                 
260 Exact figures are few, but according to McGrath and King (1994: chapter 3, volume 2), there 
were just over 150 vocational and technical training institutions at the beginning of the 1990s. In 
addition, 250 private institutions were registered, and the authors reckon that about 700 unregistered 
institutions existed at the time in Ghana. 
261 One exception is EMPRETEC, which until recently had offices in all the major cities in 
Ghana. However, the Tamale office was closed down in 2002, officially due to the outbreak of the 
conflict in the Northern Region, which made potential investors withdraw their assets from the area. 
Unofficially, however, the reason should be sought in the lack of private investment in the area. See 
footnote 283 page 244 for further details about EMPRETEC. 
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 knowledge and lack of training capacity in most of the companies that take in ap-
prentices (Fine and Boateng, 2000; Ghana Statistical Service, 2000: table 2.9; 
Hutchful, 2002). 
As a result, the Ghanaian educational system to a large degree still produces 
formal academic standards, despite the major reform undertaken in the late 1980s. 
Certainly in theory technical and practical skills are now separated from academic 
skills, but financial as well as organisatorial constraints within the educational sys-
tem have produced a certain degree of ambiguity regarding the quality of Ghanaian 
technical education among the country’s businessmen. Moreover, unemployment 
rates are still high, and formal technical education seldom leads to formal employ-
ment. As a consequence, many potential technical students instead opt for an ap-
prenticeship. And recruitment for apprenticeships in Ghanaian small enterprises is, 
according to Yamada (2005: 82), ‘highly dependent on kinship or other social rela-
tionships between masters and apprentices’ families’. Unfortunately these training 
arrangements do not lead to certification, without which there is a risk that the ap-
prentices will be stuck with their ‘masters’. Knowledge and skills thus only circu-
late very slowly in the Ghanaian private sector. It is therefore important in the 
PSDP context to consider how capabilities are circulated among Ghanaian compa-
nies.  
In addition, employees seldom have any theoretical knowledge to supplement 
their practical abilities. The educational system in Ghana may thus impede the 
building of intermediate and advanced technological capabilities like the learning-
by-doing form of acquiring knowledge in the Ghanaian private sector. The system 
simply makes it difficult to move beyond a certain threshold (cf. section 8.1). 
7.5 The role of the family, trust and authority 
Even though Richard Whitley perceives the so-called background institutions that 
encompass the dominant conventions regarding the family, authority, loyalty and 
trust as constant and enduring (like other the institutional features described above), 
this perception may be challenged in the Ghanaian context, where institutions in 
general are not yet stable, and where urbanisation, cross-border migration, eco-
nomic globalisation etc. tend to change the mentality of the upper echelons of soci-
ety that are most affected by these trends. Bearing in mind that the cultural com-
plexities of Ghanaian culture may be overlooked, this section examines key fea-
tures of the role of the family, trust and authority in relation to the Ghanaian private 
sector. It argues that some institutional features, such as the role ascribed to the 
family as the primary social unit, seem to persist, while others, such as the close 
link between seniority and respect, may be on the decline.  
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 Notwithstanding these changes, this section demonstrates the importance of 
these institutional features for the dynamics, both firm-internal and firm-external, 
of the private sector in Ghana, and thus also for how the impacts of the PSDP are 
accounted for. These institutional features tend to impede longer-term interaction 
between non-kin businessmen, and in so doing they also tend to hinder the spread 
of the effects of the programme. Likewise, the role of the family, trust and authority 
is likely to slow down the firm-internal dissemination of knowledge, as the specific 
leadership style that these features tend to produce tends to restrict knowledge to 
top management, whose staff are therefore disinclined to assume any responsibility. 
This section will take the role of the family as its point of departure before elaborat-
ing on the related institutional features. The consequences in relation to the charac-
teristics of the private sector are further dealt with in section 7.6. 
Central to the understanding of the background institutions that shape BS char-
acteristics in Ghana is the family. Even though lineage systems differ – for in-
stance, matrilineality is predominant among the Akan and the Asante, patrilineality 
among the Ewe, and double decent system among the Fanti – the family is central 
across all ethnic groups in Ghana. The family in Ghana is typically an extended 
family, that is, a grouping related by decent, marriage and adoption, which includes 
grandparents, grandchildren, cousins, nephews and their children, and in-laws.262 
Many generations of a single family often live in the same household, and it is not 
uncommon to find households consisting of three or four generations.  
The extended family provides the individual with a form of security. Moreover, 
it is a source of opportunities. Very often family members pool resources to provide 
one individual with opportunities, for instance, through the payment of university 
fees or a flight ticket abroad. In other instances, better-off members of the family 
share their economic resources (which have often been supported by other family 
members) by providing education for a younger member of the family, or by look-
ing after poorer relatives, by providing either financial support or accommodation. 
These contributions are perceived as investments that are expected to yield a divi-
dend in kind or in cash. Therefore, the role of the extended family is not confined to 
providing security and opportunities, but also involves moral obligations, for in-
stance, through the intra-family distribution of resources and job-fixing (Adepoju 
and Mbugua, 1997; Buame, 1996; Sørensen and Kuada, 2001).  
                                                 
262 The concept of grandparents, whether grandmother or grandfather (Nana) among, for in-
stance, the Akan, does not distinguish between biological and non-biological grandparents. The ex-
tended nature of the family is so pronounced that most people actually do not know whether their 
nana is biological or not (van der Geest, 2004: 48). 
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 Even though the role of the extended family in Ghana is constantly changing, 
especially in urban communities, its role as a primary social unit appears, by and 
large, to be continuing (Adepoju and Mbugua, 1997). Garcia Clark (1999), for in-
stance, has shown how the Akan in general and the Asante in particular are con-
stantly renegotiating the role of kinship. She argues that the central family system 
has been shaped and reshaped by political and economic developments in Ghana. 
On the one hand, Christian and colonial institutions have underlined the importance 
of marriage and fatherhood and thus weakened matrilineal loyalty. Likewise, na-
tional laws regarding, for instance, housing and pensions have weakened matrilin-
eal loyalty, as a man’s wife and children have to inherit two-thirds of a property. 
On the other hand, matrilineal kin remain of the utmost importance, as they are 
constantly available, whereas husbands come and go. The family thus provides a 
channel for requests, but it does not set limits regarding what to ask for. Similarly, 
kin are used to spread economic risks: ‘Kinship establishes the right to ask for 
whatever they will need most desperately in the future, along with the right to re-
fuse. Fulfilling kin commitments in new ways remains both feasible and valuable in 
the current social and economic context, and so kinship is still well worth contest-
ing’ (Clark, 1999: 81f). 
The role of the family in Ghana, which comprises aspects of security, opportuni-
ties and obligations, influences many other spheres of society. Within the private 
sector, the role of the family is, at least to some extent, related to the concept of 
trust. The individual’s loyalty towards his or her extended family is constantly rein-
forced through rituals like funerals and festivals, which provide an opportunity to 
honour one’s obligations towards one’s family and to show one’s embeddedness in 
the extended family. This is important, as ‘a man who is not thoroughly embedded 
in a network of extended family is not completely trusted since he cannot be dealt 
with in a normal way’ (Buame, 1996: 148, emphasis in original). Seen in this per-
spective, trust is a central feature in the extended family.  
The relationship between trust and the family is also important with regard to in-
teractions between Ghanaian businessmen. As a general rule, non-kin Ghanaian 
businessmen tend not engage in long-term business partnerships. Two main reasons 
may be suggested for this. The first relates to the high level of suspicion of non-kin 
business partners among Ghanaian businessmen, which is caused by an almost total 
lack of reliable information about other businessmen’s trustworthiness. Business in-
formation in Ghana is not shared in any mechanical way: no formal institutions ex-
ist, only the registrar’s office, where enterprises have to register263 merely the name 
                                                 
263 See also note 266 on page 206. 
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 of the company. Similarly banks have at best only partial knowledge of their cus-
tomers’ business activities, and they do not share this information with others, and 
business associations are fragmented.264 Due to the lack of accurate information, or 
even alongside it, most business contracts between small enterprises are transac-
tional rather than relational, thus minimising the dissemination of information be-
tween the partners (Buame, 2003; Buame, 1996; Deteah, 2003; Fafchamps, 1996; 
Kuada, 1994; ter Haar, 2003).  
The other reason for the lack of long-term business relationships is the strong 
obligations towards one’s family that tend to put the family before anyone else. En-
gagement in trade with kin therefore has to be considered before engaging in trade 
with non-kin. Similarly, the Ghanaian entrepreneur must consider borrowing 
money from the extended family before approaching other sources of credit, while 
contacts with relevant individuals and institutions are established through members 
of the extended family (Buame, 1996: 153f). 
In addition, the role of the family influences the Ghanaian work place. Kuada 
(1994) argues that it impacts upon employer-employee relationships, as the Ghana-
ian employee is brought up to ‘cultivate’ the right people in order to have a suc-
cessful career. Moreover, employees tend to have an instrumental relationship to 
their work because it is perceived as having a limited duration, whereas the family 
lasts for ever. Employees are afraid to sacrifice the family for the work place. The 
role of the family may, however, also influence the work place in an opposite direc-
tion, as successful entrepreneurs are obliged to employ family members, even if 
they lack qualifications.  
Social behaviour in Ghana is closely linked to respect, comprising both outward 
respect, which is similar to politeness, and inner respect, which can be compared to 
admiration. Seniority may denote respect as suggested by, for instance, Kuada 
(1994), but not necessarily so: respect between different generations is not absent in 
Ghana, as grandparents are still respected for their wisdom by younger generations, 
but respect in this context is confined to the first meaning of the word, that is, po-
liteness. This type of respect is constantly reinforced through the current education 
system in particular and by formal institutions in general. As regards the other 
meaning of the word, admiration, the link between seniority and respect may be 
fading, as both rural and urban areas are experiencing rapid changes in life. These 
changes imply, inter alia, that new generations need other kinds of knowledge than 
their grandparents, and thus traditional wisdom tends to be less respected than pre-
                                                 
264 Sørensen and Kuada (2001) argue that since an ever-increasing proportion of owner/managers 
belong to Old Boys’ associations or other professional bodies, the problem of sharing information 
may decline in the future. 
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 viously. In contrast, what bestows respect in the second meaning of the word in 
Ghana today is success, especially economic success (van der Geest, 1997, 2004). 
Even though the role of one’s seniors vis-à-vis respect is changing in Ghana, 
seniority still plays an important role in the private sector, as authority in the work 
place, especially in small enterprises, is likely to be ascribed to seniority. Seniors in 
small enterprises are thus, in general, expected to guide and direct juniors, who in 
turn are expected to respect the wisdom of their seniors. The most widespread lead-
ership style in these enterprises in Ghana, as well as in other SSA countries, has 
consequently been labelled authoritative, authoritarian-benevolence, non-
consultative, and driven by personalism and a desire to control. It is said to com-
prise close supervision of employees, elaborate instructions on everything matters 
and disapproval of deviations from these instructions on the one hand, and the pro-
vision of extra opportunities and privileges to the closest and most obedient em-
ployees on the other hand. Accordingly, the dominant management style in Ghana 
may be described as a vicious circle characterised by the reinforcement of manag-
ers’ as well as the employees’ behaviour: managers tend not to delegate authority to 
staff, which in turn makes the development of management skills at lower levels 
difficult; and employees tend to have an instrumental relationship to work that 
gives priority to personal goals over organisational ones (cf. Case II page 225). 
Only very little autonomy and decision-making power is shared with subordinates, 
who consequently are disinclined to act independently in the absence of the man-
ager (Jackson, 2004; Kuada, 1994; Montgomery, 1987; Sørensen and Kuada, 2001; 
Woode, 1999). 
7.6 Business system characteristics in Ghana 
The business systems approach indicates that institutional features tend to influence 
business systems characteristics – that is, ownership co-ordination, non-ownership 
co-ordination, and employment relations and work management – in a non-linear, 
non-reversible way. This section describes these characteristics in Ghana and ex-
plores how institutional features have impacted on them. 
Considerable differences in how companies are organised appear not only be-
tween countries but also within them: the business system approach seeks to single 
out the dominant forms. In Ghana, as in any other SSA country, a variety of organ-
isational forms may be singled out. However, the following three forms tend to 
dominate the manufacturing sector:  
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 1. A few large modern firms with an international focus. These companies 
are generally owned by foreigners, local non-Africans or the govern-
ment.265  
2. ‘Growing’ enterprises operating on a small scale and with low levels of 
efficiency. They are mostly Ghanaian-owned, but some local non-
Africans are also represented.  
3. Numerous ‘survival’ enterprises serving limited markets. This sector is 
entirely Ghanaian. 
Since the PSDP in Ghana targets only type two (and to a lesser degree type 
three), above, the following account is limited to the characteristics of ‘growing’, 
that is, type two enterprises. The vast majority of these companies are organised, 
that is, they have at the minimum a legal existence according to the 1962 Registra-
tion of Business Names Act (Act 151).266 They are mostly located in the major cit-
ies of Accra-Tema, Kumasi and Takoradi-Sekondi in the southern part of the coun-
try. Although they are characterised as ‘growing’ enterprises, they seldom grow 
beyond a few employees, typically being family-owned, with the owner having di-
rect control over the company. Decision-making is (thus) centralised; family mem-
bers hold managerial positions, and the likelihood of family members being sacked 
is severely limited. 
Before proceeding with the discussion of how institutional features have influ-
enced the shaping of the Ghanaian business system with regard to how the system 
is controlled and coordinated, Table 7.4 provides an overview of the main conse-
quences of these institutional developments. It lists the four main institutional fea-
tures described in the preceding sections in the first column, the description of core 
characteristics of developments within these institutions in the second column, and 
the consequences for the private sector in the third column. 
 
                                                 
265 Foreign economic interest in Ghana dates back to colonial times (cf. section 7.1), and in spite 
of the changing character of the economic interest in the country since then, foreign investments are 
still principally directed towards Ghana’s natural resources (especially gold, industrial diamonds, 
bauxite, manganese and timber), due to the modest size of the Ghanaian market. However, foreign 
investments in the form of wholly owned foreign companies, joint-venture arrangements with local 
companies, or liaison arrangements, no longer solely serve the international market with primary 
goods, but also produce for the Ghanaian market, as well as using their location in Ghana as a hub 
for the African market generally, especially through the development of regional products (Grant, 
2001, 2002). 
266 The 1962 Registration of Business Names Act is the basic form of registration in Ghana. Op-
erating a business as a sole proprietorship in Ghana thus only requires a simple registration of the 
business name at the Registrar-General’s office. Therefore, most companies, including many ‘sur-
vival companies’, have a legal existence in so far as they are registered with the Registrar. Conse-
quently, the term ‘organised’ is preferred to the more common term ‘formal’ to indicate the various 
degrees of formality encountered in Ghana. 
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 Table 7.4. Private sector consequences of institutional developments in Ghana 
Institutional 
features 
Description Consequences 
Insufficient experience among 
Ghanaian manufacturers  
Scarcity of entrepreneurial skills 
Naive replication of successes  
Investments historically directed 
towards unproductive activities 
Scarcity of private sector role mod-
els 
State-business 
relationship 
Unstable economy Diversification of economic activi-ties 
 Mutual suspicion between private 
sector and state  Lack of capacity in central agencies 
 Widespread corruption Surplus invested fixed assets 
 No private-sector mouthpiece Difficult to implement reforms  
Lack of working capital Partial capacity utilisation Capital market 
Lack of fixed capital Endless search for resources 
 Businessmen unfamiliar and hesi-
tant regarding formal banking sys-
tem  
Surplus invested fixed assets 
Scarcity of formalised technical 
skills 
Hard to advance to intermediate 
technological capabilities 
Skills forma-
tion 
Firm-specific technological capa-
bilities 
Difficult inter-firm collaboration 
Reduced capability diffusion 
 Learning practices characterised 
by mechanical repetition 
Challenging international inter-firm 
collaboration 
Family as the primary social unit 
No long-term business collabora-
tions 
Very difficult to lay off unproduc-
tive high-level staff 
Hindrance for long-term capital 
Family, trust 
and authority 
Lack of reliable information about 
non-kin business partners 
Pronounced distrust among non-kin 
business partners 
 
Authoritative-benevolence leader-
ship style 
Knowledge is kept at the manage-
rial level  
Promotion is based more on per-
sonal affiliation then qualifications 
Low rotation of workforce 
 
Section 5.2.2, starting on page 116, described the theoretical relationship between 
the degree of ownership and non-ownership coordination respectively, and the ideal 
type of business system. Moreover, it was argued that, in theory, certain forms of 
coordination tended to produce certain characteristics. Hence, according to the the-
ory, direct control of ownership, involving a high level of owner control in man-
agement and a high concentration of control over financial assets, as in the Ghana-
ian case, should limit diversification into other sectors, as diversification increases 
the owner’s risk. However, the Ghanaian case is different: Ghanaian entrepreneurs 
often engage in several unrelated businesses simultaneously. 
Several developments in key institutions account for this phenomenon, including 
economic instability, the marginalisation of the private sector through state-led in-
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 dustrialisation, large-scale corruption, the nature of the financial market, and the 
lack of reliable business information. First, the Ghanaian economy has experienced 
many fluctuations. After a few years of hope and positive economic growth just af-
ter independence, the majority of Ghanaians experienced a continuous downward 
economic spiral for more than two decades. The economy now is only slightly bet-
ter than at independence, but wealth is more unevenly distributed. Secondly, the 
creation of parastatals in all areas of the economy squeezed out the Ghanaian pri-
vate sector both directly and indirectly: directly through unfair competition, and in-
directly via the large burdens placed on the credit market. Privatisation did not radi-
cally alter the picture; a lack of both trust in the administration and of venture capi-
tal led to a lack of domestic private-sector participation in the process. Thirdly, 
kalabule generated pronounced inefficiencies and unproductive work-flows in both 
the public and private sectors. The growing difference between official prices and 
market value, which was brought about by the high levels of inflation, combined 
with dishonesty of the ruling elite that influenced the perception of right and wrong 
among ordinary people, gave rise to the growing corruption of Ghanaian society 
(Rimmer, 1992: 136). Kalabule thus forced entrepreneurs away from productive 
towards more speculative activities, while simultaneously creating an intense anti-
business rhetoric, leading to a situation in which the brutal actions taken by 
Rawlings to combat kalabule remain deeply imprinted in the memories of local en-
trepreneurs. This continues to affect the relationship between the state and private 
enterprises, and even though the government changed in 2001, some entrepreneurs 
are still suspicious of the real aim of the new state-led initiatives. Lastly, the nature 
of the financial market tends to restrict the growth of small enterprises in Ghana. 
Such enterprises are excluded from the formal banking system, since they are not 
perceived as profitable, nor can they comply with the rules. The desire to keep 
these ‘growing’ enterprises under family control may hinder access to long-term 
capital. As described in section 7.3.1, Ghana’s stock exchange has opened up a new 
window for small enterprises. However, the mere fact that these enterprises are 
characterised by a high degree of ownership control may prevent them from going 
public and thus making use of the Ghana Stock Exchange’s new window. Small en-
terprises do have access to the informal capital market, but either the loans offered 
here are too small or interest rates too high. Lastly, the dominant role of the family 
and the lack of reliable information about non-kin partners have created a pro-
nounced distrust of one another among Ghanaian businessmen. 
Since it is not only the owner of a Ghanaian ‘growing’ enterprise who depends 
on the economic success of his business activities but also his family and kin 
(whether directly through employment in the company or indirectly through his 
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 family obligations or both), it is of the utmost importance to avoid failure. There-
fore, instead of limiting diversification, Ghanaian entrepreneurs tend to do the op-
posite: that is, they protect themselves from periods of economic decline and cope 
with the historically high rates of inflation by undertaking several unrelated busi-
nesses, which have hardly anything in common and are hardly economically com-
plementary. Moreover, Ghanaian businessmen often neglect activities that do not 
immediately pay off, and often rely on connections to the political establishment to 
obtain contracts. As will be apparent from the description of the cases in Chapters 8 
and 9, since the PSDP often takes a long time to become established, there is a risk 
that the Ghanaian partner will lose interest and instead focus on other business ac-
tivities. Similarly, the shortage of formal long-term capital for small- and medium-
sized enterprises in Ghana compels owner-managers to seek capital elsewhere, one 
such place being the PSDP. Funds made available through PSDP loans are there-
fore sometimes directed to other businesses. The economic and political legacies 
have thus had an important impact on the business strategies of many Ghanaian 
firms.  
In a similar vein, these institutional features have tended to influence collabora-
tion within chains and between sectors – the other element in the category of own-
ership coordination (cf. section 5.2.2). The absence of trustworthy company data, 
combined with the role of the family, discourages the creation of long-term owner-
ship arrangements, such as joint ventures. 
In the business system terminology, direct control refers not only to control over 
the company, but also to control over markets and alliances. In so far as the Ghana-
ian entrepreneur is concerned, control is confined to the first meaning of the word. 
As stated above, the level of ownership coordination also includes intra- and inter-
chain governance, but while the Ghanaian private sector may be defined by high 
levels of owner control over management in the enterprise itself (but not in either 
markets or alliances), Ghanaian owners have no, or hardly any, intra- or inter-chain 
control. Using Richard Whitley’s terminology, the Ghanaian business system there-
fore shows low levels of ownership coordination. 
The reasons for low levels of ownership coordination also seem to account for 
the low levels of non-ownership coordination, that is, the relationship between dif-
ferent ownership units: the Ghanaian family’s interlocking structures of security, 
opportunities and obligations; the lack of ‘real’ pro-private policies; limited infor-
mation; the lack of organised private-sector challenge to the state; and an educa-
tional system that creates fragmented, firm-specific skills.  
Joint activities between the members of a production chain, among competitors 
or across sectors are constrained first by the role of the family, which stipulates that 
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 all private sector-related activities have to be directed towards the family, and only 
if, for instance, engagement in trade with kin is not viable may other partners be 
considered. Secondly, even though Ghanaian policies during the past twenty years 
have officially seen the private sector as an important player in the quest for eco-
nomic development, it has only very recently started implementing pro-private sec-
tor policies: there is no tradition of including the private sector in policy-making in 
Ghana. Thus, even though various business-support organisations have been estab-
lished by previous regimes, they remained negligible as forums for the Ghanaian 
business community because they represented only a politically acceptable fraction 
of businesses. Thirdly, limited information eases the flow of rumours and thus gen-
erates suspicion about the ‘real’ intentions of business partners or competitors. 
Fourthly, the private sector is weakly organised, and business organisations gener-
ally lack membership support, thus making the flow of information difficult. Lastly, 
the educational system, where most of the technical skills are produced in appren-
ticeship-like circumstances, tends to produce firm-specific capabilities that can be 
transferred from one company to another of with difficulty, especially if also from 
one sector to another. Thus, institutional developments in Ghana – that is, devel-
opments in the characteristics of the state vis-à-vis the private sector; in the finan-
cial sector; in the skills-training system and in the system governing trust and au-
thority – all tend to inhibit strong non-ownership coordination. 
Hardly any long-term mutually binding agreements are to be found between 
suppliers and producers or between producers and retailers. Forward and backward 
linkages are almost non-existent, especially between the small enterprises and the 
few large modern firms in Ghana. A study of Ghanaian aluminium companies 
found that only four percent of the small workshops receive regular supplies from 
the big firms, only two percent of employees had previously been employed in one 
of the large companies, and only 1½ percent of entrepreneurs had purchased 
equipment from the big firms (Yankson, 1996). Ghanaian businessmen are unfamil-
iar with collaboration across sectors, for instance, to acquire new technology or up-
grade technological capabilities. For example, hardly any forums for collaboration 
among competitors exist. Only a very few cases of collaboration among competi-
tors have been described for Ghana: the only well-known case of large-scale non-
ownership co-ordination in Ghana is the Suame Magazine in Kumasi (McCormick, 
1999). As Whitely points out, ‘An economy that is low on both dimensions [owner-
ship and non-ownership coordination] is composed of small firms that engage in 
spot-market-like competition with each other, and there is little authoritative coor-
dination of economic activities’ (Whitley, 2002: xix). 
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 Employer–employee relationships, a third dimension of the distinct business 
system, is, according to Whitley (see, for instance Whitley (1999b), basically con-
tingent on the degree of ownership and non-ownership coordination, as some em-
ployment strategies are hard to envisage with certain production systems.267 How-
ever, developments in certain institutions may also influence employer-employee 
relationships independently of the coordination system. Of importance in the Gha-
naian context are the so-called ‘background’ institutions, as on the one hand Gha-
naian employees are brought up to ‘cultivate’ the right people in order to have a 
successful career, thus frequently staying with the ‘big man’, even though ‘he’ may 
not have any contracts and therefore cannot pay their salaries. On the other hand, 
many employees have an instrumental relationship with their work because it is 
perceived as being of limited duration, whereas the family lasts forever. Employees 
are afraid to sacrifice the family for the work place. Therefore, most employment 
relationships are either very stable or of a short-term nature. The role of the family 
also works the other way around: successful entrepreneurs are obliged to employ 
family members, even though these may lack qualifications. 
 
                                                 
267 One example of a situation that is hard to envisage is the Taylorist production system, that is, 
a system of fragmented production activities characterised chiefly by a distinct occupational division 
of labour (often in different plants), in which unskilled labourers perform simple repetitive tasks, 
and which offers long-term contracts and invests in the development of employees’ skills. 
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 8. IMPACTS ARE LIKE DEATHS, THEY ARE INEVITABLE: 
IMPACTS OF DANIDA’S PSDP AT ENTERPRISE LEVEL IN 
GHANA 
The aim of this chapter is to provide a deeper understanding of the changes among 
the target group associated with the PSDP in Ghana by making extensive use of 
empirical data. Chapter 3 laid out the framework for studying these changes. Aid 
interventions were perceived as complex situations where different actors with dif-
ferent degrees of influence over the intervention pursue different strategies accord-
ing to their own needs. Moreover, interventions are seen as only one of several 
processes taking place simultaneously. Therefore, political, economic, and cultural 
changes may account for many of the observed changes in both target and non-
target groups. 
In so far as it is at all possible to distinguish them, this chapter focuses on the 
impacts on the target group, that is, on Ghanaian enterprises (owner/managers as 
well as employees) that have benefited from Danida’s PSDP in the country. Chap-
ter 9 takes the discussion further, to the levels of the private sector and of society at 
large.  
Based upon the framework developed in Chapter 4 regarding technological ca-
pabilities, the first section probes the role of Danida’s PSDP in the enhancement of 
performance among the target beneficiaries, which is the main aim of the pro-
gramme as laid out in Chapter 2. Through technology transfer, training and techni-
cal assistance, the aim of Danida’s intervention is to enhance technological capa-
bilities and thus improve productivity, turnover, employment etc. Eventually, it is 
intended that this process should lead to social and economic development in the 
recipient country. In this thesis, therefore, technological capabilities are construed 
as embracing the most important aspects of performance-enhancement through 
technology transfer.  
It is thus of the utmost importance to scrutinise how technological capabilities 
are built into Ghanaian small enterprises and how the PSDP has impacted upon this 
process. This chapter thus takes as its point of departure an analysis of exactly this 
process. It starts off in section 8.1 by analysing an instrumental PSDP case to fur-
ther our understanding of what makes this process happen (cf. section 6.2). How-
ever, the overview of technological capability building provided in section 8.1.1 
clearly shows that not all PSDP collaborations have been equally fortunate in this 
 212
 process. In order to obtain a richer understanding of the factors at play when a Dan-
ish company tries to build technological capabilities in a Ghanaian company by 
way of Danida’s PSDP, this section presents three other cases. These point to the 
interface between specific features of the Ghanaian business system and the design 
of the PSDP as an explanation for the difficulties of upgrading. This interface and 
the consequences for building technological capabilities are discussed in section 
8.1.2. 
The second section departs from Danida’s own perception of how the PSDP re-
lates to the overall developmental purpose of Danida’s development aid. These 
loosely defined indicators (cf. section 2.2.2) make up the foundation of most tradi-
tional evaluations of development interventions. These evaluations, which are 
sometimes also called ‘impact studies’, generally seek to establish qualitative indi-
cators that aim to measure the intended effects of an intervention. Section 8.2 takes 
these evaluations as its point of departure. It scrutinises four different indicators di-
rectly drawn from the goals of Danida’s PSDP (see Table 3.2 page 77) and argues 
that this type of indicator does not enhance our understanding of how an aid inter-
vention actually impacts, either on the target group or on non-target groups. Based 
on fifteen instrumental cases, this section points to the problems involved in using 
changes in employment, in earnings, in productivity and in products respectively, 
this section draws attention to the importance of focusing on the complexity of aid 
impacts, instead of searching for the simple story of success versus fiasco in devel-
opment aid.  
These cases also form a background for the discussion of how the observed 
changes have come about and the analysis of the role of the PSDP in this process. 
Basically, they underline a major conclusion of Chapter 3, namely that impacts are 
complex.  
Unintended impacts are the focus of attention in section 8.3, which builds on the 
knowledge regarding complexity established in the previous section and examines 
five PSDP collaborations in order to improve understanding of the unintended im-
pacts of the programme. The distinction between intended impacts in the previous 
section and unintended impacts in this section is ambiguous: the cases presented in 
the former to a certain degree all exhibit unintended impacts, while the five cases 
portrayed in the latter section, of course, reveal intended impacts as well. However, 
the distinction is maintained here to highlight the fact that aid interventions, which 
involve planned social change, are instituted in contexts characterised by certain 
political, cultural, economic, geographical etc. features. Hence, aid interventions, 
including Danida’s PSDP, by definition have unintended impacts. These impacts 
comprise both positive and negative, direct and derived effects of the programme.  
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 Section 8.4 concludes the chapter. It draws attention to the different logics of the 
various actors in the programmes. Principles of selection and sidetracking explain 
some of the observed impacts, while political, economic and cultural processes ex-
plain others. The end result, however, is not changed: the impacts of aid interven-
tions are inevitable.  
8.1 Building technological capabilities in Ghanaian PSDP companies  
The phrase ‘technological capabilities’ refers to the bundles of complementary 
skills and knowledge in a specific context that facilitate particular activities in pro-
ductive systems and provide the background to managing change in these systems 
(cf. section 4.5). Several attempts have been made to measure technological capa-
bilities at diverse levels and with varying foci. The problems involved in actually 
measuring changes in technological capabilities in small enterprises in SSA were 
considered in Chapter 4. Based on studies of capability building in small enter-
prises in other developing countries, it was argued that a distinction between tech-
nological capability levels (basic, intermediate and advanced) and forms (invest-
ment, production and linkage) would be fruitful for the further analysis. Techno-
logical capabilities among Ghanaian PSDP companies are therefore measured by 
distinguishing a certain activity that a company is able to carry out on its own at a 
given point in time in the matrix presented in Table 4.1 page 107. The accumula-
tion of technological capabilities is thus identified when a company has achieved a 
technological capability that it did not have before. 
A large part of the literature regarding technological capabilities takes its point 
of departure in manufacturing enterprises, and there is hardly any doubt that the 
terminology has been specifically developed for precisely such enterprises. This be-
ing said, the concept of technological capabilities does not exclude other sectors, 
such as service-providers – the concept simply has to be interpreted more broadly: 
thus, the subdivision of, for instance, production capabilities into process-centred, 
product-centred and equipment-related may not be appropriate. Instead, only the 
former two have relevance, namely how production is organised, and which prod-
ucts are produced. Likewise, the building of all forms of capabilities may not be of 
equal relevance to all PSDP collaborations: some such collaborations focus solely 
on upgrading production and linkage capabilities and leave out investment capabili-
ties, while others may give more importance to some forms of capabilities and less 
to others. However, all but a couple of collaborations, most notably a sustainable 
forest operation (P9) and an institute for caretakers (P3), have placed the building 
technological capabilities at the forefront of the PSDP collaboration. 
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 Before presenting an overview of accumulated technological capabilities in 
Ghanaian PSDP companies, the process of actually developing technological capa-
bilities is described by means of the business partnership between a Danish and a 
Ghanaian consultancy company (cf. Case I). As will be apparent from what fol-
lows, this case is unusual in many ways, but precisely because it is unusual, it may 
point to some of the factors that are important in developing technological capabili-
ties through the PSDP. 
Case I. Technological capabilities in the Ghanaian service sector (P2)  
In order to stay competitive, Ghanaian268 and Danish consultancy companies have 
to search for partners abroad. The Ghanaian consultancy company being discussed 
here had existed for less than a decade, but it had already managed to become one 
of Ghana’s largest consultancy companies, using experience from outside Ghana as 
well as from contracts with large donor agencies. Concurrently, most international 
donors were making increasing use of local consultancy companies, either to fulfil 
a restricted contract alone, or in collaboration with larger international consultancy 
companies for large contracts. To be able to exploit fully the expanding market for 
consultancy in Ghana, as well as in the West African region generally, certain areas 
in the Ghanaian consultancy company required upgrading, most importantly struc-
tural engineering and desktop publishing. Likewise, the Danish partner, a large 
consultancy company with increasing experience of international contracts, could 
benefit from formal collaboration with a Ghanaian partner already established in 
the West African market. It too, was finding that donors were increasingly demand-
ing a local partner in order to win contracts in developing countries. Moreover, a 
PSDP Business Partnership could further the internationalisation process of the 
company: it had limited experience of SSA, and its international competitiveness 
was negatively affected by the high salary levels in Denmark. 
In the mid-1990s, the Danish consultancy company won a World Bank contract 
in Ghana, which stipulated cooperation with a local partner. The World Bank rec-
ommended the future PSDP partner as a high-quality consultancy company. Basi-
cally, two companies’ capabilities complemented each other. They carried out the 
contract satisfactorily and therefore decided that they would mutually benefit from 
a more formal collaboration: the Danish company needed a Ghanaian partner to 
win contracts in Ghana, while the Ghanaian company needed training and supervi-
                                                 
268 Actually, the Ghanaian partner comprises two consultancy companies: one specialises in ar-
chitecture, real-estate planning, and urban, rural and regional planning, while the other specialises in 
transportation systems and geotechnical engineering. Besides these two companies, which are taking 
part in the PSDP collaboration, the two Ghanaian owners have two other companies.  
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 sion to enhance its capabilities and thus win more contracts. In order to meet both 
partners’ needs, and based upon the Danish company’s knowledge of the PSDP, 
they applied for funding for a formal collaboration. 
The partners examined various forms of collaboration and initially chose a non-
equity joint-venture form of cooperation that would minimise the respective part-
ners’ initial investments. This joint venture aimed to pursue business opportunities 
mostly in the international financial and development institutions, such as the 
World Bank, the European Union, the African Development Bank and the large bi-
lateral donors, as neither the public nor the private sectors in Ghana were yet ready 
for private consultancy companies. The PSDP partners agreed that possible con-
tracts from the financial and development institutions should first be offered the 
joint venture for acceptance or refusal before the Ghanaian and Danish companies 
could be offered the contract. 
From the start, the collaboration, including the training and technical assistance, 
took a project-by-project approach: whenever the joint venture won tenders, train-
ing and technical assistance associated with the contract were started. In the first 
two years of the PSDP collaboration, that is, for the full period of Danida support, 
the partners collaborated on a fixed number of projects. Thereafter, the collabora-
tion became more ad-hoc: whenever the partners gain economically or otherwise 
from collaborating, they do so, otherwise they pursue their own goals.269  
Prior to the start of the PSDP, an initial assessment of key Ghanaian employees’ 
capabilities and immediate needs was conducted. This assessment pointed out the 
following areas in which upgrading was needed: computerised project, information 
and storage management; computerised drawing and design; geographical informa-
tion systems; road construction engineering capabilities; and traffic management 
and planning capabilities.270 As it turned out, the collaboration mostly focused on 
enhancing the capabilities to perform road and transport work in Ghana and other 
West African countries; to conduct environmental impact assessments; to carry out 
quality control; to enhance project management capabilities; and reporting tech-
niques, including the ability to present the key strengths of the company to donors 
and other sources of contracts.  
                                                 
269 According to the initial plan, the partners hoped eventually to be able to create a Ghanaian 
equity-based company with shares from both partners as well as from IFU, but in the end the pro-
ject-by-project approach suited both partners better. Therefore, the subsidiary that the Danish con-
sultancy company opened in relation to the PSDP collaboration, which is physically located in the 
same building as the Ghanaian companies, is now working as a liaison office. It is therefore not al-
lowed to bid for local contracts, but has to limit itself to international contracts. It does, however, 
carry out local work in Ghana if another company wins a contract and uses it as a sub-contractor. 
270 The transport sector was regarded as especially important by the partners, as the majority of 
investments in the public sector in the late 1990s in Ghana were directed to this sector.  
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 Before the training and technical assistance were carried out, attention was paid 
to streamlining the organisational structure of the Ghanaian company. A new or-
ganisational plan was set out, which aimed to reorganise the responsibilities be-
tween the management team and other administrative personnel in the company. 
Hence, tasks previously performed by the management team are now conducted by 
other groups so as to free time and resources for the former group to make key de-
cisions in the company. According to the former resident manager in the Danish 
subsidiary located in Ghana, the human resource department in the Danish consul-
tancy company that was assigned the task of restructuring the organisation was 
generally successful, but ‘there is still a long way to go if the aim is a typical Dan-
ish company of that size’.  
A resident general manager was put in charge of the implementation of the 
PSDP – that is, assessment of the process regarding training and technical assis-
tance, coordination, and the planning of technical assistance and training. The resi-
dent GM was thus in charge of the technical assistance being admininstered locally, 
while most of the specific training was conducted by the Danish (and international) 
staff who were directly responsible for the projects. In short, all key staff in the 
Ghanaian company have been trained during the two-year period covered by 
Danida. As spelt out above, the focus was initially placed on the necessary organ-
isational changes: the management team and the administrative personnel were 
both given technical support in Denmark and Ghana. The whole management team, 
along with the chief accounts manager, have been to Denmark once a year to facili-
tate a transfer of management information systems and direct economic project-
control skills. Thereafter, technical training was purely related to the projects: in the 
pre-project phase, attention was paid to the bidding process for contracts, as well as 
to how the company’s profile was being presented. This training therefore included 
legal, technical and communicative personnel in the bidding stage, and communica-
tive and information personnel in the presentation stage. Likewise, in the later 
phases of a project, attention was paid to methods of monitoring and evaluation.  
In the five years that have passed since the PSDP was initiated, the number of 
staff has increased by one third. Most of the new employees are skilled workers 
with technical degrees, BAs or MAs. As the Ghanaian company also was expand-
ing rapidly prior to the collaboration, these figures do not by themselves point to 
the source of the expansion. However, a more detailed examination of the figures 
indicates that at least some of this expansion relates directly to the PSDP: more 
than half of the recently employed staff are specialised in the areas of interest to the 
cooperation, and these areas were previously less prioritised in the Ghanaian com-
pany. Moreover, the Ghanaian company has been able to attract staff with comple-
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 mentary expertise and thus has been able to broaden its portfolio of products. Asso-
ciated with the expansion of both staff and products, the company has therefore 
been able to bid for more tenders and thus win more contracts. The restructuring of 
the enterprise in the initial phase of the collaboration furthermore contributed to in-
crease the efficiency of the company.  
At the beginning of this PSDP collaboration, production and linkage capability 
levels were at a basic level in the Ghanaian consultancy company. The basic tech-
nological capability level spans simple as well as more complex operations. A 
company may thus possess simple basic capabilities in one form, and complex ba-
sic capabilities in another. In theory, there is no causal relationship between the 
two, even though in practice there is a tendency for forms of the development of 
technological capability to go together.  
The Ghanaian consultancy company already possessed complex basic linkage 
capabilities at the start of the PSDP: it was, among other things, able to enter 
neighbouring country markets and make links with major donor organisations. Its 
production capabilities, that is, its product- and process-centred capabilities were of 
a simple basic character. Thus, its quality-control system and its ability to plan pro-
duction ahead were very rudimentary. During the course of the formal PSDP col-
laboration, but also based on the subsequent project-by-project collaboration be-
tween the partners, both production and linkage capabilities have been upgraded.  
The process-centred production capability was the centre of attention in the ini-
tial phase of the intervention. The Danish partners simply created a new organisa-
tional structure upon which new routines were planted. The main intention was to 
create a more efficient work-flow and introduce quality-control systems in all 
stages of the production process: less attention was paid to the management team’s 
ability to be able to change the organisational structure subsequently. However, the 
mere fact that the partners were collaborating closely and that the resident manager 
actually had his office inside the Ghanaian consultancy company ensured the trans-
fer of these capabilities. Alongside the development of process-centred technologi-
cal capabilities, product-centred capabilities also increased. The company indeed 
experienced an improvement in the quality of their products and through the col-
laboration it was able first, to expand its product portfolio, and secondly, to attract 
new employees who could further expand the portfolio. The level of product-
centred production capabilities has thus increased from a basic to a more intermedi-
ate level. Equally, linkage capabilities have been increased by the collaboration: 
whereas donors and international consultancy companies previously approached the 
Ghanaian company in order to fulfil contract requirements stipulating collaboration 
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 with a local partner, the Ghanaian company is now able to search actively for suit-
able partners for certain tasks, both locally and abroad.  
The interesting question here is why and how the partners managed to build 
technological capabilities through Danida’s PSDP. The literature highlights several 
important aspects in the process of developing technological capability building 
through technology transfer in SSA (cf. Chapter 4). Most importantly, it points to 
the extent of the recipient’s efforts to intervene and interact in the transfer process, 
that is, the technological effort. Successful technology transfer – that is, technology 
that has been effectively transferred, absorbed, adopted and mastered – requires a 
thorough knowledge of the procedures, an understanding of the underlying mecha-
nisms of these procedures, and the skills to put them in use. Moreover, the literature 
emphasises that learning is cumulative and discontinuous: that is, it moves along 
particular trajectories but it is not always incremental, especially in the case of 
technology transfer through development interventions.  
These basic premises for successful transfer were present in this case. While 
most Ghanaian PSDP enterprises are staffed with unskilled or semi-skilled employ-
ees, all key personnel in the Ghanaian consultancy company are skilled. They 
therefore have a solid theoretical as well as empirical base upon which to build new 
capabilities. In addition, many key employees, including the owners, have experi-
ences from abroad and therefore recognise several of the new routines introduced 
into the company by the Danish partner. By the same token, most of the required 
learning essentially builds on the previous knowledge of the Ghanaian staff. New 
areas have been prioritised in this PSDP collaboration, but basically new capabili-
ties have been built on the basis of already existing ones, instead of having to create 
entirely new technological capabilities. 
On the whole, this PSDP collaboration has followed the guidelines of successful 
technology transfer as laid out in the literature. However, this is not the sole expla-
nation: a crucial aspect in this case is the capacity of the Danish company actually 
to provide the training and technical assistance. Successful technology transfer 
places high demands not only on the recipient’s ability to absorb the technology, 
but also on the exporter’s ability to transfer the essential tacit and codified knowl-
edge effectively. As described in Chapter 2, Danida’s Business Partnerships are 
each divided into a preparatory and a project phase. In the preparatory phase, 
Danida subsidises ninety percent of the costs of the preliminary investigations. In 
most cases, the investigations comprise a feasibility study, which includes a plan of 
the crucial training and technical assistance for the aim of the intervention to be re-
alised; it specifies who is to be trained where and by whom. However, the quality 
and accuracy of these plans vary considerably. Some feasibility studies merely pre-
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 sent broad headings for the training that provide the reader with no indication as to 
how the partners see the building of capabilities, while others provide more detailed 
accounts of the training and technical assistance.271  
The Danish partner has broad experience in training and technical assistance, 
while the educational department of the consultancy company has the overall re-
sponsibility for planning and carrying out training in both Denmark and Ghana. 
Moreover, both the Danish and the Ghanaian partner had an economic interest in 
upgrading. The Ghanaian partner wanted to increase both its portfolio of products 
and the value added. By upgrading both product- and process-centred capabilities, 
the company was able to fulfil both aims. The Danish company, conversely, had to 
stay competitive by obtaining access to highly qualified cheap labour. In addition, 
the partners knew each other from before, when informal contacts and networks be-
tween the staff in both companies had been established prior to the PSDP collabo-
ration. In addition, the project-by-project approach provided a flexibility that was 
advantageous for the partners while simultaneously ensuring that all training and 
technical assistance were perceived as highly relevant, as both were linked to actual 
projects, not just abstract examples.  
Seen from the perspective of technological capability building, this case may in 
many ways be considered a role model for the PSDP in Ghana: even though the 
Danida-supported intervention ended more than five years ago, the partners are still 
collaborating on an ad hoc basis. In addition, the transfer of technology has resulted 
in the employment of more staff, higher turnovers etc., aspects that are highly val-
ued by Danida as the funding organisation. On the face of it, moreover, no negative 
impacts are discernible. It is therefore reasonable to ask, what was the role of 
Danida’s PSDP in this case? In other words, would the partners have upgraded 
without Danida’s financial support? These questions are clearly hypothetical, but 
the following account may provide some sort of answer.  
Prior to the PSDP collaboration, several international consultancy companies 
approached the Ghanaian company in search of formal collaboration with it. Like 
its future Danish partner, these companies had realised that a formal collaboration 
with a developing-country partner was essential in order to bid for international 
contracts in developing countries, and also this partner could provide an easy entry 
                                                 
271 As shown in Table 2.2 on page 46, DI and HVR produce the great majority of all feasibility 
studies. The plan for training and technical assistance is, of course, anchored in the vast experience 
that the two organisations have acquired, partly from supporting the large portfolio of Danish com-
panies that have taken part in Danida’s PSDP, and partly from assisting Danish companies that have 
internationalised without the support of Danida. However, the inputs for the plan (as well as other 
parts of the preliminary investigations) derive chiefly from the two business partners. In other 
words, the plans are no better than the sum of the inputs. 
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 point to new and expanding markets. Even though other bilateral donors have busi-
ness-to-business development programmes in Ghana (cf. Appendix D), they do not 
cover as large a proportion of the expenses as Danida’s PSDP, nor are they so easy 
to assess. Moreover, since the Danish PSDP is restricted to collaborations between 
Danish companies and companies in Danida’s programme countries, these interna-
tional consultancy companies would probably not have had access to donor fund-
ing. Nonetheless they were still interested in collaborating with the Ghanaian con-
sultancy company. Similarly, the Danish consultancy company was well aware of 
the need for a local partner and had already collaborated with the Ghanaian com-
pany before they achieved PSDP funding. According to Jespersen (1997a: 23), 
however, the reason why the Ghanaian partners chose the Danish consultancy com-
pany was not the prospect of PSDP funding, but rather the fact that, unlike previous 
potential partners, the Danish consultancy company was seeking ‘real’ cooperation, 
not just a fictive partner to facilitate the tender bidding. Both partners needed a for-
eign partner and would therefore probably have pursued the collaboration without 
Danida’s assistance. However, this is not to say that the PSDP did not play any 
role. On the contrary, it paid for the resident general manager’s salary as well as the 
training sessions that facilitated the development of technological capabilities. It is 
thus probable that the training and technical assistance have been more comprehen-
sive and conducted within a shorter time-span than would otherwise have been the 
case. 
8.1.1 Technological capability building in Ghanaian PSDP companies: an 
overview 
Case I above highlighted important aspects in the process of converting technology 
transfer into technological capabilities and thus upgrade the recipient company. 
However, these conditions are not always met, and technology transfer, or rather 
PSDP collaboration between two companies, does not always lead to enhanced 
technological capabilities and upgrading. This section provides an overview of 
Ghanaian PSDP companies regarding this process. Table 8.1 and Table 8.2 below 
present changes in technological capabilities, that is, changes in investment capa-
bilities (IC), production capabilities (PC), and linkage capabilities (LC), but not the 
quality or the degree of these changes.  
Positive changes in technological capabilities are shown by an upward arrow, 
deteriorations by a downward arrow. The arrows are based on the findings of inter-
views with owner/managers and key personnel, observations, project descriptions, 
and available progress reports. They thus represent a best possible ‘guestimate’ 
based on triangulation of methods. The direction of the arrow refers to movement 
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 up or down the technological capabilities level (cf. Table 4.1 on page 107). ‘NA’ 
denotes PSDP collaborations that either did not have the building of technological 
capabilities as their major aim (P3/P9) or collaborations that for some reason have 
not transferred any technology as yet (S2/S12/S21), while columns left blank indi-
cate that no changes in technological capabilities are observable in these collabora-
tions. The first row in the table refers to the number given to each collaboration. ‘P’ 
represents a Business Partnership and ‘S’ a Start-up Facility.272 The cases described 
in section 8.1 are highlighted. 
Table 8.1. Technological capability building in Business Partnerships 
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Table 8.2. Technological capability building in Start-Up Facilities 
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The tables bring out several interesting facts: no improvements in technological 
capabilities could be observed in practically forty percent of the collaborations; the 
development of technological capabilities is as likely in Start-Up Facilities as it is 
in Business Partnerships; improvements in technological capabilities often come 
together, for instance, production and investment capabilities, or production and 
linkage capabilities; improvements in production capabilities, however, are present 
in nine cases without improvements in other capabilities; and roughly one-tenth of 
the PSDP collaborations have experienced weakened technological capabilities fol-
lowing the establishment of a Danida-funded PSDP collaboration. 
By its very nature (equipment and technical training), the PSDP is directed at 
enhancing production capabilities: investment and linkage capabilities are therefore 
seen as by-products of production capabilities. It is therefore no surprise to observe 
that improvements in production capabilities are twice as widespread as improve-
                                                 
272 See Appendix B for a full list of PSDP collaborations. 
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 ments in linkage capabilities, and more than twice as prevalent as advances in in-
vestment capabilities. Production capabilities have been increased in twenty cases. 
Most of these improvements are confined to replicating specifications set by the 
Danish partner, namely basic quality control and basic maintenance. None of the 
Ghanaian partners has been able to carry out effective trouble-shooting on their 
new equipment, none has acquired quality-control certification, and only one has 
begun a process towards adaptation to export market needs.  
From Table 8.1 and Table 8.2, it is clear that the development of investment ca-
pabilities has not been given the same attention as the development of production 
capabilities. In only one-sixth of the Ghanaian PSDP companies have investment 
capabilities increased since the start of collaboration with a Danish partner. These 
changes, like the improvements in production capabilities, relate to the lower end of 
the spectrum: some companies have conducted pre-investment studies, and a few 
have searched for suitable technologies outside the scope of the PSDP, but none, 
for instance, has negotiated with other partners for technology transfer. Likewise, 
most of the preparation and implementation related to new investments conducted 
solely by the Ghanaian PSDP partners emanates from the basic level of technologi-
cal capability. Contrary to the fairly even distribution of changes in production ca-
pabilities between Business Partnerships and Start-up Facilities, the distribution of 
changes in investment capabilities between the two types of Danida co-operation is 
fairly uneven: positive changes in investment capabilities in Business Partnerships 
come about in approximately a quarter of the cases, while positive changes in in-
vestment capabilities in Start-up Facilities only are observed in one-tenth of cases. 
This is, not unexpected, however, as Business Partnerships in general entail more 
comprehensive changes than Start-up Facilities: while the former, in theory, seek to 
change fundamentally the way the Ghanaian company operates, including changes 
in the organisation of production, management and physical set-up, the latter is 
normally limited to enhancing and adjusting specific routines, or introducing new 
or improved products into production. Therefore key staff in Ghanaian PSDP com-
panies participating in a Business Partnership tend to require upgrading of their 
ability to identify investment projects and to search for appropriate technologies at 
the right place and price for the company more than staff in companies taking part 
in Start-up Facilities. That said, however, as the figures indicate, upgrading of these 
capabilities is only highly prioritised by a few PSDP collaborations: in the majority 
of collaborations, the Danish partner acts as a specialised agent who handles the in-
vestment interests of his or her Ghanaian partner (cf. section 4.5).  
As regards linkage capabilities in the Ghanaian PSDP companies, the data pro-
vides a mixed picture of the changes. On the one hand, ten companies have been 
able to augment their skills to establish, maintain and exploit links with other firms 
and institutions. On the other hand, five companies have experienced declining op-
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 portunities to link up with other firms and institutions with respect to their linkage 
capabilities.  
Like the upgrading of production and investment capabilities described above, 
the building of linkage capabilities is limited to the basic level. Moreover, upgrad-
ing of such capabilities is largely related to the new opportunities that collaboration 
with the Danish partner creates, and this type of upgrading is seldom specified as 
an aim in itself. Instead, there is a tendency for linkage capabilities to come about 
as by-products of the upgrading of production capabilities: increased product qual-
ity may necessitate better inputs, which then require tighter relationships to sub-
suppliers, or it may call for an upgrading of retailers or consumers, as the products 
need special handling. However, most often the relationship between the producer 
and its suppliers is kept at arm’s length, and thus, rather than upgrade existing sup-
pliers, new ones are found, most often with the help of the Danish PSDP partner, 
and therefore usually internationally.  
PSDP collaborations often tend to result in a move away from the local sphere 
towards a more international sphere: that is, there is a tendency for Ghanaian PSDP 
companies to replace existing locally oriented products, markets, inputs, suppliers 
etc. with products aimed at the international, or rather, Danish market, international 
(Danish) suppliers, Danish recipes etc. In other words, the PSDP tends to shift 
Ghanaian companies away from their previous local or national customers towards 
their Danish partner and its customers. In cases of co-operation collapse, the end 
result is usually a degradation of linkage capabilities: the PSDP has not resulted in 
any improvements, while simultaneously, the Ghanaian partner has lost its foothold 
in the domestic market. 
Table 8.1 and Table 8.2 above do not tell the full story of capability-building in 
the Ghanaian PSDP companies. First, the tables do not allow for changes in either 
degree or quality of technological capabilities. Secondly, they do not make any al-
lowance for either company-internal variations in technological capabilities or fluc-
tuations over time caused by, for instance, changes in staff. Lastly, they do not 
identify the causes of these changes. In order to obtain a fuller understanding of the 
processes that lead to changes in the technological capabilities of the Ghanaian 
PSDP companies, three cases are presented. The first illustrates the problems of 
building capabilities among the staff if the owner/manager keeps all the knowledge 
to him- or herself. The second focuses on aspects that, in theory, at least, are only 
of minor importance for technological capability building, but in practice tend to be 
very important. In this case, certain expectations with regard to both the PSDP and 
the Danish partner, which led the Ghanaian partner to make certain decisions, made 
capability building very difficult while also making the economic situation of the 
company worse than before the collaboration. The third case illustrates how fragile 
technological capabilities are in reality. In this case, basic production capabilities 
were built to cater for the new demands that came with collaboration with the Dan-
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 ish partner. However, these capabilities were hardly of any use as the collaboration 
ended, mainly because they were mostly related to specific recipes that were lost 
when the collaboration formally ended. 
Case II. Hierarchical structure and replacement of staff impede technological capability 
building (P17) 
When one Ghanaian woman returned to Ghana from her MA studies in the United 
States, she started working as a teacher while simultaneously writing children 
books. After a while a friend introduced her to the world of publishing, and eventu-
ally she found a job in a publishing house, where she was taught the basic skills of 
publishing. She soon realised that she was doing so well in this line of business that 
she decided to start a publishing company of her own. Based on her own manu-
scripts, she started her company more than a decade ago. During the first years of 
operation, the company only published children books, for one of which it won the 
1999 UNESCO children’s book prize as well as a prize for the best African chil-
dren’s book of the century. 
Due to her success in publishing children books she was invited to book fairs 
throughout Africa, where she met, among other people, a Danish publisher special-
ising in publishing fiction from developing countries, to whom she gave copies of 
her recent publications. When, a couple of years later, she learned about the possi-
bilities of PSDP funding through the African Publishers Network,273 she ap-
proached the only Dane she knew, namely the publisher of fiction from developing 
countries, and introduced him to the idea of PSDP collaboration.  
Now, some seven years after the PSDP collaboration was initiated, the range of 
books that this small Ghanaian publishing house is publishing has been broadened 
considerably: while it was limited to children books before the PSDP, it now com-
prises novels and short stories, as well as non-fiction. Likewise, the desktop pub-
lishing that was previously carried out by other companies is now done in-house, 
thus reducing both costs and time. Quality has increased because all the manu-
scripts are proof-read by the Danish partner before they are shipped to the printers. 
Printing quality has also been improved, mostly because printing is now done out-
side Ghana, while before it was done within the country.274 Increased turnover has 
                                                 
273 The African Publishers Network seeks to promote indigenous publishing in Africa through 
training, information-sharing and sales promotion. As part of the information-sharing, it informs its 
members of opportunities for funding. 
274 The choice of foreign printers instead of local ones derives mainly from the desire to increase 
quality, since foreign printers are considered better than Ghanaian ones. However, price is also a de-
termining factor: in order to increase the availability of books in Ghana, the Government has de-
cided to exempt books from VAT and import taxes: This exemption does not, however, apply to pa-
per, and it is therefore more expensive to print books in Ghana than, for instance, in eastern or 
southern Europe.  
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 come about as a consequence of the enlarged product range and improved quality 
of the books, but also because the company benefits from a Dfid development pro-
gramme that aims to enhance knowledge of developing countries, as well as gener-
ate greater demand by buying books from developing countries. Moreover, the 
PSDP collaboration has enabled the owner of the Ghanaian company to obtain 
credit from the printers, because the mere fact that she now has a non-African part-
ner increases her trustworthiness in the eyes of her business partners (see also Case 
XXII on page 279). 
As shown in Table 8.1, technological capabilities in the Ghanaian publishing 
company have increased in respect of both production capabilities and linkage ca-
pabilities since the start of the PSDP collaboration. Over these years, the 
owner/manager of the company has gradually enhanced her capabilities to adapt 
her products to export markets, as well as expanding her network to other publish-
ers and funding institutions. However, these positive changes do not apply across 
the board for either capabilities or staff.  
First, the owner/manager has paid a great deal of attention to product-centred 
capabilities, but less so to process-centred capabilities. She therefore continues to 
forward manuscripts to the Danish partner’s company for proof-reading instead of 
trying to build capabilities for this process in-house. Unfortunately, since it is time 
that is most often the limiting factor, the Danish partner chooses to correct the mis-
takes instead of making the Ghanaian employees correct them. On the one hand, 
this has resulted in a tendency for the Ghanaian employees to make the same errors 
over and over again. On the other hand, the improved quality of the owner’s publi-
cations has been noticed by both distributors and authors. Consequently, she has 
managed to have her books distributed through organisations and institutions spe-
cialising in books from SSA, from which she receives scarce foreign exchange with 
which to pay for the printers. At the same time, she is receiving an increasing num-
ber of manuscripts from African writers. 
Secondly, the Ghanaian owner/manager is well aware that her Danish partner 
has a wide network and great knowledge of the international publishing business. 
She therefore lets her Danish partner handle all communications with, for instance, 
printers, including locating them. During the course of the PSDP cooperation, 
therefore, she has not become acquainted with the skills necessary to explore and 
maintain these links. 
Thirdly, staff have been replaced in the Ghanaian company since the collabora-
tion began: a skilled desktop publisher was employed at the start of the interven-
tion, and technical training for the first couple of years was directed solely at her. 
However, after a few years she chose to quit her job. It is not yet clear what she de-
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 cided to do next. The Ghanaian owner/manager maintained that her former em-
ployee is now working in a bank, where she does not make use of any of the skills 
she acquired from the publishing company. However, an employee of the Danish 
company responsible for desktop publishing insisted that she was offered a better 
job in publishing.275 However that may be, the fact is that, with the replacement of 
staff, all technological capabilities relating to the preprint phase of the production 
process were lost (for the company), and new capabilities had to be developed. 
Fourthly, the Ghanaian company, despite its small size, has a very hierarchical 
structure, with impermeable boundaries between the various tasks, and has proba-
bly become even more hierarchical since the former desktop publisher left. Conse-
quently, the owner/manager is responsible for all decisions regarding which books 
to publish, does all the editing work and takes care of communicating with authors, 
her Danish partner, customers and international distributors. She has only opened 
one e-mail account in the company, which is her own account. Consequently, all 
communication between the Danish company and her employees concerning pre-
press work has to go through her – the Ghanaian employees simply do not commu-
nicate with representatives of the Danish partner if the latter are not physically pre-
sent in Ghana. Therefore, the Ghanaian employees only learn whenever staff from 
Denmark are in Ghana; in between these training sessions, they just continue to 
make the same mistakes over and over again. Moreover, the Ghanaian staff have 
many other responsibilities than desktop publishing, providing lunch, serving cof-
fee, fixing the toilets whenever they break down etc. Thus, the training sessions 
seldom become intensive, and valuable time goes on activities that could have been 
dealt with by others. 
In conclusion, this PSDP collaboration has indeed assisted the upgrading process 
in a small Ghanaian publishing company, but the process has been very uneven, 
and the Ghanaian company still depends greatly on its networks, and not just the 
capabilities of its Danish partner.  
Case III. Unfulfilled expectations lead to worsening technological capabilities (P16) 
In September 1999, a Ghanaian graphic designer was invited to Denmark to present 
his business at a TechChange fair in Herning. His company profile had been for-
warded to five potential Danish PSDP partners in advance, and besides these com-
panies, a couple of others were also showing an interest in collaborating with him. 
Approximately one year later, one of these companies came to Ghana to pursue the 
                                                 
275 I was unable to locate the former employee. The Ghanaian owner/manager did not want to 
pass me information concerning her whereabouts, and the Danish partner had also been unable to 
locate her. 
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 possibility of formal collaboration further. This particular company, which eventu-
ally became the PSDP partner, already had experience of a PSDP collaboration in 
the printing business in Zimbabwe.  
The Danish owner had no interest in starting a joint venture with his Ghanaian 
partner, and therefore the two partners, with assistance from DI, agreed to form a 
technical partnership, that is, a partnership with no underlying mutually binding 
agreement. The sole purpose of this was to upgrade and improve the existing pre-
press operations and to establish an in-house printing facility in the Ghanaian com-
pany. The transfer of technology was intended eventually to lead to a doubling in 
the number of employees, a reduction of the Ghanaian company’s reliance on ex-
ternal sources for printing services, an increase in its foreign-exchange earnings, 
increases in turnover and profits, and eventually an increase the government of 
Ghana’s tax base.  
The situation some three years later is still far from the hoped-for outcome of the 
PSDP collaboration. Hardly any activity is taking place, the Danida loans have not 
been repaid, almost all the employees have been laid off, the customers have gone, 
and a key machine is still not working.  
On the face of it, this ought not to have happened: the Ghanaian partner had a 
good reputation in Ghana as well as internationally, where he had won a couple of 
prizes for his design; his key staff had a theoretical as well as practical grounding in 
design and pre-press operations; the PSDP collaboration focused partly on already 
known techniques; and the Danish partner had previous experience of both the 
PSDP and SSA. Thus, the basic premises for successful technology transfer were 
present, and one would expect that the outcome of the collaboration would have 
been somewhat different from what actually happened. The big question is thus 
why did it happen, and what was the role of the PSDP in this process? 
A main reason why the intervention did not proceed as planned relates to unful-
filled expectations on the part of both partners. In 2000, when the Danish partner 
came to Ghana to prepare the application form for the PSDP, the Ghanaian com-
pany was facing problems due to its lack of in-house printing facilities. The com-
pany had neither printing nor finishing facilities, and therefore had to outsource this 
work. However, neither deadlines nor quality requirements were met by these com-
panies, and the Ghanaian graphic designer was receiving numerous complaints 
from his customers. He had no prior experience of development agencies or foreign 
partners and thought that the PSDP would begin shortly after the application form 
had been handed in. Similarly, he expected the technology transfer, including the 
necessary training and technical assistance, to translate into productivity gains 
quickly. Based on these expectations, he decided not to accept any more orders: 
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 since he did not want to risk getting a bad reputation and lose customers due to de-
lays and poor quality products while the PSDP collaboration got started, he was re-
luctant to initiate new projects and instead scaled down his business and focused 
entirely on what could be done in-house.  
However, the actual process of getting the PSDP up and running experienced de-
lays, and when the printing and finishing equipment eventually came to Ghana, 
parts of it did not work, and some minor parts were missing altogether. This proc-
ess lasted nearly one year, during which period the Ghanaian company was hardly 
producing anything and therefore not making any profit. Salaries were only being 
paid irregularly, which led to all the trained staff – that is, the manager, the design-
ers and the desktop publishers –to leave the company, either to start businesses of 
their own or to seek employment elsewhere. Therefore, when the PSDP got started, 
the level of technological capabilities among the Ghanaian staff was much lower 
than when the partners had first met. In reality, all technical work on the computers 
was carried out by a young Canadian geekcorp (a technology volunteer). In addi-
tion to the geekcorp, the staff comprised a secretary and a driver, who had been 
working there from before the Ghanaian owner/manager went to Herning, and a 
newly employed designer, a manager, two printers, and an assistant printer. None 
of the newly employed staff had any solid prior experience. Hence, the training and 
instruction became more demanding than anticipated, and technological capability 
building therefore went, much more slowly. Moreover, training plans had to be re-
worked, due to the change of staff. 
The Ghanaian partner was fully aware that his Danish partner had insisted that 
the collaboration should not be a joint venture, but the information he received 
from the Danish Embassy, his communications with other Ghanaian PSDP partners 
and his knowledge of the Danish partner’s prior PSDP experience gave him reason 
to believe that it was just a matter of time before his Danish partner changed his 
mind. Based on the preliminary talks, first in Herning and later in Ghana, the Gha-
naian partner decided that he had to find suitable offices for the company, which 
was about to increase in size. In addition, he took out a Danida loan to pay for a 
digital camera, computers, computer programmes, a scanner, a printer etc. None of 
this seemed to be a problem at the time, first because he expected to make a large 
profit,276 and secondly because he anticipated his Danish partner investing in the 
company. As is apparent from the above, none of this happened: the company is 
hardly producing, and the Danish owner/manager never invested in the company. 
                                                 
276 Figures in the feasibility study indicate that sales turnover would increase ten times in the five 
years following the start of the PSDP, and that company profits would increase 23 times during the 
same period! 
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 In fact, the Danish partner pulled out of the collaboration shortly after it was ini-
tiated and left responsibility for it to a former employee of his, who now has his 
own private company. As already mentioned, the Danish partner had already taken 
part in one Danida-funded PSDP activity in the same line of business. He thought 
that he could transfer his experience from this collaboration directly to the one in 
Ghana, but failed to realise that the printing sectors in the two countries were very 
different, that competition in Ghana was fiercer, and that the training needed was 
different. On top of this, the Danish partner’s relationship with key personnel in the 
embassy was characterised by a certain degree of mistrust. His former employee, 
who had taken over from him, possessed managerial and organisational capabilities 
but no technical capabilities. Also, he did not face any economic risks: the PSDP 
was essentially seen as a way of coping with changing demands in his own com-
pany. 
Several other factors have influenced the current situation of the company. Most 
importantly, a combination of unfulfilled expectations and declining business made 
the Ghanaian owner/manager spend more and more time on his other income-
earning activities. This meant that the company lost more and more customers, 
while the newly employed staff either left the company or were fired. Also signifi-
cant was the fact that the Ghanaian partner had no technical knowledge of the new 
computers and desktop programmes in the pre-press department, the colour offset 
machines in the printing department, or to the laminating, stapling and folding ma-
chines in the finishing department. Moreover, the newly employed staff had no 
prior knowledge to build upon, and the Danish partner responsible for the collabo-
ration had only managerial and organisational experience. Technical training was 
thus only conducted in relation to the installation of new machines.  
In the end, therefore, technological capabilities in this Ghanaian graphic de-
signer company were lower two years after the Business Partnership was initiated 
than when the partners first met in Denmark. During the initial phase of the PSDP 
collaboration, the Ghanaian partner decided where to relocate the company and was 
able to find a suitable project, namely the PSDP. Likewise, the already existing 
technologies had been installed anew. Thus, the company already possessed basic 
investment capabilities when the PSDP took off. In principle, no change took place 
in this form of technological capability during the course of the collaboration. The 
story is somewhat different, however, as regards both production and linkage capa-
bilities. While, prior to the PSDP collaboration, the company was indeed able to 
perform tasks that could position its production capabilities between the basic and 
the intermediate levels within the narrow range of activities the company under-
took, its current employees are hardly able to carry out routine production control 
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 or basic equipment maintenance, nor to replicate specifications from either the 
Danish partner or customers: in other words, they hardly possess any simple or ba-
sic production capabilities. Almost the same can be said about the linkage capabili-
ties. While the Ghanaian graphic design company was previously able to link up 
with its suppliers and subcontractors – and even tough these contractors were one 
of the main reason for upgrading the company – these capabilities are currently un-
used and, moreover, are only possessed by the owner/manager. 
Case IV. Technological capability set-backs in a small textile enterprise (P6) 
In 1996, a Start-up Facility was initiated between a small-scale Danish textile com-
pany and a small-scale Ghanaian textile company, and in 2000, the partners signed 
an agreement for a Business Partnership. Three years later, the partnership had 
ended abruptly, and the Ghanaian company in many ways resembled what it was 
almost a decade earlier. What happened during these nine years, and especially why 
it happened, is unclear. The various stakeholders tell somewhat different stories. 
This account relates predominantly to the building of technological capabilities in 
the small Ghanaian textile company. It seeks to include the views of the two main 
stakeholders, the Ghanaian and Danish partners. However, not all aspects are exam-
ined here from both sides. In these cases, the findings are backed by my own ob-
servations or the observations of third parties. 
The Danish partner already had experience of a business venture with an SSA 
partner when the Start-up Facility began in the mid-1990s. Her former experience 
was actually the main reason why she learned about the PSDP. Danida’s pro-
gramme coordinator at the Danish embassy in Accra had read about her business 
ventures. As the PSDP was then still relatively new, he was looking for potential 
partners, both in Denmark and in Ghana. He therefore contacted the Danish partner 
and invited her to Ghana to visit a few textile companies. Based on her former ex-
port experience, as well as her prior experience with a development agency, the 
Ghanaian female textile entrepreneur was chosen for a PSDP collaboration.  
At the time the Ghanaian company was producing hand-dyed textiles, mostly 
batik for the local market. It had a few girl employees and otherwise used casual 
labourers whenever needed. All chemicals, dyes, fabric etc. were of local origin and 
mostly bought in small quantities from small enterprises in the nearby area. The in-
tention of the PSDP was to turn the company into an ‘export class business’ by 
providing new designs, making quality improvements and introducing new prod-
ucts. Competition among small textile companies in Ghana was increasing. Mean-
while, the Ghanaian partner’s local market was shrinking, due to a lack of new 
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 ideas and new products. The Ghanaian partner therefore saw plenty of possibilities 
in the new collaboration.  
In accordance with her Danish partner, therefore, she chose to concentrate fully 
on the new market opportunities in Denmark. Basically, she imported all the dyes 
and most of the chemicals through her Danish partner (dyes from the partner and 
chemicals from Germany), produced the textiles, and re-exported her products to 
Denmark. The Danish partner designed all the products before their production in 
Ghana. At the end of the Start-up Facility, the Ghanaian company had changed all 
of her production in such a way that it catered to her Danish partner’s requirements. 
However, this also meant that she lost all her local customers, as they had no inter-
est in the new designs or new colours. Thus, when the collaboration ended with ac-
cusations of irregularities on the part of the Ghanaian owner/manager, she had to 
start again from scratch because the Danish partner had been responsible for all her 
supplies, as well as for the retail same of the products. All the production capabili-
ties that had been build up during this phase proved useless, like the new tech-
niques and new designs in the local market.  
During the Start-up Facility, the Ghanaian owner/manager experienced a posi-
tive change in her company. She had employed a couple of primary school leavers 
to operate the sewing machines that came as part of the PSDP collaboration, turn-
over had increased, and she had been taught new techniques. She was therefore ea-
ger to continue the collaboration, even though she acknowledged that it had been 
far from easy to work with her Danish partner. The Danish partner, for her part, did 
not want to continue with the collaboration, but was persuaded to do so by the Dan-
ish programme coordinator, as he considered the textile industry to be important for 
Ghana.  
In the course of preparation for the second phase, the partners decided that the 
Business Partnership should not focus entirely on re-export to Denmark but instead 
be equally divided between the home market and the Danish market in order to 
avoid a total collapse if or when the collaboration ended.  
By 2000, when the Business Partnership took off, the Ghanaian company was 
virtually dormant. The Ghanaian owner/manager had taken up production of tex-
tiles and garments for the local market again, but due to a lack of working capital 
she could only buy small quantities of fabric, chemicals and dyes whenever she re-
ceived an order. All her employees apart from her adopted daughter had been laid 
off due to declining sales, and many technological capabilities had been lost, 
mostly because the Ghanaian owner/manager had not used the techniques she had 
learnt since the end of the Start-up Facility, but also because her employees had 
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 now left the company.277 Technological capability building therefore had to start 
again. 
Besides the double focus, in many ways the Business Partnership resembled the 
Start-up Facility: the Danish partner made the designs before the textiles were pro-
duced in Ghana and re-exported. Training was organised so as to support this proc-
ess. The Danish partner taught her Ghanaian partner, her adopted daughter and two 
new employees how to work with colours and how to dye. Moreover, attention was 
paid to replicating her specifications and improving the quality of her products. In 
order not to make the same mistake twice, the Ghanaian owner/manager also 
hunted for customers in public as well as private offices in the nearby area. 
However, she had difficulties turning the textile company into a sound business. 
The Danish partner demanded a relatively high royalty on her designs, which the 
Ghanaian owner/manager could not add to the price of locally sold products. She 
therefore contacted her lawyer, who insisted that the royalty at the very most should 
be one-quarter of the current royalty, which according to him was the highest roy-
alty one could legally pay in Ghana. This conflict over royalties, among other con-
flicts over marketing strategies, timely deliveries, budgets etc., eventually led to the 
total collapse of the collaboration.  
According to the Ghanaian owner/manager, the Danish partner told her one day 
that she needed the book in which they had collected all the designs, the colours, 
the dyes etc. for all the textiles they were producing because she had to make some 
corrections during the night. That was the last time she saw either the book or her 
Danish partner. Once again she had to start anew. Of course her production capa-
bilities had been increased and the collaboration itself had been an eye-opener for 
her, as she is now aware of the potential of other designs and fabrics, though is not 
able to make these designs herself. During the past nine years, however, she has 
lost all her connections with local suppliers of dye and chemicals and no longer has 
any regular customers. Both input and output were previously taken care of by her 
Danish partner. This arrangement is now finished, and she is now worse off in 
terms of linkage capability than when she began the collaboration almost a decade 
ago. Moreover, the company’s unstable turnover and profit make it impossible for 
her to obtain a loan in any commercial bank in Ghana. 
                                                 
277 All former employees are now housewives who are either not working at home or selling 
foodstuffs locally. According to the Ghanaian owner/manager, they all wanted to start their own tex-
tile businesses, but since none of them could find the necessary capital, they chose instead to get 
married and now have children. 
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 8.1.2 Technological capability building in Ghanaian PSDP companies: 
determining factors  
Technological capability building and the related upgrading process in Ghanaian 
companies are key indicators of the longer-term impacts of Danida’s PSDP. 
On the one hand, Case I to Case IV illustrate factors of importance for building 
technological capabilities in Ghanaian PSDP enterprises. One of these factors is 
learning. However, as spelled out in section 4.4.1, different learning mechanisms 
are useful in order to build different forms of technological capability, and espe-
cially to build different levels of technological capability. As shown by the cases 
above, capabilities in the Ghanaian PSDP companies mostly stem from firm-
external sources, or more precisely, from the interaction with the Danish company 
via the PSDP. By far the most frequently applied teaching methods in the PSDP 
collaborations include learning-by-doing and learning-by-using. These learning 
methods are especially advantageous for building basic production capabilities or 
capabilities that lie in the vicinity of what is already known in the recipient com-
pany. They relate directly to the new equipment sponsored by Danida and are easily 
transformed for use in training and technical assistance. However, they may not be 
sufficient to build intermediate and advanced technological capabilities: in order to 
move beyond a certain threshold, other learning mechanisms are needed. Of impor-
tance here are learning-by-interacting, learning-by-searching and learning from 
spill-overs. Of these, only learning-by-interacting is employed in the PSDP, using 
the relationship between the Danish and Ghanaian companies, as they are defined 
by having dissimilar capabilities. 
On the other hand, the cases discussed show that no general life histories may be 
applied to technological capability building in Ghanaian PSDP companies. Specific 
circumstances relating to the collaboration itself, as well as to the economic and po-
litical contexts in which it is situated, determine how capabilities are developed. 
However, some general observations can be made. The first is that technological 
capabilities tend to come together. In other words, increased production capability 
levels tend to cause linkage and investment capability levels to rise, but not neces-
sarily so. If the building of, for instance, linkage capabilities is not attended to pur-
posively, and if the Danish partner takes responsibility for procurement, sales, 
technology etc. linkage capabilities may either not develop or in certain cases actu-
ally decline. Similarly, investment capabilities need special attention from the 
PSDP collaboration in order to expand. However, almost all of the PSDP collabora-
tions pay attention to building production capabilities. Only very few collaborations 
pay deliberate attention to investment and linkage capabilities, respectively. One 
should therefore not expect all Ghanaian PSDP companies to make equal progress 
in all forms of technological capabilities. 
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 Factors internal as well as external to Danida’s PSDP seem to influence techno-
logical capability building. Put differently, the Ghanaian business system, like the 
PSDP design itself, may hinder capability building. Since, in general, Ghanaian 
companies are in constant need of capital (cf. section 7.3), most decisions seem to 
be based on the availability of capital rather than strategic planning. The decision to 
seek a Danish partner and apply for PSDP funding may be perceived as a strategy 
of enhancing the availability of capital. However, this choice usually leads to en-
tails investment-related decisions being taken by the Danish partner, who comes to 
act as a specialised agent: investment capabilities therefore only tend to be devel-
oped if the PSDP partners deliberately seek and plan to develop them. 
As already mentioned, processes of production capability building are most of-
ten stated in the form of the objectives of the collaboration: they form the central 
part of the PSDP. Therefore, improvements in this form of technological capability 
are more prevalent than in the other forms. However, the level of capabilities sel-
dom passes beyond a certain (relatively low) threshold. There are two main reasons 
for this. The first is related to the Ghanaian educational system (cf. section 7.4), 
where technical skills are mostly taught under apprenticeship-like circumstances, 
which ensures that skills are very firm-specific. This also means that most employ-
ees do not have a theoretical background to build on, which may impede the build-
ing of more advanced technological capabilities. The second reason is associated 
with the PSDP: in almost half of the PSDP cases examined in Ghana, the partners 
sought to introduce a completely new product as part of the PSDP (cf. section 
8.2.4). As shown in section 4.4.1, learning processes are usually at least partly cu-
mulative, that is, companies seldom jump from one sector to another, as the efforts 
needed to do so are far greater than just advancing along one path. The introduction 
of new products therefore demands great technological efforts, which, however, 
cannot always be met due to the structure of the Ghanaian educational system. 
Moreover, the new technologies introduced by the Danish PSDP partner may im-
pose discontinuities that also hinder rapid improvements in production capabilities. 
In general, linkage capability building is neglected, as the initiative in searching 
for and exploiting business links is left to either the Danish embassy or the Danish 
partner, or both. As soon as the matchmaking between the two partners has been 
completed and the application for funding approved, many Ghanaian owner-
managers expect the enterprise to develop instantly, due to access to the Danish 
market, new machines and a steady inflow of capital. However, this is seldom the 
case, as Danida’s specific routines make administrative procedures lengthy, and 
time schedules are seldom observed because of financial constraints, difficulties in 
obtaining the right equipment, problems in procuring high-quality inputs etc. 
Moreover, partners underestimate the time it takes to get to know each other. In-
stead of searching for alternative markets and other funding channels, owner-
managers slow down operations and wait. The result is often that they lose custom-
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 ers and pull out of agreements with sub-suppliers. Therefore, linkage capabilities 
deteriorate. 
A technological capability building strategy using the PSDP may end up being a 
two-edged sword. On the one hand, the PSDP collaboration facilitates relatively 
rapid improvements in some forms of technological capability, as the PSDP offers 
access to training and equipment. On the other hand, the Ghanaian enterprise may 
end up being fettered to one partner, namely the Danish PSDP company. There is 
therefore a tendency for the programme to cause excessive dependence, which may 
eventually impede functional upgrading in the recipient company: that is, the PSDP 
may hinder improvement in the overall skill content of the activities performed in 
the firm because the Ghanaian company relies totally on its Danish partners and 
thus fails to upgrade central investment and linkage capabilities. 
8.2 Simple indicators fail to grasp the complexity of impact: an 
attempt to measure intended impacts on the target group 
The recently published meta-evaluation of so-called ‘Private and Business Sector 
Development Interventions’ repeatedly criticises the ‘sometimes subjective and 
qualitative’ indicators used to evaluate Danish PSD support. Instead, the evaluation 
team proposes that indicators should ‘be quantitative without being highly techni-
cal’. More precisely, it suggests that evaluations should adopt indicators such as 
changes in turnover, changes in value added, and changes in market development 
(Danida, 2004a: 8f, 53, 63f).278  
In so far as an intervention’s development targets and objectives are presented in 
a quantitative form, evaluations may also apply quantitative measures to determine 
whether or not an intervention has reached its goals, but without clearly defined 
targets and objectives (as is the case in Danida’s PSD interventions), no clear rea-
son exists why quantitative measures should be any more valid or objective than 
qualitative ones.  
In the specific case of Danida’s PSDP in Ghana, many local enterprises do not 
have detailed information regarding, for instance, changes in value added over a 
long period of time, nor does information exist regarding the number of companies 
within a certain sector, or the number or types of goods available. Thus, strictly 
quantitative figures based on ambiguous data tend to suggest accuracy where no 
accuracy actually exists. In addition, an assessment of impact based on such figures 
alone would be highly unreliable, as these figures do not take the source of change 
                                                 
278 Among the most criticised evaluations are those of the Private Sector Development Pro-
gramme, which is said to be based only on qualitative indicators, with no clear indication of how 
they are operationalised; and of the Mixed Credit Programme, which is also said to be based only on 
qualitative indicators. 
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 into account: it is very unlikely that changes in these categories should be the sole 
product of the PSDP. More likely, they are the result of an interplay of factors, of 
which the PSDP may be one. 
Moreover, an impact study as defined in Chapter 3 seeks to understand the 
changes that are associated with aid interventions, not merely to list them. Changes 
here are perceived as the result of an interplay between Danida’s PSDP, the partici-
pating Danish and Ghanaian enterprises, other stakeholders, the economic and po-
litical situation in Ghana, and the Ghanaian business system.279 To facilitate man-
ageability of the impact study, a three-pronged design has been chosen (cf. section 
3.4 page 74), which distinguishes between impacts at the enterprise level (that is, 
the target group), at the private-sector level, and at the society level. 
The aims of the PSDP collaborations are unclear. As noted in Chapter 2, Danida 
does not stipulate which development goals are most important, nor how many of 
them the partners have to fulfil (or in what order, or if at all). Moreover, these goals 
cannot be assessed in all cases due to Danida’s policy of confidentiality (cf. section 
6.2.1); and many PSDP partners, especially in the early years of the PSDP in 
Ghana, stated the goals so vaguely that an unambiguous assessment of goal-
fulfilment would be misleading.280
Instead, four indicators have been chosen that focus on the developmental issues 
involved in the PSDP. These are changes in employment, which are included be-
cause it is the argument in favour of the PSDP that is most often put forward by 
Danida; changes in earnings, which are used as a proxy for the economic achieve-
ments of the company; changes in productivity, which provide an idea of a com-
pany’s ability to make a profit; and changes in products, which hint at enhanced 
product or process capabilities. Moreover, when combined, these indicators give an 
impression of the current economic situation in the Ghanaian PSDP companies, 
their capacity to make vital investments, their ability to compete locally as well as 
abroad, and their potential to increase incomes. 
Although at first such indicators may provide an idea of how the PSDP has 
fared, they are riddled with uncertainties. This section therefore argues that they 
may well provide a rough, summary idea of the situation in the local companies 
                                                 
279 One could argue that numerous other factors also affect the changes, most notably aspects of 
the Danish business system and patterns of globalisation. However, these factors are only included 
where a relationship between these aspects and changes in the PSDP company are probable. 
280 Actually, the Danish Audit Department compared the objectives stated in the application 
forms with the performance of the company-to-company collaborations. It found that in Ghana only 
three collaborations met the stated goals to a large degree, eight met the goals to an acceptable de-
gree, while five met the goals to a lesser degree (Rigsrevisionen, 2003). 
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 subsequent to a PSDP collaboration, but in order to understand how the interven-
tion has impacted on the target group, much richer data is required. 
8.2.1 Changes in employment  
As spelled out in section 2.2.2, one of the criteria used by Danida in order to as-
sess potential PSDP collaborations is their ability to create or preserve jobs. Only 
the creation of jobs may be measured quantitatively with any accuracy, as assessing 
the preservation of jobs clearly has to be based on a more thorough discussion of 
possible future scenarios once Danida’s support has been withdrawn. Moreover, 
according to Mead and Liedholm (1998: 66), this indicator is the most widely used 
indicator of change in the small-enterprise sector, as it is ‘most easily and accu-
rately remembered by entrepreneurs’ compared to other indicators “…and because 
it does not need to be deflated”. However, data from the small-enterprise sector in 
SSA suggests that the ‘changes in employment’ indicator is biased: employment 
data seem to increase with a lag after substantial growth in, for instance, turnover. 
Based on these findings, employment data suggest a conservative estimate of the 
changes in the company (Mead and Liedholm, 1998: 67).  
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 Table 8.3 and Table 8.4 above depict the changes in employment since the individ-
ual PSDP collaborations were initiated. The first row refers to the numbers given to 
the collaborations (cf. Appendix B). ‘P’ denotes Business Partnership and ‘S’ de-
notes Start-up Facility. The second and third rows in Table 8.3 and the second row 
in Table 8.4 refer to the year the collaboration was initiated and thus indicate the 
time-span of the change in employment between the figure at the start (row four in 
Table 8.3) and the figure at the time of fieldwork in 2002 and 2003 respectively 
(rows five and six). The cases described in section 8.2.1 are highlighted.  
An analysis of the changes in employment in the PSDP collaborations based 
merely on quantitative data does provide some meagre initial results (see Table 8.3 
and Table 8.4 above): in six Business Partnerships and nine Start-up Facilities, the 
number of employees has increased since the start of the collaboration; it has re-
mained unchanged in four Business Partnerships and two Start-up Facilities, de-
creased in nine Business Partnerships and nine Start-up Facilities, while for two 
Business Partnerships and three Start-up Facilities information is lacking.  
Before proceeding with a more thorough examination of the changes in em-
ployment in the PSDP collaborations, this indicator requires further qualification. 
First, not all collaborations actually aim to increase the number of employees, some 
focusing instead on, for instance, expansion of production or achieving export ex-
perience. Second, the changes in the number of employees are not necessarily re-
lated to the PSDP collaboration, but may result from, for instance, changing mar-
kets, or changes in other parts of the recipient company. Third, positive employ-
ment changes in Ghana do not necessarily designate positive overall impacts, but 
may instead conceal specific Ghanaian Business System characteristics. Fourth, al-
though the number of employees is constantly changing, the picture provided here 
is largely static. Fifth, various types of employee are included in the aggregate fig-
ure provided in Table 8.3 and Table 8.4, such as family labour, casual workers, 
part-time and full-time employees. Likewise, the figure covers skilled as well as 
unskilled workers, and managers, expatriates and administrative as well as opera-
tional staff: an adjustment in the number of jobs does not explain qualitative 
changes in employment as a result of the PSDP. Lastly, employment data in the 
Ghanaian PSDP companies must be treated with reservations: some 
owner/managers clearly embellished the data, either because they saw me as a po-
tential donor (cf. section 6.3), or because they wanted to conceal company, market 
or staff problems. Employment data may relate to various groups of more or less 
permanently employed staff (cf. section 6.2.2), and in any case most 
owner/managers could not recall the exact number of employees they had at the 
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 end of the (formal) PSDP collaboration. Thus, all figures relate to the situation in 
2002 and 2003 respectively. 
The four cases presented below demonstrate some of the problems involved in 
using this indicator.281 These cases show that a change in the number of jobs may 
derive from other mechanisms than the PSDP, such as international trends in the 
supply and demand of a particular good (Case V); that immediate changes may 
very well be different from longer-term changes revealed by this indicator (Case 
VI); that negative changes in employment may reveal positive adjustments in the 
company as a whole (Case VII); and that employment data may be embellished 
(Case VIII). 
Case V. Employment increase not related to the PSDP (P9) 
The first case is very unusual in many ways: it has received funding twice, it in-
cludes many other aspects than purely business ones, and it includes a whole com-
munity as partner. The largest forest and wood-processing company in Ghana in the 
mid-1990s was given a concession by the Government of Ghana. The area was an 
off-forest reserve located between two large forest reserves.282 From aerial photos 
dating a few years back, the forest in this area seemed to be almost as dense as in 
the adjacent forest reserves, but within the last couple of years the farmers living 
and working in the area had started cutting more and more of the wood without re-
planting any trees.  
Both the population of this area and the two partners therefore had an interest in 
making the forest remain healthy in order to make the production of timber and 
non-timber products possible in the future. The local farmers are mostly migrants 
who have moved into the area to cultivate cocoa, but the soil is not suitable for co-
coa cultivation. The yield per acre is very low compared to other cocoa-producing 
areas, and farmers must therefore cultivate an ever larger area in order to obtain the 
same yield as other farmers. Hence, they were interested in any project that could 
increase their income. The two formal partners, a Ghanaian timber company and a 
Danish trading company, also saw possibilities in the project, which aimed to re-
                                                 
281 The examples are not limited to the seven in-depth studies (cf. section 6.2.1), but cover all 48 
different collaborations. Here, the cases are chosen according to their strategic importance in rela-
tion to the general problem – that is, they are chosen to reveal as much knowledge as possible 
(Flyvbjerg, 1991, 2004). Data for the cases derive principally from my interviews with 
owner/managers and employees in the Ghanaian PSDP companies; application forms, feasibility 
studies and other relevant material made available by the partners; discussions with Danish partners; 
and sporadic data from Danida documents, such as reviews, evaluations and presentations. 
282 In an off-forest reserve the local chief may give permission to any farmer to cultivate the 
land, but the trees in the area are vested in the state. Hence, the timber industries need permission 
from the government to log the trees. These special rules, which that relate to off-forest reserves, 
therefore often give rise to conflicts between the chiefs and the logging companies (and the state). 
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 duce the reforestation, as this would eventually increase the sustainability of their 
businesses.  
The idea for a forest-management programme came from the Ghanaian partner, 
which knew that, in order to make a profit, in the long run it had to avoid conflicts 
and make sure that the off-forest area continued to produce logs. At the time, the 
Ghanaian partner was already trading with the Danish company, which knew of the 
PSDP and was aware that the collaboration itself had to be specially designed to 
make it suitable for PSDP funding. Funding was approved with the help of an ex-
ternal consultant and an eager ambassador, although the collaboration had hardly 
anything in common with usual PSDP collaborations. The Business Partnership 
was very complex – too complex, as it turned out. It included, among other things, 
the dissemination of information to the farmers to make them realise that it was 
economically beneficial to regenerate the forest; extension services so as to intro-
duce new crops; and a community development fund that transferred funds from 
the logging company to the population of the area (US$ 5 for every cubic metre of 
timber). Meanwhile, however, the Ghanaian Government eagerly promoted cocoa 
cultivation, which made it very difficult to persuade the farmers to change the way 
they cultivated the area. 
By the time the Business Partnership ended, therefore, although many activities 
were just about to take off, the risk of a collapse was still overwhelming, as the in-
terests involved in the project were many and often contradictory. In order to cope 
with its complexity and make it more profitable, the partners applied for another 
Business Partnership, this time involving a NGO to be responsible for the agricul-
tural aspects of the collaboration. Central to the second phase of the Business Part-
nership was the introduction of new species that were intended to make it possible 
for the business partners to exploit a greater share of the forest economically.  
During the course of the two phases of the partnership, the number of employees 
in the Ghanaian timber company increased dramatically: in 1995, when the PSDP 
collaboration formally began, the company employed roughly three hundred peo-
ple; by 2002, the number of staff, who were mostly hired on a day-to-day basis, had 
increased to approximately two thousand. In between staff numbers had fluctuated 
dramatically.  
What is important here is that this increase cannot be ascribed to the PSDP at all 
but relates solely to international trends in prices and the demand for tropical tim-
ber. Thus, while the PSDP collaboration between the Ghanaian logging company 
and the Danish trading company – which also involved a community of a thousand 
migrants in Ghana’s Western Region and an international environmental NGO – 
has indeed benefited positively to the economic development of the area, an unac-
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 companied indicator such as ‘changes in employment’ does not shed any light on 
this (cf. Chapter 9). 
Case VI. Immediate changes in employment are different from the longer-term impact (P4) 
The second case is a joint venture between a former Ghanaian SOE, a relatively 
small Danish pharmaceutical company that mainly sells its products abroad, IFU, 
the Nordic Development Fund and the Ghana Venture Capital Fund. While the ini-
tial period of getting acquainted lasted a couple of years, the Business Partnership 
really took off in 1998. By the time the Ghanaian SOE first made contact with the 
Danish company, it was obvious that the company would go into liquidation before 
long. However, the PSDP and the extra capital derived from the investment funds 
initially improved the economic state of the company, and in 2001, just after a new 
local management team had taken over, the number of employees was 91. Ten 
months later, this number was reduced to 56 and decreasing.  
The Ghanaian market for pharmaceutical products is highly competitive: in 
2002, eighteen other pharmaceutical companies were present in Ghana, and in addi-
tion imports, especially from India, were increasingly penetrating the market. 
Moreover, the product range of the Ghanaian PSDP company is quite typical in 
having only one product based on local raw materials. Therefore, the company has 
experiences difficulties in increasing its profits, and liquidity is again very tight – 
according to the general manager, the company is very close to bankruptcy. How-
ever, these two factors do not make up a full explanation for the current situation: 
just as important as the competitive market and question of mainstream products is 
the fact that a large share of the machines that came with the PSDP, such as the 
sugar film protection machine, were never made to work properly. In addition, the 
company has to make high service payments on its old debt, the former manage-
ment team did not realise the economic difficulties in time, and the Danish partner 
has gradually withdrawn from cooperation, as it too has been experiencing eco-
nomic difficulties.  
Based on this case, employment data alone may suggest, for instance, first, that 
the PSDP has had an impressive positive effect, since the collaboration with the 
Danish partner and the availability of extra funds ensured that the Ghanaian com-
pany did not go bankrupt in the late 1990s; or secondly, that the PSDP at best had 
no effect, and that the liquidation of the company has just been postponed; or 
thirdly, and worse, that it had a negative effect, as several employees have been laid 
off since the start of the collaboration.  
More careful analysis of the case, however, suggests that the PSDP has indeed 
had an immediate impact on the intended beneficiary, the Ghanaian partner in that 
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 it temporarily gave life to an insolvent former SOE. However, the joint venture did 
not recognise the challenges facing the company in time. Second, the product range 
was not altered sufficiently. Third, collaboration was restricted to training and did 
not take account of the managerial problems. Fourth, some machines were unsuit-
able, and many ended up standing idle. Last, the collaboration did not take the eco-
nomic situation of the company fully into consideration. Therefore, the longer-term 
impact of the PSDP collaboration has been negligible.  
This picture is indeed very far from that of the same case presented in Danida’s 
own publications. In a presentation of business collaborations, it states: ‘Constant 
growth and productivity gains have given [the company] reason for optimism’ 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.). 
Case VII. Employment has been adjusted to make the company economically viable (S23) 
Through one of its customers, who had already participated in two PSDP collabora-
tions, a small Ghanaian marketing and design company heard of the possibilities of 
finding a Danish partner, which one the one hand could provide equipment for the 
company, and on the other hand could supply it with the necessary technical train-
ing to make it more competitive. The Ghanaian company was increasingly faced 
with problems due to its limited resources: preprint operations and printing had to 
be outsourced, quality was low, and orders were often delayed. What was needed 
was to enter the printing business to cut down costs, increase reliability, and thus 
regain old markets as well as win new ones.  
The Start-up Facility with a small printing company in Denmark included a sec-
ond-hand one-colour offset printer and a couple of computers for desktop publish-
ing. Unsurprisingly, the aged equipment has generated minor problems of mainte-
nance, repair, capacity etc. What is important, though, is that it has totally changed 
the Ghanaian company: while previously it was constrained by its lack of equip-
ment to focus only on the design phase, it now performs the whole range of tasks, 
from the initial idea through to the final printing. During the course of this trans-
formation, its customers have also changed drastically, and turnover has increased 
rapidly. Concurrently, the number of employees has decreased by 33 percent! 
The Danish partner found that, in order to make the Ghanaian company profit-
able, it simply had to make two employees redundant. This means that, on top of 
the two owner/managers, the company now consists merely of a graphic designer, 
two printers and a secretary. Laying off these two workers was therefore part of a 
strategy to make it a paying business and does not denote anything negative. How-
ever, this simple truth would not have been grasped had this indicator not been sub-
stantiated.  
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 Case VIII. Embellishment of data: stated versus actual staff (S3) 
A Ghanaian entrepreneur with a dense network of politically important individuals, 
including a current minister who has worked as a financial manager and a senior 
consultant for his company and a former programme officer at Empretec,283 was 
advised to approach the Danish Embassy for support for his business idea. A couple 
of years prior to his PSDP application his company, which was mainly based on the 
work of a volunteer from the Geekcorps Ghana Programme, had developed a DOS-
based rural-banking computer system. Since then, the programme had become out-
dated and needed updating. Hence, the Ghanaian entrepreneur was looking for a 
foreign partner that could assist his company in obtaining the necessary knowledge 
to translate the programme into Windows. Based on information from his close 
network, he knew that Danida was supporting rural banks in Ghana. Thus, he 
trusted the embassy to pass his application, which it did.284  
While the Ghanaian entrepreneur was waiting for the PSDP collaboration to 
start, he made contact with an international bank that deals mostly with rural bank-
ing in developing countries. This bank was searching for a company that could de-
velop a contextually adapted rural banking system for its activities in Ghana. Thus, 
based on his expectations for the future PSDP collaboration, he employed ten peo-
ple to develop the banking system for the international bank. By the start of the 
PSDP collaboration with a Danish educational institution,285 the Ghanaian com-
pany was therefore employing some forty people, but the owner/manager soon real-
ised that the international bank had chosen an international partner to develop its 
banking system, and therefore he sacked the ten newly recruited workers. 
                                                 
283 Empretec is among the best known business-training centres in Ghana, with a certain reputa-
tion and a broad coverage. It was founded by an international network, which aims to develop entre-
preneurs to become internationally competitive. In Ghana, it has received support from UNDP, the 
NBSSI and Barclays Bank. Until recently, Empretec had offices in all major cities in Ghana. How-
ever, the Tamale office was closed down in 2002, officially due to the outbreak of the conflict in the 
Northern Region, which made potential investors withdraw their assets from the area. Unofficially, 
however, the reason should be sought in the lack of private investment in the area. Empretec offers a 
range of different courses and seminars, mostly focused on enhancing the entrepreneurial compe-
tences of the candidates. The most renowned of these is the ten-day workshop, which, based on role-
plays and games, seeks to change the minds of the entrepreneurs from a survivalist approach to a 
more growth-oriented one. Besides these workshops, Empretec Ghana offers a range of other 
courses, among them courses that aim to prepare Ghanaian entrepreneurs for business collaborations 
with foreign partners. Empretec also organises the Empretec Forum, a self-supporting membership 
organisation with its own secretariat, that aims to strengthen networks and links among former par-
ticipants in the workshop. Also of importance is the increasing collaboration with established educa-
tional institutions, such as tertiary technical institutions and universities (Deteah, 2003; Eku, 2003; 
Gibson, 1999; McGrath and King, 1994). 
284 According to a former Danish PS Coordinator, there is a tendency for Ghanaian partners that 
have participated in one or more of Empretec’s (preparation) courses to perform better in the PSDP 
than non-Empretec course participants (Carlsen, 2002). 
285 Officially the Danish partner is a public institution, but it also contains private entities. 
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 A number of misunderstandings and differing expectations brought the collabo-
ration to an end after the formal end of the Start-up Facility. Of major importance 
here is the fact that the Danish partner did not specialise in software development, 
but in distant learning. Initially this did not pose a major problem, as the Ghanaian 
owner/manager knew that the Government of Ghana had plans to develop distance 
learning in rural areas, and Danida, as well as other donors, supported education in 
Ghana. Thus, he expected that this new line of business would easily prosper – he 
had already established connections with Danida. During the initial meeting be-
tween the partners, the Ghanaian owner/manager was shown several other Danish 
companies specialising in software development. Therefore, the intention was to do 
distant learning with the PSDP partner, and then let the Danish partner spearhead 
the collaboration with other Danish companies to facilitate a transfer of the neces-
sary knowledge to upgrade the rural banking system. To take account of both part-
ners’ wishes and capacities, the final project plan laid down the following four 
components for the PSDP collaboration: Windows software development, the de-
velopment of financial systems for district assemblies, distant learning, and web-
based design (a prerequisite for distance learning). In the end, however, the Start-up 
Facility focused only on the latter component, namely web design, which was new 
to all employees in the Ghanaian company. The training plan did not take the low 
initial skill level of the employees into consideration, and therefore, by the end of 
the collaboration, none of the Ghanaian employees were yet able to construct a 
web-page (cf. section 8.2.4 below). 
The other component of the project of interest to the Danish partner, a distance 
learning centre, was never started at all. Distance learning in Ghana absolutely re-
quires a wireless radio of some capacity. The Ghanaian partner was informed of 
this and made some preliminary arrangements with a Tema-based company. How-
ever, the Danish partner argued that the capacity of this company was too small and 
instead wanted to collaborate with the leading IT company in Ghana, which was 
American-owned. Since the Ghanaian owner/manager refused to collaborate with 
this company, this component never started. One can only guess what really hap-
pened. However, the fact that the Ghanaian partner had made a pre-agreement with 
another Ghanaian company for the wireless radio, as well as the fact that the Dan-
ish partner is now collaborating with the American-owned IT-company, may point 
to the true explanation.  
As already indicated, any assessment of the merits of this collaboration based 
solely on the number of employees would be grossly misleading. In particular, it 
would include the ten employees who were employed just before the start of the 
collaboration and fired just after it started, although it hardly had any connection 
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 with the PSDP collaboration as such. Such a before-and-after assessment would 
therefore wrongly show that the Ghanaian company had lost a quarter of its em-
ployees during the course of the Start-Up Facility; by contrast, a more careful 
analysis of these figures would reveal that no changes have taken place. However, 
several factors suggest that the stated number of employees is flawed, making any 
conclusion based on this indicator at best incorrect, at worst meaningless. First, 
only seven employees were to be seen during my interview at the company, namely 
a manager, a secretary, an accountant, a programmer, a technician, a driver and a 
teacher. Of course, some of the employees could have been ill or otherwise absent, 
but it is hardly likely that three quarters of the entire staff would be absent.286 Sec-
ondly, the Ghanaian owner/manager provided me with contradictory information 
during the interview. On the one hand, he maintained that the number of employees 
has remained unchanged since the start of the collaboration, that is, since he laid off 
ten employees. On the other hand, I was informed that three employees, among 
them the two project leaders, have been offered a better contract and therefore re-
signed and were not replaced. Thirdly, the company’s entry in the membership di-
rectory of its trade organisation states that the company employs eighteen people 
(Ghana Associations of Consultants, 2005).  
Obviously this latter figure is more recent than the interview data, but it points in 
the same direction as the two previous factors: employment data has been inflated, 
either because the Ghanaian owner/manager had difficulties in distinguishing be-
tween a possible donor/partner and a researcher and therefore exaggerated his com-
pany’s merits (cf. section 6.3.2), or else because he was ashamed of the fact that his 
company was currently doing worse than he would have liked. 
8.2.2 Changes in earnings  
Several reasons make ‘changes in earnings’ an imperfect indicator for the impact of 
this type of intervention.287 First, and above all, many Ghanaian companies do not 
keep consistent accounts that are sufficiently detailed to single out changes in turn-
over, profit margins, salaries etc., to be able to calculate precise changes in earn-
                                                 
286 One year earlier, I visited the company on two separate occasions for interviews with the 
owner/manager. Unfortunately, these interviews were cancelled due to unexpected meetings abroad. 
but on both occasions I was invited in: on both occasions, hardly any activity was taking place and 
hardly any people were around. 
287 ‘Changes in earnings’ are preferred here to the more widely used ‘profit’, which may be de-
fined as revenues less the opportunity costs of labour, capital and materials, because most small-
scale entrepreneurs lack accurate accounts of the costs of all the inputs for the production: most of-
ten, the small-scale entrepreneurs know the basic costs, such as labour and inputs, but they seldom 
make provisions for the depreciation of capital goods or the cost of investments. In order to avoid 
misunderstandings and to indicate that data are based on entrepreneurs’ own perceptions of the 
changes rather than exact figures, the vaguer concept of ‘changes in earnings’ has been chosen. 
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 ings. Secondly, and closely related to the unreliability of data, exaggerations of 
changes find expression in either inflated statements of the success of the company 
or disclaimers of responsibility for the economic difficulties. Thirdly, the PSDP 
collaboration may be of minor importance to the possibility of increasing earnings, 
or to the company as such. Lastly, and like the situation regarding employment de-
scribed in section 8.2.1 above, it is almost impossible to single out the impact of the 
PSDP vis-à-vis other concurrent events. 
The changes in earnings in the 48 PSDP collaborations are summarised in Table 
8.5 and Table 8.6 below.288 Due to the ambiguity of the data, no exact figures are 
provided in the tables. Instead, arrows indicate whether earnings have increased or 
decreased since the start of the cooperation, while ‘NP’ indicates that the Ghanaian 
company is currently not making any profit, that is, that no decision has been taken 
on whether it has gone up or down. In some cases this was also the situation at the 
start of the PSDP, while in other cases the data regarding the initial situation in the 
company is simply too vague to decide whether a change has occurred or not. 
Empty cells denote either no significant change or no data.  
Table 8.5. Adjustments in earnings in Business Partnerships 
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Using these four markers for changes in earnings, the following picture emerges: 
earnings have increased in four Business Partnerships and seven Start-up Facilities; 
                                                 
288 See section 8.2.1 page 238 for an explanation of the rows and columns in the tables. The di-
rection of the arrows represents a best possible ‘guestimate’ based on triangulation. 
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 they have decreased in seven Business Partnerships and three Start-up Facilities; 
and eight Business Partnerships and five Start-up Facilities are currently making no 
profit.289
On the face of it, these results contradict the very idea of the PSDP, that is, to es-
tablish long-term binding agreements between Danish and developing country 
companies in order to provide a breeding ground for an expansive private sector 
that stimulates economic growth and poverty alleviation. Start-Up Facilities seem 
to be more profitable for the Ghanaian company than Business Partnerships, as 
only about one fifth of the latter have generated increased profits compared to ap-
proximately a quarter of the former. As many as one third of the Business Partner-
ships but less than one tenth of the Start-Up Facilities have experienced declining 
profits since the PSDP collaboration begun. 
The explanation for this noticeable contradiction is neither straightforward nor 
complete. Injection of PSDP capital, as well as the high expectations that result 
from the prospect of upgrading via the PSDP, may have an immediate effect on the 
earnings of the company. However, the more time that has passed since the PSDP 
collaboration, the greater the risk of other factors influencing the economic situa-
tion in the company. On average, my interviews with owner/managers of Ghanaian 
companies that had been involved in Business Partnerships were conducted four 
years after they had been initiated (moreover, five had previous experience from 
the Start-up Facility). In comparison, data from the Start-up Facilities were col-
lected less than three years after they had been started. More time had thus passed 
in the former compared to the latter. Moreover, as is apparent from Table 8.5 and 
Table 8.6 above, five of the seven Start-Up Facilities that have experienced in-
creased earnings were of very recent origin (less than two years) – only one com-
pany (S10/S11 with two collaborations) dates back to the first phase of Danida’s 
PSDP in Ghana. In contrast, three out of four Business Partnerships that have ex-
perienced increased earnings date back to the late 1990s; on average, data from 
these four Business Partnerships was collected more than four years following their 
launch. 
The mere fact that that, by definition, the Business Partnerships are more com-
prehensive than the Start-Up Facilities also plays an important explanatory role. 
First, the Ghanaian partners often invest substantial resources in the collaboration, 
thus increasing the risks.290 Secondly, although the partners often instigate wide-
                                                 
289 Where data exist for both 2002 and 2003, reference is made to the situation in 2003. 
290 These investments are not limited to the local partner. In some cases, particularly the joint 
ventures, the Danish partner and other investors also invest generous funds in the PSDP collabora-
tion. However, as the Danish partner is in most cases larger in terms of turnover and capital reserves 
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 ranging reorganisations of the production process with the intention of making the 
company more effective, due to specific Ghanaian Business System characteristics 
regarding organisational culture, many changes are not fully implemented, and in-
stead the Ghanaian PSDP companies are left with organisational restructuring that 
is only half-baked (cf. section 8.2.3). Thirdly, Business Partnerships often introduce 
new products (cf. section 8.2.4) in new and relatively unknown markets, which fur-
ther increases the risks involved in the collaboration.  
The following four cases demonstrate some of the problems involved in apply-
ing the indicator of ‘changes in earnings’. As revealed in section 8.2.1 above, many 
factors other than the PSDP may account for the observed changes in employment. 
This is also the case with regard to earnings. Moreover, the following cases do not 
necessarily limit themselves to, for instance, earnings, but rather point out the com-
plexity of the impact of collaborations and the many interwoven factors that are at 
play simultaneously. However, in direct relation to this indicator, they point to the 
relative importance of focusing on core activities in the local company as well as 
company size vis-à-vis the impact of the PSDP on earnings (Case IX and Case X), 
the role of changing markets (Case XI) and changes in costs composition (Case 
XII).  
Case IX. PSDP focus on non-core activities (S11) 
In the mid-1990s, a producer of insulation sheets and polystyrene products re-
sponded to an advertisement for the Danish PSDP in a Ghanaian newspaper. Fol-
lowing some meetings between the producer and the PS coordinator, the Danish 
embassy introduced him to a Danish producer of polyurethane products in order to 
set up a Start-Up Facility. The Ghanaian partner bought a mobile polystyrene injec-
tion machine intended for cold-store insulation and the necessary raw materials 
from his Danish partner, after which a dozen employees were allocated to this new 
activity (a few Ghanaian technicians were employed specifically to operate the ma-
chine, and the rest were transferred from other lines of production). The Danish 
partner provided the training for these employees, which included teaching them 
how to operate the machine, as well as how to maintain it and carry out basic re-
pairs on it. The new activity soon became a profitable business: the mobile insula-
tion machine made it possible for the Ghanaian partner to enter a new booming 
market – energy prices were increasing rapidly and owners of cold stores, therefore, 
sought to reduce costs by adding insulation. However, other players in the Ghana-
ian market also took up this opportunity and competition became more fierce. 
                                                                                                                                        
than the local partner, the investments, especially if they fail, have a relatively greater impact on the 
local partner than on the Danish one. 
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 Meanwhile, demand for this type of insulation slowed, and when the machine even-
tually broke down after a couple of years, the Ghanaian partner, finding that spare 
parts were scarce, chose to postpone repairing it. Employees who had worked with 
the machine were relocated to other activities in the company, and the mobile insu-
lation machine itself remained idle. Recently, however, it has been partly fixed and 
is now located in Tema harbour, operating as a permanent insulation apparatus. 
Alongside these developments, the company has rapidly expanded its other ac-
tivities, such as the production of polystyrene egg trays, takeaway containers and 
plates. Hence, even though the PSDP certainly increased both turnover and profit 
for the Ghanaian company in the years following the collaboration, changes in the 
market, combined with the breakdown of the machine, meant that the effect of the 
collaboration in terms of earnings decreased over time. Lately, the machine has 
been leased to a cold store and is thus again adding to the company’s earnings. The 
machine’s relative importance, however, is currently much lower than a decade 
ago, as the company’s other activities have grown substantially, and the profit the 
machine generates is now much less than previously. 
The longer-term impacts of the PSDP collaboration are therefore moderate, even 
though the collaboration may be regarded, by and large, as a text-book case of a 
Start-Up Facility. The partner discovered a profitable business idea, transferred the 
necessary technology and developed the necessary competences locally to operate 
the machine; but when the machine eventually broke down, its relative unimpor-
tance for the company was brought to light – the PSDP did not seek to upgrade the 
core activities in the large-scale local enterprise. 
Case X. Size matters: marginal intervention relative to company size (S21) 
In 2000, a Start-Up Facility was signed between one of Ghana’s largest producers 
of veneer, plywood and mouldings, and a Danish furniture manufacturer. The two 
partners had traded for a long time; the relationship began when the owner of the 
Ghanaian company was the general manager of the second largest timber company 
in Ghana, and it continued after he founded his own company. The aim of the 
PSDP collaboration was to improve the quality of the plywood in order to increase 
exports to the Danish partner. However, exports to Denmark have not increased. 
Instead, the collaboration has come to an end, mostly due to diverging motives and 
wrong equipment.  
Before the collaboration was really set in motion, the Danish partner ordered a 
batch of plywood. With the relative old machines available in the Ghanaian com-
pany, this order took a long time to produce, and thus the batch was produced with 
a loss. The Ghanaian partner accepted the low price (below the world market price) 
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 so as to give the collaboration a good start. The Danish partner, for his part, was 
satisfied with the result and ordered another container of plywood. However, the 
Ghanaian manufacturer declined the offer of another batch for the same price. 
The ‘co-operation document’ signed by the two partners and the PS coordinator 
stipulates that the Danish partner will equip the Ghanaian company with second-
hand cutting machines, rollers and auto-stops for the production of plywood. These 
were precisely the machines that would have made the production profitable, but 
they machines never arrived. Instead, the Danish partner shipped a dowel machine 
that the Ghanaian partner already had and that bore no relation to the aim of the 
collaboration, namely the production of high-quality plywood. Due to these misun-
derstandings, in 2002 the Ghanaian owner wrote several letters informing his Dan-
ish partner that ‘he under no circumstances will accept the [dowel] machine’. He 
also felt that the obvious lack of communication between the partners called for the 
collaboration to end.  
At first, this start-up facility did not change the situation in the Ghanaian com-
pany for either better or worse: the Ghanaian partner pulled out of the collaboration 
before the (wrong) machines had been installed, and therefore no technical training 
was carried out, though a consultant had been in Ghana a couple of times to discuss 
the production process. Moreover, due to the fact that the production of plywood 
represents only a minor activity in a company that employs almost a thousand peo-
ple, the collapsed PSDP hardly created any ‘changes in earnings’. However, trading 
between the partners has come to an end, and the Ghanaian partner has become 
more wary of the real intention(s) of his other trading partners and of future col-
laborators. Thus, from an impact perspective, this brief PSDP collaboration, which 
was brought to an end even before the main component of the intervention had 
been put into effect, indeed had impacts, although these cannot be measured using 
this indicator. 
Case XI. Changes in market preferences (P14) 
In the late 1990s, one parquet strips producer had become totally run down. It had 
briefly benefited from a joint venture agreement with a Taiwanese importer that 
had provided it with some second-hand machinery to be able to manufacture and 
fulfil its orders, but orders only came irregularly and the Ghanaian company had 
only a few other customers. To make matters worse competition in Ghana was 
high, and most of the company’s equipment dated back to the time of the SOE. The 
Ghanaian owner/manager was therefore enthusiastic about the possibilities of hav-
ing his production equipment upgraded, his employees trained and efficiency in-
creased through a PSDP collaboration with a Danish furniture manufacturer. 
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 After initial problems relating to the quality and quantity of the products, the 
partners chose to aim less high: instead of producing and finishing the furniture 
components in Ghana, they agreed that only rough components should be produced 
in the country, more sophisticated procedures being carried out in Denmark. Thus, 
on the one hand, the renegotiation of the aims of the collaboration meant that a 
smaller share of the added values was retained by the Ghanaian company, and also 
that less training and upgrading would take place. On the other hand, the renegotia-
tion implied that the collaboration would continue. Actually, the Ghanaian partner’s 
productivity, turnover and not least earnings began to rise shortly afterwards. The 
amount of waste caused by the cutting and finishing of teak poles was reduced by 
twenty percent, efficiency was increased, mainly due to a restructuring of the fac-
tory, safety conditions were improved, and approximately twenty unskilled and a 
few semi-skilled labourers were employed.  
However, the achievements did not last long. Due to an increasing emphasis on 
FSC-certified291 timber in Denmark, sales of garden furniture made with Ghanaian 
teak declined dramatically. Thus by 2002, this PSDP collaboration was again fac-
ing challenges: the products from Ghana were simply not sellable either in Den-
mark, or in the Danish partner’s export markets in northern Europe. The Ghanaian 
partner spent time and resources trying to obtain the certificates, but the certifica-
tion process involves the FSC (or a FSC-certified institution), national institutions, 
logging companies, forest users etc. It is therefore an often lengthy and very bu-
reaucratic process.292 By the time of my interviews, production of furniture parts 
had come to a total standstill; the company was still producing parquet strips on an 
irregular basis for the Italian and Taiwanese markets, but because of the initial eco-
nomic achievements of the PSDP collaboration at the outset, the Ghanaian partner 
had tended to neglect these two customers. Therefore, the economic situation of the 
company in mid-2002 seemed quite grave. 
What in many ways for a while became a flourishing business, exactly because 
of the PSDP collaboration, later ended in a situation of inferior economic opportu-
nities, precisely because the PSDP collaboration was met with external problems 
that the partners were not able to handle. Now the Ghanaian partner has lost its new 
                                                 
291 The Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) is an international standard for responsible forest 
management. Its goal is to promote the environmentally responsible, socially beneficial and eco-
nomically viable management of the world's forests. The process of certification is initiated volun-
tarily by forest owners and managers, who must request the services of a certification organisation, 
and it covers compliance with national and international laws, the satisfaction of tenure rights, in-
digenous people’s rights and workers rights, acting upon environmental impact etc. 
292 The lengthy certification process has led to only very few certifications in SSA: in May 2005, 
only seven countries in SSA had managed to get parts of their forest reserves FSC-certificated. Ex-
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 market opportunities as well as the previous ones, because the latter were neglected 
throughout the period of the PSDP (cf. section 8.1.1). At the height of the Ghanaian 
partner’s problems, in 2002, Danida instigated a project that aimed to establish a 
FSC regional office in Ghana and thus ease the process of certification. Thus far, 
however, no forest reserves have been certified in Ghana, and the Ghanaian part-
ner’s problems continue. 
Case XII. Rapid increases in costs while selling price remains constant (S9) 
Two farmers met at the Herning TechChange in 1999, a pig and poultry farmer 
from Ghana, and a pig farmer from Denmark. They decided to initiate a formal col-
laboration with financial support from Danida. The immediate aim of what became 
the project document for the Start-Up Facility was to increase the production of 
pigs through improved management and the elimination of diseases. The subse-
quent aim was to establish a small-scale slaughterhouse to facilitate the production 
of sausages primarily for the Ghanaian market, but hopefully also for other markets 
in West Africa.  
At first sight, the PSDP collaboration seemed straightforward: the partners were 
in the same line of business, the Ghanaian partner’s farm could easily be expanded 
to comply with the increasing demand for space, farm management software al-
ready existed and just needed to be implemented, and modules for the pigsty were 
easily available.  
However, the collaboration did not progress smoothly. When the partners first 
teamed up, a detailed schedule for the implementation of the PSDP was prepared, 
but implementation was delayed before it had even began: the Ghanaian partner 
suddenly realised that the farm manager, not himself, was the intended beneficiary 
of the PSDP-related training. The partner suddenly became anxious over the risk 
that the farm manager might leave after his qualifications had been upgraded. The 
Ghanaian partner therefore postponed the start of the Start-Up Facility for ap-
proximately six months in order to facilitate a change of farm management. This 
time, one of his close relatives was appointed as farm manager. Meanwhile, the 
Danish partner had lost interest in the project and only continued with it reluctantly. 
According to the Ghanaian partner, the Danish farmer did not understand the full 
implications of doing business in Ghana. It is of the utmost importance that you can 
trust your staff, especially the higher-level staff, and therefore Ghanaian entrepre-
neurs often end up employing relatives for strategically important positions. What 
                                                                                                                                        
cluding South Africa, only eleven certifications have been granted covering a total of 265,000 ha in 
SSA (FSC, 2005). 
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 is not so important is that these changes take time; also, it is absolutely necessary to 
engage in other income-earning activities in order to survive.  
Meanwhile, the Danish partner had purchased the essential farm management 
software, but the Ghanaian partner could not make it run properly, and apparently 
the Danish partner could not solve the problem either. The farm management soft-
ware, which should have been the essential building block for the expansion of 
production, has never, therefore, been used. As a further consequence, the pigsty 
modules were not purchased and the collaboration has in practice come to a stand-
still. The Ghanaian farmer initially expected the collaboration to result in a fivefold 
expansion of pig production, but during the course of the four years from the start 
of the PSDP to the day of my interview with him, production has only increased 
marginally. Furthermore, even though the Ghanaian farmer has acquired and ab-
sorbed certain experiences from his two short visits to Denmark, what growth in 
production there has been can hardly be ascribed to the PSDP.  
In the intervening period since the start of the collaboration, the profitability of 
pig farming in Ghana has severely deteriorated and therefore impacted negatively 
on earnings. While the costs of feed, which is mainly imported, has increased by 
eighty percent during the three years due to the devaluation of the cedi, the selling 
price for pigs has only increased by twenty percent. Unfortunately, a different sce-
nario but with similar implications is taking place in the Ghanaian poultry business: 
due to the preference for so-called white meat (breasts) over red meat (legs) among 
European and American customers, producers in these more affluent parts of the 
world dump red meat in developing markets at very low costs, thus forcing local 
produce out of the market. The result is that an increasing percentage of the chicken 
meat consumed in Ghana is now imported.  
8.2.3 Changes in productivity 
Danida places particular emphasis on the transfer of competences from the Danish 
to the local partner, as well as on social and economic developments in the host 
country (cf. Chapter two). However, improved productivity is not mentioned as a 
possible way of reaching this goal. Instead, Danida assesses the potential of PSDP 
collaborations to expand production in the recipient company (Danida, 2003a). Ex-
pansion of production certainly includes other aspects than productivity improve-
ments, but some degree of overlap exists between the two.  
The phrase ‘changes in productivity’ basically refers to changes in the amount of 
output created per unit of input; it may refer to labour productivity – that is, output 
per worker per entity of time – or capital productivity. In practice, productivity 
changes are hard to determine precisely since they may refer to changes in various 
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 parts of the company: productivity increases may, for instance, refer to a more cost-
effective use of raw materials, to more efficient division of labour on the floor, at 
management level or in the entire company, or to improved handling of orders etc. 
Since the exact variable is hard to determine, changes in productivity here refer to 
the Ghanaian owner/managers’ perceptions of changes: it may therefore include all 
the various interpretations of the concept, but most often it is associated with cost-
effectiveness and thus is closely related to the ‘changes in earnings’ presented in 
section 8.2.2 above. However, this is not always the case. In some instances, pro-
ductivity growth may not result in increased earnings due to, for example, eco-
nomic recession or changing customer preferences (see Case XIII page 256, for an 
illustration).  
Improved productivity, ceteris paribus, benefits the target group: over time, pro-
ductivity increases lower production costs and may therefore improve the ability to 
compete and make a profit. Improved productivity may also have a broader impact, 
as a company’s ability to compete and ultimately make a profit may give rise to in-
creasing incomes, improved living standards and economic growth. Based on these 
simple economic accounts, improved productivity is, therefore, of the utmost im-
portance in order for Danida’s PSDP to fulfil the overarching goal of Danida’s de-
velopment aid, namely to reduce poverty. Changes in productivity may, however, 
run counter to the other developmental issues being discussed here: productivity in-
creases may come about as a result of reductions in staff or as a result of changes in 
employment structure.  
Table 8.7. Productivity changes in Business Partnerships 
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As shown in Table 8.7 and Table 8.8 above, productivity improvements are not 
widespread in the Ghanaian PSDPs: productivity has only increased in five Busi-
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 ness Partnerships and seven Start-Up Facilities. Moreover, it has decreased in two 
Business Partnerships and one Start-Up Facility. In three-fifths of these cases, the 
changes in productivity correspond with the change in earnings described above. 
Danida’s PSDP originally distinguished sharply between technical assistance 
and training, where the former related to the training and supervision of the man-
agement team, often through expatriates posted in the local company for shorter or 
longer periods of time, while the latter referred to the training of blue-collar work-
ers actually to operate the ‘new’ equipment (cf. Chapter two). The distinction is 
maintained today, even though the boundaries between one and the other are no 
longer as sharp.  
Both types of support may be directed at increasing the productivity of the com-
pany, either by focusing on the entire enterprise or through internal spin-off effects: 
that is, even though the PSDP collaboration only relates to a small part of the local 
enterprise, changes at the management level may affect the whole enterprise 
(Danida, 1995: 84), and in reality both types of support may be conducted by one 
and the same person (P11). In practice, however, there is tendency to maintain the 
original distinction: that is, technical assistance is aimed mostly at the organisa-
tional, managerial and administrative level, while training is related to the trans-
ferred technique. 
Despite the ambiguity of what ‘changes in productivity’ actually refers to, this 
indicator seems to capture the essence of the PSDP better than the two indicators 
discussed above (cf. sections 8.2.1 and 8.2.2). However, this indicator is not with-
out its problems either: the partners may pursue other aims, such as generation of 
employment and foreign currency earnings, but, faced with a deteriorating econ-
omy, these aims are not met. Nevertheless productivity has be raised (Case XIII), 
and the collaboration may end before training has been initiated, but the organisa-
tional changes still impact positively on the productivity of the company (Case 
XIV). However, the PSDP may also influence the target group in a negative direc-
tion. Case XV illustrates how the opportunity to obtain donor support has acted as a 
pretext for not finding other solutions to the problems of the company.  
Case XIII. Original aim not met, but productivity has increased (S20) 
An advertisement in a newspaper opened the eyes of a Ghanaian jeweller: he had 
just completed a one-year entrepreneur training course at Empretec293 and had be-
come aware of the limitations of his company. The organisational set-up could be 
improved, and in order to improve the efficiency of the production process and thus 
                                                 
293 See note 283, page 244, for a description of Empretec Ghana. 
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 increase his turnover and earnings, he needed a semi-automatic machine to be able 
to produce many similar products. The PSDP could give him exactly what he 
needed: technical equipment and technical training.  
According to the application forms, the developmental aims of the collaboration 
between the Ghanaian and Danish jewellers were an expansion in the number of 
staff, the generation of foreign currency earnings and improvements in the working 
environment. Strictly speaking, none of this has been achieved. During the course 
of the Start-Up Facility, the staff were reduced from five to four; exports to Den-
mark have not been achieved, as the finishing of the products is different, being 
quite simply more sophisticated in Denmark – and the adaptation of the new ma-
chine is proving to be a gradual process; and the working environment has not yet 
been changed to any major degree.  
However, this still does not make the project collaboration a failure: the Ghana-
ian jeweller has indeed increased the productivity of his own and his employees’ 
work. The new machine, which is of the same type as that used by the Danish part-
ner, is gradually being adapted to the needs of the Ghanaian partner, and the Gha-
naian company is now able to produce many of the same items in a short period of 
time. The Ghanaian owner/manager and his staff have been trained to use the new 
machine, and new ideas and designs are being passed between the partners.  
As a result productivity has increased sharply, but it has not resulted in devel-
opmental effects in the intended areas. The economic recession in Ghana has 
caused customers to watch every penny, and even though tourists pass by the shop 
now and then, their numbers are too small actually to influence the turnover of the 
company.  
Case XIV. Productivity increases despite collaboration ending prematurely (P18) 
During the first phase of the Ghanaian PSDP in the first half of the 1990s, a large-
scale Danish company dealing with electrical and mechanical installations was pre-
paring a tender for a contract in Ghana. In order to obtain information about the lo-
cal opportunities for and obstacles to doing business, it made contact with a me-
dium-sized Ghanaian company specialising in electrical contracting. Based on this 
first contact, the partners decided that they wanted to pursue a more formal collabo-
ration. A joint venture was established managed by the owner and executive direc-
tor of the Ghanaian company, with the managing director of the Danish company as 
chairman of the board. 
The Business Partnership, which was only planned to last for one year, was di-
vided into two phases. The first phase focused primarily one pre-contract training, 
that is, enhancing managerial and organisational capacities in the company so as to 
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 increase workflow management, project-cycle management and cost management 
and thus enabling the company to bid for large contracts. The second phase related 
directly to the contracts. Thus, the partners planned to design the training according 
to the specific needs of the projects.  
Eventually, the aim was to enhance the capacity of the Ghanaian company so 
that it could carry out electrical contracting at high voltages. At the start of the col-
laboration, the Ghanaian workforce was only able to design and construct lines of 
up to 34.5 kV. Based on the collaboration with the Danish partner, which was able 
to do lines of 220 kV, the partners hoped to be able to augment the capacity of the 
Ghanaian partner to 161 kV.  
The joint venture was principally limited to projects that were sent for interna-
tional competitive bidding with an estimated value of over US$ 2 million. How-
ever, the partners were also free to decide to collaborate on other projects. The ba-
sic premise behind the PSDP collaboration was that at least one contract would be 
won. However, this never happened. According to the Ghanaian executive director, 
the Danish partner wanted to retain full responsibility for the bids for tender. They 
had no prior experience of Ghana and prepared the tender the way they were used 
to doing. Thus helicopters for surveying and bulldozers to prepare the ground were 
included in the tenders, so as to present the best possible solution. According to the 
manager of the Ghanaian company, the Danish company failed to realise that price 
is a determining factor in winning a contract in Ghana, and the inclusion of sophis-
ticated technical machinery simply made the tender too expensive. In the mean-
time, the Danish company won a contract with a large-scale Swedish–based trans-
national company to build Kotoka International Airport in Accra. This contract was 
commercially more sustainable for the Danish partner than the PSDP collaboration, 
and therefore the Danish partner decided to withdraw from the Business Partner-
ship. 
Formally, the Business Partnership ended before the second phase of the training 
had been initiated and without the Ghanaian partner having an opportunity to up-
grade its capacity to construct and design lines. Only just over half of the funds al-
located for training had been used, mostly for a training session at Århus Technical 
School, but also on the premises of both the Danish and the Ghanaian partners. The 
training was directed entirely at the management team, mostly its upper levels.  
Informally, the collaboration has continued. While the Danish company was 
working at the airport, it hired employees from the Ghanaian company to install 
and design the necessary electrical and mechanical devises for the project. In this 
way the Ghanaian company, or at least some of its engineers and electricians, came 
to work as subcontractors for the Danish company.  
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 According to the managing director, the company’s efficiency has improved 
during the course of the aborted Business Partnership and the subsequent informal 
co-operation. The working culture has changed, punctuality has improved, projects 
are better planned, work-flow patterns have changed and managerial responsibili-
ties have been delegated downwards. Consequently, although the premature ending 
of the PSDP collaboration did mean that design and construction capacity was not 
upgraded as intended, both the quality of the work and its productivity has in-
creased as a consequence of both the formal and informal collaboration with the 
Danish partner. 
Case XV. The PSDP as a pretext for doing nothing (S18) 
One of the leading printing companies in Ghana in the late 1990s employed almost 
ninety people; it had previously been a lucrative business, but little by little the 
printing machines either broke down or proved incapable of printing with the preci-
sion customers required. The owner of the company, a leading entrepreneur with a 
dense political network that includes very close ties to a current minister, owned 
several other companies and realised that competition in the printing sector was in-
creasing, especially among and from so-called ‘wayside printing companies’. As a 
result, he postponed investing in new machines and instead allowed the machines 
to inform his quest for a partner. 
Previously the Ghanaian owner’s connection with the minister had facilitated 
several contracts for security printing with, for instance, Standard Chartered Bank 
and Ghana Commercial Bank. Even though the quality of the printing declined, the 
owner’s connections still provided the company with lucrative contracts: recently, 
for instance, the company received the contract to print the ballot papers for the 
2004 presidential elections in Ghana. However, as the printing machines have be-
come increasingly obsolete, the company fears that it will lose these contracts, es-
pecially as businesses in East Asia have gradually taken over large proportions of 
precision and security printing in Ghana.  
The two partners met through a Danish consultant. The Ghanaian partner, as 
noted, wanted a foreign partner in order to obtain new machinery and related train-
ing, while the Danish partner was primarily interested in the collaboration out of al-
truism, and to a lesser extent he saw the PSDP collaboration as a way of promoting 
know-how and machines and of managing changing domestic demands. 
After visits to each others’ companies, a co-operation document was signed just 
before the turn of the millennium. However, the partners soon realised that the 
equipment was more expensive than initially anticipated. They therefore applied for 
additional funds from the PSDP and were told that instead they had to apply for a 
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 full Business Partnership. However, the process was severely delayed, and three 
years after the co-operation document had been signed, only a quarter of the origi-
nal budget had been spent. The partners had applied for a grant that far exceeded 
the limits that could be approved by the embassy and therefore had to go to the 
board of Danida, which necessarily postpones the process. More importantly, how-
ever, Danida had begun a new policy regarding the many private consultants who 
had thrived by matching PSDP partners – they were now banned. The consultant 
who brought these two partners together was one of them, and therefore, in order to 
proceed any further with the application, the partners had to get rid of him (cf. Case 
XVIII page 267). 
More than five years had gone by since the partners first met. During all this 
time, the Ghanaian company had not been chasing any other business opportunities: 
instead it simply sat back and waited for the PSDP to reform the company so as to 
kick-start it again. However, none of this seems likely to happen. 
Production in what was once a leading printing company has now come to a 
standstill, and staff numbers have decreased rapidly, from 86 in 1998, to 60 in 
1999, to 36 in 2000 and to just a handful in 2003. The company has won no con-
tracts in the last few years apart from that to print the ballot papers, which it owed 
to the owner’s political ties. Moreover, the machines are in such a bad state that it is 
unlikely that they will ever work again for precision-printing purposes.  
8.2.4 Changes in products (new products versus better quality products) 
New or better quality products are not an aim in itself in most PSDP collaborations. 
Certainly this may be regarded as a means of expanding production, but it is sel-
dom given as a separate goal in project documents. Nevertheless, a large majority 
of PSDP collaborations do bring about changes in products, whether by introducing 
new lines or a broader range of products, or improving the quality of existing ones.  
New or improved quality products may indicate positive impacts at the enter-
prise level, the private-sector level, or even at the society level. At the enterprise 
level it may denote increased technological product or process capabilities (cf. sec-
tion 4.5 and 8.1.1 above); at the private-sector level, the capacity of subcontractors 
as well as retailers may be enhanced because new, more technologically demanding 
production specifications call for upgrading both up- or downstream. And eventu-
ally, new enhanced products may benefit the Ghanaian population as such and thus 
indicate positive impacts at the society level. There is, however, no causal relation-
ship between new or better quality products and positive impacts at any of these 
levels: new product lines may also increase the financial, managerial and organisa-
tional risks associated with the PSDP collaboration.  
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 Table 8.9 and Table 8.10 show product changes in Ghanaian PSDP companies. 
‘N’ represents a new product, ‘Q’ represents quality, and ‘R’ represents range. The 
arrows in the first column signify improvements and declines, respectively. 
In almost forty percent of PSDP collaborations, the Ghanaian partner had no 
prior experience of the new products, which may lead to poor quality, inefficient 
production, delays in the collaboration, disappointments etc., if the initial skill level 
is not taken into consideration. Seen from this perspective, it is interesting that all 
seven Business Partnership that have introduced new products as an element of 
their PSDP collaboration are now experiencing decreasing profits or none at all (see 
Table 8.5 above).294
Table 8.9. Product changes in Business Partnerships 
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Table 8.10. Product changes in Start-Up Facilities 
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The distinction between new products and expanding the range of products is not 
clear-cut: new products here denote activities that bear no or hardly any relation to 
the primary activity of the company. Examples include a company that imports, 
distributes and retails various industrial products, engages in the production of 
wooden jigsaws (S4) or the establishment of a institution for caretakers (P3); a 
company that is established with the sole purpose of obtaining PSDP funding (Case 
XVIII page 267); or a sales agency specialising in fork-lift trucks and diesel gen-
erators that has started the production and assembly of solar panel support struc-
                                                 
294 The picture is less clear concerning the Start-Up Facilities: in more than half of the cases, data 
are either lacking or changes have been insignificant, in almost one-third of cases the Ghanaian 
partner is currently not making any profit, though in the last two cases earnings have increased since 
the start of the collaboration a decade ago. These two cases (S10/S11) are exceptional, given that the 
PSDP activity only related to a tiny part of the local company and thus did not significantly affect its 
economic situation (cf. Case IX page 249). 
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 tures (P5). Expansion of the range of products, conversely, denotes that the new ac-
tivities brought about by the PSDP collaboration have some connection with prod-
ucts that are already being manufactured or services delivered. Examples include a 
consultancy company that expanded its product portfolio (Case I page 215), a pro-
ducer of re-tread tyres that started production of technical rubber (Case XVII page 
264), and one-man producer of organic waste that, through collaboration with a 
Danish consultancy company, started to experiment with different varieties of or-
ganic fertiliser (Case XXV page 295). In one instance (Case XVI page 262), the 
PSDP collaboration actually resulted in both the introduction of new products and 
an expansion of the range of products. 
The data indicate that in only one-fifth of the collaborations have increases in 
product quality occurred – that is, the quality of the products have increased in five 
Business Partnerships and in five Start-Up Facilities. In the remaining collabora-
tions quality has remained largely unchanged or decreased (one instance only). It 
should be noted, however, that not all collaborations seek to upgrade product qual-
ity. Hence, it would be misleading to interpret the relatively few successful quality 
upgraders too negatively. In order to obtain a more comprehensive picture of the 
impacts at the enterprise level, the analysis must also include an examination of the 
broadening of the product range: seven Business Partnerships and nine Start-up Fa-
cilities have managed to broaden their product ranges. These companies may all be 
better prepared for increasing competition than they were before the start of the 
PSDP collaboration. 
Case XVI. New products have been introduced, but money is still being earned on well-
known products (S16) 
According to one of the directors of a Ghanaian company that formerly specialised 
in selling hospital beds and low-tech equipment to the health sector, everybody in 
Ghana knows Danida. It was thus a reasonable assumption that Danida could assist 
the company to upgrade its technological capabilities as well as inject working 
capital into it. The directors got in touch with the staff at the PS secretariat in the 
Danish embassy first to acquire more information about the PSDP, and subse-
quently to apply for a partnership with a Danish company. The Ghanaian company 
was facing competition and aiming to expand its product line, but it understood 
that, in order to expand, it desperately needed assistance from abroad. For its part 
the Danish company, which specialises in the design and manufacturing of medical 
equipment, had already established subsidiaries in Europe, Asia and the US. Even 
though it therefore had vast export experience, it had none of Africa. The expand-
ing West African market was especially of interest to the Danish company, and it 
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 was therefore attracted by the possibilities of support from a Danida PSDP collabo-
ration. 
Through its previous experience with sales of hospital beds etc., the Ghanaian 
company had gained considerable knowledge about the health sector, particularly 
in the Accra-Tema metropolis, which could easily be transferred to the new product 
line and thus ease access to the market. However, it was also aware that it lacked 
critical capabilities in dealing with high-tech equipment. Therefore, the partners 
agreed that the initial phase of the project should be devoted solely to technology 
transfer. If this was successful, the collaboration would widen into a licensing 
agreement. The partners decided that the first couple of years should be used to get 
to know each other and to obtain more thorough knowledge of the market in 
Ghana. During this period, the partners spent most of their time and the energy on 
getting acquainted with each other and with the Ghanaian and Danish business cul-
tures. According to the Ghanaian directors, it was of the utmost importance to build 
up trust before the company could really take off. In this case, building trust has 
taken far more time than the estimated six months that a Start-Up Facility normally 
lasts. 
In 1998, when the Start-Up Facility between the two partners took shape with 
the birth of a new Ghanaian company to be the exclusive distributor of the Danish 
company’s medical equipment in Ghana, the products were new to the Ghanaian 
market. Moreover, competing products from Philips, Siemens, Toshiba, Aloka and 
Honda were already established brands. Furthermore, as part of a donor scheme, 
the Dutch government provides similar products produced by Philips to many gov-
ernment and missionary hospitals in Ghana. In order to penetrate the market, there-
fore, the partners had to adopt innovative marketing strategies that included price 
competitive products, provision of after-sales service, three years of customer credit 
and the training of end-users. 
By 2003, the Ghanaian company had sold seven ultra-sound scanners in 
Ghana.295 Due to the level of trust that has been established between the partners, 
the Ghanaian company is now able to sell the scanners in Ghana on a three-year 
credit basis (twenty percent of the payment has to be put down in advance). The 
difference between the buying and selling price for the Ghanaian company is 
€7,000. The scanners are sold with a one-year guarantee, minor repairs and mainte-
nance after this first year being conducted by the Ghanaian company’s engineers, 
while the Danish producer is responsible for major repairs and spare parts. More-
over, the Ghanaian company is responsible for the installation, testing, commis-
                                                 
295 According to the company’s homepage, this had not changed by the summer of 2005. 
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 sioning, and training of customers’ staff. There is the potential to increase the turn-
over of the company over time, but so far economic results have been meagre.  
All the seven ultrasound scanners sold so far in Ghana are small. They have 
generated revenues of roughly €50,000, which equals €12,500 a year. However, 
this is not sufficient to pay for the new premises in Nungua or the salaries of the 
eight employees. Therefore, the Ghanaian company still devotes much of its time to 
selling all kinds of low-tech accessories to the health sector. 
Recently, the Danish partner has invested €300,000 in the project so as to pro-
vide the company with an easier cash flow. Bank loans are difficult to obtain, even 
with collateral, and interest rates are high. Therefore, it is very difficult for the 
Ghanaian partner to obtain sufficient working capital to be able to penetrate the 
market more fully.  
Case XVII. Fierce competition, economic recession, and lack of focus gave rise to meagre 
results (P20) 
Twenty years ago, in 1985, a Ghanaian businessman returned from the UK to start 
up his own business in Ghana. While in the UK, his fiancé had asked him to buy 
her tyres for her car. He went to a shop and was shown three different kinds of 
tyres: used, new, and re-treads. New tyres were sold at almost double the price of 
re-treads, but the Ghanaian, who was yet to come businessman, did not understand 
why – he could not see the difference between the two. For some time he kept 
thinking about this and gradually became more and more enthusiastic about the 
idea of launching the production of re-treads in Ghana. Therefore, he asked his 
friends and relatives in the UK and in Ghana about the specific techniques and if 
anyone in Ghana already was doing tyre re-treading. He received two positive an-
swers: the technique was pretty simple and therefore could be done in Ghana; and 
there were no competitors. 
Luckily, his fiancé, who had by then become his wife, worked in the National 
Investment Bank in Ghana, and therefore he was able to obtain a loan to start his 
business. Even though he gave the production site near the old harbour in Sekondi 
and the buildings on it as collateral, he assures me that it was only because his wife 
was working in the bank that he was able to get the loan at all. However, proce-
dures were slow, and even though he registered the name of the company in 1985, 
he did not obtain the loan until 1991, the company eventually taking off in 1992.  
Since his company started in 1992 a few other Ghanaian-owned competitors 
have entered the market, but it is still the dominant player and meets 60-70 percent 
of the demand. The company buys up old tyres from transportation companies, as 
well as from private customers in the three largest cities in Ghana (Accra-Tema, 
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 Kumasi and Takoradi-Sekondi). The old tread is removed, and the tyres are then 
prepared for re-treading with imported rubber from Dunlop’s factory in Nigeria. In 
this process, a relatively large quantity of sub-standard rubber is produced, which 
cannot be used for the re-treading of tyres, but can be used for less demanding rub-
ber products. Moreover, machines are often lying idle, as the company faces short-
ages of the most important raw material for the production, namely used tyres, 
which, due to high import tariffs, are too expensive to import from neighbouring 
countries. 
The owner of the Ghanaian company is a very active player in the Ghanaian pri-
vate sector. Besides the re-treading company, he owns a travel agency in Accra 
managed by his wife and a retail shop in Accra. He is the regional chairman of AGI 
(Western and Central Regions), the chairman of the Committee and a member of 
the Board of the Ghana Shippers Council, and a member of the boards of Ghana 
Rubber Estates, and Empretec. Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, he is 
the regional Chairman of the NPP (Western Region).  
It was therefore no coincidence that he met up with a representative of HVR at a 
trade exhibition for small- and medium-sized enterprises in Sekondi. The HVR rep-
resentative introduced him to the possibilities of the PSDP, which he knew of from 
his involvement in AGI and Empretec, and matched him with a producer of tyres in 
Denmark. Due to a factory fire in Denmark the collaboration was postponed, and 
HVR instead tried to match the Ghanaian businessman with several other Danish 
tyre companies. However, they were all either too big or too technically advanced 
compared to the Ghanaian company, and for that reason neither the Ghanaian part-
ner nor HVR really believed that collaboration would work.  
Meanwhile, however, the Ghanaian businessman had become enthusiastic about 
the idea of a foreign partner and the possibility of long-term cooperation largely fi-
nanced by a donor. He therefore allowed the process of manufacturing re-treads 
guide his search for a partner. On the one hand, he needed to broaden his portfolio 
of products to minimise periods of inactivity due to shortages of raw material. On 
the other hand, he needed both machinery and knowledge to make the rubber rem-
nants into sellable products. Eventually, HVR matched him with a Danish producer 
of technical rubber for the Danish medical, motor and sanitary industries.  
Just before the formal start of the PSDP collaboration the Danish partner moved 
its production site, and in this connection wanted to change several of its machines. 
These machines, a boiler and other equipment for the production of technical rub-
ber, were sold to the Ghanaian partner for approximately twice the amount covered 
by Danida, and production could take off. 
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 The Start-Up Facility was formed as a joint venture between the Ghanaian part-
ner, the Danish partner and a friend of the latter. This friend at first acted as the 
technical advisor for the Start-Up Facility and later became the expatriate produc-
tion supervisor during the subsequent Business Partnership, which was intended to 
further the production of technical rubber and eventually also be able to produce 
tread for the tyre re-treads. Due to what he calls slow procedures at the Embassy 
and in Danida’s PS secretariat, the Danish partner quickly lost interest in the col-
laboration. Thus, from the very beginning he was very keen on handing over his 
Ghanaian activities to his friend and technical advisor in the collaboration, and at 
the outset of the Business Partnership the Danish partner sold his shares to his now 
expatriate friend.  
On the face of it, the future of the new company seemed bright. First, it is the 
only registered company in Ghana that produces technical rubber. Second, inputs 
for the production are readily available – synthetic rubber is imported from the 
Danish partner, and natural rubber is bought from Ghana Rubber Estates, where the 
Ghanaian partner is a member of the Board. Third, it largely complements the ac-
tivities of the original Ghanaian company. Fourth, the staff only needed moderate 
training in order to be able to handle the new techniques. Finally, the Ghanaian 
partner already had a dense network of potential customers. However, the birth of 
the new company was not without its problems, and four years after the Start-Up 
Facility began, and just over a year after the Business Partnership began, the com-
pany only receives orders occasionally. Furthermore, used tyres are still in short 
supply, and the company has not been able to benefit fully from its alliances with 
either the Ghanaian tyre re-treading company or the Danish producer of technical 
rubber. 
Explanations for this are many and possibly interwoven. First, even though no 
other registered company in Ghana produces technical rubber, numerous micro-
scale artisan producers of rubber exist. Second, despite the Ghanaian partner’s nu-
merous relations in all areas of the Ghanaian private sector, the company has not 
been able to obtain a lucrative contract with, for instance, large-scale lumber com-
panies, which use technical rubber for rollers. Third, cumbersome PSDP proce-
dures caused both the original Ghanaian and the Danish partners to lose interest in 
the project. Only because the Danish technician took a personal interest in the pro-
ject did it continue from Start-Up Facility to Business Partnership, and the birth of 
the Business Partnership was actually postponed for approximately half a year be-
cause the Ghanaian partner was uncertain as to whether we wanted to continue the 
PSDP collaboration or not. Finally, when the 2004 presidential elections in Ghana 
were approaching, the Ghanaian partner, as the regional chairman of NNP, began 
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 devoting relatively more time to his political career and relatively less to his busi-
nesses. The daily management of the company was therefore largely left to the 
Danish expatriate, while the Ghanaian businessman stayed in the politically more 
important capital. 
Although everything looked nice on paper, and preliminary investigations con-
ducted prior to the Business Partnership indicated that the market for technical rub-
ber is relatively large in Ghana, the Ghanaian-Danish partners have been incapable 
of making a sound business. All the staff are still employed, but the company lacks 
orders, and the capacity of both machines and personnel is only being used to a mi-
nor degree. Moreover, the economic recession in Ghana has caused small and me-
dium-sized companies to postpone large-scale investments and instead repair the 
existing equipment. These companies are only approaching the joint venture in or-
der to acquire minor spare parts, and so far no large orders have landed on the desk 
of the PSDP partners, partly because minor spare parts are also made by artisan 
producers. Large-scale companies in, for instance, the wood sector can buy cheaper 
and better quality rubber rollers and other basic equipment in Southeast Asia.  
Danida’s PSDP has enabled the Ghanaian company to broaden its portfolio of 
products. Theoretically, the expansion in the range of products should enable the 
company to become more competitive and increase the capacity utilisation of both 
capital and labour, but in reality this has not occurred. Instead, the production of re-
treads has been left almost untouched (production has slowed down recently any-
way due to the political activities of the owner/manager), and production of techni-
cal rubber is quite sluggish. 
Case XVIII.  ‘You have to learn to crawl before you can walk’ (S5) 
A Danish one-man consultancy company with associated consultants in, among 
other countries, Ghana, South Africa and Zimbabwe approached a Danish small-
scale producer of plastic cards in order to learn whether it had an interest in form-
ing a partnership with a Ghanaian company based on support from Danida’s PSDP. 
The Danish consultant wanted to make a feasibility study first. His associate in 
Ghana happened to be the consultant for an Ashanti businessman who had prior 
experience as the GM of one of the largest real-estate companies in Ghana, and 
who is currently the owner/manager of an electrical installation company and a lo-
cal construction company. The Ghanaian consultant informed the Ghanaian partner 
about the potential of the PSDP and of obtaining almost full coverage of the ex-
penses. Based on this information and the recent success of another PSDP company 
in manufacturing security ID cards (S19), the search began for a partner in this line 
of business and for funding. 
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 However, the Danish consultant never carried out the feasibility study, as the PS 
coordinator refused to work with private consultants who were not associated with 
either DI or HVR (cf. section 2.2.4 and Case XV page 259). Instead, the Danish 
company was invited to Ghana to meet his future Ghanaian partner, who in fact did 
not even have a company in this line of business, though he had several high-
ranking contacts in various ministries. In the words of the GM of the Danish com-
pany, ‘I’ve never before met three ministers in order to start up a tiny ID card com-
pany’ (personal communication, Copenhagen, 120302). He was impressed, and 
even though a bit sceptical regarding his future Ghanaian partner’s business experi-
ence, he decided to join the collaboration, not least because he was supported by 
HVR, which did the necessary paperwork.  
The Ghanaian businessman indeed has a dense network of political connections. 
Among the shareholders of his new company, which employs four computer-
literate production assistants and a driver, is a Commander of the Ghana Armed 
Forces Command and Staff College. He has friends in government, in the Kumasi 
Municipality Assembly, in the army and in the largest hotels in Accra. However, 
despite the density of high-ranking connections, the company has only been able to 
produce a small quantity of plastic cards and has not yet been able to obtain any 
contracts from any public agencies. 
Several factors may account for these poor achievements by the company, but 
there is hardly any doubt that the Ghanaian partner’s lack of experience in this line 
of business is a main reason. Just after the Start-Up Facility began, two production 
assistants and the owner/manager went to Denmark for basic technical training in 
how to design and manufacture plastic cards. The owner/manager had never 
worked with a computer before and thus, according to his own account, he was 
there to oversee the training so as to be able to manage production in the future. 
Subsequently, the necessary computers, printers and software were installed in 
Ghana by a Danish technician. From the very beginning the lack of experience 
caused major problems. The essential printer for the production of plastic cards 
went out of order, and due to the lack of training none of the employees, let alone 
the owner/manager, knew how to fix it, so production stopped. As of April 2002 
production had come to a total stand-still, but the Ghanaian owner/manager assured 
me that the company would restart as soon as the Danish technician returned to 
Ghana in May. He complained, though, about the capacity of the equipment: due to 
fact that the Ghanaian owner/manager was not familiar with the printing business, 
the partners decided to let the Danish partner choose the machinery. He chose a 
printer with a maximum capacity of 50 cards per hour, which is significantly below 
the capacity required to fulfil orders of over a million plastic cards from Kumasi 
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 Metropolitan Assembly, which the Ghanaian partner was expecting to get in the 
near future. Moreover, he complained about the set-up of the PSDP arrangement: if 
the Danish partner was bearing even some of the economic risks associated with 
setting up the new company, he would have sent one of his employees immediately 
to fix the equipment.  
From the other side of the table, the explanation for the poor achievements looks 
somewhat different. A couple of months earlier, the Danish partner assured me that 
the collaboration was about to end: ‘the Ghanaian partner continuously talked about 
fancy arrangements with the state apparatus, but up until now he has never had any 
orders….You have to learn to crawl before you can walk’ (personal communica-
tion, Copenhagen, 12.03.02). He basically found that his partner was unable to run 
a business. On top of this, the Danish partner maintained that Danida had never re-
imbursed his expenses. Thus, he was certain that under no circumstances would he 
continue the collaboration. 
Case XIX. Faulty equipment and no prior experience, but positive derived impacts (S1) 
A Ghanaian producer of plywood furniture for houses and offices was looking for a 
foreign partner so as to enhance his company’s productivity and hopefully also the 
quality of his products. It approached an international consulting company, which 
drew up a feasibility study for the company and forwarded it to an international 
venture fund, which passed it on to DI. The international consultancy team at DI 
had simultaneously received an enquiry from a Danish producer of planed wood 
and parquet strips who wanted a Russian partner. At that point, DI did not know of 
any suitable Russian partners and thus suggested that the Ghanaian producer of 
plywood furniture be matched with a Danish producer of planed wood and parquet 
strips.  
The objective of the collaboration was to asset up production of semi-finished 
parquet strips, which could then be shipped back to Denmark for the final finishing. 
However, this has never happened. Four years after the Start-Up Facility began, al-
though the collaboration is formally continuing, the partners are not speaking to 
each other any longer. Basically two things went wrong. First, according to the 
Ghanaian general manager, most of the equipment that was shipped to Ghana as 
part of the collaboration was not in working order. The Danish partner had bought 
all the equipment from a really old company, taken what his company needed, and 
shipped the rest to Ghana. The Ghanaian partner expected the PSDP collaboration 
to bring his company new capital equipment, and therefore he was very disap-
pointed when he saw what he called a pile of junk. 
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 Since this line of production was entirely new to the Ghanaian company, the lo-
cal partner had allowed the Danish partner to decide what to purchase. Now, the 
company’s storage area in central Accra looks more like a junkyard than a back-
yard: an area of more than fifty square metres is piled up with old machines and 
machine parts. According to the local partner, most of the pile is equipment from 
the Danish partner. Of the machinery that was sent to Ghana as part of the PSDP 
collaboration, only a four-sided planer and a cutter for massive wood are now in 
use. Numerous repairs and alterations have been found necessary in order to make 
even these machines work properly, but eventually, two years after they were 
shipped, they work, even though they still break down occasionally and need a lot 
of maintenance due to their old age.  
Secondly, neither the Ghanaian owner/manager nor his approximately one hun-
dred employees had any experience working with hardwood. Therefore, and con-
nected with the malfunctioning machines, the Ghanaian company only progressed 
very slowly with the production of parquet strips. The local partner had long 
wished for collaboration with a foreign partner, and although he was disappointed 
with the state of the second-hand machinery he had been sent, he allocated his best 
employees to this part of the production and hence part of his regular production 
was set aside.  
As stated above, the Danish partner never bought any products and eventually 
the Ghanaian partner decided to stop producing parquet strips. Although the result 
of the PSDP regarding its original aim is therefore close to zero, the collaboration 
nevertheless had some positive derived impacts. First, the increased knowledge and 
the new technique have enhanced the quality of the other products in the company. 
Secondly, the four-sided planer, which was originally intended for the production 
of parquet strips, is now being used to make furniture of made out of massive 
wood, which has a higher added value than the original plywood furniture. 
8.2.5 Employment, earnings, productivity and products: intended impacts on 
the target group 
Up to this point, this section has scrutinized the intended impacts of the PSDP at 
the enterprise level. Even at this level, the analysis has revealed the difficulties in-
volved in using single quantitative indicators to measure impact. One may un-
doubtedly understand some output targets related to the original aim of the inter-
vention by applying these kinds of indicators, but if one is seeking to understand 
what actually happened and why, these indicators seem inadequate.  
First, these cases have reinforced a major conclusion of Chapter 3, namely that 
the very concepts of success and failure are analytically vague. They only make 
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 sense with respect to the stated objectives of the development intervention, but as 
the above cases have demonstrated, many PSDP collaborations neither state the de-
velopment aims unambiguously, nor continue with the same objectives unchanged 
throughout the course of the collaboration. Thus, an assessment based on these 
aims is highly misleading. Moreover, the very use of the term ‘intended’ is am-
biguous: what is intended for one PSDP intervention may not be intended for an-
other, and what is intended for the Danish partner may not be intended for the local 
one, Furthermore, PSDP application requirements with respect to the specificity of 
the intended development aims have also changed over time. Even though the 
guidelines are still vague on this issue, project documents illustrate an increasing 
awareness within especially DI and HVR of the necessity of presenting measurable 
development aims in order to secure the approval for Danida support from the Em-
bassy (cf. section 2.2).  
Secondly, the cases have established a high level of impact complexity. On the 
one hand, impacts are often interwoven: increases in the level of productivity may 
very well be associated with increases in earnings for the target group. On the other 
hand, no causal relationship exists between the various indicators: productivity en-
hancement does not necessarily lead to increases in earnings or employment gen-
eration. In addition, impacts are not limited to the planned outputs of an interven-
tion: even though the above cases were chosen to reveal as much knowledge as 
possible about the chosen indicators for immediate intended impacts at the enter-
prise level, they demonstrate clearly the level of unintended impacts associated 
with all collaborations, whether these are positive or negative, short-term or long-
term, or affect the intended beneficiaries or others.. 
Thus, even though the Ghanaian PSDP at first shows meagre results pertaining 
to each particular indicator – for example, employment growth in only three-eights 
of cases, increased earnings in just over one-fifth, productivity rises in a quarter, 
and product quality improvements in one-fifth – these figures do not in themselves 
point to any conclusion regarding the impact of the programme. On the one hand, it 
is important to bear in mind that the data are flawed in certain respects. First, the 
quantitative data provide a static picture of the situation, and before-after assess-
ments miss out changes that happen just prior or just after the chosen point in time. 
Secondly, the lack of reliable statistics, combined with the precarious position of 
the interviewer vis-à-vis the interviewee (cf. section 6.3), affect the trustworthiness 
of the data. Finally, apparently negative data concerning, for instance, the employ-
ment situation may actually conceal positive longer-term impacts. 
On the other hand, these four indicators act as pointers to the current economic 
situation in a company – its capacity to make vital investments, to compete locally 
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 as well as abroad, to create jobs and to increase incomes and thus improve living 
standards. They may, therefore, provide a basis for the examination of the sustain-
ability of the firm’s activities, as well as provide a marker of some of the broader 
impacts of the programme. 
The qualitative case study material, along with the quantitative data, provides a 
far more comprehensive picture of the intended impacts of Danida’s PSDP in 
Ghana, that is, its developmental effects in relation to Danida’s overall aim of re-
ducing poverty. These case studies demonstrate that the immediate output of the in-
tervention is very much dependant on the entrepreneurs who carry the responsibil-
ity for the collaboration. Since only in a few cases are both partners economically 
committed to the cooperation, the developmental effect of the PSDP is dependant 
on whether they relate effectively on a personal level, whether the collaboration 
fulfils the partners’ original motive(s) for involvement in the PSDP, whether they 
are spared major delays, and whether the feasibility study is adequately comprehen-
sive. 
Moreover, these cases also suggest that size matters. There is a tendency for in-
tended impacts to be more significant the smaller (employment/turnover) the local 
partner. This is valid both for the mainly positive impacts and for the chiefly nega-
tive impacts. There is nothing deleterious here: the Danish partner’s influence on 
production methods, production processes, organisational set-up and managerial 
routines is ceteris paribus greater the smaller the local partner. Likewise, the eco-
nomic risks that the local partner faces is associated with the size of his economic 
activities: in some cases, the local company may only represent a minor part of the 
entrepreneur’s economic activities, and therefore the risks should be related to the 
sum of activities rather than the particular PSDP enterprise. Therefore, the relative 
gains and losses related to Danida’s PSDP are inversely proportional to the size of 
the local economic activities.  
Similarly, the duration of time of the collaboration, and the duration of time 
since the collaboration was initiated, are of importance for the intended impacts of 
the PSDP on the intended beneficiaries. The longer the partners have collaborated, 
the more they can influence each other’s way of doing business (although, in real-
ity, this is mostly a one-way process). Similarly, the more time that has passed 
since the collaboration, the more likely it is that other factors will have influenced 
the current situation in the local company.  
Relevance also matters. Like the conclusions presented above, there is nothing 
controversial about this inference – it simply suggests that there is a tendency for 
PSDP collaborations that are closely attached to the primary activities of the bene-
ficiary company to fare better vis-à-vis the intended aims than activities that bear 
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 no relation to previous activities in the company. What is more, the cases suggest 
that, even though internal spill-over effects are present in some cases, the impact of 
Danida’s PSDP is augmented if training, technical assistance, supervision, restruc-
turing etc. are closely related to the core business activities. 
Besides these three factors, which interact in a multitude of ways – relevance 
and size may sometimes be one and the same thing, and time may have an influ-
ence on how relevance is perceived – the institutional context is of major impor-
tance in understanding how the PSDP impacts upon the intended beneficiaries, as 
well as for other groups in society. The cases have fully established the role of eco-
nomic resources and political preferences in shaping the current situation of the 
Ghanaian companies. Chapter 9 will elaborate further on the role of institutional 
developments with respect to the role of the Ghanaian private sector. Suffice it to 
say here that these factors indeed play an important role in determining the room 
for manoeuvre of the Ghanaian PSDP companies as illustrated by the changing de-
mands in Ghana (Case IX page 249) and abroad (Case XI page 251), the devalua-
tion of the Cedi (Case XII page 253) and the economic recession (Case XIII page 
256).  
In other words, given that intended impacts are dependant on personalities, 
quick economic gains, size, time, relevance and especially on context, it is a rea-
sonable assumption that these intended impacts – which to a large extent equal the 
stated (developmental) aims of the PSDP collaboration – are mainly fulfilled only 
by coincidence.  
Broader impacts, on the other hand, are omnipresent: they result from an inter-
play of many factors, among which the intervention is only one. In order to come 
closer to a description of how Danida’s PSDP has impacted upon the target group 
(as well as the Ghanaian private sector and Ghanaian society, discussed in Chapter 
9), a more comprehensive consideration of the unintended impacts of the pro-
gramme is essential. The following sections will deal with exactly these issues. 
8.3 Impacts are not limited to an aid agency’s intentions: unintended 
impacts of Danida’s PSDP (on the target group) 
Basically any impact that is not intended, but is still associated with the interven-
tion, is unintended. Unintended impacts comprise direct as well as derived impacts, 
that is, effects caused directly by an aid intervention, as well as changes caused by 
these very effects. Unintended impacts also comprise both positive and negative ef-
fects, no matter what the time-horizon.  
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 Following the definition of impact presented in Chapter 3, however, a distinction 
is maintained between the various levels of impact, namely enterprise, private sec-
tor and society. Danida nowhere presents the (causal) link between the intended 
immediate effects of the programme (employment generation, HIV/AIDS meas-
ures, environmental improvements etc.) on the intended beneficiaries (the PSDP 
companies) or the broader developmental goals (poverty reduction, economic 
growth, raising incomes), but only includes a sentence or two referring to the trans-
fer of knowledge and technology through long-term binding agreements. Therefore, 
the concept of derived impacts is here confined to the first level, namely the enter-
prise level; the two other levels are perceived as being derived only.  
Unintended impacts are neither exclusively positive nor negative, as the story of 
the restructuring of the manufacturing company demonstrates (Case XX). In this 
case, the PSDP partners managed to restart a company on the verge of bankruptcy 
and thus created a sound business, but they also had to make two-fifths of the em-
ployees redundant, as well as handing almost all the shares over to the Danish part-
ners.  
X
The imprecise distinction is also clearly illustrated by the account of a local air-
line company that is filled with racy stories of fraud, political networks and even-
tual bankruptcy, but which is also a story of employees who have increased their 
capabilities and opportunities because of the training they did receive before every-
thing went wrong (Case XXI).  
The third account is more straightforward. It tells the story of a collaboration 
that has faced many obstacles, mainly due to a lack of trust between the partners, 
and therefore it has not reached the planned goals regarding increased productivity 
and product quality, though, mostly by coincidence, it has been able to increase 
turnover drastically (Case XXII). 
The collaboration portrayed in Case XXIII is by and large an account of poor 
matchmaking and substandard pre-investigations that resulted in a joint venture that 
has never come to manufacture the amount and quality of products that it set out to 
do. However, it is also a story of environmental problems, economic losses and the 
non-repayment of Danida loans. 
The last account (Case XXIV) can be characterised as showing nothing but un-
intended impacts: at least, none of the intended impacts on the intended beneficiary 
lasted for very long. In contrast, the major unintended impacts seem to be lasting 
for some time, at least. This PSDP collaboration came to an early end due to con-
flicts between the partners, but while the Danish company, a leading player in the 
field, continued with other PSDP collaborations, the Ghanaian owner/manager 
ended up without a business: two cases of armed robbery brought an end to what 
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 was left of the company. The Ghanaian owner/manager assumes that the robberies 
are directly linked to the fact that the collaboration involved a reduction of local 
purchases and thus a reduction of income for local farmers – they simply felt that 
the collaboration was a threat to their livelihoods. 
Case XX. Restructuring, layoffs, acquisition of local shares, and increased earnings (P15) 
This particular case is part of the old gang in Ghana: it is one of roughly five com-
panies that are visited by all official Danish delegations in Ghana. At first, it is an 
uncomplicated choice: when this Ghanaian producer of plastic bottles and pharma-
ceutical packaging and a Danish producer of similar products applied for support 
for a PSDP collaboration, the Ghanaian company was on the verge of bankruptcy, 
it had huge outstanding debts, and its main production equipment was outdated: of 
the eight moulding and injection machines, only three were working. In the five 
years that have passed since then, the expensive debt from a leasing company has 
been redeemed, other expensive loans have been replaced with less expensive ones, 
and two second-hand machines provided by the Danish partner have made it possi-
ble for the local company to produce more varieties more effectively and at a better 
quality.  
However, this case is not as simple as it may seem. According to the project 
document, the aim of the collaboration was indeed to broaden the range of products 
and improve their quality, but it was also an aim to maintain virtually all the exist-
ing jobs and even create some new ones. However, in order to stay competitive, 
more than fifty people, or two-fifths of the work-force, have been laid off. Some 
were simply made redundant by the organisational restructuring in the company, 
while others, especially leading administrative staff, were fired because they were 
unable to adapt. Moreover, the Ghanaian company – which was originally founded 
in the 1970s by a Dane with previous experience as the head of the export depart-
ment in a large Ghanaian SOE, and which is owned by him plus a number of 
prominent Ghanaians – is now 96.3 percent owned by the Danish partner and IFU 
(69.7 and 26.6 percent, respectively). Thus, almost all profit is now repatriated to 
Denmark.  
The two companies had collaborated for many years when they applied for a 
PSDP grant in 1997. The Danes on both sides of the table benefited from the col-
laboration: in particular, on the Ghanaian side sat a Dane who wanted to hand over 
his assets, since he was getting older and wanted to withdraw from his responsibili-
ties. As a general rule, however, private companies cannot be sold in Ghana: in-
stead they are either handed over to someone in the family or simply closed down. 
Thus, in order to ensure that the company in Ghana continued, he needed an exter-
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 nal partner to take over. On the Danish side of the table was the owner of a Danish 
medium-sized company approximately fifty years old. He was looking for ways to 
cut down his costs in an increasingly competitive market: by outsourcing simple 
operations and cutting his losses, he hoped that the company would again become 
competitive.  
As part of the PSDP collaboration, Danida granted the collaboration a loan for 
an injection machine that was bought second-hand from the Danish partner. At the 
beginning of the collaboration, the Danish partner took over just over fifty percent 
of the shares in the local company. However, the shares were not released as cash: 
instead, DKK 1.2 million was spent on a second-hand moulding machine bought 
from the Danish company. Moreover, IFU invested approximately DKK 1 million 
in the collaboration, though according to the former Danish managing director of 
the company, this investment was more or less fully redirected from the Ghanaian 
company back to the Danish one to cover losses. Since then, almost all shares have 
been handed over to the Danish partner. Hence, less than four percent of the shares 
are locally owned.  
The question of who is benefiting from this PSDP collaboration remains ob-
scure. When the PSDP collaboration was started, the Danes began an organisational 
restructuring process that created employment for a whole new management team 
but led to the dismissal of numerous employees. The Danida loan and the Danish 
share capital were both invested in two second-hand machines. Ownership of the 
company is now almost entirely non-Ghanaian, but the productivity level has in-
creased rapidly, turnover has increased threefold, and profit, which is now largely 
transferred back to the mother company in Denmark, has also grown. Obviously, 
both partners perceived the PSDP as worthwhile in order to fulfil their ambitions 
and, as shown above, both partners succeeded. However, so far the company has 
been unable to find new customers: the main customers remain the large-scale 
Ghanaian companies and transnational companies in Ghana. Nonetheless costs 
have been cut and new products introduced. Therefore, profit margins have in-
creased, and the company is able to cover a wider spectrum of its customers’ needs.  
Case XXI. Fraud, corruption and eventual bankruptcy, but the pilot and stewardesses now 
fly in the US (P12) 
A growing interest in Ghana in starting up a new airline company emerged in the 
mid-1990s. At the time three domestic airline companies were in operation, but it 
was believed that the inadequacy of their services, combined with the pressures on 
their routes, made a case for a new airline company, which at first should provide 
domestic flights in Ghana, but subsequently expand to include flights to the West 
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 African sub-region. In Ghana, it is normally a lengthy process to obtain the neces-
sary licenses and permits to operate an airline company. However, procedures may 
be effectively simplified and time shortened if political connections are used and 
access is available to the key decision-makers. In the case of the joint Ghanaian-
Danish airline company, that was effectively what happened: A Dane, who at the 
time was earning his living by initiating donor-financed projects in West Africa, 
had a friend in the Ghana Venture Fund, who happened to be a top NDC member 
and who had very close relations with a former first lady, who happened to have 
decision-making power regarding flight licences in Ghana. Thus, the only thing that 
was missing was a Danish partner in order to obtain PSDP funding. By coinci-
dence, the Dane’s summer cottage in Denmark was located next to the summer cot-
tage of the director of a Danish airline company. The Dane had vast experience of 
dealing with donor agencies, not least Danida, which he had collaborated with since 
the early 1970s, and he knew about the financial opportunities of the PSDP. More-
over, he also knew about the possibilities of obtaining extra funding from IFU. 
Since the Danish airline company was facing economic problems, its director was 
easily persuaded that the project in Ghana could be of great economic benefit for 
him and his company, ultimately rescuing it from economic bankruptcy.  
According to the project document, the project’s development objectives were 
rather vague: it was to ‘facilitate socio-economico-cultural interactions’ in Ghana 
and between Ghana and its West African neighbours, to ‘establish an efficiently 
managed air transport system’, and to create 26 new jobs in two years. Nonetheless, 
a grant of more than DKK 4 million and a loan of approximately DKK 1½ million 
were easily approved by Danida. The grant was used to pay the salaries of the MD 
– which in the initial phase turned out to be the Dane who initiated the project –the 
Danish flight engineer, the Danish chief stewardess and the Danish training captain. 
Only twelve percent of the Danida grant was allocated for the training programme 
of eight Ghanaians in Denmark. 
The airplane was rented from the Danish airline company and thus acted as the 
director of the company’s shares in the company. In addition, the Ghana Venture 
Fund, IFU and the Ghanaian partner, the top NDC member who became the chair-
man of the board, held shares in the newly established company.  
Even though a recent market survey showed a huge demand for reliable and top 
quality domestic air transport between the larger cities in Ghana, the joint venture 
never became an economic success. In April 1998, five months after the company 
had been inaugurated, all its shareholding capital had already been spent. The MD 
and the chief pilot were dismissed, and the board members were also fired by the 
two partners. The board members and the MD had obviously not lived up to their 
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 responsibilities, and the Danish chief pilot, along with the other Danes responsible 
for the training, had acted like lords while in Ghana, so that the relationship be-
tween the Danes and the Ghanaian quickly became very tense. Thus, the follow-up 
training session in Ghana, involving two Ghanaian pilots and a couple steward-
esses, was a total disaster.  
Following the economic and cultural crisis in the company, a new Danish MD 
was recruited to rescue some of the investors’ money. Unfortunately, the problems 
in the company did not cease. First, the Danish airline company wanted its airplane 
back, and the new MD had find (and rent) a new airplane. Secondly, the company 
had to recruit a new chief pilot. Thirdly, based on the new MD’s suspicion that the 
chairman of the board, the Ghanaian partner and the main shareholder, was with-
drawing company money for his own personal use, an impartial audit report was 
commissioned. Meanwhile, the Danish partner’s economic problems continued to 
grow, while the airline company in Ghana was going bankrupt, leading to the Dan-
ish MD selling company furniture and equipment in order to obtain his own salary.  
Many unpleasant things can be said about this collaboration: it has elements 
fraud, corruption, and racism; it eventually went bankrupt; and the investors as well 
as Danida lost a great deal of money without any of the original aims being met. It 
did not facilitate socio-economic or cultural interactions, as the plane only was air-
borne for a couple of months, it did not establish an efficiently managed air trans-
port system, and it did not create any lasting jobs. Moreover, the former Ghanaian 
partner is now in hiding in the UK: not only did he presumably mix private and 
company funds as the chairman of the board of the Ghanaian airline company, but 
as a member of the Board of Directors of the Social Security and National Insur-
ance Trust in Ghana, he allegedly bought properties in Europe costing several bil-
lions of cedis. Likewise, the former financial controller is in hiding in Zimbabwe 
and will not return to Ghana for fear of prosecution. Finally, the head of the Ku-
masi sales office was fired due to fraud. 
However, even this is not the full story. As part of their training, the two Ghana-
ian pilots obtained an American certificate. While previously they had been re-
stricted to working in Ghana, they are now able to fly internationally. Thus, one 
former pilot in the Ghanaian airline company now flies internationally for a trans-
national freight company, while the other is working as a pilot in the US. Similarly, 
four stewardesses who received training as part of the PSDP collaboration now 
work for private airline companies in the US.296  
                                                 
296 Of the other employees in the former Ghanaian airline company, the head of the sales office 
in Tamale is now studying in the US, one driver is now working for his former company, another is 
unemployed and the third is employed as the former MD’s private driver. No information exists as 
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 Case XXII. ‘When they see a white man, they see efficiency’ (S13) 
Based on a single visit to the Ghanaian enterprise and a few conversations, a one-
page project document was formulated and a Start-up Facility initiated between a 
Danish and a Ghanaian producer of (dissimilar) dairy products. The main aim of 
the collaboration was to expand the production by investing in new technology, 
improving hygiene procedures and introducing quality-control measures. Due to the 
fact that the Danish partner did not have any experience in the specific line of pro-
duction in which the Ghanaian partner was operating, expansion of production was 
initially sluggish.  
The Danish partner had made contact with the main player in the field in Ghana 
in a search for advice regarding machines and equipment, but he failed to realise 
that the products in these two Ghanaian companies were basically of a very differ-
ent nature and thus that the advice he was given was inappropriate. This in its turn 
meant that some of the machines that were purchased for the PSDP collaboration 
were worthless. Many mistakes were subsequently corrected, and the partners have 
now entered into a Business Partnership to expand their production further. 
The launching of a Start-up Facility implies that the Ghanaian company’s sales 
have increased dramatically, but not all of this change was planned indeed, some of 
it was quite unexpected. To produce a higher turnover, the Danish partner had been 
inspired by the marketing strategies of the largest player in the Ghanaian market, 
which uses tricycles fitted with cold-storage boxes to bring its products to its cus-
tomers, and thus he purchased twenty cold-storage boxes for his Ghanaian partner. 
Unfortunately, these boxes were useless due to the specifications of the product, but 
the idea was taken up and two mobile freezers were procured and fitted on to tricy-
cles. The Ghanaian company is now able to reach other segments of the population: 
while affluent customers from the outskirts of the town previously came in vehicles 
to buy products in large quantities, the clientele now includes less well-off custom-
ers, who buy cheap products in small quantities. 
Just as important for the increased sales, however, is one particular derived im-
pact of the PSDP collaboration. In Ghana, all major supermarkets and all petrol sta-
tions apart from Shell have signed contracts with the largest player in the field. 
These stipulate that the shop be provided with a freezer solely for this company’s 
products. If the supermarkets and petrol stations sign the contract, they are there-
fore not allowed to sell competing products. Shell has not signed such a contract, 
and the Ghanaian PSDP partner has been struggling to get it petrol stations to ac-
                                                                                                                                        
regards the administrative team of the company. They were all sent to Denmark for training basi-
cally to learn how to run an airline company, but as the Danish company was essentially a one-man 
company the training was inadequate.  
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 cept his products in its shops. Until the collaboration started these attempts had 
proved fruitless, but when the Ghanaian partner brought his Danish partner with 
him to Shell’s shops in order to show him the market possibilities, the Shell shops 
suddenly became eager to sell his products. In the words of the Ghanaian 
owner/manager, ‘When they see a white man, they see efficiency’ (personal com-
munication, Kumasi, 10.06.02). The visit was meant as a demonstration of future 
markets, but it ended with a signature on a contract that was far better than the 
Ghanaian partner could have obtained otherwise, if he had been able to obtain it at 
all. 
Case XXIII.  ‘It has been a bad marriage’ (P10) 
Through his position on the board of the Association of Ghana Industries, a Ghana-
ian entrepreneur got to know of all the development interventions in Ghana that 
were aimed directly at enhancing the role of the private sector. Thus, shortly after 
the PSDP was launched in Ghana, he made contact with the Danish embassy in or-
der to find himself a Danish partner for his furniture company. The embassy and 
the relevant agencies in Denmark were not able to find him such a partner, so when 
the Danish Technological Institute approached the embassy with a Danish partner 
interested in a formal collaboration in Ghana in a marginally related activity, the PS 
coordinator suggested that the Ghanaian entrepreneur should pursue this line of 
business instead.  
During the course of 1994, when the Danish partner came to Ghana to see the 
future production site and inspect the market opportunities, the partners formally 
agreed to apply for a PSDP collaboration that would produce treated wooden poles 
for the Ghanaian electricity and telecommunication sectors. Formally, the collabo-
ration began in 1995. According to the project documents, the plant was to have a 
capacity of approximately 7000 treated poles per year, but the current situation is 
worlds apart from this aim. At the moment, the company occasionally imports logs 
from neighbouring Togo, which are then treated in the plant and re-exported to 
Togo, which allows the Ghanaian owner/manager to be exempt from Ghanaian im-
port duties. However, his company has never been able to reach its objectives, even 
though the project was kick-started by the mere fact that in the mid-1990s Danida 
had supported an electrification programme aimed at electrifying larger parts of the 
country. 
The explanations for current as well as earlier problems are many and often con-
tradictory. In Danida’s own magazine, Udvikling, the problems are described as re-
lating to the environmental effects of the collaboration: due to the Ghanaian entre-
preneur’s ignorance regarding the chemicals that are used to treat the poles, the 
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 Ghanaian authorities demanded that the plant introduce several safety regulations to 
protect both the staff and the surrounding environment. This, of course, delayed the 
start of the production (Jespersen, 1997b). A review of the programme conducted 
by a Ghanaian consultancy company concurs with the conclusion that the PSDP 
collaboration had failed to implement the environmental procedure agreed upon, 
but it also stresses the lack of project preparation, the underfunding and the ‘ex-
tremely difficult and uncoorperative Danish partner’ as the reasons for the delay 
and for the problems that the collaborations faced (Technical Systems Ltd., 1999). 
Danida’s own list of project and programme statuses as of 2002 simply lists the de-
lays as a reason for difficulties of collaboration between the two partners (Danida, 
2002). These explanations probably all have some truth to them. However, there is 
more to the story. 
Related to the environmental problems described above, the joint venture also 
lacked the necessary testing equipment in order to get the poles certified and thus 
obtain government contracts. For quite some time, then, the partners were formally 
unable to obtain lucrative contracts from government bodies. However, it seems 
that the lack of certification has not excluded the company totally from this market, 
as it has obtained contracts from, for instance, the Ministry of Energy. How this 
happened remains uncertain, but no doubt the Ghanaian partner has a wide-ranging 
network, which may have helped. Besides his membership of the board of AGI and 
the two companies, already mentioned, he is the owner/manager of an environ-
mental consultancy company strategically located in Accra. His connections have 
so far allowed him to attract development funding in large quantities: besides the 
support of Danida for this joint venture, he has subsequently been able to obtain 
funding twice from Danida’s PSDP for his furniture business (P7/P8), and once 
from an American development agency for the same business. Lately, he has been 
able to obtain testing equipment for the treated poles from a third development 
agency. 
A desire to help a relative financially may also account for some of the problems 
the company has experienced: the machines for the plant were purchased from a 
company in Singapore that happened to be owned by the Danish partner’s brother. 
However, this was not known to the Ghanaian partner until a few years ago, when 
one of the machines, a kiln dryer, broke down and he needed spare parts. At that 
point, the collaboration – which was formerly a joint venture between the two part-
ners, with the Danish partner holding seventy percent and the Ghanaian partner 
thirty percent – had ended, and the Ghanaian partner had taken over the company’s 
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 activities.297 Due to internal disputes the partners were no longer communicating 
with each other, and therefore the Ghanaian partner contacted the producer of the 
dryer directly, only to be very amused to discover that it was the Danish partner’s 
brother who owned this company. Even though he did not know the world market 
price for kiln dryers and hence did not known whether or not the joint venture had 
paid a reasonable price, he felt that the lack of transparency pertaining to his Dan-
ish partner’s procurement decisions was intended to cover up irregularities. 
At the time of the interview, approximately fifteen people were working in the 
company, some in both this plant and in his furniture manufacturing company 
nearby. When the Ghanaian entrepreneur first contacted the Danish embassy for 
support, this enterprise did not exist: therefore it can be said that the collaboration 
has had some positive effects. However, these effects are clearly outweighed by the 
negative effects of the collaboration. First, there is no indication that the Ghanaian 
partner has managed to solve the company’s environmental problems. Even though 
he has erected a roof on top of part of the plant site and the area itself has been 
fenced off to minimise the risk from humans and animals in the surrounding area, 
chemicals are still easily accessible, and employees are not properly protected. 
More importantly, the company has still not managed to obtain the required certifi-
cates relating to the use of chemicals in the production. Secondly, the company has 
never made a profit. Indeed, both partners claim that project itself has caused them 
losses. The Danish partner never saw any returns on his investments. The Ghanaian 
partner raised a loan of DKK 2.65 million from the PSDP loan facility, which has 
never been repaid. Even when the merchant bank that is formally responsible for 
the loan decided a couple of years ago to re-establish the loan conditions, whereby 
all interest rates were subtracted, nothing happened. This is hardly surprising, as 
nobody has any economic stake in the loan. As the loan is repaid, Danida transfers 
the money it receives to the Government of Ghana as budget support. The money 
has already been withdrawn from its budget and counts as development assistance, 
while the merchant bank is simply administering the loan for Danida and hence has 
no interest itself in forcing the borrower to pay the loan back.298 Left out of this 
equation is the Ministry of Finance, which should eventually received the money 
                                                 
297 According to the Ghanaian owner/manager, the Danish partner never paid his share of the 
joint venture, but this accusation is not supported by the project documents shown to me during the 
interview. On the contrary, these documents reiterate the formal agreement of a 70/30 joint venture.  
298 The problems associated with the recovery of old loans is partly to be blamed on the organ-
isational set-up between Danida, the merchant bank and the Government of Ghana, as already noted 
by the Ghanaian consultancy company prior to the second internal review of the PSDP (Technical 
Systems Ltd., 1999).  
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 back, but it has no means to force the borrowers to repay the loans, so generally 
speaking loans are not repaid. 
Case XXIV. Lack of capabilities, rudeness or greed? Diverging accounts of a prematurely 
ended collaboration (S15) 
A Ghanaian producer of poultry and piglet feed attended a business management 
course at Empretec in order to enhance the productivity of his company. A couple 
of new tools and principles were introduced to him, but most importantly, he was 
informed about the possibilities of collaborating with a foreign partner through 
Danida’s PSDP. Immediately after the course, the Ghanaian producer of feed there-
fore approached the Danish embassy to obtain more information about this support 
scheme. Following this, he was invited to the Agromex fair (TechChange) in Hern-
ing, where he met up with his future PSDP partner, one of the leading producers of 
animal feed and vitamin and mineral supplements in Scandinavia. The Danish part-
ner saw an opportunity in the PSDP to acquire risk free experience of a new market 
and a future opportunity to enter an expanding market for high-quality feed.299  
In Ghana in the late 1990s there was only one large-scale producer of animal 
feed, and local demand was largely met by numerous small-scale artisan producers. 
However, the quality of these products was very variable, and an inquiry among lo-
cal pig farmers indicated that, even though products based on the Danish premix 
would be more expensive than locally produced feed, farmers would be ready to 
cover the extra costs. Consequently, the partners started production of the Danish 
company’s products in the existing mills. While the previous feed was basically 
made of local maize, fish and wheat, the new feed required that more than 20 per-
cent of the ingredients be imported (16 percent mix from the Danish partner and 5.8 
percent meat meal). 
As shown in section 2.2.1, the majority of the sum allocated for a PSDP collabo-
ration is for technical assistance and training – only a maximum of DKK 100,000 is 
allocated for production equipment. As a general rule, Danida does not provide 
working capital. However, this rule may apparently be twisted: according to the fi-
nal evaluation report signed by the Danish partner, DKK 86,496 had been used to 
pay for imports of the mix from the Danish partner, and only a very small amount 
had been used to pay for technology. 
Even this relatively large sum granted by Danida did not make the business 
sound: after a short initial boost, sales quickly started dropping, since the farmers 
were no longer prepared to pay the extra price for the newly enhanced product. Mu-
                                                 
299 Like several other Danish PSDP companies, this company has subsequently collaborated with 
other developing country partners through the PSDP. 
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 tual allegations of all sorts were made between the partners. The Danish partner 
maintained first, that his Ghanaian counterpart lacked even the most basic manage-
rial abilities and was incompetent in other aspects of business life, and secondly, 
that the Ghanaian partner had confronted him and his business partners with a rude 
and aggressive attitude. Therefore, the collaboration could not continue.  
The Ghanaian partner agreed that he lacked managerial abilities, but that was the 
main reason why he approached the embassy in the first place. Furthermore, he as-
serted that this is only the official version of the story. According to him, the ‘real’ 
story is that a Danish production manager and managing director were too greedy: 
while the partners were marketing the new Danish-based feed in the region, the 
Ghanaian partner introduced his Danish partners to one of the biggest farms, with 
over 100,000 hectares of farmland. The farmer immediately saw the difference in 
quality between the locally produced feed and the new Danish-based feed and 
wanted to buy the latter instead. The Ghanaian partner perceived this as part of a 
marketing strategy for his company, but he soon learned that the farmer had signed 
a separate contract with the Danish partner to import the feed directly instead of 
through his company. The Ghanaian partner felt cheated and demanded a percent-
age of the sale, which he did not receive. This was when the problems between the 
partners began.  
Whether it was mostly a lack of abilities, a rude attitude or greed that caused the 
problems does not really matter. What matters is that the collaboration came to an 
end and the Ghanaian partner started producing feed using the original recipies 
once again. He would have liked to continue producing the enhanced quality feed 
with mix from the Danish partner or using imports from other similar companies, 
but he did not have any working capital for imports. Thus, he was forced to return 
to what he was doing originally.  
On the face of it, thus, nothing really happened: Danida matched two partners, 
spent roughly half a million DKK, and after an unsuccessful intervention, both 
partners went back to doing what they were used to doing. Something, however, 
might have happened: when the collaboration ended, the Ghanaian partner contin-
ued producing local feed, but on a smaller scale than before; networks and business 
connections had to be resumed, and he had to lay off many employees. Since the 
collaboration began the Ghanaian partner has experienced two cases of armed rob-
bery at the factory site, and he has the bad feeling that these robberies are closely 
connected with his collaboration with foreigners. He feels that someone in the 
community has resented the fact that he has stopped buying inputs for production 
locally and instead turned to doing business with a foreign partner, and therefore 
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 wanted to scare him out of business. They succeeded, production has now come to 
a total standstill, and all non-family labour has been sacked. 
Moreover, his reputation as a businessman has been ruined by the statements 
made by his former Danish partner in the final evaluation reports. In order to revive 
his feed business, he subsequently applied to be a part of a European Union-
financed business association scheme, but he was rejected because the Danish Em-
bassy had passed on information to this donor organisation stating that, based on 
previous experience, he was not suitable for a partnership. However, the Danish 
embassy never visited the premises of the Ghanaian partner but based its assess-
ment solely on what the Danish partner had said. 
8.4 The inevitable impacts 
Impacts of development interventions are like deaths: they are inevitable. Impacts 
are not predetermined, but rather reflect the combination of policy design, political 
will, economic resources, business culture, historical legacy, diverging motives 
among the various actors and different principles of selection and sidetracking. Nor 
is the route towards these impacts direct: similar impacts, such as employment gen-
eration, earning an income and improvements in product quality, may be attained 
through various processes, and there is not necessarily one proper way of reaching 
these ends.  
This chapter has laid bare the impacts of Danida’s PSDP in Ghana at the enter-
prise level. It has examined how the PSDP may facilitate the building of techno-
logical capabilities in small Ghanaian enterprises, but it has also revealed all the 
hindrances to the process of upgrading these companies through an aid intervention 
like the PSDP. Moreover, using four indicators, this chapter has examined how the 
intervention has fared in relation to Danida’s overall goals, but it has also uncov-
ered all the problems related to such an analysis. Lastly, this chapter has exposed 
some of the unintended impacts of the intervention. 
Based on the framework for studying changes in technological capabilities de-
veloped in Chapter 4, this chapter has instigated an examination of these changes in 
the Ghanaian companies that have collaborated with Danish companies via the 
PSDP. Four conclusions should be highlighted as emerging from this analysis. 
First, in almost two-fifths of the collaborations, the PSDP did not lead to any im-
provements of technological capabilities in any form. Certainly some collaborations 
did not have capability building as one of their stated objectives, but since the over-
all objective of the programme is to transfer skills, one may assume that techno-
logical capability building is highly prioritised, even though it is not directly speci-
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 fied.300 This figure challenges the claim put forward by, for instance, Romijn 
(1999), that the introduction of new production equipment should lead by default to 
the generation of new skills and thus also to improvements in technological capa-
bilities (cf. section 4.6.1). Secondly, improvements in production capabilities are 
more widespread than improvements in investment and linkage capabilities, which 
only confirms the significance of the focus on building up skills via inter-firm col-
laborations that pay attention to product and process upgrading through learning-
by-doing and learning-by-interacting. Thirdly, these positive changes all belong to 
the lower end of the technological capability level, or what has sometimes been re-
ferred to as technology-using capabilities (unlike technology-changing capabili-
ties). Improvements that are confined to these basic levels may be sufficient to in-
crease productivity levels, but in general intermediate and advanced technological 
capabilities are needed in order to achieve longer-term dynamic changes (cf. sec-
tion 4.5). Fourthly, the PSDP has resulted in the degrading of some companies’ ca-
pabilities to link up to suppliers, customers, business organisations and the like, 
simply because the Ghanaian company has a tendency to leave these matters for the 
Danish company to decide. 
In addition, this chapter accounted for how the PSDP facilitates the building of 
technological capabilities. Four cases were chosen to illustrate these processes. The 
first case pointed towards the shared motives for entering the collaboration: organ-
isational restructuring, practical as well as theoretical knowledge to build upon, the 
detailed planning and execution of training and close supervision as determining 
factors for the upgrading process. In contrast, the three other cases all pointed to-
wards the obstacles to upgrading. Among the most important aspects here were hi-
erarchical organisational structures, staff replacement, excessive expectations, un-
committed partners, divergent motives and inter-personal problems.  
Chapter 3 established the framework for studying impacts of Danida’s PSDP in 
Ghana. This framework distinguished between impacts at the enterprise level and 
broader impacts. This chapter has dealt with the former. Four indicators were cho-
sen to shed light on the Ghanaian companies’ economic situation. These indicators 
provided a very blurred picture of the impacts, one that points to a major conclu-
sion of these types of study, namely that the very concepts of success and failure 
are analytically useless. This is because the impacts of an intervention are inter-
preted differently by the various stakeholders. Moreover, these perceptions change 
over time. Hence, a success for one person at a given point in time may turn out to 
be less positive later or for someone else. The study also found that although im-
                                                 
300 In two cases, however, the intention was not to build technological capabilities (cf. Table 
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 pacts are interwoven, the relationship between the different impacts cannot be es-
tablished in advance: each and every case has to be examined separately to obtain 
an idea of how the aid intervention has impacted on the target group, as well as on 
others elsewhere.  
For fear of ending up by contradicting these general conclusions, I will neverthe-
less venture to point out some of the PSDP-related aspects that influence the in-
tended impacts on the target group. The chapter established that size, relevance and 
time all matter: that is, the smaller the recipient enterprise, the more extensive the 
impacts tend to be; the more relevant the collaboration is for the core activities in 
the recipient company, the higher the propensity of the intended impacts to come 
about; and the longer the partners have collaborated, the higher the chances that 
they have influenced each other. However, this does not suggest that brief collabo-
rations may not have a huge impact, that initiatives isolated from the core activities 
of a company cannot lead to positive intended impacts, or that impacts of the PSDP 
are by default diminutive in large Ghanaian companies. It only indicates that the 
tendency for considerable intended impacts depend on these variables. 
This chapter also pointed out the importance of not limiting a study to the ex-
pected outcomes of an intervention. First, the fifteen cases that were chosen to re-
veal the problems of using simple indicators to measure impacts suggest that the 
PSDP impacts are definitely not restricted to what either Danida, DI/HVR or the 
business partners state they expected. The reason for this discrepancy relates to the 
only partial adoptions of interventions by the actors. Put differently, the PSDP is 
typically not adopted completely by all members of the target group. Instead, 
owner/managers pick the programme apart and select what is most appropriate for 
them, discarding or playing down other elements of the programme. In the words of 
Olivier de Sardan (2005: 144f), the target group thus ‘disarticulates’ the coherence 
of an intervention which ‘results in a number of “perverse effects”, which annul the 
effectiveness of the improvements proposed and might even induce outright nega-
tive results’. The Ghanaian owner/managers’ motives for participating in the PSDP 
are often at odds with Danida’s intentions. Likewise, the Danish partners’ motives 
are often at odds with those of both the Ghanaian owner/managers and Danida. Dif-
ferent groups thus select specific parts of the intervention and appropriate these, of-
ten in ways not originally anticipated. This process of selection and appropriation 
tends to result in a sidetracking or transformation of the programme, away from the 
original stated objective towards a new situation that results from this process of 
disarticulation (Olivier de Sardan, 1988, 2005). It is therefore important to go be-
                                                                                                                                        
8.1).  
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 yond the intended impacts in order to reach a fuller understanding of the interven-
tion. 
Ghanaian owner/managers, for instance, do not enter into collaboration with a 
Danish partner in order to create economic and social development in Ghana or to 
alleviate poverty. Rather, several different logics guide their choices. The most ob-
vious of these logics is the constant search for capital. In a country characterised by 
a scarcity of capital (cf. section 7.3), the search for working as well as fixed capital 
therefore becomes very urgent for most small enterprises. This logic also applies to 
the Ghanaian PSDP enterprises, which perceive Danida’s PSDP as a way of obtain-
ing access to capital. The grant for production equipment plus the loan facility 
makes Danida’s PSDP very attractive for Ghanaian small enterprises, indeed, more 
attractive than most other business-to-business support interventions in Ghana. Ac-
cess to capital tends to overshadow other (and, regarding Danida’s objective, more 
important) aspects of the intervention, that is, training and technical assistance to 
upgrade companies in the recipient country. Since Ghanaian businessmen are 
mostly tempted by the chance to obtain access to capital via the PSDP, in many 
cases they do not recognise that the PSDP is more than just a grant. They therefore 
select parts of the intervention and tend to disregard others. In Danida’s perception, 
the grant is actually only a minor part of what is on offer, the important parts of the 
intervention being the training and technical assistance. Access to technologically 
advanced machinery also seems to play a major role, both when Ghanaian busi-
nessmen choose to participate in the programme, and when they appropriate parts 
of it.  
Likewise, Danish businessmen do not participate in this programme solely out 
of altruism. Like the other actors in the PSDP, they act according to certain logic, 
especially the leveraging of resources. The Danish partners thus perceive the PSDP 
as a way to increase their prospects for internationalising almost risk-free, to secure 
the company against demand fluctuations (by planning the training sessions in pe-
riods of low demand) and to enhance the opportunity to sell otherwise unsaleable 
second-hand machinery via the programme. The Danish partners therefore do not 
only engage in inter-firm collaborations in order to start a ‘long-term binding 
agreement’ (that is, to facilitate economic and social development in Ghana), but 
rather to leverage resources. Needless to say, this aim influences a collaboration 
that is actually intended, by Danida, to bring about social and economic develop-
ment in the recipient country.  
Secondly, unintended impacts are not either solely positive or solely negative. 
The five cases chosen to highlight the unintended impacts on the target group rein-
force the conclusion given above: what is positive for some may be negative for 
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 others. In addition, these cases highlight the fact that decisions that may affect 
some stakeholders negatively may be necessary to minimise the overall negative 
impact. Likewise, these cases pointed to ‘cultural’ perceptions as determining for a 
collaboration: in one case, the mere fact that the business partner was ‘white’ in-
creased the trustworthiness and credibility of the Ghanaian business, while in an-
other collaboration with a ‘white’ businessman was seen as the main reason why 
his business had been robbed.  
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9. DIFFUSION OF IMPACTS, ACCESS TO RESOURCES, AND 
THE EMBEDDED-DISEMBEDDED CONFLICT IN DANIDA’S PSDP 
By now it should be clear that the PSDP forms part of Danida’s large portfolio of 
development interventions, which target the private sector in order to fulfil the 
overall goal of Danish development assistance, namely to alleviate poverty. As we 
have seen, the PSDP seeks to assist in this process by establishing links between 
Danish companies and companies in Danida’s partner countries. These links, it is 
assumed, should upgrade technological capabilities in the recipient country compa-
nies in order to make them more profitable and thus contribute towards intermedi-
ate development goals, such as the generation of employment, enhanced environ-
mental procedures, increased foreign exchange earnings etc. in the recipient com-
panies. On the other hand, it is assumed that the impacts on these companies will 
spread to other parts of the private sector in the partner countries, as well as to soci-
ety at large. It is unclear exactly how Danida perceives the flow of impacts to the 
private sector: will impacts spread to the private sector through spill-overs from a 
recipient company to its suppliers or customers, through demonstration effects 
(sound management, good quality, labour rights etc.) among private entrepreneurs, 
or via increased customer expectations regarding, for instance, between delivery 
times or better quality, thus leading to increased demand? Likewise, it is unclear 
how the positive impacts of the PSDP are believed to diffuse into the surrounding 
society. Will the companies employ ‘poor’ people, raise salaries, and transfer parts 
of the return on investments back into local villages? Will the PSDP lead to im-
proved trade balances or to a broader tax base?  
Danida’s own publications on the subject (such as Danida (1993; 2000c; 2001c; 
2003a; 2005b)) do not provide any answers. As argued in section 2.2.2 on page 41, 
the aims of the specific PSDP collaborations to a large degree remain unspecified. 
The Danish embassy places its emphasis on certain ‘development’ aspects in the 
screening process, most notably if and how competences are transferred from the 
Danish company to the recipient country company, and whether the collaboration 
contributes to social and economic development in the host country, but it does not 
say how this may come about. The PSDP project documents also stress these two 
aspects, but again the connection between technology transfer and developments in 
the private sector or in society at large are not revealed. Notwithstanding these am-
biguities, the PSDP is marketed as a development intervention that, alongside 
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 Danida’s other development interventions, should contribute to alleviating poverty 
by improving the competitiveness of local enterprises in recipient countries and 
thus contributing to economic growth. 
This chapter aims to deepen our understanding of the impacts of Danida’s PSDP 
in Ghana on the Ghanaian private sector and Ghanaian society respectively. The 
distinction between the Ghanaian private sector and Ghanaian society may seem 
arbitrary, as the latter includes the former, and since many of the conclusions re-
lated to one issue also relate to the other. For the sake of clarity, however, this 
chapter provides two examples of how PSDP impacts have diffused into these two 
spheres. The first example illustrates how the introduction of a new product has led 
to demands for inputs that were previously regarded as waste. The second presents 
the broader impact of a PSDP collaboration, namely the replication of a community 
development fund that was established by the PSDP partners, first by one of the 
partners in another logging area; but more importantly the idea was taken up by the 
government of Ghana and included in the recent Timber Concession Act. Thus, 
from now on five percent of the profits of logging in off-forest reserves will be de-
voted to socially responsible projects in the logging area. 
Unfortunately, these two cases are rare. In by far the majority of the Ghanaian 
PSDP collaborations, the broader impacts on the private sector and on society at 
large are either hard to determine or practically non-existent. This chapter argues 
that a combination of specific Ghanaian institutional features described in Chapter 
7 and the non-adaptation of the PSDP to the specific Ghanaian business system 
tends to prevent dissemination of the impacts of the programme.  
Following this, two PSDP collaborations explain how some characteristics of the 
Ghanaian business system impede the spread of impacts. It thus builds on the 
analysis of the business system characteristics set out in section 7.6 page 205. Case 
XXVII page 297 tells the story of a powerful businessman in a relatively under-
privileged region in Ghana who has been quite successful with his interaction with 
donor agencies, but less so with his manufacturing enterprises. In a period of ap-
proximately three years, his employees received on-the-job training in connection 
with two PSDP collaborations. However, the company never became profitable, 
and all its machines are now lying idle. Unfortunately, the Ghanaian entrepreneur’s 
power, in combination with lack of other employment opportunities in the region, 
has resulted in technical capabilities not spreading: the employees simply stay with 
the ‘big man’ in hope of new contracts and a salary, instead of seeking greener pas-
tures elsewhere. The upgrading process in the Ghanaian PSDP company portrayed 
in Case XXVIII page 299 brought demands for higher-quality inputs for the pro-
duction. However, the partners faced difficulties in acquiring good quality raw ma-
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 terials within Ghana, and therefore they chose to set up a new company with the 
sole purpose of importing good quality inputs from Denmark. As a result, the pos-
sibilities of spin-off effects to suppliers were limited. Moreover, it used the existing 
network of PSDP collaborations as its main customer base. Thus, the demonstration 
effect to other parts of the Ghanaian private sector was reduced.  
Because the impacts of Danida’s PSDP in Ghana have only spread to a minor 
degree, it is important to analyse who the beneficiaries of the programme really are. 
Section 9.2 critically examines the 48 PSDP collaborations in Ghana. These Ghana-
ian enterprises are categorised according to their own perceptions of ranking vis-à-
vis other enterprises in the sector, to whether they were formerly a SOE, whether 
the owner has a close political network, and whether the owner is a leading member 
of an important business organisation. This categorisation shows that almost three-
fifth of the owners of the PSDP enterprises belong to the upper echelons of Ghana-
ian society. In other words, this section reiterates Olivier de Sardan’s (2005: 149) 
conclusion regarding aid intervention to rural societies in SSA, namely that ‘devel-
opment is a game which favours those who have the best cards in hand at the out-
set’. This section describes further the implications of this insight. 
Section 9.3 departs from the characterisation of Ghanaian ‘growing’ enterprises 
provided in section 7.6 and summarised in Table 7.4 page 207 and adds the design 
of the PSDP in an analysis of why the PSDP in Ghana has only spread to the pri-
vate sector and society at large to a minor extent. This section argues that the dis-
crepancy between the ‘real’ needs of the Ghanaian private sector and Danida’s 
PSDP result in the low sustainability of the programme, limited developmental ef-
fects, the maintenance of existing local power structures etc.  
9.1 Diffusion of impacts into the private sector and society at large 
By definition, the diffusion of impacts is hard to determine: which impacts are im-
portant and which are less important, are impacts that are important for some stake-
holders also important for other stakeholders, and when and where are these im-
pacts important? These questions are by no means less relevant in the Ghanaian 
context, as methodological problems pertaining to a lack of information regarding 
early collaborations (which are less successful in the minds of the embassy), as well 
as doubts surrounding the interviewer’s role vis-à-vis the interviewee (cf. sections 
6.2.1 and 6.3.2), mean that some impacts are simply impossible to follow up (cf. 
Case II page 225). 
Any assessment of the diffusion impacts on the private sector must thus relies 
first on an examination of the linkages between the Ghanaian PSDP company and 
suppliers, customers and retailers, and competitors. Thereafter, it rests on an inves-
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 tigation into the transfer of skills through trained employees’ changes of job, as 
well as an enquiry into sales of machinery (cf. Henny Romijn’s (1999) suggestion 
that the introduction of machinery can lead to mastery of new skills, section 4.6.1). 
Lastly, it hinges on an examination of the role of business organisation in Ghana 
(cf. section 7.2.4). 
All these indicators point in the same direction: the (intended) impacts of 
Danida’s PSDP do not spread to the Ghanaian private sector. Practically all link-
ages to suppliers are either of a short-term nature, or else inputs are standard prod-
ucts and therefore producers do not upgrade suppliers. The same can be said in re-
lation to customers. Most products are sold in a spot market. Since credit is scarce, 
buyers purchase a couple of items, such as wheelbarrows (P13), take them to the 
roadside and sell them, then either returning to the manufacturer and buying some 
more, or buying wheelbarrows from someone else: again, no long-term linkages ex-
ist that demand upgrading. Only in cases where the Ghanaian PSDP company links 
up to the Danish company either as suppliers of raw materials or as sales outlets for 
Danish products are such linkages are established – but to the Danish company, not 
to other Ghanaian companies. The story may well be repeated with reference to the 
diffusion of capabilities through competitors. The Ghanaian private sector is char-
acterised by an abundance of small enterprises that are only registered in the most 
basic way, therefore Ghanaian PSDP companies only have partial knowledge about 
their competitors and tend to be very suspicious of their motives (cf. section 7.6). 
An investigation into the diffusion of skills through job rotation showed that, in 
ten PSDP collaborations, trained employees have either chosen to leave the com-
pany or have been made redundant. Table 9.1 summarises these collaborations, 
showing that in only one of these cases were some of the staff trained through the 
PSDP clearly employed in another company in the same sector in Ghana (P4). In 
three other cases (S1/S27/P16), staff started their own businesses. In two of these 
cases, some of the employees may well have used the skills obtained via the PSDP 
in their new business, though it is questionable whether employees in a relatively 
capital-intensive manufacturer of fruit concentrates could use their skills in artisan 
production (S27). In one case the employees are making use of their skills, but not 
in Ghana (P12); in two cases the employees are certainly not making any use of 
their skills (P6/P13); and in three cases the managers maintain that they have no 
data about the whereabouts of their former employees (S4/S15/P17). Unfortunately, 
the cases that potentially could have enhanced knowledge of the diffusion of capa-
bilities, and thus of impacts to the private sector, turned out to be a dead end in re-
search terms: one company had changed its management team, and the manager 
had only a superficial knowledge regarding what had happened prior to his arrival, 
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 while three other companies either did not want to disclose such information or did 
not have any. 
Table 9.1. Job rotation of PSDP-trained employees 
PSDP Who? Where? 
S1 Case XIXX
10 unskilled workers 
made redundant Produce handicrafts or hawks on the street 
S4 - Two employees released No data 
S15 Case XXIV All employees dismissed No data 
S27 - A few employees made redundant  Own businesses 
P4 Case VI
Trained employees made 
redundant due to eco-
nomic problems 
Some have jobs in the pharmaceutical sector, but as the 
management team has changed it possesses no data about the 
former employees 
P6 Case IV
Four female employees 
(tailors and textile print-
ers) dismissed due to 
production stop 
Wanted to start own business but failed to get hold of suffi-
cient capital. Chose instead to ‘get married and have chil-
dren’ 
P12 Case XXI
The company went bank-
rupt. All employees ei-
ther fled or were made 
redundant 
The financial controller hides in Zimbabwe, one pilot flies 
internationally, one is employed in the US, four stewardesses 
work in the US, the head of sales studies in the US, one 
driver returned to his former company, and one is unem-
ployed 
P13 - One accountant quit her job She got pregnant 
P16 Case III
Two desktop publishers 
left Started their own businesses 
P17 Case II One desktop publisher  Undecided. Perhaps working in a bank as a secretary 
 
The potential diffusion of skills by means of equipment was probed via the market 
for second-hand capital goods: it was assumed that skills could be transferred along 
with machinery. Thus, if machinery that came as part of Danida’s PSDP was either 
sold or given away, this might suggest that skills had been transferred. However, 
only one company (P12) has sold some of its equipment, namely the computers. 
Diffusion of impacts via this channel has thus not taken place. 
Lastly, dense business networks could indicate an exchange of ideas and knowl-
edge on the management level. However, as shown in section 7.2.4, business or-
ganisations in Ghana are fragmented and lack membership support.  
To sum up, the impacts of the PSDP do not diffuse into the Ghanaian private 
sector to any large degree, and even though data for broader impacts on society 
generally are sparse, nothing suggests that impacts spread to society to any consid-
erable extent. This section discusses with two cases that actually illustrate how im-
pacts are spread, the next section two cases that focus on the obstacles to the dis-
persal of impacts. 
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 Case XXV. Product offers economic potential for local farmers (S14) 
In 1996 USAID invited a female Ghanaian entrepreneur with a background in biol-
ogy and soil management to North America to promote her organic soil conditioner 
on the US and Canadian markets. Although she experiences real difficulties in per-
suading North American retailers to buy her unknown Ghanaian product, her trip 
was an eye-opener for her. During it, she visited one of the world’s largest produc-
ers of organic fertilisers and received a brief introduction to the process of produc-
ing fertilisers. She soon realised that an abundance of organic waste for such pro-
duction was available in Ghana: it was just a matter of getting production started. 
She provided friends with kitchen dustbins in order to make them separate out the 
waste that she could use. 
A couple of years later, after numerous tests on flowers, vegetables, corn etc., 
she decided that she was ready to enter the commercial market and therefore ap-
proached the Ghana Standard Boards to have her products certified. However, the 
commercial organic fertiliser could not be based on her friends’ waste, and she 
therefore made initial contact with a large-scale cocoa-producer to procure cocoa 
bean husks for her production. On top of this she needed coconut husks and 
chicken droppings for the fertiliser. These inputs are bought directly from local 
farmers.  
In 2001, a Start-up Facility was initiated with a Danish agri-business consultant 
so as to expand the production of organic fertilisers and introduce new products. 
The initial phase of the collaboration was aimed at enhancing production methods 
and developing new products. Even though the Start-up Facility is regarded more 
as a search for new opportunities than a long-term business partnership, the Ghana-
ian company has been able to increase its sales while the programme has taken 
place.  
Thus from a start of only one employee, the company has grown to ten unskilled 
casual labourers, all from the surrounding area. More importantly, however, the in-
creased production implies an increased demand for inputs, which are partly bought 
from the local farmers, while others were formerly regarded as waste. Hence, the 
production of organic fertilisers directly impacted on the livelihood of the local 
community. 
The role of the PSDP is hard to determine. First, I visited the partners in the ini-
tial phase of the collaboration. Secondly, the aim of the collaboration was to ex-
plore new opportunities rather than to increase production. The Ghanaian entrepre-
neur, for instance, went to Denmark to become acquainted with the Danish market, 
but even though she has managed to export some samples, the market for her prod-
ucts is largely confined to commercial farmers in her surrounding area in Ghana. 
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 Lastly, the machine designed to dry the waste turned out to be too expensive. In-
stead shovels were purchased from the PSDP funds, the remainder being reserved 
for a possible Business Partnership. 
Notwithstanding the actual role of the Danish company in the process, this case 
identifies important aspects that may increase the positive effects of such a devel-
opment intervention. 
Case XXVI. Local power balance makes the future for the collaboration unsure, but the 
broader impacts remain (P9) 
This case (also described in Case V page 240) clearly shows that the use of 
‘changes in employment’ as a single indicator may skew the picture radically: the 
tremendous increase in the number of employees in the Ghanaian company could 
not be related to the PSDP. However, this in no way means that the programme did 
not have any impact. On the contrary, this is one of the only cases of impacts on 
society at large.  
First, the PSDP collaboration has enabled the farmers in the forest to enhance 
their potential for a higher income by initiating a process towards a diversification 
of the production of farmers living in the logging area. The newly introduced crops 
turned out to have a significantly higher yield than cocoa, the traditional crop in the 
forest. Thus the basis of the farmers’ income increased. Moreover, the partners, as 
part of the PSDP, have established a community development fund that aims to 
transfer some of the profits of the logging back into the community. Thus, for every 
cubic metre logged in the area, US$ 5 are deposited in a fund that may be used for 
projects that benefit the local community, such as the construction of schools or 
health centres. 
Secondly, the design of the interaction between the logging companies and the 
local farmers in an off-forest reserve has been transferred to another PSDP collabo-
ration. Thus the idea of tree-nursing schools to regenerate the forest, of extension 
services and of a community fund have all been taken up by another PSDP collabo-
ration. 
Thirdly, and most importantly with regard to the discussion of broader impacts, 
the idea of involving locals in reforestation and the introduction of a development 
fund have been taken up by the government of Ghana. The government has thus 
recognized the importance of involving rural people in reforestation programmes, 
and government representatives are currently trying to demonstrate to the popula-
tion living in rural areas that it is indeed possible to grow agricultural products 
along with timber. Moreover, the Timber Concession Act of 1997 states that five 
percent of the profits from logging should be used for socially responsible projects 
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 in the area. According to representatives of this PSDP collaboration, a paragraph in 
the Act guarantees that some of the profits will be shared with the local population. 
However, not everything concerning this collaboration can be viewed through 
rose-coloured spectacles. Recently, the chief of the area was ‘destooled’ (dis-
missed). Internal problems between factions supporting the different chiefs in the 
area meant that a battle for the stool broke out. The former chief was solely respon-
sible for the agreement between the logging companies and the local farmers. As a 
general rule the chief secures the tenure of land, but at the moment there is not one 
chief but many competing for this power. These chiefs use land tenure and land use 
as ways of obtaining support from the farmers. The reasoning goes like this: sup-
port for a chief may be won if that particular chief enables a farmer to cultivate 
more land and thus raise his income. Therefore, the competing chiefs invite new 
migrants from their former power base into the off-forest reserve and allocate plots 
to them in order to obtain their support. As a result there is currently a double ten-
dency to cultivate an ever-greater share of each plot and to exploit the whole off-
forest reserve instead of just parts of it. This goes against the whole idea of refores-
tation initiated by the partners. 
The future of this particular collaboration is thus unclear due to internal power 
conflicts, but the broader impacts appear to remain. 
9.1.1 Non-diffusion of impacts in the majority of PSDP collaborations 
Case XXVII. Machines stand idle, but employees stay with the ‘big man’ (P7/P8) 
Through his high-ranking position in one of the major business organisations in 
Ghana, one Ghanaian became aware of the possibilities of technical and financial 
support to his business through Danida’s PSDP. In his hometown he had estab-
lished a company that manufactured wooden windows and doors. This company 
had already benefited from a development intervention aimed at the Ghanaian pri-
vate sector. Indeed, most of his machines in the first half of the 1990s derived from 
this intervention. However, his employees were unable to make use of most of 
them, which he felt were too old to make quality products. He therefore approached 
Danida to obtain a Danish partner for him. As shown in Case XXIII page 280, 
Danida at first did not manage to match him with a Danish partner in this line of 
business. Instead, it found him a partner for the production of treated wooden poles.  
The wooden poles collaboration, however, was described as a ‘bad marriage’, 
and according to the Ghanaian owner/manager, the PS coordinator at the embassy 
felt that he was indebted to the Ghanaian businessman and therefore was eager to 
find him a partner for the window and door frame factory. Eventually, in 1997 an 
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 agreement was signed for a Business Partnership with a Danish furniture manufac-
turer. The Ghanaian businessman wanted a joint venture, but in the end the Danish 
partner only wanted a technical agreement: second-hand machines for solid wood 
products were to be shipped from Denmark to Ghana, and the Danish partner would 
also see to the necessary training. The future looked bright. In particular, Danida’s 
health-sector programme included the construction of several primary health clinics 
throughout the country. The Ghanaian businessman obtained the contract to supply 
these clinics with windows and doors.  
However, he soon put a spanner in the works of the collaboration. Behind the 
back of his Danish partner, he ordered all the machines from another Danish com-
pany that he had come to know of through a Danish ‘consultant’. He obtained a 
huge loan from Danida to pay for the order, but when the machines eventually ar-
rived, none of them were in working order. According to the Ghanaian business-
man, the Danish company had apparently bought up an old factory, taken what was 
useful, and then shipped the rest in a container to Ghana. The Ghanaian business-
man felt that he had been cheated. Conversely, his Danish partner accused him of 
having made a private agreement with the Danish company so as to obtain a ficti-
tiously high invoice for the machines, which could then be forwarded to Danida, so 
that he could pocket the difference. The Danish partner therefore chose to pull out. 
Whatever the truth behind the allegations, Danida decided to make a new at-
tempt to find him a partner. The purpose was once again to make door and window 
frames. ‘New’ equipment was shipped to Ghana, and training was carried out so 
that the staff could handle the machines. The Ghanaian businessman maintained 
that, by the end of this collaboration, the company was actually producing frames 
for doors and windows, as well as educational desk and chairs (for the donor was 
paying nearby schools). However, some three years later all his machines were 
standing idle and no production at all was taking place. A couple of employees 
were sleeping in one corner of the company, but the rest were nowhere to be seen. 
The Ghanaian businessman emphasised that he had a policy of keeping his em-
ployees in case he should win a contract. Meanwhile, the employees chose to stay 
with the ‘big man’ in town in preference to finding another job, because they rea-
soned that, if any contracts were to be won in the area, they would probably be won 
by their boss, who had two companies in town, another company in Accra and a 
political career.  
The trained employees have stayed in the company, even though there are no or-
ders, and the Ghanaian businessman keeps all the equipment in case someone 
should want wooden doors or window frames in the future. Consequently, none of 
the capabilities developed during the PSDP collaborations are operational. More-
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 over, no capabilities have diffused to other parts of the private sector, as both the 
employees and the machines are being kept in the company. 
Case XXVIII. Contradictory tendencies regarding impacts on the Ghanaian private sector 
(S23/S25) 
During the course of the Start-up Facility between a small Ghanaian marketing and 
design company and a Danish printing office (cf. Case VII page 243), the PSDP 
partners realised that one of the major obstacles for good quality printing and thus 
for growth was the shortage of good quality printing paper. As well as installing the 
offset machines and the computers for commercial printing, they searched the Gha-
naian market for printing paper, but without luck. Moreover, the Ghanaian partners 
were financially constrained. Consequently, instead of applying for a Business 
Partnership in the closing stages of the Start-up Facility, the partners agreed to set 
up a new business (S25), basically owned by the Danish partner (92½ percent) but 
managed by one of the Ghanaian partners, with the sole purpose of importing good 
quality paper, both for in-house production and to sell to other printing companies.  
Seen from one perspective, this company has forced out other small Ghanaian 
importers of paper, as this Danish paper is of better quality. The company has con-
vinced a large number of the other companies that have taken part in Danida’s 
PSDP, including the printing companies, to change their paper suppliers, and they 
now all buy their paper from this company. As part of its marketing strategy, the 
company regularly invites both current and potential customers for training sessions 
in how to handle paper and to choose the right paper for different purposes. This is, 
of course, part of the strategy to drive out competitors, but it may also be perceived 
as a way of broadening the impact of the PSDP: by teaching customers how to han-
dle paper and how to tell good quality paper from bad quality, the partners also 
teach their customers what good quality is and how to demand it in other cases.  
The scope and magnitude of this type of impact on the Ghanaian private sector 
is obviously not measurable: local companies are driven out by a largely Danish-
owned company, but printers (and other private-sector actors) receive better quality 
inputs for their own production. In contrast, the company seeks to influence their 
customers’ perception of quality. 
The broader impact of this PSDP collaboration on the private sector may also be 
probed into from another angle. Prior to the start of the PSDP collaboration, the 
Ghanaian company mostly produced advertising story boards for television com-
mercials as well as for billboards, but never did the pre-print or printing stages. The 
PSDP collaboration enabled the company to go into commercial printing. Even 
though its commercial success here has yet to materialise, the collaboration has en-
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 abled the company to achieve a steadier turnover, mostly because the new custom-
ers do not delay payments to the same extent as their former customers did. How-
ever, the new customers do not comprise a random sample of Ghanaian companies. 
On the contrary, almost half of the customers are members of the Ghana–Denmark 
Chamber of Commerce (formerly the Ghana–Denmark Business Club), a business 
forum set up by the Danish Embassy in Ghana to bring businessmen from the two 
countries together and thus encourage and facilitate business contacts between its 
members. The remainder comprise the Danish embassy itself and other Scandina-
vian companies based in Ghana. Thus, the effects upstream are not spread to the 
Ghanaian private sector as such, but only to other PSDP companies and large-scale 
Scandinavian companies. 
9.2 Access to PSDP funding: impacts on society at large 
The overall aim of the PSDP is to alleviate poverty via the stimulation of economic 
and social development in Danida’s partner countries. However, as argued in Chap-
ters 1 and 2, Danida, or indeed any other development agency, does not stipulate 
how a specific private-sector intervention, in this case the PSDP, helps alleviate 
poverty: it is simply assumed that the support it provides for long-term binding 
agreements between Danish companies and companies in developing countries will 
bring about this development by itself. However, this section shows that in the case 
of the PSDP in Ghana, the relationship first is not simple, and secondly, that special 
attention has to be paid to the diffusion of impacts. 
The PSDP targets ‘growing’ enterprises in developing countries. Section 4.1 
showed that on the one hand these enterprises have special needs that may best be 
fulfilled through access to technologies, inputs and well-educated staff. On the 
other hand, assistance to ‘growing’ enterprises to fulfil their needs does not result in 
large-scale positive impacts on poverty alleviation in the same straightforward 
manner as assistance to ‘survivalist’ enterprises does. Special attention must there-
fore be paid to this particular aspect.  
The theoretical distinction between ‘survivalist’ and ‘growing’ enterprises pre-
sented in Chapter 4 is hard to operationalise in practice. Among the Ghanaian 
PSDP companies, a couple of enterprises could rightly have been categorised as 
survivalist enterprises in terms of size at the start of the PSDP collaboration. How-
ever, whether in terms of economic outlook (P17/S14), technological capabilities 
(S26) or specific origin (S25), these companies surely cannot be classified as ‘sur-
vivalist’ enterprises. This being said, the remaining PSDP enterprises are heteroge-
neous: some may rightly be classified as ‘growing’ enterprises, while others are al-
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 ready medium- to large-scale. However, they too face growing competition and are 
therefore in need of upgrading in order to stay competitive. 
In order to obtain more knowledge about who benefits from the PSDP in Ghana, 
the Ghanaian PSDP companies will be broken down here in terms of their degree of 
connectedness to the upper echelons of Ghanaian society. The discussion of inter-
viewing foreign business owners in section 6.3 called attention to the fact that elite 
status first is not easy to determine, and secondly, that it depends on the local con-
text as well as on local perceptions. Belonging to the upper echelons of the Ghana-
ian private sector is here taken to denote that among other things the Ghanaian en-
trepreneur’s company is among the leading companies in a particular sector301 in 
Ghana or is a former SOE. Moreover, close political links to current or former min-
isters, as well as high-ranking positions in one of the two leading parties in Ghana, 
are here also interpreted as indicating that an entrepreneur belongs to the elite of 
Ghanaian society. Lastly, board membership of leading Ghanaian business associa-
tions is also perceived as an indicator of elite status in Ghana. 
Table 9.2 and Table 9.3 summaries these categories for Business Partnerships 
and Start-up Facilities respectively. The tables also include a row listing the Ghana-
ian companies that historically have close links to Denmark, whether due to Danish 
leadership (P5/S6/S7) or because of business collaboration with the Danish partner 
prior to the PSDP (P2/P9/P15/S19). According to the classification applied here, 
almost three-fifths of the owner/managers of the Business Partnerships belong to 
the upper echelons of Ghanaian society. In contrast, only one-third of the Business 
Partnerships neither had significant links to Denmark at the start of the PSDP, nor 
were directed by a member of the Ghanaian elite. The connection between elite 
status and access to PSDP funds is not as noticeable with reference to Start-up Fa-
cilities, where less than half of the funded collaborations in this study are directed 
by a person belonging to the upper echelons of Ghanaian society. Moreover, just 
over half of the Start-up facilities neither had significant links to Denmark, nor was 
not directed by a person belonging to the Ghanaian elite.  
 
                                                 
301 Enterprise ranking is constantly changing, especially in a highly volatile economic and politi-
cal situation as that in Ghana. Moreover, ranking is at best imperfect and fragmentary, as reliable 
comparable information regarding Ghanaian companies’ economic activities is non-existent. The 
classification as one of the leading enterprises in a particular sector thus rests on an entrepreneur’s 
own perception of his or her company vis-à-vis other companies in Ghana. Moreover, it refers to the 
situation that prevailed when the Ghanaian PSDP company initiated its collaboration with a Danish 
company. 
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 Table 9.2. Who has access to PSDP funding in Ghana? (Business Partnerships) 
№ P1
 
P2
 
P3
  
P4
 
P5
  
P6
 
P7
  
P8
 
P9
 
P1
0 
P1
1 
P1
2 
P1
3 
P1
4 
P1
5 
P1
6 
P1
7 
P1
8 
P1
9 
P2
0 
P2
1 
Leading ent.         X      X   X    
Former SOEs    X         X X        
Pol connections       X X  X  X        X  
Business ass.   X    X X  X          X  
Links to Dk  X   X    X      X       
Table 9.3. Who has access to PSDP funding in Ghana? (Start-Up Facilities) 
№ 
S1
 
S2
 
S3
  
S4
 
S5
  
S6
 
S7
  
S8
 
S9
 
S1
0 
S1
1 
S1
2 
S1
3 
S1
4 
S1
5 
S1
6 
S1
7 
S1
8 
S1
9 
S2
0 
S2
1 
S2
2 
S2
3 
S2
4 
S2
5 
S2
6 
S2
7 
Lead.         X X X      X X   X       
SOEs                            
Pol.   X  X   X          X X         
BAs    X           X             
Dk      X X            X         
 
Based on this simple categorisation, several conclusions emerge. First, there is a 
tendency for influential businessmen to have easier access to Danida’s PSDP funds 
than less influential businessmen. This is hardly surprising, as the Ghanaian busi-
ness system tends blur the distinction between business and politics: in order to be-
come a successful businessman, some degree of political connection is essential. 
Historically, public contracts have typically been won on the basis of political, eth-
nic or personal affiliations, rather than on rigid scrutiny of the bids received, and 
even though Ghanaian political rhetoric constantly claims that large-scale corrup-
tion is on the retreat in Ghana, most surveys still report widespread corruption in all 
spheres of Ghanaian society (cf. section 7.2.2). Moreover, Danida, like any other 
donor, needs collaborators in the private sector in order to find and screen potential 
beneficiaries of its PSDP. It therefore collaborates closely with the most influential 
private-sector organisations in Ghana. Throughout the lifetime of the programme, 
Danida has benefited from its collaborations with these organisations in finding 
suitable projects. However, this close collaboration has also contributed to a rela-
tively high proportion of PSDP companies being led by someone belonging to the 
Ghanaian elite, as this elite generally has access to information regarding the pro-
gramme before anyone else, and also because their chairmanships of private-sector 
organisations gives them credit in the eyes of both the staff at the embassy and po-
tential Danish partners.  
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 Secondly, the tendency for influential businessmen to have easier access to 
PSDP funds is more noticeable with regard to Business Partnerships than Start-up 
Facilities. The overall difference is rather small, but the overall picture hides some 
differences in the subcategories. Of interest here is the fact that only two of the 27 
Start-up Facilities have owner/managers on the boards of significant business asso-
ciations, while this is the case for five out of 21 Business Partnerships. This may be 
a coincidence, but it also suggests that entrepreneurs who are acquainted with the 
programme go for the ‘full package’, or else that board membership gives them 
credibility, and thus the chances of having an application approved increase (cf. 
section 2.2.4). 
Thirdly, to a large extent Danida’s PSDP maintains local hierarchies and stratifi-
cations: the PSDP allocates funds, training and technical assistance to businessmen 
who are already well-established and well-connected politically, while entrepre-
neurs who do not have this dense network or who are already among the leaders in 
their sector have only been able to profit from the programme to a lesser degree. 
This tendency not only relates to the first years of the programme’s existence, it is 
reinforced partly through the fact that general promotion of the programme only 
takes place in high-ranking business forums, such as the Ashanti Economic Forum, 
where the Ashanti king invites Ashanti businessmen for networking, and partly be-
cause the embassy asks its closest collaborators in the private sector, namely the 
Association of Ghana Industries and Empretec, to find additional Ghanaian enter-
prises within a certain line of business when a Danish company comes to Ghana to 
find a potential PSDP partner.  
 Chapter 7 demonstrated how changing governments in Ghana, as well as its his-
torical legacies, have to a large degree squeezed out the local private sector in the 
country. Historically, productive companies have been forced into more speculative 
activities, investments have been targeted towards fixed assets, entrepreneurial 
skills are scarce, and there is a general lack of private-sector role models (cf. Table 
7.4 page 207). The basis upon which to build a private-sector development pro-
gramme that aims to alleviate poverty through social and economic development is 
thus fairly small. Moreover, the PS staff at the embassy there are concerned about 
the limited resources they have with which to locate and screen potential Ghanaian 
PSDP companies. In other words, the leverage of leading business organisations in 
locating potential companies through their networks is expected, but it appears that 
the PS staff at the embassy have not realised the consequences of this choice for the 
overall aim of the programme: in so far as leading enterprises are the preferred 
mechanisms, policies have to be implemented that spread the intended effects of 
the programme to other parts of the private sector and to Ghanaian society. 
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 9.3 The embedded–disembedded conflict in Danida’s PSDP in Ghana 
Section 7.2-7.5 outlined central aspects of the Ghanaian business system. More-
over, Chapter 2 scrutinised Danida’s PSDP. This section focuses on the interface 
between the business system and the PSDP. It departs from the description of the 
characteristics of the Ghanaian private sector presented in section 7.6 and identifies 
some of the conflicts created by the interaction of a recipient embedded in a certain 
business system and a form of donor intervention that is disembedded from this 
context, as well as outlining the consequences of this interaction.302 Table 9.4 lists 
the more obvious interactions. 
The first conflict between the realities of the Ghanaian private sector and the 
PSDP arises because key institutions in Ghana tend to create small, family-owned 
enterprises characterised by direct owner control over management. Furthermore, 
the majority of Ghanaian businessmen do not trust non-kin business partners. In 
contrast, Danida’s PSDP is based on the assumption that the recipient country part-
ner wants to form a joint venture with a foreign partner. Only approximately one-
third of the business partnerships that had received funding between 1993 and 2001 
were joint ventures, due to a combination of the general distrust of non-kin partners 
among Ghanaians and the motives of Danish partners in seeking access to new 
markets with limited risks. Thus, the majority of business collaborations are re-
stricted to technical assistance, with relatively short time horizons. 
The second conflict arises through the transfer of knowledge from the Danish to 
the Ghanaian company. The authoritarian-cum-benevolent style of leadership and 
the role of the family often prevent the necessary organisational changes for effi-
cient knowledge transfer from taking place. Information is kept at the level of the 
owner-manager, only seldom spreading to employees. The partners in the PSDP 
decide how to arrange the training. Very often, the Ghanaian entrepreneur partici-
pates in the training sessions instead of the relevant technical or administrative staff 
because he or she is worried that the employee might then leave the company, tak-
ing valuable knowledge with him. A very large proportion of the owner-managers 
of the Ghanaian firms that participate in the PSDP have an academic degree, but no 
specific technological knowledge.303 Training therefore does not have the intended 
impact. 
                                                 
302 The ‘anthropology of development’ literature would frame this as a conflict of logics, be-
tween the intervention’s logic and the entrepreneurs’ logic. However, the embedded-disembedded 
dichotomy is applied here instead in order to point out the importance of the literature on private-
sector development that has formed part of the argument of the thesis. 
303 Ghanaian owner-managers participated in over fifty per cent of the training sessions that took 
place in Denmark. In only 25 percent of these cases did an employee outside the management team 
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 Table 9.4. Some embedded-disembedded conflicts in Danida’s PSDP in Ghana 
Ghanaian private 
sector 
The PSDP Conflict Consequence 
Small family-owned 
enterprises 
Mutually binding 
long-term co-
operation 
Lack of trust of non-
kin business partners Low sustainability 
Authoritarian-cum-
benevolence leader-
ship 
Knowledge transfer 
through Danish en-
terprises  
Knowledge is power Only owner-managers are trained 
Financial constraints Grants limited to training 
Lack of inputs for 
production 
Interruptions of pro-
duction process 
Few linkages Business-to-business focus No spread 
Limited developmen-
tal effect  
Business and politics 
are interwoven  
High requirements to 
participate 
Only access to funds 
for already powerful  
Upholding local 
power structures 
Risk awareness Risk-taking 
Only parts of the 
‘package’ are se-
lected 
Unintended impacts 
Specific growth sec-
tors Tied aid 
Lack of expertise in 
certain sectors Limited effect 
 
The third conflict takes place because almost all the available funds go into 
training and technical assistance, hardly anything into capital equipment, and noth-
ing into working capital. Ghanaian entrepreneurs face numerous difficulties in ob-
taining capital. They are in reality excluded from the formal banking system, and 
the susu system does not cater for their needs for capital. In addition, government 
agencies often delay payments by up to nine months, and Ghanaian entrepreneurs 
also have many obligations outside the realm of the enterprise itself. Thus, firms 
are often short of capital and therefore cannot purchase inputs for production. This 
has two major consequences. First, machines are often left lying idle, employees do 
not receive their salaries, and the entrepreneur does not make any profit. Secondly, 
Ghanaian partners regularly fail to pay their Danish partners in time due to finan-
cial constraints, thus placing the future of the collaboration in jeopardy.304
The fourth conflict arises because the PSDP has a strict business-to-business fo-
cus. The Ghanaian business system is characterised by small units with low levels 
of ownership and non-ownership co-ordination: in other words, horizontal as well 
                                                                                                                                        
join the owner-manager. Roughly half of Ghanaian owner-managers have a BA or MA, and a fur-
ther 44 percent have a tertiary-level diploma. 
304 The exact figure for the non-payment of inputs and services is hard to establish, especially 
because conflicting views on the matter are presented by Danish and Ghanaian partners. However, 
most partners told me that they had experienced delays in payment. Moreover, 85 percent of the 
business partnerships that have made use of the PSDP loan facility have not yet started to repay the 
loans. 
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 as vertical linkages are weak. Moreover, hardly any platforms exist for collabora-
tion between competitors. Therefore, the assistance of Danish enterprise seldom ex-
tends up- or downstream. Ghanaian companies therefore often become either sales 
outlets or providers of semi-processed inputs for their Danish partners. The net de-
velopmental effect of the PSDP therefore remains limited. 
The fifth conflict between the Ghanaian private sector and the design of the 
PSDP arises because business and politics are interwoven in the Ghanaian context. 
The Ghanaian economy is characterised by a high level of corruption, which on the 
one hand creates a tendency for Ghanaian businessmen to engage in speculative ac-
tivities rather than productive ones, and on the other hand means that, in order to 
secure contracts, credits etc., businessmen have to participate actively in politics in 
one form or another. In order to ensure that Ghanaian companies that receive fund-
ing through the PSDP indeed produce what they claim they produce and sell what 
is declared, Danida searches for suitable business partners via the leading business 
organisations. These organisations are governed by the Ghanaian elite, who thus in 
effect have direct access to the PSDP funds. Since linkages are few and benefits are 
kept at the managerial level, the PSDP tends to reinforce already existing stratifica-
tions in society. Moreover, the Ghanaian entrepreneurs that Danida deals with 
through the PSDP do not represent the interests of all entrepreneurs in Ghana, let 
alone those of the owner/managers of ‘growing’ enterprises. The PSDP entrepre-
neurs only represent particular interests, which may or may not converge with those 
of Ghanaian entrepreneurs in general. 
The sixth conflict arises because Ghanaian PSDP entrepreneurs seek to mini-
mise risks, while the PSDP, on the contrary, includes aspects of risk-taking. Eco-
nomic security may be achieved by diversifying economic activities, as described 
in section 7.6, by investing surpluses in fixed assets, or simply by always choosing 
tried and proven methods. This contrasts sharply with the expansion of production, 
investment in new production sites, introduction of new production and manage-
ment methods etc. that often form an integral part of a PSDP collaboration between 
a Danish and a Ghanaian company. However, although the Ghanaian partners are 
well aware of the potential conflict, instead of rejecting the intervention, they select 
parts of the intervention instead and disregard the other parts. For instance, they 
gladly accept the machines but postpone (for ever) investments in new premises or 
the (necessary) organisational changes. They only reluctantly introduce these 
changes, as they are constrained by cash shortages and because organisational 
changes tend to limit their power base. This principle of selection tends to result in 
a sidetracking of the intervention that causes unintended impacts, as described, for 
instance, in section 8.3. 
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 The seventh conflict arises from the interplay between tied Danish aid and spe-
cific growth policies in Ghana. The Danish embassy in Ghana has to rely on 
DI/HVR to find suitable Danish partners. However, the Danish private sector, like 
the Ghanaian one, has certain strengths and weaknesses. It has a comparative ad-
vantage internationally in specific sectors, but hardly any expertise at all in others. 
The result is either that Ghanaian enterprises receive sub-optimal assistance, or else 
that only Ghanaian enterprises with sub-optimal potential receive assistance. In ei-
ther case, the net effect of the PSDP is reduced. 
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 10. CONCLUSIONS 
The focus of this study is the understanding of the impacts – intended as well as un-
intended – of development interventions. Of specific relevance for the present re-
search is the understanding of the impacts of Danida’s Private Sector Development 
Programme in Ghana, that is, an understanding of the changes associated with the 
intervention, as well as of how these changes are accounted for. In order to further 
the understanding of impacts, a set of research questions has guided the develop-
ment of a theoretical framework to determine which impacts to look for and how. 
These questions will also be dealt with in the subsequent discussion. 
The study takes as its point of departure the changes observed in the target group 
in Ghana, that is, in Ghanaian companies that have collaborated with a Danish 
company, facilitated by Danida’s PSDP, but it also asks what the impact has been 
on non-target groups in Ghana. 
At a general level, the thesis has revealed that merely analysing a planned inter-
vention’s ‘results’ in order to understand impacts may be a risky endeavour, as it 
presupposes a single plan. This type of analysis therefore fails to grasp that devel-
opment interventions comprise multiple plans (for multiple actors) working simul-
taneously: what is positive for some may be negative for others, and the perception 
of positive and negative results may change over time.  
Directly related to the multiple plans, this research suggests that, in order to ac-
count for impacts, history matters. More specifically, the analysis suggests that in-
stitutional development matters: specific historical developments have shaped the 
way actors in the Ghanaian private sector act and interact, and thus the way they 
perceive, make use of and adopt a development intervention like the PSDP. 
Political, economic and cultural developments in Ghana thus influence the ac-
tors, as a result of which certain logics tend to dominate their choices. These logics 
tend to cause the actors to disentangle the intervention and only select parts of it 
while ignoring other parts, in which case the intervention is sidetracked away from 
its originally stated objective towards a form shaped exactly by these historically 
produced logics. Therefore, many PSDP business collaborations did not meet the 
stated objectives, and even if they did, it was not necessarily only because of the in-
tervention, but also due to changing business conditions. 
Given the embeddedness of the Ghanaian private sector, the disembeddedness of 
the programme and the sidetracking of the intervention, this study suggests that is 
not reasonable to expect that an intervention of this type – limited to supporting in-
dividual companies – will be able to change the Ghanaian private sector fundamen-
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 tally. What such a programme can be expected to do is rather to act as a catalyst for 
processes of technological capability-building in individual companies and thus lay 
the foundations for performance enhancement in these enterprises; however, only 
in rare instances can this programme act as a catalyst for broader developments. 
At a more specific level, therefore, the research revealed that the motives of im-
portant stakeholders in engaging in PSDP business collaborations seldom tally with 
Danida’s intended objectives for its interventions. This does not mean, however, 
that changes are kept to a minimum. Rather, the mere fact that funds are made 
available through development interventions changes both the structure and the atti-
tudes of the actors. Consequently, interventions have unintended impacts. The 
PSDP, for instance, did not always produce the intended enhancement of business 
performance, interpreted here as improvements in technological capabilities, in the 
target group. Instead, improvements were minor or non-existent, and in a few cases 
the target group experienced negative developments in technological capabilities. 
Moreover, the research revealed that no life histories can be defined in abstract to 
the building of technological capabilities: the individual collaborations all have 
their own story has to be studies case-by-case.  
The lack of all-embracing life histories is also valid for the other indicators, such 
as employment generation, improvements in earnings, productivity increases and 
expansion of the product portfolio. Changes in these indicators were affected by the 
same set of processes as the building of technological capabilities, that is, develop-
ments in key institutional features and different (and often opposing) logics. Like-
wise, the spread of impacts from the target group to non-target groups were influ-
enced by the way actors adopted the programme, as well as the specific Ghanaian 
business system characteristics that tend to impede the diffusion of impacts. 
This concluding chapter first substantiates these arguments, based on the finding 
of the previous chapters. Then it seeks, in a critical realist sense, to inform the ab-
stract research with the empirical findings; that is, it discusses the theoretical impli-
cations of the study. Finally, it reflects on the partial discrepancy between the theo-
retical framework and the empirical findings that stems from difficulties of access 
to data and the fact that the theories applied were developed in a context very dif-
ferent from the Ghanaian one.  
10.1 Logics, sidetracking and embeddedness: understanding the impacts 
of Danida’s PSDP in Ghana 
Development interventions are often perceived of as plans that can be prepared 
in detail in order to create certain results or certain changes in a given context. 
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 However, the idea of a plan is hardly very fruitful, especially when the aim is to 
understand the changes associated with a development intervention. This research 
has shown that changes associated with an intervention are only singled out with 
great difficulty, as observable changes are perceived to be triggered by numerous 
factors, among them the intervention itself. A clear-cut account of the impacts of an 
intervention, be it (apparently) simple or (apparently) complex, is thus unattainable, 
as it would require a framework that could single out social causalities, a venture 
that is at best possible in simple positivist ontology, but is not possible in, for in-
stance, critical realism. What one may aim at instead is an understanding of the dif-
ferent logics informing the various actors involved in the intervention and an ac-
count of the underlying structures and mechanisms in society that also bear a re-
sponsibility for the identified changes associated with an intervention.  
However, this understanding of impact is by no means the only one. The analy-
sis of development aid pursued in Chapter 3 showed that the term ‘impact’ is now 
widely used but has numerous connotations. The literature on the topic of devel-
opment aid in general and development interventions in particular perceives impact 
as anything from the quantification of the expected effects of an intervention to a 
study of the changes that are associated with it. This study rejected the idea of de-
velopment interventions as discrete projects in time and space: impacts are not con-
fined to the target group(s) of an intervention, nor are they limited to the interven-
tion period or to changes which persist long after the intervention. Interventions 
impact from the time the idea of an intervention is launched till long after it has 
ceased. Who, how and what is changed depends on when changes are assessed, the 
type of intervention, its size, the local political economic circumstances, and the 
history of the area, of interventions etc. In other words, the intervention should not 
be perceived as part of a social engineering process in which development can be 
predicted and controlled. Instead, it is but one of several factors that influence de-
velopment. 
This understanding of impact entails that simple (quantitative) measures of im-
pact risk becoming meaningless. This type of indicator does not, strictly speaking, 
measure impact, but rather the changes which may or may not have come about as 
a result of an intervention. More likely, the PSDP may have instigated some 
changes, which then have been enlarged, balanced or even reduced by other events, 
such as changing world-market prices, economic recession, change of management 
etc. Moreover, impacts are by no means limited to the intended impacts of an inter-
vention. The cases presented in the study expose the wide range of unintended im-
pacts of the PSDP in Ghana, which cannot be classified as either positive or nega-
tive. Rather, they are positive for some and negative for others, a sort of situation 
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 that changes over time. These unintended impacts illustrate how the intervention is 
used by different stakeholders to attain personal as well as company or organisa-
tional goals: the important stakeholders’ motives for engaging in a PSDP business 
collaboration are affected by local circumstances and shaped by historical devel-
opments. Such motives are seldom consistent with the official motives for estab-
lishing these collaborations, and therefore what were stipulated as being the in-
tended outcomes of a collaboration may not have been intended for all parties in the 
first place. Thus, merely analysing of the ‘results’ of a planned aid intervention 
may be a risky endeavour: this type of analysis neglects the fact that there is not 
just one plan but many plans at work simultaneously. 
History turned out to have great significance for impacts, especially because his-
torical events (and interpretations of these events) laid the foundations for the ac-
tors’ logics and thus the foundation for the way they selected and adopted parts of 
the intervention. The theoretical foundation for the understanding of history as it 
has been applied in this thesis was set out in Chapter 5, which argued that, in a non-
linear, irreversible way, certain key institutions influence how firms act and interact 
in a certain national context. However, exactly how these institutions – which are 
perceived to guide, constrain and liberate economic activity – influence the domi-
nant ways in which transactions take place is unclear. Moreover, how firms act and 
interact is depicted in terms of ideal types. This study therefore argues that specific 
historical developments in key institutions must be scrutinised.  
History here is thus confined to the specific developments that have shaped the 
current situation in the Ghanaian private sector. The study demonstrated that the 
Ghanaian private sector is characterised by a scarcity of entrepreneurial skills, a 
lack of private-sector role models, mistrust and suspicion between it and the state, a 
lack of capacity to implement new initiatives and high levels of corruption, to name 
but a few. The reasons for this situation are many and include the crowding out of 
the Ghanaian private sector under colonial rule, liberalisation resulting in fierce 
competition from imported goods, high domestic borrowing, which brought about 
escalating rates of inflation and reduced capital availability for the local private sec-
tor, and high interest rates.  
More importantly, the study suggested that institutional developments matter. 
Key institutions in society define the playing field for Ghanaian companies. This 
study has examined how developments in these institutions tended to influence the 
way ‘growing’ Ghanaian-owned enterprises operate and thus provided a picture of 
the most common logics among the Ghanaian entrepreneurs. The picture was clear: 
in addition to the brief description of the Ghanaian private sector provided above, 
these developments have given rise to a naïve replication of successes among Gha-
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 naian entrepreneurs, a tendency to invest in fixed assets, an endless search for re-
sources, a pronounced distrust of non-kin partners, a concomitant tendency to give 
preferences to kin or family members, authoritative leadership styles, hardly any 
long-term business collaborations, and low rotations of workforces. The Ghanaian 
business environment is, moreover, characterised by uncertainty and unpredictabil-
ity, which hinders the establishment of crystal-clear business strategies that explic-
itly focus on the development of one enterprise. Instead, the Ghanaian business en-
vironment tends to make Ghanaian entrepreneurs diversify their activities. 
At the enterprise level, for instance, the hierarchical organisational structure and 
the authoritarian leadership conducted in most enterprises prevent employees, espe-
cially at floor level, from acquiring sufficient knowledge to upgrade technological 
capabilities. Family members are often employed in top positions in the company 
and are most often included in the staff who are sent abroad for training. These 
structures hinder the effective construction of, for instance, production capabilities 
that include the skills to adapt equipment to local needs and, if necessary, modify 
raw materials. Thus, increasing production capabilities entails organisational 
changes in as the sense that blue-collar staff need information about suppliers and 
customers in order to adapt the process or product to the required specifications. 
The Ghanaian business system effectively hinders this. 
Ghanaian PSDP enterprises are thus embedded in a context shaped by specific 
historical developments that generate certain logics among the actors. In contrast, 
Danida’s PSDP is totally disembedded from this context. This study has exposed 
the fact that the Danish private sector was heavily involved in the programme, 
which was set up after the role of the Danish private sector in development aid de-
clined in the late 1980s. The new programme essentially resembles the original de-
sign and takes into account the interests of the Danish private sector alongside 
those of the recipient country’s private sector. This has resulted in a programme 
that in theory is identical for all countries, notwithstanding the enormous differ-
ences, which pertain to the room for manoeuvre available to the local private sec-
tor. The intention was to make a programme that was easily manageable and which 
did not exclude any Danish enterprises anywhere. The result, however, is a pro-
gramme framed in a technical discourse that focuses simply on training and techni-
cal assistance in order to facilitate transfer of skills and techniques from the Danish 
company to its Ghanaian partner. However, this process is disembedded from the 
local context, maintains local power balances, has only limited developmental ef-
fects and has low sustainability. Such an intervention, detached from the realities – 
historical, economic, political and cultural – of the target group, cannot be expected 
to fulfil its rather ambitious development aims. It can, however, be expected to act 
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 as a catalyst for certain restricted developments, such as the building of technologi-
cal capabilities in the target group. 
These more general conclusions all point to the fallacy of describing the impact 
of an aid intervention. Aid interventions by definition have a variety of impacts for 
the target group, as well as for others. Danida’s PSDP basically funds long-term 
binding agreements between a Danish company and a company in Danida’s partner 
countries. The idea is to transfer skills from the Danish company to the developing 
country company. The overall aim is then to facilitate social and economic devel-
opment in the host country and thus assist the alleviation of poverty. This aim, 
however, cannot be fulfilled directly. Therefore, the immediate aim is to enhance 
the performance of the collaborating Ghanaian enterprises.  
The enhancement of business performances is directly linked to the building of 
technological capabilities. This study has established the following factors as par-
ticularly interesting regarding the process of building technological capabilities. 
First, technology transfer does not itself lead to technological capacity-building, 
partly because not all knowledge is equally easy to transfer, and partly because the 
transfer relates to the absorption capacity of the recipient. Secondly, the transfer 
process becomes harder the more the experience differs between the people who 
are transferring the knowledge. Thirdly, technological efforts are needed in order to 
set the process from transfer to technological capacity-building in motion. Fourthly, 
these technological efforts are undertaken by companies in order to make progress, 
but the gains are uncertain. Finally, the extent to which firms deliberately devote 
resources to technological efforts is the distinguishing factor if technological capac-
ity-building through technology transfer is to be achieved. The study has also estab-
lished that not only do firm-internal factors account for the building of technologi-
cal capabilities, but also that the contexts in which the companies are embedded are 
of importance for their willingness to undertake technological efforts.  
Technological capabilities were build in roughly half of the business collabora-
tions that aimed to increase skills in one area or another. In other words, the PSDP 
managed to make the intended improvements for approximately half of the target 
group in Ghana. On closer examination, however, this figure hides many important 
details. First, the improvements in technological capabilities were confined to the 
basic level: that is, these improvements may provide a productivity gain in the short 
run, but they are probably not sufficient to alter a company’s position in the market 
radically. Secondly, technological capabilities tend to come together, indicating that 
an improvement in one activity may stimulate improvements in others. Thirdly, not 
only did the PSDP affect the building of technological capabilities, but also the po-
litical and economic context in which the companies were embedded. Fourthly, the 
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 study revealed that some companies were worse off regarding linkage capabilities 
after the PSDP than before. This is no coincidence, but relates directly to the fact 
that in Ghana the PSDP has tended to force Ghanaian companies to leave the initia-
tive to their Danish partners, with the result that, when the collaboration ends for 
whatever reason, the Ghanaian company may be left high and dry and end up worse 
off than before. Finally, and related to the above, the PSDP may end up being a 
double-edged sword, as it can act as a catalyst in an upgrading process in the short 
run but also hamper it in the longer run, as the Ghanaian company becomes tied to 
only one partner.  
The enhancement of business performance is perceived by Danida as being re-
flected in employment generation, productivity increases and increases in turnover, 
among other things. This thesis analysed four indicators that should be able to act 
as pointers for the current economic situation in Ghanaian PSDP companies. Be-
sides the conclusions stated above regarding the importance of context, this analy-
sis revealed that impacts are complex and interwoven: changes in one indicator are 
most often directly associated with changes in another. That said, however, this 
study shows that the intended impacts of the programme have only been fulfilled to 
some extent, depending on size of the Ghanaian partner, the duration of the col-
laboration (and duration since the collaboration) and the relevance of the interven-
tion. Moreover, the motives for entering into a collaboration proved to be of the 
utmost importance. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the collaborations that resembled the 
logic of the intervention the most fulfilled the donor’s aims to the greatest extent, 
while collaborations between partners driven by other logics only seldom fulfilled 
the stated objectives of the programme.  
The partial fulfilment of intended impacts does not mean that other collabora-
tions (or other parts of these very collaborations) were unaffected by the interven-
tion – the intervention just impacted in ways that were not intended by Danida. The 
disarticulation of the intervention as prompted by it partial selection and adoption 
tends to cause a transformation in the intervention, which by definition produces 
unintended impacts. It was especially the search for capital and access to technol-
ogy among the Ghanaian partners and the leveraging of resources among the Dan-
ish partners that seemed to transform the intervention.  
The account of impacts presented in this thesis thus reveals the importance of 
understanding how local companies act and interact and why. It becomes no less 
important in the description of how the impacts spread into the private sector and to 
society at large. On the one hand, the analysis showed how in rare cases the ‘in-
tended’ impacts of the PSDP have led to positive social and economic develop-
ments for other private-sector actors, as well as for whole communities. On the 
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 other hand, it also revealed the many obstacles to these types of impact being dif-
fused. Of special importance here were the characteristics of the Ghanaian business 
system, which has been formed and shaped by the country’s dominant institutions 
since colonial times. Likewise, the design, or rather, the lack of adaptation of the 
design of Danida’s PSDP to the specific circumstances under which Ghanaian 
companies operate is another reason for the obstacles to diffusion.  
It proved impossible to carry out a systematic analysis of the changes for non-
target groups (cf. section 10.3). What can be said, however, is that these collabora-
tions showed no tendency to hire either more white-collar workers or more blue-
collar workers due to the PSDP itself: – the overall composition and educational 
level of work-forces remained largely unchanged. In general, the equipment that 
has been acquired as part of the PSDP does not directly replace existing technolo-
gies: rather, it is intended to allow the Ghanaian company to produce types of prod-
ucts or undertake work that it previously could not undertake. Therefore, generally 
speaking it is meaningless to conclude that labour intensity has gone either up or 
down. In relation to the in-depth studies, however, one PSDP-company (P1) intro-
duced labour-saving machines where all work previously was done manually. This 
does not appear from the employment data (cf. Table 8.3), as the people that previ-
ously performed this particular task were not formally employed by the company 
but worked on a contractual basis directly for the municipality.  
Moreover, the study has revealed that positive changes in product quality may 
call for an upgrading of suppliers and retailers (given long-term collaborations be-
tween Ghanaian companies) and thus spread the impacts to the private sector level 
and potentially also to society at large. However, less than one-fifth of the collabo-
rations have managed to increase product quality since the start of the PSDP. What 
is more, long-term business linkages do not generally exist between either produc-
ers and supplier or producers and retailers. Two small companies catered mostly for 
the international market and thus increased export revenues, but meanwhile the 
share of imported inputs going into production increased. The net effect of this 
change is probably close to zero. Moreover, most companies are so small that that 
trying to measure the impacts of this on a larger scale would be ridiculous. Lastly, 
only one of the 48 collaborations had introduced a social security fund as part of 
the PSDP, and one a development fund.  
10.2 Theoretical implications of the findings 
In line with the presentation of the research process depicted in Figure 6.1, this 
study has sought to inform the concrete research with abstract findings. Moreover, 
the concrete research has provided inputs for the abstract research. The use of ab-
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 stract findings to guide the concrete research has aptly been described in the design 
of the theoretical frameworks. The opposite process, however, has only been men-
tioned in brief. This section will therefore first provide an example of how the con-
crete research has informed the abstract research, and then discuss how the findings 
may inform theoretical discussions in the future. 
The business system literature only provides very loose guidelines as to which 
institutions should be examined in order to arrive at a better understanding of the 
characteristics of a particular business system. Moreover, it has not been developed 
in an SSA context, but rather in a context defined by stable institutions. It was 
therefore necessary to adapt the framework to suit the Ghanaian setting. A central 
feature of the general framework, such as the ‘role of unions’, which is perceived to 
control the skills that are developed in the national educational system, has conse-
quently been left out, due to the unions’ diminutive role in small enterprises in 
Ghana. In contrast, the ‘state-business relationship’, which is seen to reflect the role 
of the state in relation to leading economic actors, has been interpreted very broadly 
to account for its enormous importance in the Ghanaian context. Here, therefore, 
the state-business relationship comprises the dominating development discourse, 
the spread of corruption plus the policies to combat corruption, official policies to-
wards the private sector, and the private sector’s response to these policies. 
As shown in Chapter 5, the business system approach aims to provide a frame-
work to study the relationship between the key institutional features in society and 
the coordination and control systems that are visible in different national settings. 
The proponents of this approach all maintain that it is precisely national historical 
developments that determine how companies operate, and that forces like, for in-
stance, globalisation only influence the system to a minor degree. This may be cor-
rect for the stable business systems studied in East Asia and Europe, but as in the 
case of Ghana, the fragmented business system is precisely characterised by rela-
tively recent and underdeveloped institutions and by social groupings that are not 
solid. Consequently, it seems unlikely that the penetration of foreign companies 
into the Ghanaian economy, the numerous donors that are all seeking to change the 
room for manoeuvre for the private sector; and the numerous foreign locals in 
Ghana will have no influence at all on the Ghanaian business system. 
The way firms act and interact in countries characterised by fragmented business 
systems may therefore not only be a result of historical developments in key na-
tional institutions, as stipulated by the proponents of the business systems ap-
proach, but also of changes in the management and organisation of production as a 
result of subcontracting arrangements with foreign companies, mergers, joint ven-
tures etc. One could therefore argue that the particular business system in Ghana, as 
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 well as in other parts of SSA, may indeed resemble parts of the fragmented busi-
ness system, but it is probably more accurate to argue that the business system in 
Ghana has yet to develop. The institutions have not yet been stabilised, and large 
social cleavages still exist.  
This understanding of the Ghanaian business system provides some room for 
manoeuvre for development agencies to change the local private sector, but not all 
private-sector interventions have the same chance of success in this endeavour. 
Clearly, interventions that aim at changing the playing field for the private sector 
(interventions that aim at the international level or at the macro- or meso- level, cf. 
Table 1.1) – that is, at changing the future direction of dominant institutional fea-
tures – or those that take as their point of departure the reality of the local private 
sector, have a greater chance of achieving their aims than interventions that focus 
on the micro-level on the basis of a superficial understanding of the private sectors 
in developing countries. Interventions that concentrate on the higher levels, how-
ever, cannot steer free of the inherent complexities of development interventions. 
These interventions cannot expect merely to fulfil their aims: numerous unexpected 
impacts will emerge, due to the partial selection and subsequent sidetracking of all 
development interventions. 
The discrepancy between theory and empirical findings in relation to the coordi-
nation system (cf. section 7.6) suggests that it is of the utmost importance to under-
stand the specific national context in order to understand how the particular institu-
tional features are both guiding and constraining economic actors. Institutional fea-
tures do not influence the way firms act and interact in the same way everywhere. 
This also suggests that the advantage of the business systems approach lies in its 
ability to provide guidelines as to which types of institution to examine in order to 
understand how companies act and interact in specific contexts, rather than in its 
ability to issue instructions regarding how firms act and interact given certain insti-
tutional features.  
10.3 Discrepancy between theory and empirical data 
This thesis has sought to avoid mono-factorial explanations by combining different 
approaches and different viewpoints. The business systems approach was chosen to 
shed light on the Ghanaian owner/managers’ room for manoeuvre with respect to 
the PSDP; the literature on technological capabilities was chosen to provide a 
background for measuring changes in business performance as a result of the aid 
intervention; the literature on technology transfer sheds light on the processes of 
absorption; the anthropology of development literature reveals the importance of 
selection, sidetracking and unintended consequences; and the ‘broad impact stud-
 317
 ies’ stress the importance of context, national as well as international. However, not 
all of these approaches were originally designed for this type of study. In fact, none 
of them were: they either stem from a totally different geographical setting, focus 
on a different scale, or they were originally intended for studies of single entities. 
As a result, all the approaches needed adaptation and alteration. Moreover, in their 
original form, these approaches require conflicting data: while, for instance, the 
‘anthropology of development’ literature calls for in-depth ethnographic data, the 
technological capability literature generally requires rigid quantitative data. This 
section will first take a critical stance towards the main theoretical lines of reason-
ing applied in this study, and then discuss problems of access to data in relation to 
this framework. 
This study draws inspiration from both the ‘anthropology of development’ lit-
erature and the ‘broad impact studies’. Neither of these approaches could directly 
be applied to this study, but in combination they were able to take account of ac-
tors’ logics, while the context paved the way for the study design. However, this 
design does not have the in-depth quality of the former, nor the (sole) intervention 
focus of the latter –rather, it seeks to bring in insights from both camps while main-
taining that a theoretical framework is required in order to delimit the study of im-
pacts. This framework consists of studies of technology and upgrading on the one 
hand and institutional developments on the other. 
The study of technology transfer, technology change, technological efforts and 
technological capabilities all tend to focus on a developed-country context and a 
high level of innovation. However, this study has argued that the basic mechanisms 
of building technological capabilities from technology transfer are the same, albeit 
on a different scale. The exact analytical framework therefore needed a thorough 
adaptation. Much of the literature on technological learning, for instance, deals with 
technological front-runners and consequently distinguishes between several differ-
ent forms of learning. The empirical data from Ghana, by contrast, suggests that 
these enterprises are by no means technological front-runners; instead, they use 
technology transfer to (partially) bridge the gap from their partners. Learning, 
therefore, is confined to a couple of different mechanisms. Likewise the concept of 
technological capabilities stems from a discussion of high-end technology users. 
Technological capabilities are not, moreover, easily measured in either a developed 
country or a developing country context. In either case numerous approaches can 
be singled out, but none are directly transferable to this particular study: they focus 
chiefly on leading industries and thus rely on statistical material regarding, for in-
stance, patents and exports. In a small company in a sub-Saharan African context, 
technological capabilities are of a different quality, and statistics are generally not 
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 available. Therefore, a more detailed, firm-centred framework was required. Chap-
ter 4 developed this framework. The aim was to single out changes in technological 
capabilities in concrete enterprises as part of a process of technology transfer initi-
ated by a development agency. This framework obviously does not provide infor-
mation as to where the changes originate, but it does provide an initial way in to the 
discussion of impacts at the enterprise level.  
The advantages and disadvantages of the business systems approach have been 
dealt with in Chapter 5 and will not be repeated here. Instead one central feature of 
the approach, that is, its original design for comparative studies, will be discussed, 
as this study has so far set aside this aspect. The central concern of the business 
systems literature, especially as is portrayed in Richard Whitley’s writings, is to 
explain differences in firm organisation and firm behaviour. It was, in other words, 
originally intended for comparative analyses of diverging business systems, not for 
the analysis of a single business system. This study has applied the business sys-
tems approach merely to understand firm behaviour in a single setting. This calls 
into question the applicability of the approach. On the one hand, the approach em-
phasises the role of institutions in framing the room for manoeuvre for national 
businesses. On the other hand, it misses out the role of global actors in shaping the 
local context in these ‘fragmented’ systems. Moreover, on the one hand, the vague-
ness of this all-encompassing approach calls for a bottom-up approach – the con-
crete case will determine which institutions are important, as described in section 
10.2 above – in which not all institutional features are equally relevant everywhere. 
On the other hand, the choice of this approach risks directing attention to the insti-
tutions that coordinate and control economic activities, and away from institutional 
features that do not have the same national historical boundedness, such as conven-
tions and standards, but which may have great importance for the private sector. 
Put differently, the study could have been enriched with insights from, for instance, 
the network literature, which highlights exactly this type of institution. 
The study originally set out to deepen our understanding of the impacts of the 
PSDP, on both the target group and non-target groups (cf. sections 1.3 and 3.4). 
However, the limited access to data gave rise to numerous difficulties for the study 
of impacts on non-target groups. Thus in the event it proved impossible to conduct 
a systematic assessment of the changes associated with the PSDP at the society 
level in Ghana through an analysis of changes in the composition of the work-force, 
the labour intensity of the technology applied, the changes in imports and exports, 
product quality or social security etc., as stipulated in the theoretical framework. 
Inquiry into these matters for more than a couple of collaborations was not viable. 
First, the Danish Embassy and the PS secretariat in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
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 were either unwilling or unable to provide me with anything but an incomplete list 
of past PSDP collaborations in Ghana.305 Secondly, the hierarchical organisational 
structure and authoritarian leadership style sometimes rendered interviews with 
employees impossible. Thirdly, some owner-managers were unwilling to be inter-
viewed more than once. Fourthly, some companies did not possess the necessary 
information, due either to inadequate bookkeeping or to a change of management. 
Finally, a few owner-managers perceived me as a potential donor and thus would 
not disclose to me ‘negative’ information about their PSDP collaboration, including 
information on the whereabouts of former employees (cf. Table 9.1). The in-depth 
studies that, among other things, should probe the broader impacts through an in-
vestigation into these matters therefore turned out to be very challenging, and the 
data collected very ambiguous. The analysis of impacts on non-target groups there-
fore became less stringent and more superficial than was originally intended.  
Finally, the impacts of Danida’s PSDP in Ghana also depend to a large degree 
on the logics of the Danish partners. Thus, to obtain a more comprehensive under-
standing of this type of aid intervention, the thesis should have examined the Dan-
ish institutional setting and thus provided a more in-depth understanding of the way 
Danish firms act and interact, and thus of their logics. 
                                                 
305 See footnote 150 page 133, for the official explanation for the absence of cooperation on 
these matters. 
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Appendix A: List of interviews in Denmark and Ghana 
 
Informants related to Danida’s PSDP collaborations in Ghana: 
(‘P’ refers to a Business Partnership, ‘S’ to a Start-up Facility. An overview of the 
collaborations are provided in Appendix B) 
P1, Administrative Manager, Accra (29.08.03, 12.09.03, 30.09.03, 07.10.03, 
03.12.03) 
P1, Production Manager, Accra (30.09.03, 28.10.03) 
P1, Project Manager, Accra (20.06.02, 29.08.03) 
P2, Resident Manager, Accra (23.05.02) 
P3, Owner-manager, Accra (26.04.02 & 30.04.02) 
P3, Owner-manager, Accra (26.04.02) 
P4, General Manager, Accra (25.04.02) 
P5, Executive chairman of the Board of Directors, Accra (11.04.02, 28.10.03) 
P6, Member of staff, Tema (25.11.03) 
P6, Owner-manager, Tema (22.04.02, 25.11.03) 
P7, Managing Director, Ho (24.05.02) 
P8, Managing Director, Ho (24.05.02) 
P9, Project Manager, Takoradi (06.06.02) 
P10, Managing Director, Ho (24.05.02) 
P11, Danish Engineer, Tema (21.05.02) 
P11, Managing Director, Tema (21.05.02) 
P11, Owner, Tema (21.05.02) 
P12, Former Managing Director, Accra (29.05.02) 
P13, General Manager, Tema (30.04.02, 01.09.03) 
P14, General Manager, Kumasi (12.06.02) 
P15, Managing Director, Accra (18.06.02) 
P16, Danish Managing Director, Accra (10.04.02, 12.04.02 & 13.04.02) 
P16, Danish technician, Accra (12.04.02 & 13.04.02) 
P16, Danish technician, Accra (12.04.02 & 13.04.02) 
P16, Geekcorp voluntary, Accra (15.04.02, 27.05.02, 28.05.02) 
P16, Owner-manager, Accra (12.04.02, 15.04.02, 17.09.03, 19.09.03, 04.12.03) 
P17, Danish technician, Accra (15.09.05) 
P17, Desktop Publisher, Accra (15.09.05) 
P17, Owner-manager, Accra (26.04.02, 03.09.03, 11.09.03, 15.09.05, 06.11.03) 
P18, Owner & Executive Director, Accra (19.04.02) 
P19, Managing Director, Accra (18.04.02, 30.04.02, 10.09.03) 
P20, Foreman, Takoradi (17.11.03 & 18.11.03) 
P20, Managing Director, Takoradi (06.06.02, 30.10.03) 
P20, Danish Technical advisor, Takoradi (17.11.03 & 18.11.03) 
P21, Owner-manager, Kumasi (22.09.03) 
S1, Owner, Accra (01.05.02) 
S2, Managing Director, Kumasi (11.06.02) 
S3, Managing Director, Accra (09.09.03) 
  
S4, Managing Director, Accra (26.04.02 & 30.04.02) 
S4, Owner, Accra (26.04.02) 
S5, Owner-manager, Accra (18.04.02) 
S6, Chairman of the Board of Directors, Accra (21.04.02) and Copenhagen (22.09.05) 
S6, Operations Manager, Accra (21.04.02) 
S7, Executive chairman of the Board of Directors, Accra (11.04.02, 28.10.03) 
S8, Owner & Executive Director, Tema (23.04.02) 
S9, Owner-manager, Accra (29.10.03) 
S10, Managing Director, Accra (30.05.02) 
S11, Managing Director, Accra (30.05.02) 
S12, Managing Director, Accra (16.05.02) 
S13, Managing Director, Kumasi (10.06.02) 
S14, Managing Director, Takoradi (31.05.02) 
S14, Production Manager, Takoradi (08.06.02) 
S14, Shareholder, Takoradi (31.05.02) 
S15, Managing Director, Winneba (07.05.02) 
S16, General Manager, Accra (18.09.03) 
S16, Managing Director, Accra (18.09.03) 
S17, Managing Director, Kumasi (10.06.02) 
S18, General Manager, Accra (20.09.03) 
S19, Owner & Executive Director, Accra (23.04.02 & 26.04.02) 
S20, Owner-manager, Accra (25.04.02) 
S21, Managing Director, Kumasi (13.06.02) 
S22, General Manager, Accra (22.05.02) 
S22, Operation Manager, Accra (22.05.02) 
S23, Managing Director, Accra (29.05.02) 
S24, Business manager, Accra (23.05.02) 
S25, Managing Director, Accra (29.05.02) 
S26, Owner-manager, Accra (16.04.02) 
S27, Danish Area Project Manager, Accra, (30.04.02) 
S27, Managing Director, Tema (02.05.02) 
 
Key informants in Ghana  
Alhaji Saaka, Chief Director, Ministry for Private Sector Development, Accra 
(03.12.03) 
Bedman Narteh, PhD Researcher, School of Administration, University of Ghana, 
Legon (16.09.03, 26.09.03, 30.09.03, 31.10.03) 
Belinda Tandoh, Programme Officer, Royal Danish Embassy, Accra (22.04.02) 
Bernard Joe Appeah, Chief Executive Officer, Pentax Management Consultancy 
Services, Accra (27.11.03 & 02.12.03) 
Brahms Achiayao, Policy, Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Division, Ministry of 
Trade, Industry and Special Presidential Initiatives (24.11.03) 
Carsten Bondersholdt, PDSP Programme Coordinator, Royal Danish Embassy, Accra 
(30.09.03, 20.11.03, 11.12.03) 
  
Cletus Kosiba, Director for Policy and Communication, Association of Ghana 
Industries, Accra (12.11.03)  
David Addo, Regional Manager, Ghana National Chamber of Commerce and 
Industries, Accra (14.11.03) 
Dunwell Ekow Eku, Head of Training, Empretec Ghana Foundation, Accra (06.11.03) 
Eric Baraifi Antwi, Ghana Denmark Business Club, Accra (10.09.03, 30.09.03) 
Ernest Aryeetey, Professor, Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research, 
University of Ghana, Legon (20.11.03) 
Fadi Bou Khalil, Marketing Manager, Everlast, Accra (08.10.03) 
Flemming Bjørk Pedersen, Ambassador, Royal Danish Embassy, Accra (11.12.03) 
Francis Aboagya-Otchere, School of Administration, University of Ghana, Legon 
(07.11.03) 
G. K. Amoako, Director, Policy, Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation, Ministry of 
Trade, Industry and Special Presidential Initiatives (24.11.03) 
Godfried Funkor, Research and Training Specialist, Ghana National Chamber of 
Commerce and Industries, Accra (01.12.03) 
Hans E. Wenneberg, General Manager, Emidan Ghana ltd. (10.09.03) 
Joe Tackie, Ghana-Denmark Business Club (10.09.03) 
Jørgen Carlsen, PDSP Coordinator, Royal Danish Embassy, Accra (24.04.02 & 
29.04.02) 
Kingsley Deteah, Regional Manager, Empretec Ghana Foundation, Takoradi 
(18.11.03) 
Minerva Kotei, Business Development Officer, Africa Project development Facility, 
IFC, Accra (13.11.03) 
Moses Agyeman, Senior Economist, Private Enterprise Foundation, Accra (21.11.03) 
Mr. Robert Baldry, General Manager, Living Garden, Takoradi (08.06.02) 
Onur Oguzhan, Senior Supervisor, Ernst & Young, Accra (03.10.03, 07.10.03 & 
09.12.03) 
Patricia Safo, Owner-manager, Sustainable Aqua-Culture Ltd., Accra (22.04.02) 
Peter Mac Manu, Regional Chairman (Western/Central), Association of Ghana 
Industries, Takoradi (06.06.02) 
Quame Kokroh, Programme Officer, Royal Danish Embassy, Accra (24.04.02,  
29.04.02 & 30.04.02) 
Sal Amegavie, Executive Director, Ghana National Chamber of Commerce and 
Industries, Accra (14.11.03) 
Samuel Buame, Lecturer in Management end Entrepreneurship, School of 
Administration, University of Ghana, Legon (26.09.03, 07.11.03, 28.11.03) 
Seth Buatsi, Lecturer of Marketing and International Business, School of 
Administration, University of Ghana, Legon (28.08.03 & 28.11.03) 
Seth Evans Addo, Acting Chief Director, Ministry of Trade, Industry and Special 
Presidential Initiatives (24.11.03) 
Stella Damoah, Programme Assistant, Royal Danish Embassy, Accra (23.05.02, 
19.06.02, 26.08.03, 07.09.03) 
Steven ter Haar, Branch Manager, Sikaman Savings and Loans Company Ltd., Tema 
(07.12.03 & 09.12.03) 
  
Susanna Wolf, Economist, Department of Agricultural Economics, University of 
Ghana, Legon (26.09.03) 
Theo Gadzanku, Regional Chairman (Volta), Association of Ghana Industries, Ho 
(24.05.02) 
V. Ate Ofosu-Amaah, Technical Advisor, Public/Private Partnerships, Ministry for 
private sector Development, Accra (03.12.03) 
 
Key informants in Denmark 
Anders Hauch, Regional Manager, DI International Business, Copenhagen (23.07.04) 
Henrik Wind-Hansen, PSD-Secretariat, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (31.01.02) 
John Kuada, Associate Professor, Dept. of Business Studies, Aalborg University 
(27.06.03) 
Olav Jull Sørensen, Professor, Dept. of Business Studies, Aalborg University 
(27.06.03) 
Peter Blom, European Marketing Director, GMD Danmark (08.03.02) 
Poul Buch-Hansen, Development Associates, Copenhagen, (24.01.02) 
Svend Englyst, Scanagri, Copenhagen (03.04.02) 
Thomas Bustrup, Regional Manager, DI International Business, Copenhagen 
(21.03.02) 
  
BUSINESS PARTNERSHIPS 
№ Sector Main objective Current situation Positive 
changes 
Negative 
changes 
Derived & unin-
tended effects 
TC changes AOB 
P1 Waste col-
lection 
 
Mechanisation of liquid 
waste collection 
Just started due to initial 
problems. Ghanaian 
partner out. Runs with a 
loss 
Employment↑ 
Productivity↑ 
No profit 
Loans not re-
paid 
Company is now almost 
entirely on European 
hands 
+Investment cap. 
+Production cap. 
+Linkage cap. 
AMA sets the prices 
for waste 
P2 Consultancy 
 
Capacity building espe-
cially as regards road con-
struction 
The coll. has ended but 
the partners still collabo-
rate on a project-basis 
Employment↑ 
Product quality↑ 
Productivity↑ 
Product range↑ 
Turnover↑ 
Profit margin↑ 
÷ Able to bid for interna-
tional contracts 
+Investment cap. 
+Production cap. 
+Linkage cap. 
Collaborated before 
P began. Dk partner 
needed a Gh partner 
to bid for tenders 
P3 Education  Establish Inst. for caretak-
ers. Sales of edu. toys 
Coll. has ended. No con-
tact 
Caretakers can 
get education 
Profit↓ 
Employment↓ 
 NA New activity. Same 
Gh. as № S4. 
P4 Pharmaceu-
ticals  
Create modern pharma-
ceutical factory 
On the verge of bank-
ruptcy.  
Product range↑ Employment↓ 
No profit 
Loans not re-
paid 
Spent capital reserves 
on Indian machines. No 
working capital 
Machines never 
came to work.  
Staff changed 
Competition is very 
hard on this market. 
P5 Environ-
ment / en-
ergy  
Assembly and sales of im-
ported solar collectors  
No activity is taking 
place in the company 
Employment↑ No profit (Increased imports)  Devaluations made 
products too expen-
sive. New activity. 
Same Gh. as № S7. 
P6 Textiles  Production of textiles for 
export 
Coll. has ended due to 
dispute btw partners 
Product quality↑ 
 
Employment↓ 
Customers↓ 
Increased imports + Production cap. 
÷ Linkage cap. 
Began as a S. Large 
delays 
P7 Furniture  Production of doors and 
window frames 
Coll. has ended due to 
accusations of fraud.  
No activity 
÷ Loans not re-
paid 
No profit 
 ÷ GM continuously 
seeks new foreign 
partners. Same Gh. as 
№ P8 & P10. 
P8 Furniture  Production of doors, win-
dow frames and office fur-
niture 
No activity 
Sporadic contact 
Product range↑ 
Safety conditions 
improved 
Loans not re-
paid 
No profit 
 ÷ Same Gh. as № P7 & 
P10. 
P9 Sustainable 
forest opera-
tion 
Reforestation and im-
proved forest management 
Partners are still collabo-
rating  
Employment↑ 
Turnover↑ 
Profit margin↑ 
 Positive economic de-
velopment in the area 
NA Changes are not at-
tributable to PSDP. 
P10 Teak poles  Production of impregnated 
teak poles 
Coll. has ended. No con-
tact. No activity 
Employment↑ 
 
Running with a 
loss 
No profit 
Negative environmental 
effects 
÷ Teak not certified 
Same Gh. as № 
P7&P8 (diff. comp). 
New activity. 
A
ppendix B: overview
 of the studied PSD
P collaborations 
 
BUSINESS PARTNERSHIPS 
№ Sector Main objective Current situation Positive 
changes 
Negative 
changes 
Derived & unin-
tended effects 
TC changes AOB 
P11 Refrigera-
tion plant  
Export of fish  Money has been spend 
to make already installed 
machines work 
÷ Employment↓ 
Profit↓ 
 +Production cap. Both partners ran into 
financial problems. 
Dk. partner has other 
partners. 
P12 Airline 
company 
Formation of a domestic 
airline company 
Project cancelled due to 
fraud 
÷ Profit↓ 
Money lost 
Loans not re-
paid 
Int. licenses have en-
abled pilots & steward-
esses to work in US 
÷ Fraud and cultural 
barriers. 
New activity. 
P13 Metal indus-
try 
Assembly of wheelbar-
rows 
Coll. has ended. No con-
tact. Hardly any activity 
Safety conditions 
improved 
Employment↓ 
Profit↓ 
 
Loss of previous cus-
tomers 
+Production cap. 
÷ Linkage cap. 
Gh. owes Dk partner 
money. New activity. 
Same Gh. as № P14. 
(diff. comp). 
P14 Furniture  Production of parquets 
strips and furniture parts 
for export 
Until recently a success, 
but due to changing 
market preferences in 
Europe production has 
stopped 
Employment↑ 
Product quality↑ 
Productivity↑ 
Salary↑ 
Profit↓ 
 
The employees are 
mostly unskilled labour 
from the surrounding 
area 
+Investment cap. 
+Production cap. 
Same Gh. as № P13. 
(diff. comp). 
Faces problems due 
to uncertified wood 
P15 Plastic con-
tainers  
To widen product range 
and improve quality 
PSDP showcase 
Making a profit and ex-
panding operations in 
Ghana and abroad 
Environmental↑ 
Product quality ↑ 
Product range↑ 
Productivity↑ 
Turnover↑ 
Profit margin↑ 
Employment↓ 
Trained per-
sonnel laid off. 
Ghanaian partner has 
sold all shares to the 
Danish partner 
Foreign management 
+Investment cap. 
+Production cap. 
+Linkage cap. 
Virtually bankrupt 
when the Danish 
partner took over. 
P16 Graphic de-
sign  
In-house print and pre-
print  
The coll. has encoun-
tered numerous prob-
lems but is still running.  
Product range↑ 
 
Employment↓ 
Productivity↓ 
Product qual-
ity↓ 
Salary↓ 
Loans not re-
paid 
Profit↓ 
All qualified personnel 
left due to financial 
problems. Not able to 
employ specialists. 
÷Production cap. 
÷Linkage cap. 
Some essential ma-
chines didn’t work 
upon arrival. No 
spare parts. Dk. 
partner lost interest 
 
P17 Publishing  Broaden range of products 
and in-house pre-press  
Project ongoing and suc-
cessful 
Employment↑ 
Exports↑ 
Product quality↑ 
Product range↑ 
Productivity↑ 
Turnover↑ 
Profit margin↑ 
÷ Books printed outside 
Ghana 
+Production cap. 
+Linkage cap. 
Has benefited from a 
development project 
to buy books from 
dev. Countries 
 
 
BUSINESS PARTNERSHIPS 
№ Sector Main objective Current situation Positive 
changes 
Negative 
changes 
Derived & unin-
tended effects 
TC changes AOB 
P18 Engineering  Upgrade technical skills Project never finished as 
the Dk. Partner with-
drew because it won an-
other contract  
Productivity↑ ÷ Some former employees 
now work as sub-
contractors for the com-
pany 
+Investment cap. 
+Production cap. 
Partners still collabo-
rate on a project basis 
 
P19 Beauty solu-
tions  
Production of beauty solu-
tions based on Dk recipes 
Only periodic produc-
tion. Lack of working 
capital. Only limited 
market  
÷ Loss of invest-
ments 
Profit↓ 
Owner has had to set up 
another business to fi-
nance the PSDP 
÷ Began as a S. Im-
ported products were 
given away for free 
to penetrate market 
P20 Rubber 
products  
Production of technical 
rubber products 
Had a successful start. 
But has since encoun-
tered numerous prob-
lems → low turnover. 
Running with a loss 
Product range↑ 
 
 Market has expanded 
due to knowledge of 
other PSDP partners 
+Production cap. 
+Linkage cap. 
Began as a S. Appli-
cation for P delayed. 
Ghanaian owner lost 
interest - election 
campaign. 
 
P21 Wood  Improve production qual-
ity and capacity 
Ongoing for almost 5 
years without really tak-
ing off. Economic condi-
tions has changed 
 Loans not re-
paid 
Employment↓ 
  Fraud and cultural 
barriers 
Wrong technology 
 
 
 
START-UP FACILITIES 
№ Sector Main objective Current situation Positive 
changes 
Negative 
changes 
Derived & unin-
tended effects 
TC changes AOB 
S1 Wood  Production of wood block 
for parquet strips 
The coll. has ended and 
the partners do not 
communicate.  
Product quality↑ 
Productivity↑ 
Employment↓ 
 
One machine is now 
used for furniture pro-
duction. This has in-
creased the quality and 
productivity.  
+Production cap. New product. 
Equipment of a poor 
quality. Dk partner 
never bought the 
blocks 
S2 Wood Production of wood bri-
quettes from saw mill 
waste  
The project was can-
celled due to dishonesty 
 Employment↓  NA New product. Staff 
tried to migrate to 
Dk illegally. Ma-
chine never worked.  
S3 IT  Distant learning and win-
dows programming 
The coll. has ended and 
the partners do not 
communicate. 
 Money and 
time spent 
without result 
No profit 
The Gh. company has 
seen new market possi-
bilities 
 New product. Dis-
agreement re. the 
aim of the project  
S4 Educational 
material 
Production of wooded jig-
saws 
Production stopped 
abruptly when the coll. 
ended 
 Employment↓ 
No profit 
 No lasting 
changes 
New product. Dk 
partner took the ma-
chines back. Same 
Gh. as № P3. 
S5 Security sys-
tems  
Production of ID-cards The coll. has ended and 
partners do not commu-
nicate. No activity. 
Employment↑ 
 
 Production has stopped 
due to unavailability of 
spare parts 
 Company was set up 
to get PSD-funding. 
New product. 
S6 Veterinary 
medicine  
Repacking and labelling of 
products 
The company is big. 
Money left for training. 
  Efficiency ↑ 
Exploration of West Af-
rican Market 
 Labelling machine 
had no impact on 
the rest of the com-
pany 
S7 Engineering  Sales of solar water heat-
ers 
The product was not 
saleable in Ghana and 
the coll. stopped 
 No profit A new and more realis-
tic project was subse-
quently initiated 
No lasting 
changes 
Same Gh. as № P5. 
S8 Pig breeding  Improve hygienic standard 
and productivity 
Very successful  Employment↑ 
Product quality↑ 
Productivity↑ 
Profit margin↑ 
Import ↑  +Investment cap. 
+Production cap. 
 
S9 Pig breeding  Efficient pig breeding & 
production of sausages 
Gh. Partner delayed the 
process. Dk partner lost 
interest. Personal prob-
lems. Coll. stopped 
NA NA   Technology incom-
plete 
Ghanaian pig mar-
ket deteriorated 
 
 
START-UP FACILITIES 
№ Sector Main objective Current situation Positive 
changes 
Negative 
changes 
Derived & unin-
tended effects 
TC changes AOB 
S10 Life boats 
and vests  
Production of life boats 
and vests for WA market 
Production stopped after 
the end of coll. Did not 
influence the rest of the 
company 
Employment↑ 
Profit margin↑ 
Turnover↑ 
   New product. Prod-
ucts too expensive. 
Same Gh. as № S11. 
S11 Polystyrene 
products  
Introduction of mobile 
polystyrene injection ma-
chine for cold stores  
Initially a great success 
but the machine broke 
down. Only a few people 
employed for this line of 
business 
Employment↑ 
Profit margin↑ 
Turnover↑ 
  No lasting 
changes 
New product. Ma-
chine now fixed and 
works in Tema. 
Same Gh. as № S10. 
S12 Traffic signs  Automatisation of produc-
tion process 
The factory has not yet 
been finished. Hence, 
SU not taken off 
Machines are still 
in Denmark 
NA NA NA Dk. Partner not in-
terested in continu-
ing 
S13 Dairy prod-
ucts  
Increased quality of prod-
ucts 
Numerous problems, but 
the end result is positive. 
Employment↑ 
Turnover↑ 
Profit margin↑ 
 Gh. Partner has been 
able to obtain better 
contracts w. retailers 
+Production cap. 
+Linkage cap. 
The partners spe-
cialised in different 
lines of production 
S14 Organic fer-
tilisers  
Development of new 
products 
Trial period to develop 
new products and make 
a market survey 
Employment↑ 
Product range↑ 
 Income↑ for locals as 
the company buys waste 
from them 
+Production cap. New techniques 
have been post-
poned to the P.  
S15 Feed  Produce feed of a better 
quality 
The coll. stopped before 
all the money was used 
 Employment↓ 
Profit↓ 
The Gh. is on the verge 
of bankruptcy 
÷Linkage cap. The Dk. partner rec-
ommended the pro-
ject to be stopped 
S16 Medical 
equipment  
Import and sales of ultra-
sound scanners + training 
of end users 
Slow start w/difficulties 
penetrating market. Ap-
plied for P. 
Employment↑ 
Product range↑ 
Turnover↑ 
 Sales of other products 
have slowed down 
+Linkage cap. 
+Investment cap. 
Fierce competition 
in the market 
S17 Wood  Production of laminated 
products 
Just about to take off. 
The products haven’t 
been marketed yet. 
Product range↑ NA NA +Production cap. Partners traded pre-
viously. Wanted to 
introduce a new 
product. 
S18 Graphic de-
sign  
Improve security printing Running at a loss 
Aim and scope of SU 
has changed during the 
past 5 years 
 Employment↓ 
Productivity↓ 
Trained per-
sonnel laid off. 
Profit↓ 
 ÷Linkage cap. Danish ‘consultant’ 
impeded further col-
laboration 
S19 Security sys-
tems  
Production of ID-cards Successful collaboration. 
Applied for P. 
Employment↑ 
Productivity↑ 
Product range↑ 
Turnover↑ 
Profit margin↑ 
  +Production cap. Previous collabora-
tion. Company was 
set up to get fund-
ing. New product. 
 
START-UP FACILITIES 
№ Sector Main objective Current situation Positive 
changes 
Negative 
changes 
Derived & unin-
tended effects 
TC changes AOB 
S20 Jewellery  Increased quality and de-
sign 
Successful collaboration. Productivity↑ 
Product range↑ 
Employment↓  +Production cap. 
 
Company has lim-
ited space. Hence it 
is difficult to expand 
production. 
S21 Wood  Production of plywood Formally ongoing, but 
will end soon. 
NA NA NA NA Wrong equipment. 
Gh. partner pulls out 
S22 Paving 
blocks  
Increase product range and 
quality 
Successful collaboration. Productivity↑ 
Product quality↑ 
Product range↑ 
Employment↓ 
No profit 
Running with a loss +Production cap. The partners have 
decided to stop due 
to disparities in size. 
S23 Graphic de-
sign  
In-house pre-press and 
printing 
Successful collaboration. Productivity↑ 
Product quality↑ 
Product range↑ 
Profit margin↑ 
Employment↓ Inputs are imported +Production cap. 
+Linkage cap. 
Gh. partner has not 
enough money to 
expand 
S24 Digital maps  Production of aerial pho-
tos and digital maps 
Numerous problems, but 
still collaboration on a 
project-basis. 
Employment↑  Has learned to deal with 
int. partners 
+Investment cap. Previous collabora-
tion. Management at 
Dk has changed 
S25 Paper  Import of high quality pa-
per for № S23 
Basically a subsidiary to 
№ S23 
Employment↑  Market has expanded 
due to knowledge of 
other PSDP partners 
 Previous collabora-
tion. Company Set 
up to get funding. 
S26 Dairy prod-
ucts  
Production of yoghurt Successful collaboration. 
Company was virtually 
bankrupt when the SU 
started 
Employment↑ 
Productivity↑ 
Product quality↑ 
Product range↑ 
Turnover↑ 
Profit margin↑ 
  +Production cap. 
+Linkage cap. 
Prepares a feasibil-
ity study for a P. 
S27 Fruit juices  Production of orange con-
centrate 
The coll. is about to 
stop. Dispute btw. part-
ners. Hardly any produc-
tion takes place 
Product range↑ Employment↓ 
No profit 
Buys barrels from a 
PSDP company instead 
of MNC 
+Linkage cap. World market 
prices↓ Difficulties 
finding raw material 
 
   
Appendix C: Interview guide 
 
Date: 
Location: 
Informant (Mr/Mrs): 
Occupation: 
 
1. BACKGROUND DATA 
? Name of enterprise: 
? Established (year): 
? Address: 
? Ownership structure: 
? Type and date of Partnership / Start-up facility: 
 
General Manager/owner: 
? Name: 
? Age (approx.): 
? Educational background: 
? Ethnic background (local, local non-African, foreign): 
? Former management experience: 
? Manager/owner of other enterprises: 
 
Danish partner: 
? Name of enterprise: 
? How did you get in contact with the Danish partner?  
 
 
 
? When: 
 
 
? Where: 
 
 
Brief description of firm activities: 
 1st year of operation Date of partner-
ship/Start-up 
Present situation 
   
   
   
Products 
   
Capacity utilisation (%)    
Domestic market share 
(%) 
   
Salaried employees F/M F M F M F M 
Unsalaried employees  F M F M F M 
 
 
   
2. THE PRODUCTS 
 Description  Main market (local/ 
national/international 
(South vs. North)) 
Main competitors 
(Ghanaian/MNC 
small- /large-scale)
Inputs (lo-
cal/ foreign) 
Sub-
suppliers 
Product#1  
 
    
Product#2  
 
    
Product#3 
 
     
Product#4 
 
     
 
Changes due to collaboration w/Danish partner: 
? Range (new products) 
 
 
 
 
? Quantity 
 
 
 
 
? Price (compared to domestic competitors/foreign competitors) 
 
 
 
? Quality (compared to domestic competitors/foreign competitors) 
 
 
 
? Market share  
 
 
 
How do you perceive your products compared to competing products (now and then)? 
 
 
 
 
   
3. TECHNOLOGY/MACHINES  
 
A brief characterization of the technology used in the enterprise (including technology 
transfer) 
 
 Description Date of 
purchase 
Origin 
(new/ 
second 
hand) 
As part of 
collabora-
tion 
Labour 
intensity 
Subse-
quent 
altera-
tions 
Machine#1  
 
     
Machine#2  
 
     
Machine#3 
 
      
Machine#4 
 
      
Which factors have influenced the choice of new technology? 
 
 
 
Have you had any problems with the machines (operation, complexity, inadequate training, main-
tenance, repair, component supply)? 
 
 
 
Who was in charge of the implementation and adaptation of the new technologies? 
? Scrutiny of needs 
? Investigation of market 
? Appropriateness of technology in relation to: 
o Products produced 
o Demand of the market  
o Available inputs (domestic/foreign) 
o Labour employed (qualifications) 
? Labour intensity (effects on the size of the employed workforce) 
? Maintenance of new machines 
o Who (in-house vs. hired technicians) 
o How often 
o Availability of spare parts 
o Costs 
o Effects on overall productivity (delays due to breakdowns) 
 
How does the new technology/machines affect: 
? The level of productivity? 
? The types of products? 
? The quality of the products? 
? The daily routines? 
? The composition of the workforce (see below)? 
 
   
4. PRODUCTION PROCESS   
(A description of the different step in the production process). 
 
Please give me an overview of the changes that have occurred in the production process due to the 
collaboration with XX.  
? Use of quality control in the different step of the work process 
 
 
? Change of daily routines 
 
 
? Change in the amount of goods stocked 
 
 
? Altering responsibilities 
 
 
 
 
5. PRODUCTIVITY 
How has the collaboration influenced the level of productivity in the company? 
 
 
 
Please describe the effects of the new machines/equipment? 
 
 
…of new knowledge? 
 
 
…of new organisation processes? 
 
 
Which factors do you ascribe the economic changes in the company 
? Product quality, 
? Competition (domestic/import),  
? Alternative products,  
? Purchasing power,  
? Marketing,  
? Government policies 
 
 
   
6. THE EMPLOYEES  
Further portrayal incl.f/m Edu. background Subject of quali-
fica. 
Prev. work experie. 
Owner#1     
Owner#2     
Manager#1     
Manager#2     
Expatriate     
Prior to the collaboration Present situation Administrative & 
operative personnel F Salary M Salary F Salary M Salary 
Total         
Family members         
Non-family         
Permanent         
Casual         
        
        
        
Skilled 
MA, BSc 
Technical degree 
Vocational          
        
        
Semi-skilled  
Apprenticeship 
Informal apprentice.
        
        
        
        
Unskilled 
Secondary 
Primary 
None 
        
 
Reasons for change/difference: 
 
   
7. TRAINING 
How much training has your company received in connection with the collaboration with the Dan-
ish partner? 
 
 
 
? How many employees have been sent to Denmark? 
o Who? 
o For how long? 
o What was the main focus of the training programme in Denmark? 
 
 
 
? How many Danish employees have been here? 
o Who? 
o For how long? 
o What was the main focus of this part of the training? 
 
 
 
 
How do you perceive the training in relation to the actual need of the company? 
 
 
? to the new machines 
 
 
? to the new administrative routines 
 
 
 
? to the new organisational structure 
 
 
 
Have you lost any employees following the initiation of the collaboration? 
 
? Why? 
? Who? 
o Trained or not? 
o Skilled vs. unskilled (specify)? 
 
 
 
? What do they do now? 
o Unemployed 
o Started own business 
o Working for a rival company (Private vs. public / Ghanaian vs. foreign) 
 
 
   
8. COSTS COMPOSITION 
 Prior to the collaboration Present situation 
Salary   
Energy   
Raw materials   
Intermediate goods   
Machines   
Sales and Marketing   
Other 
 
  
 
 
9. ADMINISTRATIVE AND MANAGERIAL ROUTINES 
Management 
 
Changing responsibilities 
 
 
 
Changing authorities 
 
 
 
Administrative system  
 
Changing responsibilities 
 
 
 
Changing authorities 
 
 
 
Description of changes within the following areas: 
? Accounting 
 
 
? Training & supervision 
 
 
? Marketing 
 
 
 
? Planning 
 
 
? Purchasing 
 
 
   
10. LINKAGES 
Prior to the collaboration Present situation Inputs for the 
production Local % Imported (S/N)% Local % Imported (S/N)% 
Raw material#1     
Raw material#2     
Intermediate good     
Intermediate good     
 
 
Sub-suppliers Prior to the collaboration Present situation 
 Description Firm location Size Firm location Size 
Input#1      
Input#2      
Input#3      
Input#4      
 
Please elaborate on the role of suppliers/sub-contractors after the initiation of a partnership with 
XX. 
 
? Changing demands on  
o Quality (ISO 9000 regulations for export to the European market) 
o Standardisation 
o Regularity 
o Price 
o Environmental procedures 
o Safety 
 
 
 
? Effect on which suppliers are used (local vs. foreign) vs. upgrading of suppliers 
 
 
 
Customers  
Who are the customers of your products?  
 
 
 
How has the collaboration with the Danish partner influenced the composition of the customers? 
? Local, regional, national or international market 
? Segment of population (income) 
? Retail vs. wholesale 
 
Effects on marketing strategies? 
 
Membership of business organisations: 
? Chambers of Commerce 
? Ghana-Denmark Business Club 
? Empretec 
? Association of Ghana Industries 
? Others 
   
10. THE COLLABORATION WITH THE DANISH PARTNER 
How and when did you get in contact with your Danish partner? 
 
 
 
Have you had any experience with foreign partners before? 
? Who/when/focus? 
? Part of a donor programme? 
 
 
 
Do you know of any other business collaborations within the PSD-programme? 
? Which/how? 
 
 
 
How do you perceive the collaboration with the Danish partner? 
 
 
 
Besides the changes mentioned above, has the collaboration brought anything else along with it? 
 
 
 
11. THE COLLABORATION WITH DANIDA (THE DANISH EMBASSY IN ACCRA) 
Please, describe the different phases of the collaboration with Danida 
 
? First contact 
 
 
 
? Knowledge of the PSD-programme 
 
 
 
? TechChange 
 
 
 
? Support from the embassy 
 
 
Agency Programme Main objective Secondary purpose  Key policy instruments Target Groups Level (scale) 
Private Sector De-
velopment Pro-
gramme (PSDP) 
Contribute to sustain-
able economic and 
social development 
Respond to private sec-
tor demands 
Business to business partner-
ships 
Private companies National (micro) 
Business Sector 
Support Programme 
Do Improve business envi-
ronment and trade op-
portunities 
Technical assistance Public and private insti-
tutions in Ghana 
Interna-
tional/national  
(macro & meso) 
Danida 
Industrial Fund for 
Developing Coun-
tries  
Promote FDI  
Enhance social and 
economic progress 
Return on investments Share capital to JVs between 
Danish and developing country 
based companies 
PSDP partners National (micro) 
Ghana Regional 
Appropriate Tech-
nologies Industrial 
Services (GRATIS) 
Promote grass-root in-
dustrialisation through 
access to credit, and 
improved profitability 
Spread of suitable technologies GRATIS National (meso) 
Ghana Credit Un-
ion  
Improve Credit Union 
feasibility 
Training & technical support Financial sector National (meso) 
Enterprise Support 
Services 
Increase number of vi-
able companies 
Business development services 
for SMEs 
SMEs National (micro) 
CESO Private sec-
tor Partnership 
Increase number of vi-
able companies 
Volunteer advisors MSMEs National (meso and 
micro) 
CIDA1
Canada Youth Field 
Pro-poor economic 
growth and improved 
standards of living 
 Exchange of students Canadian and Ghanaian 
students 
 
Promotion of the 
Private Sector 
Improve investment cli-
mate, promote invest-
ments and trade be-
tween Ghana and Ger-
many, and enhance ex-
ports of non-traditional 
goods to Europe 
Policy dialogue, advisory ser-
vices, institution building and 
promotion of companies. 
Human resource development, 
vocational training, technology 
transfer, financial services, and 
infrastructure 
German and European 
firms plus affiliated 
companies in develop-
ing countries  
Interna-
tional/national 
(macro, meso and 
micro) 
GTZ (Pri-
vate-Public 
Partner-
ship) 
Promotion of mi-
cro- and small en-
terprises 
Enhance economic 
growth through job 
creation and transfer 
of knowledge and 
technology.  
 Increase number of vi-able MSEs 
Support and establish support 
and advisory services for the 
MSEs 
Executed through the 
Ministry of Trade and 
Industry and the Bank 
of Ghana. 
National (meso and 
micro) 
A
ppendix D
: PSD
 interventions in G
hana, 2004 
                                                 
1 CIDA’s emphasis is currently changing. Hitherto, focus has been placed on developing new policy instruments to support the private sector in Ghana. However, in the future this 
will be phased out. Instead, private sector development will be included in CIDA’s other programmes, e.g. the governance programme will also seek to promote investments in the 
private sector and human needs programme will aim to include the private sector in water and food security components.  
 
Programme for Co-
operation with 
Emerging Markets2 
(PSOM) 
Poverty reduction by 
supporting sustainable 
economic development 
Technical assistance, hardware 
supply and installation, mar-
keting and training 
National (micro) Dutch Devel-
opment Co-
operation 
Agency 
Development Re-
lated Export Trans-
actions Programme 
(ORET) 
Assistance to trade and 
industry in developing 
countries 
Encourage trade and in-
vestment relationships be-
tween Dutch and local 
companies  
Financial support for invest-
ments that are not commer-
cially viable and that have a 
positive impact on employ-
ment or environment 
Dutch companies in-
vesting in Ghana in co-
operation with a Ghana-
ian SME.  
 
National (micro) 
USAID Trade and Invest-
ment programme 
Broad-based sustainable 
economic growth 
Boost the non-traditional 
export sector 
Address policy change 
Improvement of production 
and marketing practices 
Agricultural producers 
mostly small-scale 
International/national 
(macro and meso) 
Dfid Ghana Business 
Linkages Challenge 
Fund (G-BLCF) 
To assist businesses to 
enhance competitiveness 
and thereby, generate 
benefits for the poor. 
Encourage linkages that  
-improve export perform-
ance. 
-strengthen the competi-
tiveness of domestic pro-
ducers. 
-lead to improvements in 
the business climate. 
Support formation of viable 
business linkages by enter-
prises in Ghana with each 
other and/or with regional and 
international partners  
Private enterprises and 
associations hereof. 
National (meso and 
micro) 
JICA3 Technical coopera-
tion 
Social and economic de-
velopment 
Respond to private sector 
demands 
Technical training and dis-
patch of experts 
 National (micro) 
UNDP Private Sector Pro-
motion Programme 
Create employment and 
wealth to overcome pov-
erty 
Strengthen institutional 
and technical capacity of 
private sector  
Capacity building, export de-
velopment, and advocacy 
Ministry for Private 
Sector Development, 
Business associations, 
vulnerable women and 
the youth. 
National (macro and 
meso) 
                                                 
2 PSOM is implemented by the Agency for International Business Cooperation (EVD) in the Netherlands. 
3 JICA is currently preparing a framework for supporting the private sector in Ghana. Based on the experience from other countries we should expect the programme to focus exclu-
sively on the micro-scale.  
 
Enterprise Support 
Service (ESS) 
Upgrade capacities of 
SMEs 
Assist entrepreneurs to ob-
tain financing 
Accounting and marketing as-
sistance and product im-
provements 
SMEs  National (micro) 
Business Advisory 
Services (BAS)4
Enhance Ghanaian Con-
sultancy capacity 
Provide consultancy servi-
ces for entrepreneurs 
Educate local consultants Consultants National (micro) 
African Pro-
ject Devel-
opment Facil-
ity (Apdf) 
Micro and SME 
Initiative 
Upgrade capacities of 
MSMEs 
Improve business climate Establishment of SME Solu-
tions Centres to improve ac-
cess to information and fi-
nance 
MSMEs National (meso and 
micro) 
Ghana Trade and 
Investment Project 
Accelerate export-led 
growth 
Attract export oriented in-
vestors 
Reform of legislative and in-
centive structures 
Tema harbour 
Private sector 
National (macro) World Bank5
Private Investment Enhance economic 
growth 
Reduce poverty 
Public sector reform Tax policy, public expendi-
ture, administrative and civil 
service reform 
Public sector National (macro) 
IFC 
With UNDP 
African Training 
and Management 
Services Project 
Improve the competitive-
ness of African compa-
nies 
Train local staff for man-
agement succession 
Company analysis, recruit-
ment of managers, subsidizing 
part of manager’s salary, and 
assessment of skill gaps 
SMEs with growth po-
tential 
National (micro) 
Finance sector National (meso) Support of small- 
and medium-scale 
investments6
Economic growth Long-term finance to pro-
mote private sector devel-
opment 
Global loans and equity in-
vestments Industrial enterprises National (micro) 
Infrastructure Enhanced infrastructure Private participation in 
public enterprises 
 Railways, water supply 
and power transmission 
National (macro) 
European In-
vestment 
Bank (EIB) 
Large projects Increased value-added Support of key sectors Direct funding Agro-industry, mining 
and tourism 
National (micro) 
UNCDF7 MicroStart Ghana 
Programme 
Build institutional capac-
ity in the micro finance 
sector 
Enhance sustainability of 
financial services to the 
poor 
Under formulation Micro finance institu-
tions 
National (macro and 
meso) 
 
                                                 
4 The ESS and the BAS were merged in 2001 in order to provide a more comprehensive approach to business development in Ghana. 
5 The choice of two Word Bank programmes may seem arbitrary as PSD is seen as the key strategy to eradicate poverty in the World Bank (Schulpen and Gibbon 2001). 
6 The programme has not been very successful. Until 1995 EIB was unable to find suitable intermediaries for investments and thus, EIB chose to focus on the non-banking sector. 
From 1995-2000 EIB managed to award two loans and in 2000 EIB awarded the first two loans to the financial sector in Ghana. 
7 At present, UNDCF is altering its strategies. Hitherto, the MicroStart Ghana Programme has had a double objective, i.e. to strengthen institutional capacity in micro finance institu-
tions and provide financial services to the poor. Since the beginning of the 2nd phase of the programme in 2003, focus has changed. Now it will take a sector-wide approach instead 
of the individual approach pursued up till now. 
